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1 Introduction
Language is a complex system that consists of atomic units called morph-
emes. These units can be combined in the form of structured entities called
sentences. There are two main sorts of words: singular terms and predic-
ates. While the former refer to individual objects, the latter refer to sets
thereof. Words mean something by virtue of referring. Sentences mean
something by virtue of expressing truths and falsehoods.
Something along these lines is the orthodox view in formal semantics
and the mainstream opinion conveyed in contemporary philosophy of lan-
guage textbooks. The main thesis of this book is that this view is essentially
wrong-headed. The opposite view to the above approach is usage-based
semantics. This book explains why current strands in empirical research
undermine formal semantic theories.
Classications always imply simplications. I take it that one quite plaus-
ible divide in the area of philosophical approaches to meaning is along the
lines of ‘truth-conditional vs usage-based’. In the following chapters, I shall
therefore present the current debate in philosophy guided by this distinc-
tion. Truth-conditional semantics is the orthodox view in philosophy in
two distinct respects. There are many explicit adherents of this research
tradition, most notably Emma Borg, Ernest Lepore, and Kirk Ludwig.1 But
then there are even more people who are implicitly committed to this view
or related views. Although it is hard to prove this point, usage-based se-
mantics is probably the minority view in current philosophy of language.
The currently by far most inuential usage-based philosopher is Paul Hor-
wich. Much of this book is inspired by his 1998 book Meaning.
The main thesis of the present book is that current empirical research
in linguistics clearly suggests that philosophical semantics should be pur-
1 Among the historically most inuential scholars in that area are people like Gottlob
Frege, Richard Montague, and Bertrand Russell.
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sued on a usage-based basis.2 In the empirical disciplines, the research
paradigm of construction grammar has gained more and more popularity
recently—especially in the area of language acquisition, language evolu-
tion, and grammar theory.3 The idea of construction grammar is that all
dierent kinds of linguistic information can be represented in a common
format: constructions. That is, from words to complex phrases to syntactic
structures, everything might be a construction, where a construction is,
roughly speaking, a pairing of form and meaning. Up to now, there has
been no satisfying account that could serve as a philosophical underpin-
ning of construction grammar. This is the main reason for the existence of
this book.
Construction grammar has quite a few features that are highly relevant
from a philosophical perspective. The most important ones are: (i) con-
struction grammar suggests that there is no clear-cut divide between se-
mantics and pragmatics; (ii) furthermore, it suggests that semantics can’t
be pursued formally; (iii) it suggests that a theory of meaning should be
part of a theory of communication, and not the other way around; (iv) it
suggests that pragmatics is by far more relevant for the study of semantics
than the reverse.
Construction grammar is a movement in which a variety of disciplines
are involved, among them semantics, developmental psychology, conver-
sational analysis, anthropology, and psycholinguistics. The general tend-
encies that I just cited apply universally to all strands of ‘construction
grammar’, although, to be sure, many dierent theories sail under this ag.
There is not just one construction grammar but many dierent theories that
go by this name. Still, for most philosophical concerns these dierences are
irrelevant. More importantly, the unifying characteristic as regards philo-
sophy is that they are all incompatible with the mainstream view, i.e. with
truth-conditional semantics.
2 I shall lay out in detail in 2.2.1 why certain developments in linguistics can impose re-
strictions on what a corresponding philosophical theory should look like.
3 Which, to be sure, is far from saying that construction grammar is universally accepted
in these areas, or even accepted by the majority of linguists. The only thing I am saying
here is that there is a signicant increase in popularity of the constructionist paradigm
in linguistics; and that this is a fact philosophy of language should respond to.
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Accordingly, this book explains why—in view of the evidence provided
by theorists working within a constructionist research framework—truth-
conditional semantics is awed in that most varieties of construction gram-
mar clearly work on the assumption that their relevant semantics are usage-
based. It also explains why established usage-based approaches to meaning
à la Horwich are incapable of providing the philosophical underpinning of
construction grammar. Last but not least, this book provides an alternative
theory framework that is capable of providing such an underpinning in the
required sense.
1.1 Structure of the Book
This book has three parts. The rst part, ‘Meaning’, is an extended review
of the state of the art. Chapter 2 gives a general overview of some of the
most important theories of meaning on the market. This chapter serves
as a backdrop for the whole discussion. I shall show in this chapter that
the notion ‘meaning’ can serve all sorts of dierent purposes. Moreover,
my main aim here is to demonstrate that (philosophical) semantics is best
o if it begins by observing actual practice in the empirical disciplines, and
by ‘incorporating’ their actual results. The following two chapters provide
overviews of usage-based approaches to meaning and of truth-conditional
semantics. Both chapters include critical remarks. In the chapter on usage-
based theories, these remarks concern Horwich’s identication of ‘use prop-
erties’ with ‘acceptance properties’, which I will explain in due course. This
strategy of identifying ‘use properties’ with something else, namely accept-
ance, has some undesirable consequences. The most important one is that
the restriction to acceptance properties implies accompanying restrictions
in the classes of words that are covered by the semantic theory; i.e. that
such a theory is, in eect, limited to descriptions of words that contribute
truth-evaluable content. In the chapter on truth-conditional semantics, the
focus lies on Davidson’s ‘psychological’ argument that the learnability of
natural languages suggests that semantic knowledge is based on the know-
ledge of recursively dened rules. These rules, which operate on word
meaning, are supposed to explain why languages are learnable in the rst
place. I show that the crucial decit of this argument is that research in lan-
15
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guage acquisition indicates that just the opposite is true: during language
learning, hearers understand syntactically ‘complex’ expressions without
parsing their underlying structure.
I present my own view in part two and three. The second part, ‘Dis-
position’, consists of chapters 5 and 6, the rst of which directly links to
the critical discussion of Davidson. My main point here is that two dis-
tinct issues often get mixed up in the literature.4 One is the phenomenon
that people seem to understand sentences that they have not encountered
before. The other issue is compositionality. I argue that keeping both is-
sues apart helps seeing what is going on in language acquisition. Chapter
6 is highly relevant for the rest of the book. There, I defend the view that
one should clearly distinguish between the metaphysical basis of meaning5
and adequate semantic descriptions that try to ‘capture’ this basis. Many
serious counterarguments against usage-based semantics can be disarmed
by showing that the notion of ‘meaning’ that they apply oscillates between
these two readings. I argue that the most appropriate semantic descriptions
are dispositional analyses.
The third part of the book is entitled ‘Method’ and contains my meth-
odological convictions that shine through at several points throughout the
book. Chapter 7 contains important background assumptions, most not-
ably my arguments for why philosophical theories of meaning should strive
at compatibility with relevant theories of language acquisition. Construc-
tionist theories of language acquisition are usage-based, which lends fur-
ther support to the idea that philosophical semantics should be pursued
usage-based as well. Chapter 8, then, is an argument to the eect that
tokens (as opposed to types) play a central role in any usage-based theory
4 The least I would defend here is that many people, even if they do not literally conate
the two notions, they still tend to think that it goes without saying that compositionality
is the only reasonable option you could possibly think of for explaining learnability of
natural languages. And that suggestion, I think, comes too soon.
5 When it comes to semantic theories in philosophy, we are typically dealing with theor-
ies devoted to the ‘reductionist programme’, i.e. theories that try to answer the question:
by virtue of which underlying—more basic—properties do natural language expressions
have the semantic properties that they de facto have? In this sense, theories of this sort
try to ‘reduce’ higher-order properties (the semantic ones) to some lower-order prop-
erties in a systematic way. So when I talk about ‘metaphysical basis’, I typically mean
these lower-order properties that serve as one’s reduction base.
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of meaning. Thus, in this chapter my focus lies in explaining why this is, in
eect, a virtue of usage-based theories, and how token-based theory frame-
works can cope with the most relevant counter-objections. In particular, I
explain why token-based theories of meaning are well-designed to handle
meaning shifts, i.e. long-term developments of word semantics. Chapter 9
concludes my discussion and gives a short summary.
1.2 Terminological Preliminaries
Given that this book is primarily dealing with language, it seems reason-
able to state the applicable terminological and notational conventions at
the very beginning. Throughout the book, I use double quotation marks
(“apple”) whenever I mention a word or phrase. I use single quotation
marks (‘apple’) for basically four purposes: (i) quotations in the text that
are not indented; (ii) mixed quotations in which a phrase is mentioned and
used at the same time; (iii) gurative use of particular words or phrases;
(iv) paraphrases of meaning (“apple” means ‘apple’). I did not align the use
of my quotation marks in quotes with my own system, in particular I left
single quotation marks that indicate metalanguage in American English
untouched. Note, though, that this deviates from the standard applied in
the rest of this book. I use quasi-quotation (p appleq) where appropriate. I
use small caps to denote concepts; in contrast to capital letters (APPLE),
which were only employed in the discussion of Horwich’s so-called capit-
alisation convention, which I will explain later on. Italics are solely used
for emphasis. Here and there I indicate talk of propositions by use of angle
brackets (“<apples are green>” abbreviates “(the proposition) that apples
are green”).
For sake of simplicity, I talk about the meaning of words most of the time
(rather than sentences, phrases, morphemes, syntactic structures, and so
on). Generally, most considerations apply to words and sentences alike.6
6 For the simple reason that I do not mean to discuss the semantics of specic expressions,
be they words or sentences or whatever, but rather the philosophy behind specic theory
frameworks. In this respect, I am concerned with whether there is evidence in linguistics
or psychology, for example, that may support or, alternatively, undermine a particular
approach. But I am not particularly interested in whether that evidence is established on
the basis of a discussion of words, or on the basis of a discussion of sentences.
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I tend to use the terms “semantics” and “theory of meaning” interchange-
ably. The term “sentence” usually denotes sentence types, whereas I re-
serve the term “type of sentence” for types of sentence (declaratives, in-
terrogatives, imperatives, etc.). The term “use theory” exclusively denotes
Horwich’s theory of meaning; all other usage-based theories of meaning
(both in philosophy and in linguistics) are called “usage-based theories”.
For most parts of the book, I use “context of utterance” only to denote Ka-
planian contexts comprising speaker, place, and time. In contrast, I use the
phrase “conversational context” as a neutral term for contexts of utterance
that may also include contextual features beyond these three variables: e.g.
cotext7, common ground, world knowledge, and so forth.
7 The cotext of an expression is its immediate linguistic surrounding (Catford 1965). For
a given word, for instance, the corresponding sentence in which that word is embedded
belongs to its cotext.
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Meaning
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2 Meaning: Primary, Pragmatic,
and Others
This chapter serves two purposes: rstly, it introduces the idea that mean-
ing statements—i.e. statements of the form “x means y”—can be conceived
as descriptions. Descriptions that are such that, relative to a given back-
ground theory, they illuminate the role a specic word plays in a particu-
lar language. The discussion of this idea is an excellent backdrop against
which I can give an overview of established theories of meaning. The basic
idea of this overview is not to argue for a particular position, but rather to
get to grips with the massive variety of possible approaches in the eld of
semantics. Secondly, it gives a rough overview on construction grammar
(CxG, henceforth). In particular, I will introduce those aspects of CxG that
are especially relevant to philosophical theories of meaning (rather than for
semantics per se). That is to say, my main emphasis here lies on (i) show-
ing that CxG fosters the decline of a sharp boundary between semantics
and pragmatics and on (ii) showing how CxG ts with modern theories of
language acquisition. These two points are particularly relevant as they
lend support to a broadly usage-based approach to meaning, despite the
prevailing success of formal theories in philosophical semantics.
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into two sections. In the rst section
(2.1), I will be dealing with meaning statements in general. Besides giving
an overview of semantic theories, in this section I propose to take a liberal
stance toward meaning statements; a topic that I take up again in the third
part of this book. Also, I give a rst overview on compositionality, because
compositionality will become quite important in later chapters in the dis-
cussion of truth-conditional semantics. In the second section (2.2), I give
an overview on CxG. In this section, I also briey introduce the notion of
multimodality, as compositionality is an aspect of language that CxG seems
particularly well suited to cope with.
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2.1 Meaning Statements are Descriptions
All sorts of theories get labelled ‘theories of meaning’ or ‘semantic theory’.
The purpose of this section is to give an overview on how varied the eld of
semantics actually is. By doing this, I propose to conceive of all semantic
statements—statements of the form “x means y”—as descriptions. More
precisely, I shall argue that semantic statements describe that particular
set of knowledge concerning a particular linguistic item that a competent
natural-language user associates with this item. This indeed quite general
characterisation of “meaning” will serve as something like an ‘outer bound-
ary’, if you like. That is to say, all actual semantic statements are, in fact,
descriptions.1 But something else must be added to a proper characterisa-
tion of “meaning” in order to sort out inappropriate descriptions. Framing
such an ‘inner boundary’, then, will be the task of later chapters.
1 Prima facie, this seems to be in stark contrast to what people like Lewis think semantics
does actually (Lewis 1970, e.g. p. 18). Although I would tend to think that there is a funda-
mental dierence between treating ‘meanings’ as entities and treating them as something
else, I would argue that the claim that all semantic statements are descriptions is well justi-
ed, despite that dierence. The reason is that—see 6.2—I distinguish between semantic
descriptions and their respective justications. In that sense, even Lewis, who thinks
that ‘genuinely semantic relations [. . . are] relations between symbols and the world of
non-symbols’ and that semantics (in his sense of the term) is a ‘description of possible
languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated
with aspects of the world’ (1970, 19), eectively oers some sort of description when it
comes to semantic statements. No matter what semantic statements describe (use, refer-
ence relations, or something else) and no matter how they do it (specically for individual
terms, or rather generically for types of terms), they all, at least, describe what ‘meaning’
is, from their perspective. For Lewis, the meanings of names can generically described
thus:
[A] meaning for a name is something that determines what thing, if any,
the name names in various possible states of aair, at various times, and so
on. [. . .A]n appropriate intension for a name is any function from indices
to things [. . . ]. (1970, 23)
Accordingly, in line with that view, what I call ‘constitutive basis’ further below is not
use, but rather a certain symbol–world relation. And that is what legitimises a certain
semantic statement, or not. Be that as it may, the dierences between dierent semantics
concern only their justicatory bases, not their way of describing relationships between
certain linguistic units (e.g. words) and some other things (e.g. things).
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In line with established practice in linguistics and philosophy, I need
to note right at the beginning that in the following I will presuppose the
fundamental distinction between literal and non-literal meaning. Thus, for
a large part of this book, I will presuppose that there is some theoretically
relevant dierence between, say, “There is no milk in the fridge” meaning
‘that there is no milk in the fridge’ and ‘that there is no more milk to drink
available in the fridge’. Although, eventually, one of the main aims of this
book is to show that this strict distinction is unjustied, it makes sense
to take it for granted in the following overview. Because, rstly, it is a
common assumption in all relevant semantic theories anyway; accordingly,
presenting an overview in line with the distinction seems required. And,
secondly, literal meaning is theoretically relevant in several respects (e.g. in
explaining metaphors); so there is independent reason to equip the theory
framework that I will present in the course of this book with a theoretic
notion that is capable of explaining non-literality.
As just indicated, one major position to be defended in the chapters
below is that it is not entirely unproblematic to assume that semantics
should be dealing solely with literal meaning, i.e. context-free, formally
speciable meaning. Rather, semantics should be viewed as an enterprise
that involves far more elements from (traditional) pragmatics than usually
assumed. This view is motivated mainly by some recent developments in
linguistics, in particular in grammar theory (CxG) and language evolution
(Tomasello’s programme)2. Both will be explained at length later on. The
notion “literal meaning” has quite a few cognates in the literature, among
them “lexical”, “stable”, “rst”, “semantic”, “invariant”, and “conventional”.
The conceptual dierences between these notions, if any, are not relevant
for my present purposes though. Just to avoid confusion, I will stick to
“primary meaning” in the following. In a rst step, I will present the way
pragmatic meaning is typically conceived in the literature, i.e. in terms of
reference relations. In a second step, I propose a rened denition of the
2 One of the readers of this chapter reminded me of the fact that this paradigm is not
entirely uncontroversial. Yes, but what is? Moreover, what, I take it, is relatively uncon-
troversial is that within the last decade, Tomasello’s approach to language acquisition
gained signicant popularity within the relevant scientic community. This should be
enough of a starting point for a philosophical theory that is supposed to correspond to
the developments taking place in the empirical disciplines.
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term that ts better with my demands. For reasons that will emerge later,
I will dub the counterpart “pragmatic meaning” (instead of “non-literal” or
“derived”).
Primary meaning as a theoretical notion is essentially needed to account
for a variety of important, systematic linguistic eects such as irony, slip of
the tongue, etc. In this chapter, I will argue for a liberal stance on meaning
in general. Note that the qualication “literal” (or its equivalent) is often
omitted in the literature in otherwise unambiguous contexts, which is to
say that the following remarks apply primarily to ‘meaning statements’
that deal specically with primary meaning in my sense of the term. Yet,
since my plan is to omit ordinary primary meaning altogether (by pro-
posing a new denition of the term that is capable of fullling the task of
accounting for eects such as irony, slip of the tongue, etc.), it seems nat-
ural to take one step at a time. I begin with a general overview on meaning
statements; after this I then turn to issues that are particularly relevant for
primary meaning.
2.1.1 What is Meaning and What is It Good For?
For the task at hand, I understand “meaning” provisionally as follows (fur-
ther qualications in due course): the meaning of a word is a description
of what competent language users typically associate with this word, i.e. a
description of how they understand the term in question. This denition
only serves the purpose of motivating a great deal of examples and will be
specied later on. Prototypical examples of meaning statements are lex-
icon entries. Lexicon entries reformulate or paraphrase, in more common
terms, what a competent speaker associates with a given word. The mean-
ing of a sentence, then, would be a description of what competent language
users typically associate with this sentence, a description that is often sys-
tematically dependent on (primary) meanings of sub-sentential parts and
syntactic structure.3
3 See also the sections on compositionality (2.1.3 and 5.2.3).
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I shall rst clarify this denition step by step. What is a description? A
description is any paraphrase of a given word (or sentence)4 that helps
illuminating how a competent speaker understands this word. ‘Under-
standing a term’, in turn, means implicitly knowing how to use this term
(Horwich 1998, 16–18). Descriptions are paraphrases of a given word by
any person or institution that enjoys authority concerning the relevant
language: for instance, lexicons, linguists, native speakers, etc. Here is
an example: “church service”, for example, means ‘a formalized period of
communal worship’5. Now assume the following: Mary asks Peter: “Peter,
what is a church service?” Peter replies: “A church service is a formal-
ised period of communal worship.” Assume further that Mary understands
“formalised”, “period”, “communal”, and “worship”, and the relevant syn-
tactic structure (copula sentence).6 In the terminology that I adopt here,
this amounts to saying that she implicitly knows how to use the terms
(i.e. how to apply them and how they are actually used by other mem-
bers of her linguistic community). Relative to these assumptions, Mary
understands “church service” after having heard Peter’s instructions. His
description was illuminating—as, in fact, any other description would have
been that would have had the same eect in Mary. In general, a description
of the meaning of a given term is correct if it enables an otherwise com-
petent speaker to know how this term is used in the respective language
community. Conversely, if the latter is already known (which is the more
interesting case in linguistics), a given description is correct if, and only if,
it accords with this prior knowledge. In this way, meaning statements, var-
ied as they are in practice, are all alike in that their adequacy necessarily
hinges on whether they accord with prior knowledge concerning use.
4 For sake of brevity, I omit reference to sentences in the following. In many cases it
will be clear in which way explanations for words can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to
sentences. Whenever there are potential ambiguities, I will explicitly mention them.
5 Entry ‘Church service’, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Church_service, accessed on: 28/02/2013.
6 Please note that the line of argument that follows takes Paul Horwich’s notion of ‘un-
derstanding’ for granted, including his justication. This notion is controversial. In par-
ticular, people question Horwich’s view on implicit knowledge (Fodor & Lepore 2002,
ch. 3, pp. 43–62). Thus, my argument hinges on the success of Horwich’s.
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All this, to be sure, is about knowing-how.7 In line with Horwich’s ap-
proach, I assume that when Mary learns how to use “church service”, she
is not (necessarily) in a position to declare what this knowledge is. She is
not (necessarily) able to tell in which situations “church service” would be
applicable, for instance. Rather, her knowledge, if any, consists in her abil-
ity to apply “church service” in a way that is suciently similar to the way
other competent speakers of English would use it. Nothing over and above
this ability is required in order to be justied in ascribing understanding
to Mary. In other words, learning the meaning of “church service” is, in
important respects, more like learning to ski (knowing-how) than learning
that green is a colour (knowing-that). This is even more important when it
comes to syntactic knowledge, which is typically not available to language
users in such a way that they could actually declare what their (syntactic)
knowledge consists in.
So far I have talked rather naïvely about someone’s knowing how to ap-
ply a given term. Even if we agree that this kind of knowledge is implicit,
there is still a certain degree of controversy regarding how to narrow it
down any further. Following Wittgenstein’s terminology, knowledge con-
cerning the use of a term is often conceived of in terms of the relevant rules
that supposedly ‘guide’ one’s use. Again, the nature and status of rules is
highly controversial.8 I bracket this issue here (and elaborate further in
3.1.2). Let me just stress that the implicit knowledge that constitutes a sub-
ject S’s understanding of a word “w” is just that kind of knowledge that
manifests itself in specic, systematic, behavioural patterns of S towards
occurrences of “w”.
I propose to conceive of the notion of a ‘description’ in a liberal manner.
I said that descriptions paraphrase how a given term is used. A paraphrase,
however, can only be illuminating relative to a given system. The most
obvious such system is natural languages. For example, the paraphrase
“a formalised period of communal worship” is illuminating relative to the
system of English. Apparently, there are also many statements that can
legitimately be considered proper meaning statements but which are only
7 For issues surrounding this notion, cf. Jung & Newen (2010) and Stanley & Williamson
(2001).
8 See, e.g., the references in Biletzki & Matar (2014, section 3.5).
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informative or illuminating relative to some other system. What makes
a meaning statement illuminating (relative to a specic system) is some-
times only remotely similar to what makes natural language paraphrases
illuminating.
To see this, consider grammar theory, for instance. A grammar theory
such as head-driven phrase structure grammar (HPSG) consists of meaning
statements, among other things. Yet, the fundamental purpose of a gram-
mar theory is to distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical sentences.
That is to say, its purpose is to determine, for any complex string of sym-
bols, whether a specic string in a given language is grammatical relative
to the formation rules provided by the theory.9 The ‘meaning statements’
in HPSG are, arguably, the semantic aspects of (HPSG) lexicon entries. It
seems reasonable to suppose that these representations are a kind of para-
phrase, because they illuminate how words are used (or are thought to be
used) relative to the system of HPSG. For example, they illustrate what
semantic aspect a single word contributes to the meaning of a complex ex-
pression. Hence, there is reason to dene “meaning” in such a way that it is
capable of covering formalisms such as HPSG. Relative to their respective
systems, the representations of at least certain grammar formalisms para-
phrase the meaning of a given term.
Another quite illustrative example of what a ‘paraphrase’ might look
like is translation. Consider the two terms “breakfast” (an English word)
and “Frühstück” (a German word). Both, let us suppose, mean the same.
In other words, there are structural similarities between how “breakfast” is
used in English, relative to the rest of English, and how “Frühstück” is used
in German, relative to the rest of German. Teaching an English-speaking
9 At least, this is what is done in HPSG. Other grammar theories might be dierent in this
respect. HPSG is a lexicon-based grammar, i.e. a grammar that ‘moves’ all information
into the lexicon. Besides the lexicon, there is only a handful of quite general rules. The
important part of lexicon entries is their syntactic information. If two entries (words,
morphemes, suxes, etc.) are combined, their respective representations are unied,
which is only possible if the syntactic information is compatible (Müller 2013b, 195–
206). Despite the quite heavy technical machinery employed in HPSG, the basic working
principle is really simple: the complex strings that emerge from unifying lexicon entries
are ‘grammatical’; everything else is ‘ungrammatical’. Note, by the way, that the idea that
lexical entries in HPSG represent primary meaning is not controversial (Sag & Wasow
1999, 103).
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person with basic knowledge of German the meaning of “Frühstück” is
possible by simply telling her that “Frühstück” translates to “breakfast”.
Accordingly, an instance of
“Frühstück” translates to / means “breakfast”
is a paraphrase on the view proposed here, because it is an illuminating de-
scription of how “Frühstück” is used in the community of German-speaking
people. In general, it seems quite reasonable to assume that, for every
meaning statement, there is a way to conceive of this statement as para-
phrasing the use of a term relative to a speciable language system (natural
language; grammar theory; formal-semantic system; knowledge represent-
ation system; and so on).
The link between use and meaning statements is quite tight in every-
day discourse. Of course, the function of a paraphrasing statement is to tell
someone (who is otherwise competent in the relevant system) how a spe-
cic word is used relative to this system. However, the adequacy criterion
for a paraphrase—be it a lexicon entry, a translation, or what have you—
is just the reverse. That is to say, in order to determine whether a given
meaning statement is correct, we would ask someone who already is famil-
iar with the relevant language system (including the term in question)—or
better: ask several such people—if this meaning statement paraphrases the
use of this specic term correctly. In order to assess a given translation, one
would ask a speaker who is competent in both relevant languages whether
the terms on the left-hand side and on the right-hand side are used struc-
turally similar in their respective languages.
What does “competent” mean in the above denition? It is quite com-
mon in the philosophy of language to assume ‘standard’ or ‘average’ lan-
guage users (e.g. Stalnaker 1984). They are taken to be competent in a given
language such as English. Normally, the notion of a ‘competent speaker’ is
introduced by examples. A competent average user of English, for example,
knows a priori that the sentence “All bachelors are unmarried” is true qua
being competent in English. (Truth follows by denition.) Note, however,
that this is true only if one takes for granted that the average speaker of
English is familiar with the denition of, e.g., “unmarried”. What about
the truth of “Local supervenience implies global supervenience”? It is true
by denition, hence knowable a priori. Nevertheless, one would not as-
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sume that an average speaker knows this, for he lacks lexical knowledge
of the terms in this sentence (except for “imply”, maybe). The denition of a
‘standard’ speaker of a natural language presupposes a certain set of lexical
knowledge that one would typically ascribe to such a speaker. “Unmarried”
would probably be in it, “supervenience” not. For present purposes, I only
need the notion of “competence”, anyway. I restrict competence not to
whole languages, but to words. In the Peter/Mary example, a description
of “church service” along the lines of “a formalised period of communal
worship” counts as a correct description i someone who is competent in
using “church service” typically associates ‘formalised periods’ with this
word. That is, the notion of ‘competence’ with respect to individual words
is independent from other linguistic knowledge that a speaker might (also)
have.10
What does it mean that a language user ‘associates’ something with a
word? I suggest that associating a word with something else can more
or less be equated with understanding. This is motivated as follows: a
meaning statement is typically a paraphrase of how a word is used by
competent speakers. Hence, if I say that someone associates ‘formalised
periods of communal worship’ with the concept of “church service”, then
this amounts to the claim that, mutatis mutandis, his use of “formalised
periods of communal worship” is systematically similar to that of “church
service” (though not identical). This, in turn, means that the implicit know-
ledge associated with the use of “church service” and “formalised periods of
communal worship” is systematically similar. Hence, a competent speaker
may be said to understand “church service” in the sense of ‘formalised peri-
ods of communal worship’. This view suggests that a certain use might be
indicative of understanding, while understanding is treated as knowledge
of use—a view that might sound circular to some. Against this, I can only
say that I am not aware of any plausible explication of ‘understanding’ that
would lack the assumption that understanding of a given term is implicitly
10 This is true if we ignore issues surrounding holism for a moment (cf. section 3.2.2). Be-
cause, roughly put, a speaker can’t be just competent in using a given word if he is not
also competent in using some other words that are meaning-related (in extreme cases,
all other words of the relevant language). I assume in what follows that a speaker’s
competence in using a particular word is reasonably clear. Incorporating holism, would
unnecessarily complicate matters at this point.
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exemplied by some typical patterns of use associated with that term. I
doubt that even a die-hard truth-conditional semanticist would seriously
deny this.
2.1.2 Meaning Liberalism
If I now take for granted in the following that, for example, (i) ‘formalised
periods of communal worship’ is a proper paraphrase of “church service”;
that (ii) a paraphrase is appropriate if it helps competent language users
to understand how a given word is used; and that (iii) from a pre-theoretic
perspective, meaning statements describe implicit use knowledge, then, at
rst glance, it might seem that my conception of meaning is indeed quite
narrow.
On the contrary, I propose to take a very liberal stance toward mean-
ing statements. That is, I suggest dening “meaning” rst of all in such
a broad way as to include a broad variety of dierent cases. The idea
behind this is to have a wide, pre-theoretic notion of “meaning” at hand
that poses no ex-ante restrictions on genuine meaning statements. Philo-
sophically more interesting are two further questions that can be accoun-
ted for independently, I think. One is the nature of meaning, which is
the actual core of all philosophical (foundational/reductionistic) theories
of meaning. The proper treatment of this issue, however, is unaected by
the acknowledgement that, essentially, all existing meaning statements are
paraphrases, whose adequacy is determined relative to how well they ac-
cord with one’s pre-theoretic knowledge concerning use. Another issue is
the relative appropriateness of particular theories, which is just the other
side of the coin. Once you ‘know’ the nature of meaning, you also know
how to classify existing theories according to how well they t with this
conception.
Since, as I have just shown, there is an independent reason for a liberal,
pre-theoretic denition of “meaning”, it is the aim of the following few
paragraphs to look more closely at some typical kinds of meaning state-
ments in order to see whether they are covered by the pre-theoretic con-
ception of meaning as ‘paraphrases of implicit knowledge of use’. To this
end, I shall, in particular, look at list of relevant examples that exemplify
the broad range of natural-language cases that are typically discussed in
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the relevant literature in language philosophy. Such a list of paradigm ex-
amples would typically include the following:
Translation How is meaning conveyed by translations?
Reference What about meaning statements in terms of reference?
Discourse How do we cope with discourse representations?
Lexica Is a lexical entry a meaning description?
Formalisms Can formal representations be conceived of as paraphrases?
Trivialism If “dog” meant DOG11, what would this mean?
Ostensive definitions Can meanings be ‘paraphrased’ by ostensive den-
itions?
Translations: A typical example of a meaning statement is when someone
translates a word from one natural language into another. For example, one
might say: “Schnee” means ‘snow’ in German, or, alternatively, “Schnee” is
the German equivalent to our (English) “snow” (like in a dictionary). Sim-
ilarly, we typically ‘translate’ words or sentences from natural languages
to metalanguages, as in the notorious “‘Schnee ist weiß’ is true if and only
if snow is white”.12 Translations are the most straightforward examples of
paraphrases, as a ‘normal’ paraphrase is nothing but a ‘translation’ within
11 Horwich (1998) uses capitalised words to denote meanings (see below).
12 Note that for the present argument it does not matter whether truth conditions are suf-
cient descriptions of meaning. Even a use theorist might allow for T-sentences (see
4.1.3), i.e. sentences that specify at a meta-level the truth conditions of a given object-
level sentence—as long as these conditions are not identied with meaning. The obvious
reason is this: the meaning, describable in terms of use, of our own language (English/the
metalanguage) is known and, in principle, explicable. It is quite a good heuristic method
to assume that people with otherwise similar environment and similar psychological
make-up to ourselves will use their sentence “Schnee ist weiß” in a structurally sim-
ilar manner to the way we use “Snow is white”, given that the truth conditions of these
sentences are identical. In this sense, T-sentences are actually nothing over and above
ordinary translations. Given the tight link between T-sentences and the criteria for their
respective adequacy (which is use, at the end of the day), there is nothing special about
usage-based theories that assign truth conditions to sentences and referential relations
to terms (cf. Horwich 1998, ch. 4).
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a given language. It paraphrases, in terms known to the addressee, the
meaning of a given term that might be unknown to that addressee. Ana-
logously, translations also presuppose that certain terms, namely that ones
in which the translation is couched, are known to the addressee, whereas
other terms, namely those that get translated, do not necessarily need to be
thus known. For example, someone who says that “Schnee” means ‘snow’
in German presupposes that the addressee knows the meaning of “snow”;
otherwise the relevant T-sentence would be incomprehensible to the ad-
dressee. And what he says, actually, is that the use of “Schnee” in Ger-
man is structurally similar to the use of “snow” in English (plus minus the
inaccuracy of our dictionaries). I emphasise ‘structurally’, because it is a
similarity relative to German, of course.
If “Schnee” and “snow” have equivalent meaning, the similarity between
the two in terms of use is just this: considering the correspondences be-
tween related pairs of words in German and English—e.g. the fact that
“weiß” means ‘white’—the tendency of competent speakers of German to
apply “Schnee” and the tendency of competent speakers of English to ap-
ply “snow” is absolutely alike (all else being equal). From this point of
view, translations are a paradigm example of meaning statement (i.e. para-
phrases), as they are shorthand descriptions of how a given word or sen-
tence would be used in the relevant target language. Trivially, ‘intra-lan-
guage translations’ as well as proper translations between two languages
are equally as informative or illuminating for an addressee as she is able
to understand that bit of information to which the paraphrase recurs. For
example, the information that “Schnee” means ‘snow’ in German is only
informative for you, the reader, to the extent that you are competent in
German (and English).
Reference: Another relevant example is reference, such as reference of
proper names. It is undeniable that there must be some connection between
reference and meaning. Some people in the history of philosophy of lan-
guage even go as far as to say that reference is meaning (e.g. Mill 1916)—an
idea that lives forth in truth-conditional semantics and neo-Davidsonian
approaches. Others (e.g. Carnap 1956) add additional layers (intensions)
in order to determine reference. These people stick to the main idea of
identifying meaning with reference, because the main purpose of the in-
termediate level is solely to x reference. This is an approach to semantics
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that continues to be developed in all strands of linguistics and philosophy
related to possible worlds semantics (now classical milestones include the
works of Lewis (1970, 1975, 1980), Kaplan (especially his 1989), Montague
(1974),13 and Partee (e.g. 1976, 1977)). Among more recent proponents of
frameworks directly working with, or being inspired by possible worlds are
Emma Borg (2004b, 2012a, 2012b), Herman Cappelen (e.g. 2004), or Wil-
liam Lycan (2010).14 Still others—i.e. all those not belonging to the rst
two camps—are sceptical about the identication of meaning and reference
(plus truth-conditional functions) but argue that it is an essential element
of any serious semantic theory. At any rate, meaning and reference seem
to be tightly linked.
Further evidence for a close link between reference and meaning comes
from everyday discourse: very often, one can hear people saying things like
“‘Water’ means H2O” or “‘Today’ means 31 January”. Professional philo-
sophers would reformulate this and say instead: “‘Water’ refers to H2O”
and “‘Today’ refers to the 31 January” (on 31 January). In fact, this way
of reformulating it is the only way to ‘make sense’ of these utterances.
People clearly can’t mean that “today” means the same as “on 31 January”,
because the referents of both terms are only alike on 31st of January. Simil-
arly for “water”: it only refers to H2O in ‘H2O worlds’ (an assumption that
is commonplace in philosophy since Putnam 1975 and Burge 1979; cf. also
Chalmers 2006). The close link that holds between reference and meaning
13 For a quick overview on Montague semantics, I refer the reader to Janssen (2006).
14 I emphasise “inspired” here, since possible worlds proper (i.e. model-theoretic descrip-
tions of states of aairs) play an important role only in logic. In mainstream (that is,
qualitative) philosophy of language, ‘possible worlds’ are often nothing more than mere
labels. Still, the reason to label certain strands of theorising as being, at least, ‘inspired’
by possible worlds talk is the following. Frameworks such as Borg’s identify meaning
with certain semantic cores, namely the respective equivalents to what has been labelled
“character” by Kaplan. Characters are, essentially, functions from contexts (of utterance)
to contents (referents). In other words, two main ingredients from possible worlds frame-
works are still at work here. Firstly, contexts of utterance (or whatever you might call
them) are possible worlds. So, by their very construction, these frameworks presuppose
talk of possible worlds. Secondly, the main purpose of introducing characters (or their
corresponding equivalents) is to have some stable semantic entity that ensures, for every
context of utterance, that there is a specic referent that is picked out. This, I think, jus-
ties conceiving of these frameworks as being heavily inuenced by possible worlds
semantics, even though they are not possible worlds approaches in the logician’s sense.
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is exploited, so to speak, in meaning statements of the form “Term ‘x’ refers
to entity y”, in which the meaning of “x” (and hence its use) is introduced
by appealing to referential ‘facts’. As I will demonstrate later, referential
statements need not necessarily be true—i.e. recurring to facts—in order
to successfully hint at a specic use. An example of a reference statement
that is used to convey meaning is the following: “‘The Morning Star’ refers
to Venus” (said to someone who knows what Venus is). It seems plausible
to regard this as paraphrasing how “The Morning Star” is used. Depending
on the background knowledge of the addressee of such a statement, she im-
mediately understands an important aspect of how “The Morning Star” is
used. Remarkably enough, this knowledge concerning use can be conveyed
simply by making statements concerning referential facts15.
The “Venus” case exemplies that appealing to referential relations may
sometimes convey details about use only imperfectly. A competent speaker
of English who learns that “The Morning Star” refers to Venus has learnt
something about just one mode of presentation concerning Venus. “The
Evening Star” is a term that is used dierently, even though it shares its
referent with “The Morning Star”. Many philosophically important results
can be drawn from this observation; in the present context, though, we are
only interested in the role of reference statements (rather than in modes
of presentation per se). Please note only that reference statements can be
good approximations of how a given term is used. But they need not ne-
cessarily be the best such description. This, however, does not aect my
main claim that meaning statements are paraphrases of implicit knowledge
of use. This is because those aspects of ordinary reference statements that
describe meaning ‘correctly’ are merely those aspects that recur to the use
of a particular term. By the same token, reference statements like “‘Wa-
ter’ refers to H2O” are ‘exhaustive’, since they can convey—subject to the
addressee’s background knowledge—the entire use of a given term.
15 Strictly speaking, not facts are important but what people take to be facts. If someone
makes someone else familiar with the use of “water” in chemistry by saying that “water”
refers to H2O, then this ‘meaning statement’ in terms of reference might be successful—
in the sense that the addressee has learnt how to use “water”—even if water ‘turned
out’ to be something else (given a certain development in chemistry and given that,
say, the causal-historical story about reference xing (Kripke 1980) is true). I omit this
complication in what follows and continue to talk simply about facts.
34
2.1 Meaning Statements are Descriptions
However, this ‘ability’ is not restricted to reference statements. As in
the translation case, such a statement may be taken as incomplete evid-
ence for such-and-such a use of the word in question. For instance, the
addressee might infer that “The Morning Star” will be used in contexts
in which planets (not stars) are relevant, given the information that “The
Morning Star” refers to Venus. Yet, note that this is only an assumption.
The kind of inferences the potential addressee of a reference statement will
draw depends crucially on what else she already knew about the language
at hand. It seems quite instructive to compare this case with a situation in
which some ‘non-referential’ information is learnt. Say, for example, that
someone learns that “slacker” is considered rude. A possible inference to
draw from this is to assume that “slacker” probably will not be used in the
presence of women. But this is only a rst guess—similar to reference state-
ments. Which inferences an addressee will actually draw depends crucially
on what else she knew beforehand.
The bottom line is that it might indeed be referential ‘facts’ that convey
meaning sometimes, but only insofar as they are abbreviated ways of im-
parting (partial) knowledge about uses of words. It is a well-known fact
about language that co-extensional words might have diverging Fregean
senses, which is to say that the corresponding use associated with each
word might dier (cf. “water” and “H2O”). This is why I emphasise “inso-
far” in this context.
Discourse: Discourses are notoriously hard to handle for semantic the-
ories. One important diculty is to model the reference relations that
can be shared between dierent discourse units, such as the way ana-
phoric reference is transferred from sentence to sentence. Kamp & Reyle
(1993) present a model-theoretic possibility to represent discourse. Their
approach—Discourse Representation Theory (DRT)—has set the standard
in the eld of discourse representation. Being part of the formal semantics
movement, DRT covers only a limited set of discursive factors. In partic-
ular, it accounts for the linguistic context. DRT is thus able, for example,
to represent anaphoric reference in successive sentences. A very simple
representation in DRT (called ‘Discourse Representation Structure’; ‘DRS’)
might look like this:
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x
Jones(x)
[x own Ulysses]
[. . . ] Like all DRSs it consists of two components:
(i) a set of discourse referents, called the universe of the DRS,
which will always be displayed at the top of the diagram;
and
(ii) a set of DRS-conditions, typically displayed below the
universe. (Kamp & Reyle 1993, 63, diagram also there)
Conceived this way, discourse representations are theoretically on a par
with representations in truth-conditional semantics. Essentially, what they
formalise is propositional content. It is for this reason that DRSs are not
particularly illuminating concerning the natural sentences they are rep-
resentations of. The representations are as illuminating as T-sentences:
everyone who understands them, did so before. Their main purpose is to
make explicit the formal relations that hold between sub-discursive units
(e.g. sentences): anaphoric reference, implication, etc. That is, the explan-
atory aims of DRSs are, by their nature, severely limited. This general-
ises to all formal frameworks in semantics that conne themselves to mere
truth conditions or representations of propositional content. Still, relative
to the relations they formalise (e.g. anaphoric reference), discourse repres-
entations paraphrase meaning in that their adequacy is determined by how
well they capture our pre-theoretic intuitions regarding these semantic re-
lations.
Accordingly, the representations oered by DRT are clearly covered by
my liberal, pre-theoretic denition of “meaning”, since they reveal import-
ant aspects of language that are closely connected with use: which sen-
tential inferences are valid; how words (e.g. personal pronouns) get and
keep their referents through discourse; and so on. Still, it is equally obvi-
ous that a DRS like the one cited above is, in essence, nothing more than
a very sophisticated way of saying that “Jones owns Ulysses” means that
Jones owns Ulysses. It is quite clear that not all strictly formal approaches
36
2.1 Meaning Statements are Descriptions
are alike in this regard. There are other, equally formal approaches to se-
mantics that model specic semantic properties that cannot easily be read
o from the natural sentences (or discourse) they are part of: see, for in-
stance, the literature surrounding the range of possible interpretations for
‘donkey sentences’16 (e.g. Geurts 2002) or semantic theories that account
for semantically validated inference patterns (Pietroski 2000). The philo-
sophically important point, though, is not whether a given theory deals
with, if you like, ‘transparent’ aspects of meaning like anaphoric relations
or with more intricate ones like competing interpretations of donkey sen-
tences. Rather, the point here is whether the proposed denition of “mean-
ing” in terms of implicit knowledge of use matches with (the notion of
“meaning” used in) particular theories that apparently are established se-
mantic theories—of which, by the way, the above-mentioned theories are
only examples. Concerning formal semantic theories such as discourse rep-
resentation theory and the like, the answer is a clear “Yes.”
Lexicons: Lexical entries are prototypical examples of meaning state-
ments. In fact, a lexicon just is a collection of meanings of words (if mean-
ing is nothing over and above appropriate paraphrases). It is quite clear
that lexicons are covered by my initial denition only if the lexicon is good
enough, i.e. if it consists of descriptions that help otherwise competent lan-
guage users to understand particular words, i.e. the entries of a specic
lexicon.
In several respects, lexicons are unique in relation to semantics. For ex-
ample, the trivial aspect that lexicons contain only meaning statements—
the lemmas—that are comprehensible relative to the very same linguistic
system they are descriptions of. Another unique aspect of lexicons relates
to what I will say below in the more theoretical chapters of this book. To
anticipate a bit: below I will show that it will prove helpful to distinguish
between what constitutes meaning and meaning itself (see the third part of
this book). My proposal will be that word meaning is constituted by every
single tokening of a word type. Meaning, in contrast, can be identied with
the most general, most eective description of how that word type is used
16 ‘Donkey sentences’ get their name from examples such as “Every farmer who owns a
donkey beats it”, which have two distinct readings (and hence truth conditions): every
farmer who owns a donkey either beats all donkeys he owns, or he beats at least one of
them.
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in a specic community (see especially section 8.2). It might turn out that
many lemmas actually comply quite well with this requirement. If this is
true, it would have some interesting consequences. For example, one im-
portant result could be that there might be no uniform code for appropriate
meaning statements. For some words, it might be most eective to sum-
marise their use in terms of reasonable examples, or by comparing it with
meanings of related words, or in terms of its conversational function, and
so forth.
Formalisms: I mention formalism here in order to demonstrate very brief-
ly that formal semantic representations t nicely with the proposed notion
of meaning. I illustrate this by using a particular theory, which I already
briey mentioned above, as an arbitrarily chosen example: head-driven
phrase structure grammar (Sag & Wasow 1999). The considerations below,
however, can be generalised to similar formalisms; they are independent
of the niceties of this specic framework. Being a grammar theory, HPSG
is not primarily concerned with semantics. Accordingly, questioning the
status of semantics in HPSG seems like a cheap shot. However, semantics
is not a mere by-product in HPSG. Therefore, it seems worth the eort to
look at it in some more detail from the point of view of a theory of mean-
ing. Semantic representations gure prominently in, for example, ‘refer-
ence transfer’. Or, to put it dierently, some syntactic features of English
can only be accounted for by incorporating semantic operations, such as
reference transfer, into one’s grammar theory. HPSG is concerned with
distinguishing grammatical from ungrammatical sentences. An example—
taken from Pollard & Sag (1994)—of a problematic sentence that is classied
‘grammatical’ by native speakers is: “The hash browns at table six is getting
angry”. The problem is that the copula (singular) is incongruent in number
with the subject (“hash browns”; plural). Very roughly, the solution is to
say that in an ‘ordering food at a restaurant’ situation, reference is trans-
ferred from the actual denotation of the thing ordered (hash browns) to the
person ordering it. Congruency with the copula gets then determined by
the new referent (the person who ordered the hash browns). Hence, the
singular form of the copula is the correct, grammatical choice in this ex-
ample. What is important here is that semantics plays a crucial role, for
syntactical features (singular vs plural copula) are inuenced by semantic
features (reference transfer).
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〉
Figure 2.1: Lexical entry of “die” (Sag & Wasow 1999, 394).
A lexical entry in HPSG (e.g. gure 2.1) is similar in important respects
to ‘normal’ lexical entries like in the Oxford Dictionary or the (German)
Duden. In contrast with these regular lexicons, the lexical entries of lexicon-
based grammar theories focus on specic linguistic features only. This sets
them apart from lexicons that contain comprehensive summaries of the use
of given terms. However, there is no reason not to concede that theories
like the HPSG model at least include important aspects of meaning—e.g.
licensing a singular copula with plural subject in cases of reference trans-
fer. In the example—“die”—it is quite obvious that an understanding of the
meaning of “die” that goes beyond mere truth conditions is presupposed,
because in the semantic part of the representation (SEM) we see that its
meaning is the relation of dying (REL die). That is to say, you need to know
what the relation of dying is in order to understand what the representa-
tion is a representation of. Compare this with a “die” lemma in an ordinary
lexicon. The indices for CORPSE (apparently identifying the corpse) and
SIT[UATION] only serve the purpose of tracking referents in the discourse
(within and across sentences).
Generally speaking, when it comes to formalisms it is important which
aspects are coded in the relevant representations. The most prominent in-
formation in the gure taken from Sag and Wasow is that “die” denotes the
relation of dying. That is to say, it is made absolutely transparent that the
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formal framework of (this historical variant of) HPSG is not designed to
reveal any specically semantic aspects of its lexical entries. HPSG is, to
be sure, rst and foremost a syntactic theory, i.e. a theory that licenses par-
ticular phrases as grammatically well-formed ones.17 HPSG is at least not
primarily concerned with semantics anyway. It comes as no surprise that
the semantic features covered by the theory are therefore quite limited.18
Trivialism: A special case of theories that generate genuine meaning
statements is what I dub ‘trivialism’. A semantic theory is trivial if its mean-
ing statements for particular words are derivable from the theory without
any further knowledge about the object language. Horwich’s ‘use theory’
can partly be seen as a theory of this kind. Consider the following quote:
The English word “dog” means DOG. (Horwich 1998, 14)
The quote shows that the capitalised spelling of words is understood in
this framework as something like a placeholder, i.e. as something denoting
the yet-to-be-specied meaning of a term. Horwich adopts a ‘convention
of capitalizing an English expression in order to designate its meaning or
17 Note that, in HPSG, a sentence is a subtype of phrases:
A combination of a head with a further constituent is called projection of
the head. A projection that involves all parts necessary to build a complete
phrase is called a maximal projection. A sentence is the maximal projection
of a nite verb. (Müller 2013c, 10, my translation)
So it is really just phrases that are licensed, even though it is equally possible to talk
about sentences from within this framework.
HPGS is a lexicon-based approach, i.e. most of the syntactic information (and the com-
plete semantics) is represented in lexical entries. This information is accompanied by
a few general rules that specify how to combine lexical entries. Phrasal structures are
licensed (that is, ‘grammatical’) i their feature values are compatible. The theory builds
complexes (genuine phrases and sentences) from the bottom up out of simpler units (lex-
ical entries or simple phrases). Which units are grammatical is solely determined by the
compatibility of the feature values of their constituents. The semantics does not interfere
with grammaticality, i.e. its sole function in the theory is to keep track of referents (via
indices) and to state which constituents provide which semantic aspects (e.g. referents
for singular terms and pronouns; relations for verbs). The semantics is, if you like, ‘trans-
parent’ and relies on constant meanings that are not aected by contexts: for example,
“die” is semantically specied simply as [RELN die].
18 For a modern derivative of HPSG, see, e.g., Fillmore (2013).
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meanings’ (1998, 15). It is important to bear in mind that, although Hor-
wich’s book is full of statements like “‘Red’ means RED”, the explanator-
ily relevant work is done by means of acceptance properties (see 3.1.1). In
general, trivialism is always committed to explicating what is supposed to
substitute the relevant placeholders. Some forms of trivialism, incorpor-
ating no placeholders, simply displace the burden of explanation from one
area to another, e.g. by equating the semantics of natural languages with
the semantics of their corresponding concepts.
Other trivial ‘theories of meaning’ are similar to Horwich’s use theory
in important respects. These theories specify word meanings in that they
postpone the problem of word meaning to other areas of research. A very
popular move is to talk implicitly as if concepts and the corresponding
words that express these concepts can be identied in regard to their re-
spective meanings.19 In this sense, then, these theories account for the
meanings of words via a theory of mental representation.20 In these theor-
etical frameworks, the explanatorily interesting part concerns the linkage
of mental representations and semantic content (especially reference). The
identication of the semantics of a given word with the semantics of the
specic mental representation that is expressed by this word is typically
not focused by these theories. It rather has the status of a postulation.
All mentioned theories, dierent as they are, share a trivial core: mean-
ing statements are derivable either by applying a capitalisation convention
(e.g. that “red” means RED) or by identifying the meaning of words with
the meaning of mental representations (e.g. that “red” means red). As far as
this part of the theory is concerned, neither case requires any object-level
knowledge whatsoever.
How can ‘trivial’ meaning statements be reconciled with our pre-theo-
retic understanding of ‘meaning’? The ‘trivial’ part apparently can’t be
incorporated directly, for “RED” (as such) is nothing close to a paraphrase
19 Fodor, for one, even goes as far as to claim that language inherits higher-order properties
(systematicity, productivity) from concepts due to meaning identity (Fodor 1998, 26–27).
20 Interestingly, the theories of meaning listed by Horwich as alternatives to his own theory
are mainly such theories of mental representation: Mental Image Theory, Informational
Theory, Teleological Theory (1998, 51–54). The main proponents Horwich thinks of here
are probably Hume, Dretske, and Millikan, respectively. For a similar vantage point on
semantic theories cf. Godfrey-Smith (1989, esp. section II).
41
2 Meaning: Primary, Pragmatic, and Others
of how “red” is used. So whether trivial meaning statements are covered by
my provisional denition of “meaning” depends on what the trivial state-
ment is connected with. In Horwich’s account, for instance, “RED” serves
as a placeholder denoting the meaning of “red”, whatever it is. The non-
trivial part of the theory, then, gives us that the use of “red” is traceable to
a specic set of acceptance properties. To wit:
The explanatorily fundamental acceptance property underly-
ing our use of “red” is (roughly) the disposition to apply “red”
to an observed surface when and only when it is clearly red.
(Horwich 1998, 45)
Here, one can see clearly that certain sorts of trivialism t quite nicely
with the proposed denition of “meaning”. Because this usage theory aims
at providing every single word of a language, for example English, with a
general property (expressed in terms of a disposition to accept certain sets
of sentences) that paraphrases its use.
In the area of theories of mental representation, ‘semantic’ theories in-
clude all so-called informational (/teleological) theories (Dretske (1986) is
a point of reference here), or theories of ‘asymmetric dependence’ (Fodor
1990). From the viewpoint of natural language semantics, these theories
are trivial, because in regards to words they just equate their respective
meanings with the meanings of corresponding concepts. For the present
purposes, it is irrelevant whether this identication itself is plausible. I
am only concerned with the fact that the semantics of words and mental
tokens are very often thus identied in the philosophical literature. Here
are some randomly chosen examples:
The speaker introducing the term says something like (or thinks,
it doesn’t matter), ‘by “water” I mean [. . . ]. (Levine 2010, 190,
my emphasis)
To know English is to know, for example, that the form of
words ‘there are cats’ is standardly used to express the thought
that there are cats; and that the form of words ‘it’s raining’ is
standardly used to express the thought that it’s raining [. . . ].
(Fodor 1998, 9)
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[T]he expression ‘that sofas are more comfortable than pews’
provides the content of Alfred’s belief that sofas are more com-
fortable than pews. (Burge 1979, 101)
If S thinks, or says, “The man in the picture was evil incarnate”,
whom is he referring to or thinking about: the unknown actor
or Stalin himself? (Sosa 1995, 93)
Words have meanings, and thinking has content. [. . .O]ften
I’ll move carelessly among talk of meaning and content, the
meanings of words and the identity of concepts. (Gibbard 2012,
26)
By postponing the problem of accounting for the semantic basis of words,
this way of talking as if words and concepts were interchangeable parallels
Horwich’s placeholder approach.21
The question as to whether theories of this type paraphrase uses of
words in the relevant sense and, hence, count as genuine semantic the-
ories (in my sense) hinges on what takes the placeholder’s place. Fodorian
and Dretskian accounts of mental representation, for example, emphasise
the causal nexus of concepts. More precisely,
Informational semantics generally ignores the actual history
of a sign [of thought or language], and looks to what is a nat-
ural indicator of it. It is the mechanism of nomic dependence
between sign and object that determines content. (Godfrey-
Smith 1989, 535)
This way of approaching natural language is inspired by the 20th century
dominance of truth-conditional semantics. For this reason, informational
21 The parallel is even stricter than it might seem at rst:
[. . . ] the concept DOG is most directly identied as the concept that is nor-
mally expressed in English by using the word “dog” [. . . ] (Horwich 1998,
98).
And, further down this page:
[. . . ] the natural view that the meaning of an expression is the concept it
expresses is quite consistent with the further claim that such concepts are
identied by means of the use regularities of the words that express them.
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theorists stress, for example, the alleged referential facts of words. Thus,
we have Fodor claiming that
The basic problem is that we want there to be conditions for
the truth of a symbol over and above the conditions whose sat-
isfaction determines what the symbol represents. (1984, 243)
Being solely concerned with truth/falsity and related concepts (reference,
fullment), informational theories are semantic theories that focus only
on specic aspects of language.22 So, like formal semantics, the scope of
at least some trivialist theories is severely limited in regard to semantic
aspects.
Still, these theories are covered by my provisional denition of “mean-
ing” insofar as, concerning natural-language semantics, they are tightly
linked with non-trivial explanations such as Horwich’s acceptance proper-
ties. Or, to put it another way: in the terminology of Speaks (2011), theories
such as informational theory in fact belong to the area of foundational the-
ories. On the other hand, subsuming the theories mentioned above under
the heading ‘trivialism’ seems justied, because, in regard to the semantics
of natural language (as opposed to mental representations), informational
theory and similar frameworks are on a par with Horwich’s capitalisation
convention. The fact that “dog” is a symbol whose meaning nomologically
depends on the existence of dogs is not immediately relevant to how “dog”
is used. Therefore, informational-theoretic theorems do not illuminate the
use of the expressions they are dealing with.
Ostensive Denition: Kripke’s causal-historic theory of reference is an-
other example of a theory that clearly belongs to the realm of foundational
22 ‘For Fodor, [semantics] is a relation between certain thoughts (beliefs, etc.) and the
world, in virtue of which the thoughts are either true or false. Semantics, meaning,
is about truth and falsity, period’ (Dietrich 2001, 90).
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theories. The famous ‘baptism ceremony’ of “gold”, though, is ambiguous
between the ‘foundational’ and the ‘semantic’ reading.23,24 Kripke writes:
For species, as for proper names, the way the reference of a
term is xed should not be regarded as a synonym for the
term. In the case of proper names, the reference can be xed
in various ways. In an initial baptism it is typically xed by
an ostension or a description. Otherwise, the reference is usu-
ally determined by a chain, passing the name from link to link.
The same observations hold for such a general term as ‘gold’.
If we imagine a hypothetical (admittedly somewhat articial)
baptism of the substance, we must imagine it picked out as
by some such ‘denition’ as, ‘Gold is the substance instanti-
ated by the items over there, or at any rate, by almost all of
them’. (1980, 135)
First of all, this is an explanation for why “gold” means what it does, i.e.
it concerns its genesis. But it is also explains the meaning of “gold”. The
‘baptism ceremony’ is, if you like, a special case of reference xing, already
discussed above. A speaker who performs such a ceremony commits him-
self to a certain use of “gold”. That is, a proper description of the ceremony
(plus Kripke’s theory) is a paraphrase of how “gold” is used. Remember
that I dened a ‘paraphrase’ as a description that provides competent lan-
guage users with information about how the term is used. That certainly
is the case for someone who is confronted with Kripke’s story and is—
save for the meaning of “gold”—competent in English. Note that this is a
precondition for the ceremony; because if the ceremony (or a description
23 Kripke’s story is not meant as describing what actually happened when “gold” was intro-
duced for the rst time, but rather as a description that simply is in accordance with the
actual use of that term. His claim is that the semantics of, for example, “gold” looks as
if that word had been introduced by such a ceremony. In this sense, Kripke’s approach
maps exactly onto what I said above about eective ways of summarising use. It might be
that, in fact, the most eective method is by way of telling a ctive story.
24 The distinction foundational/semantic is adopted from Speaks (2011), who says that ‘[. . . ]
a semantic theory [. . . ] is a theory which assigns semantic contents to expressions of
a language’. In contrast, a foundational or reductionist theory is simply a theory that
species by virtue of which underlying non-semantic properties (e.g. use) the expressions
of a language have the meanings they in fact have.
45
2 Meaning: Primary, Pragmatic, and Others
thereof) did not imply a certain use, a speaker could not commit himself to
a certain meaning of “water” by performing this baptism. Thus, ostensive
denitions of the form “By ‘x’ I mean y from now on” can be considered
genuine paraphrases of how a term “x” is or will be used. They are there-
fore absolutely within the scope of the proposed preliminary, pre-theoretic
denition of “meaning”.
It is evident from this cursory list of kinds of meaning statements that my
denition of ‘meaning as paraphrase’ is broad enough to cover very dier-
ent varieties of semantic theories and semantic aspects of related theories
such as grammar theory. I am not, by virtue of provisionally employing this
denition of “meaning”, forced to adopt a particular (philosophical) theory
of meaning. I shall show in later chapters that an order among theories
in terms of appropriateness can be achieved by other means. Generally,
the denition is as liberal as possible. It covers a broad range of dier-
ent semantic representations that can all legitimately be considered to be
dealing with relevant aspects of meaning. At the same time, the discussion
of the proposed denition has already hinted at some problematic areas.
These include purely formal approaches, e.g. truth-conditional semantics,
discourse representation theory, teleological semantics, and so forth. The-
ories of this kind work with a constrained notion of meaning; or, in other
words, they deal only with quite specic aspects of meaning (most promin-
ently, reference). Their theorems consist of semantic representations that
hardly go beyond what can already be read o from the relevant linguistic
signs they are representations of.
It goes without saying that the list of theories chosen for the above over-
view is incomplete. Yet it is broad enough that one extrapolate from this
list that the proposed pre-theoretic denition of “meaning” is compatible
with all meaning statements that gure in mainstream theories in linguistic
semantics and philosophy of language.
2.1.3 Primary Meaning and Compositionality
In semantic theories in general and in philosophical semantics in particu-
lar, compositionality is a key concept. Here, I focus particularly on the rela-
tionship between compositionality and the classical conception of primary
meaning in terms of reference, as both notions seem to partially justify
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each other (see the following paragraph). The ‘correct’ formulation of the
compositionality principle is still controversial (e.g. Gendler Szabó 2012a,
Gendler Szabó 2012b). Most scholars, though, would typically subscribe
to the view that compositionality is a feature of language, according to
which the meaning of a complex expression is systematically determined
by the meaning of its atomic parts and their mode of combination. This
characterisation should suce for present purposes; I continue discussing
compositionality in 5.2.3.
Compositionality usually presupposes xed lexical meanings of atomic
parts of one’s language (e.g. words). For otherwise there could be no ‘mech-
anism’ (i.e. the syntax) that, starting from meanings of words (i.e. seman-
tics), could help determining the meaning of complete sentences. A quick
argument for primary meanings could therefore run as follows: that nat-
ural languages are compositional is a widely accepted view; the composi-
tionality principle is by far the most commonly accepted solution to com-
positionality; the principle is, inter alia, based on the assumption that there
are xed lexical meanings (e.g. meanings dened in terms of reference/sa-
tisfaction). Therefore, compositionality lends indirect support to the as-
sumption of ordinary literal meanings. Independently of how this quick
argument is spelled out exactly, it seems clear that there is a very close
link from compositionality to literal meaning. One of the aims of this book
is to argue against the common assumption that words always ‘have’ a
literal meaning irrespective of the contexts in which they are instantiated.
Accordingly, it looks like a good idea to explicate the exact nature of the re-
lationship between literality and compositionality, for there must be some-
thing in my own theoretic framework that can serve as a substitute for lit-
eral meaning. Accordingly, I shall propose in the following a denition of
“primary meaning” that, on the hand, is capable of handling literality/non-
literality issues, and, on the other hand, does without assumptions that
usually go hand in hand with primary meanings (e.g. the assumption that
words literally refer).
When it comes to compositionality and the justication for why we
think that natural languages are compositional, Fodor (e.g. Fodor & Lepore
2002) is our rst port of call. I shall briey remind you of his main argu-
ment. Clearly, natural languages seem to be productive and systematic
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to a large extent.25 Productivity, in the sense at stake here, is the phe-
nomenon that an innite number of well-formed complex expressions in
natural languages can potentially be understood by speakers who are com-
petent in the relevant language. In other words, there are an innite num-
ber of grammatical sentences, all of which are potentially comprehensible
for those who understand the involved semantic atoms and composition
rules. Systematicity is the common property of languages that every com-
petent language user who understands a given sentence and recognises its
structure is similarly able to understand other grammatical sentences that
result from rearranging the relevant constituents. For example, competent
users of English who understand “John loves Mary” are likewise able to un-
derstand “Mary loves John”. Both systematicity and productivity require—
for reasons not be further examined here—a language that features atomic
semantic units (e.g. Fodor & Lepore 2002).
To sum up thus far: two main reasons motivate the concept of primary
meaning. Firstly, the distinction held up in linguistics as well as in philo-
sophy of language between semantics and pragmatics.26 Secondly, the
compositionality of natural languages and the corresponding principle that
accounts for it. It is a view on meaning widely shared by linguists and
philosophers of language alike. What is important in the following ex-
amples is not that the respective arguments are based on the composition-
ality assumption but, rather, that the respective authors presuppose stable
lexical word meanings:
[. . . ] it is part and parcel of the compositionality of English
that the symbol ‘John jumps’ is complex, that it has among
its constituents the symbols ‘John’ and ‘jumps’, and that its
meaning (viz., John jumps) is inherited from the meanings of
these subsentential parts. (Fodor & Lepore 2002, 1)
25 Problematic cases, which seem to show that natural languages are, at least, not sys-
tematic all the way down, will come into play later on. For example, it seems that the
semantic content that “white” contributes to “white wine” diers from the content it con-
tributes to complexes such as “white Socrates” or “white wall”. Suce it to say for now
that systematicity seems to be prevalent in at least large areas of natural languages.
26 Gendler Szabó (2006), Heusinger & Turner (2006), Jaszczolt (2012).
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[. . . ] “dogs bark” somehow gets its meaning [. . . ] from the
meanings of the two words “dog” and “bark”, from the meaning
of the generalization schema “ns v”27, and from the fact that
the sentence results from placing those words in that schema
in a certain order. (Horwich 1998, 154)
[Our hypothesis] is that the process by which a speaker inter-
prets each of the innitely many sentences is a compositional
process in which the meaning of any syntactically compound
constituent of a sentence is obtained as a function of the mean-
ings of the parts of the constituent. (Katz 1966, 152)
The denotation of an adjective is always a function from prop-
erties to properties. [. . . ] The standard denotations of many
adjectives—for instance, pgreenq and pmarriedq—may be taken
as intersection functions [. . . ]. (Montague 1974, 211, emphasis
omitted)
What is striking about the typical examples that theorists choose when
characterising compositionality is that they are very simple. A typical sen-
tence might be “University buildings are ugly”, which, presumably, consists
of four constituents, namely “university building”, “-s”, “be” and “ugly”.
The noun denotes university buildings, the sux denotes plurality, the cop-
ula itself is, in the interpretation involved here, more or less semantically
empty (basically, it functions as a syntactic device that ‘enables’ predic-
ation),28 and “ugly” denotes unattractiveness. The syntax of English, in
27 “n” is for ‘noun’; “v” is for verb.
28 Below I will be discussing many interesting examples of allegedly meaningless expres-
sions. Depending on one’s theory of meaning, copulas might also turn out to be mean-
ingless after all, for they contribute nothing substantial to the semantic content of a
complex expression. Rather, the ‘meaning’ of the copula seems to consist solely in its
functionality: that is to say, it indicates that two other expressions stand in a certain re-
lation to each other. Roughly, the copula function is to indicate that the thing denoted
by the grammatical subject is among the things that has the property denoted by the
predicative noun (or anything along these lines). To be sure, that is its meaning. But,
arguably, the only way to state its meaning in these terms is in theories that recognise
that the meanings of at least some terms consist solely in their function, which many
philosophically interesting theories do not, after all.
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conjunction with the meanings of the sentence constituents, gives us, or
so it is claimed, the meaning of the complete sentence.
In the above example, this procedure might tell us that the property of
unattractiveness is predicated of the plurality of university buildings and,
hence, that the sentence is true i university buildings are ugly. This pretty
straightforward—and for ease of presentation, slightly simplied—strategy
is, essentially, what truth-conditional semantics says is actually going on. I
will show in the chapter after next that this way of approaching semantics
is a bit too straightforward. Of course, it is always justied to choose a
simple example in order to get one’s point through without annoying the
reader with unnecessary technicalities and complexity. But in the cases
typically chosen in characterisations of compositionality, the simplicity is
unjustied. The reason is that such a strategy only works if what is ex-
plained at the level of very simple sentences is applicable analogously to
more complex sentences. This seems questionable in these cases, for reas-
ons having to do not with the complexity or length of sentences but with
the semantics of the words occurring in them.
In particular, the unjustied move is to generalise from a very limited
class of words of speech to whole natural languages. Typically, the parts of
speech chosen include proper names and verbs functioning as predicates.
The semantics for these is then provided more or less in the style of the
example above (“university building” means ‘university building’, and so
on). All this is intuitively compelling but ignores the problem that not all
of semantics can be cashed out this simply. Think of truth-valueless sen-
tences, for instance. They clearly have meaning—if well-formed. Look, for
example, at the following, still very simple example: “Hey, Mrs Robinson!”
Presumably, this sentence, although well-formed, is not truth-evaluable, i.e.
no truth conditions can reasonably be assigned to it. The common move
here is to switch from truth conditions to ‘satisfaction-conditions’, because
it is not the former but rather the latter that can account for some classes of
non-declarative sentences such as interrogative or imperative sentences.29
But this would not help either in cases of exclamations like the one cited.
The meaning of such an exclamation is best described in terms of the con-
versational function associated with exclamations of this type: along the
29 Although that is the probably most popular strategy, there are also alternatives.
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lines of ‘is used to express one’s interest in a good social relationship’. How-
ever, it looks highly counter-intuitive to describe this function in terms of
satisfaction/fullment, e.g. by saying that “Hey, Mrs Robinson!” is satis-
ed i such-and-such conditions hold. This is because a command is, with
conceptual necessity, satised i the conditions specied in the command
actually hold. But the analogy with exclamations breaks down ‘at all levels’,
so to speak: the meaning of “Hey, Mrs Robinson!” remains the same, no
matter whether the addressee’s social relationship with the speaker alters;
or whether the addressee recognised that this was the speaker’s intention;
or whether it indeed was her intention; and so on. So, whereas the move
to satisfaction-conditions is at least consistent in the case of imperative
sentences, it is implausible in the case of exclamations that regulate social
status. The fact that “Hey, Mrs Robinson!” is not truth-evaluable is unprob-
lematic as far as it goes. But the deeper problem is that, on the one hand,
“Hey, Mrs Robinson!” seems intuitively compositional, whereas, on the
other hand, all existing philosophical theories of meaning—from Davidson
semantics to Horwich’s use theory—focus on truth-evaluable sentences30
and how these sentences derive their meaning from corresponding con-
stituents. An established philosophical account of the meaning of purely
‘functional’ expressions—e.g. exclamations that clarify social status—is still
missing. This is a problem that generalises to the huge class of types of sen-
tences that, in general, lack truth-evaluable content.31
30 For sake of simplicity, I continue to talk of sentences here. Bear in mind, though, that
at least some of the problematic cases can be, strictly speaking, individuated in terms of
their corresponding force, i.e. in terms of speech acts rather than sentence types. For ex-
ample, interrogatives are types of sentences (they can be described formally), but wishes
are types of speech acts (they can only be described with regard to accompanying inten-
tions); what ‘unites’ them is that they both lack truth conditions but (probably) possess
satisfaction conditions.
31 That is to say, there is a huge class of sentences that are incapable of being ‘them-
selves’ truth-evaluable. It is possible to link expressions which lack truth value with
some other expressions that do not, where the latter are supposed to express the ‘right’
truth conditions for the former. The theories that adopt this idea provide truth con-
ditions for some expressions by taking into account their use conditions. Here is an
example: “Hello!” might not be truth-evaluable. But of course there is a certain use
condition associated with “hello”. For example, ‘is used to maintain social relation-
ship’. David Kaplan, for one, proposes something along these lines (see https:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=iaGRLlgPl6w, accessed: 14/01/2015).
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To take another example, think of gestures, which must be included into
an exhaustive account of natural language semantics.32 Surely, many of
them have meaning—e.g. iconic gestures. Moreover, they surely equally
have meaning in the sense of ‘constituents’ of complex expressions. Here
is an example of a complex communicated content whose meaning is ‘com-
posed’ of individual meanings that are partly established by gesture (rough-
ly, ‘being annoyed’ and ‘I’m referring to this person’):
In an airplane, I take my seat on the aisle. There is a woman
sitting next to the window in my row. A man comes into the
row behind us, talking extremely loudly and obnoxiously. I
look to the woman and roll my eyes, expressing an attitude
best glossed as “Ugh, this is going to be a long trip.” I did not
need to indicate the referent of my exasperation for her; it was
clear to us both. (Tomasello 2008, 80)
It is hard to see what lexical meanings of gestures (here: rolling of the eyes)
would look like, if they were such that they could then be used as a basis
for an explanation of the complex meaning. A comprehensive account of
compositionality must cover cases like these, since not all natural language
sentences consist of simple subject-predicate structures.33
Truth-valueless sentences as well as gestures are two problematic areas
in the eld of compositionality. They indicate that the simplicity of ex-
amples typically chosen to describe how compositionality works is not just
a matter of style but, rather, an unjustied simplication as regards parts
of speech (or, generally, types of ‘communication signs’). This, in turn, un-
dermines the plausibility of justifying ordinary primary meanings by re-
curring to compositionality principles. For there must be a way to accom-
modate (some kind of) ‘compositionality’ in the cases discussed above—
i.e. a strategy that does without the classical compositionality principle,
which is inappropriate for gestures and sentences with specic functions
(as opposed to truth-evaluable content). Prima facie, there is no need to
32 I argue for this in 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.
33 I devote a large portion of the third part of this book to a discussion of the standard reply
that, for sake of simplicity, I ignore at this point: namely the worry that while pretending
to talk about semantics, I actually talk about communication all the time.
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assume that this modied manner of conceiving compositionality must in-
volve primary meanings spelled out in terms of reference relations. Hence,
the indirect support for primary meaning that might arise from the clas-
sical compositionality principle seems unjustied.
It is clearly not the aim of this chapter to decide this matter, nor even to
suggest a possible direction between the two extremes: full-avour primary
meaning versus no primary meaning at all. Rather, the purpose of the
above paragraphs was to present evidence pointing, as it were, in both
directions. Save for the critique of compositionality in the very last para-
graphs, all the above was ‘in favour’ of primary meaning. Thus, in the next
section I now turn to the cons.
2.2 Constructionist Approaches to Semantics
One of the most inuential paradigms in linguistics today is construction
grammar. It aims at ‘developing a comprehensive model of linguistic struc-
tures that is [. . . ] a universal theory of representation, acquisition, and
change of linguistic knowledge’ (Ziem & Lasch 2013, 1). One of its lin-
guistically most relevant aspects is that it starts linguistic theorising by
looking at language phenomena that are conceived as peripheral from a
more classical point of view (e.g. idioms). However, from a philosopher’s
perspective, another feature is by far more interesting: namely, construc-
tion grammar’s tendency—discussed below—to neglect a clear-cut bound-
ary between semantics and pragmatics as well the denial of such a strict
boundary in the case of semantics and syntax. In construction grammar,
pragmatic and syntactic information is generally represented in essentially
the same framework in which semantics is represented. This development
ts quite nicely with a more general tendency in philosophy of language
(cf. François Recanati’s work on ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ (2007)) and
in the research of language acquisition (cf. Michael Tomasello’s work on
‘joint attention’ (e.g. 2009))34 to shift the divide between semantics and
pragmatics more and more towards pragmatics. In other words, in these
research paradigms, semantics typically includes elements that would fall
into pragmatics in more classical frameworks (cf. Recanati’s treatment of
34 See also Butterll (2012) and Pacherie (2011).
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‘what is said’). After a very brief overview of the theoretical background,
I turn to some more specic issues, in particular to multimodal composi-
tionality, i.e. the linguistic phenomenon that many modalities contribute
to utterance meaning at once.
2.2.1 Construction Grammar: From Cognitive Semantics to
Philosophy
In linguistics, construction grammar (CxG) has attracted more and more at-
tention over recent years. I shall only briey summarise the main theses of
the theory. For detailed expositions, I refer the reader to Fillmore (1993) and
Goldberg (1995).35 CxG deviates signicantly from the standard. The most
important thing is that no strict distinction is drawn anymore between the
lexicon and the syntax.36 Lexical and syntactical information is still en-
coded (and dierentiated), but both ‘kinds’ of information are handled in
largely the same manner, i.e. both are represented in the form of construc-
tions. Constructions are form–meaning pairings, the simplest of which are
morphemes. Accordingly, all linguistic information is stored, not in the
lexicon and the grammar, but in what is often called the ‘constructicon’
(Goldberg 1995, 5). In similar fashion, construction grammar dismisses the
semantics/pragmatics distinction. This is particularly important for the
present discussion, because of the close relationship between this very dis-
tinction on the one hand and primary and derived/pragmatic meaning on
the other hand.
One of CxG’s major principles is that every sign is a form–meaning
pair. Interestingly, syntactic constructions are treated as bearing their own
meanings—contrary to all alternative approaches in which syntactic rules
map meanings of lower-level constituents (morphemes, words, phrases)
onto complex meanings. Such rules usually do not bear their own mean-
ings, the meaning of a complex expression—eventually, the meaning of a
35 The list of obligatory standard references includes: Croft (2001), Fillmore (1988, 1988),
Goldberg (1995, 2006), Langacker (1987), Lako (1987, 467–858). Comprehensive over-
views can be found in: Fischer & Stefanowitsch (2007), Lasch & Ziem (2011), Lasch &
Ziem (2014), Stefanowitsch & Fischer (2008), and Ziem & Lasch (2013).
36 Besides the mentioned standard references, the presentation developed here and in the
following is heavily inspired by the comprehensive overview in Ziem & Lasch (2013).
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sentence—depends solely on the meanings of its parts (Tomasello 2003a).
In CxG, all form–meaning pairs are constructions: from words to particular
syntactic arrangements. A construction is recursively dened as follows:37
C is a construction i C is a form–meaning pair 〈 Fi, Si〉 such
that some aspect of Fi or some aspect of Si is not strictly pre-
dictable from C’s component parts or from other previously
established constructions. (Goldberg 1995, 4)
Before I turn to the discussion, let me just very briey give you an im-
pression of what a constructionist representation of linguistic information
looks like. The formal apparatus of (some theory families of) CxG stems
from head-driven phrase structure grammar. Although there are, as far
as linguistic analysis is concerned, subtle dierences between HPSG and
CxG, they are similar and often even equivalent in regards to their rep-
resentation format (Müller 2013b, 248–253).38 The details do not matter
here, this is just to give you the avour of what we are talking about. The
most important thing is that both grammars represent linguistic informa-
tion as attribute-value matrices. The attributes encompass both syntactic
and semantic information. The respective representations license certain
structures in such a way that a complex expression (a phrase, a sentence)
is grammatical i the corresponding attribute-value matrices of its parts
are compatible. They are compatible, basically, if their values match, or,
otherwise, if one of two corresponding values is left unspecied. A simple
example would be a case in which you already have a representation of a
verb phrase that lacks only a subject to form a complete sentence. The verb
37 This is the ‘standard denition’. A newer version, also from Goldberg, is broadened
in that entrenchment is explicitly allowed as a sucient criterion for constructions,
even in cases in which their meaning is otherwise predictable from other constructions
(Goldberg 2006, 5). Linguistically, this dierence is signicant; from a philosophical point
of view, it is not particularly relevant in the present context. Here I am primarily inter-
ested in whether the research paradigm of construction grammar is compatible with
established theories of meaning in philosophy. As far as that compatibility is concerned,
there does not seem to be a dierence between Goldberg’s two denitions of “construc-
tion”.
38 Other CxG variants that are less inspired by HPSG are sometimes characterised as ‘cog-
nitive’ (Ziem & Lasch 2013). If not indicated otherwise, the dierences between indi-
vidual construction grammars are irrelevant for my argumentation.
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Transitive Construction
SYN
[
CAT v
VOICE active
]
VAL

[
ROLE
[
GF obj
DA –
]]

Figure 2.2: Representation of Transitive Construction (Müller 2013b, 242).
phrase, then, constrains the possible values of the subject. For instance, it
might demand a noun phrase that meets certain requirements. The result
of applying a compatible noun phrase to the verb phrase is a sentence li-
censed by the grammar (assuming that the verb phrase was constructed
accordingly). To put it more generally, the grammatical sentences in CxG
are exactly those constructions that are built up from compatible lower-
level constructions, with morphemes probably being at the lowest level.
As I already noted, in construction grammar everything from words to
syntactic structures is represented as constructions. The ‘Transitive Con-
struction’, for instance, might look like gure 2.2.
Here you can see the representation of linguistic information by means
of attribute-value matrices. The function, so to speak, of the construction
is to restrict the possible values of certain attributes. In this case, it restricts
the value of ‘DA’ (distinguished argument) to ‘–’, which just means that it
is that argument that would not be the subject of the sentence in active
voice. All these linguistic details do not matter for the moment. What
is important to note is that the grammaticality of complex constructions
is determined according to the values of lower-level constructions. Plus,
syntactic restrictions are encoded on a par with semantic information.
When it comes to semantic theories in philosophy, the discussions of-
ten develop independently from actual linguistic theories. This holds in
particular for grammar theory. The thing is, though, that developments
in linguistics need to be taken into account by philosophers of language
working in semantics—a truism, actually. Otherwise, one’s theory is likely
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to lack empirical underpinning. This is a general point that not only con-
cerns semantics but also, for example, language acquisition. You might
think that philosophers are dealing only with non-empirical questions and,
therefore, issues negotiated in philosophy of language are largely inde-
pendent of ndings in the sciences, in particular in linguistics. This is ne
as far as it goes. It is ne if the claim is only that there need be no ‘direct’
connection between both theories in such a way that the results of one the-
ory are deployed in the respective other theory.39 This is so because there
is no data that we would need to account for by combining philosophical
and linguistic views on semantics.
However, if the claim is that both areas are completely independent, then
it is probably false. Generally, philosophical theories in semantics must be
compatible with results produced in empirical disciplines such as linguist-
ics, psychology, anthropology, etc., i.e. these theories and their philosoph-
ical counterparts should not contradict each other (cf. also 7.1.3). Some
general considerations justify this claim. The most general background as-
sumption is that one’s (philosophical) theory calls for psychological (/lin-
guistic) reality. Let us rst have a look at language acquisition theories.
In philosophical terms, acquisition theories belong to the realm of founda-
tional (or reductive) theories, i.e. they are theories that explicate the under-
lying properties that constitute semantic properties (Speaks 2011). In this
case, they explicate the underlying properties that amount to the ontogeny
of semantic competency. For example, a foundational theory would explain
the origin of the relationship that holds between, for example, (the word
type) “apple” and its corresponding meaning, i.e. ‘apple’. A given theory
of meaning must be compatible with one existing acquisition theory—this
will typically be the currently accepted theory—for the following reason.
Assume it were incompatible with all acquisition theories. The latter de-
scribe how we, human beings, come to speak a language with certain fea-
tures. If both theories were incompatible, two cases may be distinguished.
First case: either of the theories might be false. If the semantic theory
were false, that would be bad news anyway. So we may ignore this case.
To assume—all else equal—that the psychological theory could be false be-
39 Like when the laws of optics and of physics are combined to interpret observations of
the Sun via telescopes.
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cause of its assumed incompatibility with a competing philosophical the-
ory is highly implausible. For “false” in this context may be taken to mean,
roughly, ‘empirically falsied’. Ex hypothesi, the psychological theory is
the only empirically informed theory (of the two). To take incompatibility
with a non-empirical theory as evidence for empirical inadequacy is unjus-
tied. One is therefore justied in excluding this option. The second case is:
the philosophical theory might not call for psychological reality. This op-
tion would allow for contradiction between the theories in question, since
however language actually is acquired according to the psychological the-
ory, the philosophical theory might be just one way of accounting for the
available data. This looks like a possible strategy, but is has an evident
drawback. Since language acquisition theories are the only theories that
explain how natural languages are acquired, every theory that is incom-
patible with these theories and that denies any call for psychological real-
ity could not possibly be a theory of our language (e.g. English). It might
be a theory of something similar (i.e. grammar-wise supercially similar,
but acquired dierently); however, nding a theory of meaning that ts
with actual language use is an ‘all-or-nothing game’, as it were. Explaining
something ‘similar’ to natural language is not explaining natural language
at all.
Mutatis mutandis, the same reasoning applies to the relation between
philosophical and linguistic theories ofmeaning. They also need to be com-
patible. The only case in which they could end up being incompatible is
when the philosophical theory is a product of ‘armchair philosophy’, i.e.
the result of (and only of) a priori methods. For if both are empirically
informed and both deal with the same subject matter, then there can’t be
any ‘competing’ theories, strictly speaking. As a matter of fact, it should
always be possible in such cases to favour one theory over the other on
the basis of objective criteria of theory choice (simplicity, universality, el-
egance, etc.). Naïvely speaking, there can always be only one best theory
in the empirical realm (in the long run), in which case there is no actual
‘competition’. In real life, this is a bit more complicated, because, for ex-
ample, people tend to disagree about the appropriate set of theory choice
criteria, or they disagree about how to apply them to a particular case. Be
that as it may, if any of the two approaches is empirically adequate, it is
the linguistic theory. As above, no matter what the philosophical theory is
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dealing with in such a case, it is not English (or, for that matter, any other
natural language). Therefore, if one wants to account for the semantics of
natural language, one better ensure that the philosophy ts in with current
linguistics.
Another background assumption is that empirical evidence is a means of
theory choice. All else equal, if two competing philosophical theories are to
be evaluated, one of which contradicts current linguistic theories, then the
respective other theory is better o. Conformity of philosophical theories
with empirical theories can always be regarded as indirect evidence for em-
pirical adequacy, for the scientic success of the latter heavily depends on
their adequacy. A nal important background assumption concerns con-
tradictions between theories. Firstly, theories within semantics dier sig-
nicantly as towards the notion of ‘meaning’ they involve. Secondly, there
are huge dierences in regard to the semantic descriptions in philosophical
theories and scientic theories. One assumption needed in order to estab-
lish the claim that theories of both kinds must be compatible is that there
is a way of how to verify whether this is the case or not. Without further
argument, I assume that this can be done. I shall show in what follows that
this is unproblematic.
This digression serves the purpose of preparing an argument for the
rather strong connection between empirical and philosophical theories.
The important thing to note is that if you claim your theory to be about
the semantics of natural languages in the form they are actually used, you
better make sure it is compatible with the relevant empirical theories. This
is where CxG comes into play. This is, for obvious reasons, not the right
place for a detailed discussion of the status of CxG within linguistics.40 Of
course, the argument to follow ultimately depends on the success of con-
struction grammar, since there is no apparent incongruence between the
assumption of primary meanings and other grammar theories (in partic-
ular, Chomskian generative grammar). So, the argument against primary
meaning at hand hinges on the empirical plausibility of CxG. Be that as it
may, there will always be competing theories and CxG is just one of many.
40 Müller (2013b, 237–258) reviews the current state of construction grammar and provides
a comprehensive bibliography on the subject matter. Stefanowitsch & Fischer (2008) is
an introductory textbook focusing solely on CxG. The most recent overview in English
is Michaelis (2006). Again, the most recent overview is Ziem & Lasch (2013).
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In a nutshell, the weakest claim to be defended in the following is this: all
else equal, a philosophical theory of meaning is better o if it dispenses
with the ordinary notion of primary meaning explicated in terms of refer-
ence.41
Given the recent popularity of construction grammar in linguistics, it is
worth the eort to see whether the theory is compatible with established
philosophical (semantic) theories. For the moment, though, I will focus
on a particular aspect of the theory, namely its connection to ordinary
primary meaning. The success of CxG might be interpreted as evidence
against referential semantics, this is because there is no place within the
theory for any such notions as reference relations and truth-conditional
functions (se also above). The most obvious counter-evidence is that one
of the arguments for primary meaning can be reversed: I have shown that
the semantics/pragmatics distinction justies primary meanings, because,
very roughly put, pragmatic meaning ‘derives’ from stable lexical mean-
ing (i.e. primary meaning). In construction grammar, on the other hand,
the semantics/pragmatics distinction vanishes. ‘Ocially’, it is still there,
i.e. the values of constructions are labelled accordingly. But no principled
distinction is made any longer; the pragmatic ‘principles’ are handled as if
they were semantic information:
It seems appropriate to allow the notion of compositionality to
comprise [. . . ] ‘pragmatic’ instructions embedded in the gram-
mar that provide the addressee with a certain semantic struc-
ture and instruct him or her to nd content in the context that
satises that structure. Consider utterance of a sentence like
[the following]:
Kim won’t (even) get question eight right let alone
Sandy get question nine.
[. . . ] In this example, we have to think that the problems can
be arranged on a scale (presumably of diculty) and students
arranged on a scale (presumably of ability) where the scales
are interrelated in such a way that a more able student will
41 Here I am tacitly assuming that this leaves compatibility with other grammar theories
unaected.
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answer correctly any problem that a less able one will and a
less able student will miss any problem that a more able one
misses. (Kay & Michaelis 2012, 2283–2284)
It is no trivial matter where exactly to draw the distinction between se-
mantics and pragmatics.42 In any case, though, semantics is the study of
meanings. Or, more precisely, semantics is the study of lexical, context-
independent meaning43, if you single out the meanings of particular utter-
ances in particular circumstances as an independent eld of study (which
would then be pragmatics). Interestingly, you need not be exactly clear
about where to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics in or-
der to establish the claim that in construction grammar, the distinction is
more or less obsolete.44 This is because CxG still employs meanings in
its ‘lexical’ representations of constructions. That is to say, by their very
denition, constructions are form–meaning pairings and, therefore, they
all have meaning. No matter what you take pragmatics to be, it certainly
encompasses a distinct class of pragmatic ‘principles’45. These principles
or pragmatic regularities, however, are incorporated into constructionists’
meaning representations (see Kay & Michaelis (2012) and Ziem & Lasch
(2013, 14, 25–26), for example).
To be fair, many constructionist analyses ignore pragmatic issues to a
large extent. These are either left out completely (e.g. Michaelis 2006), or
they are mentioned only in passing (e.g. Kay & Michaelis 2012).46 Still,
if pragmatics is part of one’s analysis, then the ndings are modelled as
42 See Gendler Szabó (2006) for a review.
43 Note that the context independence of meanings is independent from the context de-
pendence of the expressions modelled. For instance, a formal-semantic description of the
meaning of “this” might essentially be ‘context-dependent’ in that it describes how the
referent of “this” depends on context. The meaning itself, though, is independent from
any such context (e.g. ‘refers to what’s most salient in the relevant context’).
44 ‘More or less’ because, judging from the terminology used by construction grammarians,
one may easily get the impression that the distinction still plays a role.
45 In particular, principles that involve references to intentional explanations—e.g. ‘If the
speaker utters something obviously false, he must mean something dierent’. Classically,
Gricean maximes count as paradigm examples of pragmatic principles.
46 Cf. also Östman (2005, 125):
Very little has been done on pragmatics proper and discourse proper in re-
lation to Construction Grammar. It is often recognized that there is ‘some-
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part of the construction in just the same way as semantic information is
represented:47
The CxG notation relies on three major devices:48 boxes-within-
boxes diagrams for representing constituent structure, feature
structures for detailed grammatical information, and co-index-
ation for keeping track of unication relations. [. . . ]
syn [. . . ]
prag constructional pragmatics & information-structure spe-
cications
val semantics of the construction
phon [. . . ] (Fried & Östman 2004, 25–26)
In similar fashion, some constructionist approaches combine CxG rep-
resentations with data drawn from conversational analysis. This is relev-
ant to our present discussion for the very same reason as in the case of
pragmatics proper: normally, one would want to explain the meaning of a
given term in a particular conversational situation by referring to primary
meanings. However, this strategy is again unavailable here because con-
versational aspects of meaning are already included in the constructions
from which sentence meaning is derived in the rst place. As before, this
makes it seem rather implausible to assume that one’s basic semantic units
can have primary meaning in the sense of mere reference relations.49 Here
thing’ more out there, but what it is has largely remained a waste-paper
basket.
47 Cf. also Wide (2009, 131). Fried & Östman (2004) discuss the format of construction
specications more generally (see especially pp. 25–76).
48 In this general form, this claim is probably untenable. For one thing, this might be correct
for HPSG derivatives of CxG (cf. their mentioning ‘unication relations’ here), but it is
certainly false for most ‘informal’ sketches of construction grammar, especially those in
the tradition of spoken-language research.
49 The reader who is worried that I might confuse issues of communication with issues of
semantics is asked to have a look at chapter 8 before reading further.
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is an example of how conversational aspects are modelled within a CxG
framework:
form:
communication partner: turn (TRP) speaker: PM
but-clause
meaning:
topic continuity
successful contact, perception, understanding
acceptance of contribution
solidary interpersonal function (Fischer 2013, 200)
The ‘Turn-initial Pragmatic Marker’ Construction50
It is irrelevant for the argument at hand that not all varieties of con-
struction grammar incorporate pragmatic or conversational aspects. Even
those approaches that focus solely on semantics, largely ignoring the ac-
tual communication situation, acknowledge the role played by context. It
is just that this aspect is often left out of the analysis. In principle, contex-
tual factors may be modelled in all variants of the CxG family. Moreover, in
the case of formal varieties such as sign-based CxG (Michaelis 2013) or uid
CxG (Steels 2011), pragmatics is often excluded for reasons of convenience,
although its relevance is widely accepted in principle.
This means that, if one wants to stick to the semantics/pragmatics dis-
tinction, pragmatics becomes—at best—part of semantics, i.e. roughly in
the sense that semantics would be the study of meanings, while pragmat-
ics would deal with a certain subclass of them. Apparently, such a weak
notion of pragmatics is, in fact, not solid enough to back the idea of cash-
ing out primary meaning in terms of reference relations. In the argument
50 “TRP” is short for “transition relevance place”, “PM” stands for “pragmatic marker” (like
“yeah” or “okay”). The terminology of the items listed under ‘meaning’ stems from con-
versational analysis and is more or less self-explanatory. “Solidary interpersonal func-
tion” refers to what is usually known as ‘face-saving strategy’, i.e. communication acts
that serve the purpose of signalling politeness against the interlocutor, the one from
whom the turn had been taken.
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for primary meaning that is based on the semantics/pragmatics distinc-
tion, pragmatics plays the following role: starting with mere preference
relations, the pragmatic principles are functions from contexts to mean-
ings in context. Such a procedure presupposes stable lexical meanings. In
CxG, however, although there is still pragmatics, there are no such relev-
ant ‘principles’, i.e. nothing that takes meaning (plus x) as input and yields
(other) meaning as output. Accordingly, the way pragmatic information is
handled in construction grammar is inappropriate to support the ordinary
notion of primary meaning recurring to relations of reference.
This is not to say that a theory framework such as construction grammar,
which does not allow for a principled distinction between semantics proper
and pragmatics, still allows semantic information to play the same role as
in other frameworks. Semantics can only be the input of pragmatic rules
if indeed there were such rules. For example, if the intonation of “a is F”
were such that it triggered an ironic interpretation, then that interpretation
would be that ‘a is non-F’. Conversely, if there were no such rules, there
is no need for semantic information to serve as ‘input’ to such processes.
Hence, no matter what the distinction between semantic and pragmatic in-
formation in constructionist theories (other than being labelled ‘semantic’
and ‘pragmatic’, respectively), it is not the traditional one—that informa-
tion of the former kind serves as input to processes of the latter kind.
2.2.2 The Tomasellian Programme
Another argument against primary meaning stems from developmental
psychology. Tomasello and colleagues have stressed repeatedly the import-
ance of gestures for the ability of (human) animals to develop a language
(e.g. Tomasello 2008). Developing gestures as simple communication signs
is an initial but very important step towards this end, they claim. At rst
sight, this seems quite irrelevant for the question at hand. But it is not, as
I will show in a moment. One important background assumption in what
follows is that when it comes to semantics, gestures and other commu-
nication signs—typically, words and sentences—are handled on a par, i.e.
no principled distinction is or can be drawn between them with respect
to their ‘ability’ to contribute to complete utterances. From this, one may
infer that if there are primary meanings, gestures have them (assuming
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primary meaning is a universal feature of natural language signs). Thus,
if we are able to show that gestures do not exhibit primary meaning, this
allows us to infer that gestures provide counter-evidence against primary
meaning. Therefore, the task is to show that this is actually the case: ges-
tures can hardly have primary meaning, if primary meanings are supposed
to represent relations from signs to the world.
For a start, consider the following randomly chosen examples:
A man in a bar wants another drink; he waits until the bar-
tender looks at him and then points to his empty shotglass.
Gloss: Attend to the emptiness of the glass; please ll it up
with liquor. (Tomasello 2008, 63)
At a loud construction site, one worker pantomimes to another
ten meters away as if he were using a chainsaw. Gloss: Imagine
me doing this; bring me the thing I need to do it. (68)
The examples are supposed to show two things: rstly, the ‘meaning’ of
a given gestural sign varies enormously from one occasion to the other;
secondly, no formally speciable context dependency can account for this.
The rst observation, I take it, is more or less clear. So, let me concentrate
on the second.
In all of the following, I take for granted that this is not the right place
to defend the merits of Tomasello’s research agenda. For the most part,
I will restrict myself to merely reporting on his view—and to draw those
conclusions that are relevant to philosophical theorising, given the results
established by Tomasello and his colleagues. Given this, let us return to
the question why there are many gestures for which it seems impossible
to trace back their meaning to some formally speciable context depend-
ency. Why not assume gestures work like indexicals? you might ask. We
have theories of how to handle indexicals, so there is no problem with ges-
tures.51 If the context sensitivity of gestures could be captured by charac-
ters,52 nothing could prevent us from saying their meanings were primary.
51 There is a massive amount of literature solely dealing with indexicals. The locus classicus
in this context is Kaplan (1989).
52 “Character” is Kaplan’s now-classical term for a function from contexts of utterance to
truth-conditional content. The basic idea here is that the meaning (as opposed to its se-
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Granted, their primary meanings are not lexical meanings, strictly speak-
ing, but the same holds for the meanings of usual indexicals like “this”. Just
provide a context of utterance and you immediately get full-blown mean-
ing including reference, which then may be used, relative to a given set of
pragmatic rules, to derive meanings in context. This strategy suers from
the following shortcoming: in a nutshell, it is impossible to state appropri-
ate characters of gestures.
Let me explain. The character of a term or gesture—i.e. meaning minus
contextual values—must be describable in such a way as to cover all pos-
sible cases. That is to say, its semantic description needs to be weakened so
as to be applicable to all counterfactual circumstances (contexts) in which
the term may be applied. This sounds a bit abstract; a simple example
will help to clarify the idea. A term with a ‘normal’ (complete) meaning is
“Chris”, for instance. It simply denotes the person called ‘Chris’. A term
like “he” might be described as already ‘weakened’ in the following sense:
although we do not know, independently from context, its complete mean-
ing (at least not its (actual) reference), what we do know is quite a lot.
Namely that, in all contexts, “he” would usually denote the last male per-
son mentioned in the discourse (be it a conversation, a text, or whatever).
This meaning is xed (I assume) and fairly complete. Even ‘weaker’, then,
is the semantic description we have of a term like “this”. As with “he”, we do
not know (in advance) its reference. But this time we actually know even
less, as linguistic rules alone do not suce in this case to determine the ac-
tual referent. The contextual information must include also non-linguistic
data: information about pointing gestures, for instance.
Primary meaning is the information about an atomic semantic unit of
our language that we have prior to encountering specic instances. The
semantic information is, as I have just demonstrated, relatively limited in
mantic value in specic contexts of utterance) can be dened or characterised in terms
of token-reexive rules. For instance, “I” gets associated with a rule such as “The se-
mantic value of an instance of ‘I’ in a given context is the speaker of ‘I’ in that context”.
The ‘token-reexivity’ lies in the fact that the meaning of a given token of an index-
ical expression can’t be stated without referring to the same token again. Dening the
character of “I” is comparatively easy; “here” and “now” (and cognates) are signicantly
harder to dene, as their actual referents (relative to contexts of utterance) arguably de-
pend on a variety of background assumptions shared between speaker and hearer (e.g.
world knowledge). The locus classicus for indexicals more generally is Perry (1986).
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the case of “this” compared to “Chris”. Nevertheless, it is there. It might be
characterised thus: “this” designates the object that is contextually most
salient, with salience being determined by the linguistic context and a cor-
responding pointing gesture.
The point is that, when it comes to gestures as such, it is question-
able whether it really makes sense any more to speak of meanings proper
(though it is not completely incomprehensible to do so). I have shown
that in order to determine the complete meaning of (a token of) “this”,
one needs to know its character (e.g. ‘the most salient object in the vi-
cinity’) plus further linguistic information (the discourse into which the
token is embedded) plus contextual information (information about bod-
ily movements of the speaker)53. The ‘character’ of a gesture is, in the
sense described above, even weaker, i.e. almost no information about the
meaning of a gesture tokening is available beforehand. The relevant in-
formation thus always needs to be read o the specic situation in which
a gesture gets instantiated. This is apparent if one takes a look at Toma-
sello’s examples. In addition to all the information necessary in the case of
indexicals, one needs to know the ‘common ground’ shared between the
relevant interlocutors. Common ground is knowledge about the situation
that is shared by the participants of a given situation (Tomasello 2008, ch.
3).54 The cited examples strongly suggest that the stable, lexical part of
meaning (i.e. meaning minus context minus linguistic information minus
common ground) would be so thin that it seems absurd to take this for the
‘primary meaning’ of a given gesture.
If you assume that the primary meaning of a pointing gesture is that
which is contextually salient depending on the linguistic embedding, the con-
text including bodily movements of the speaker, and the common ground
of the participating speakers, then this amounts to saying that you know
hardly anything in advance. It could be just anything. Contrary to “this”,
one does not even know for sure that the referent is a (concrete) object of
53 If you nd pointing gestures or bodily movements unconvincing, you may amend the
list of contextual information that is necessary to compute the whole meaning of a term,
in particular its referent. This just complicates the issue but does not aect the point at
hand.
54 Horton (2005), Liebal (2009).
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any sort. The gesture might even denote a situation. For example, consider
the following scenario:
Suppose that I and you are walking to the library, and out of
the blue I point for you in the direction of some bicycles lean-
ing against the library wall. Your reaction will very likely be
“Huh?,” as you have no idea which aspect of the situation I
am indicating or why I am doing so, since, by itself, pointing
means nothing. But if some days earlier you broke up with
your boyfriend in a particularly nasty way, and we both know
this mutually, and one of the bicycles is his, which we also both
know mutually, then the exact same pointing gesture in the ex-
act same physical situation might mean something very com-
plex like “Your boyfriend’s already at the library (so perhaps
we should skip it).” On the other hand, if one of the bicycles is
the one that we both know mutually was stolen from you re-
cently, then the exact same pointing gesture will mean some-
thing completely dierent. Or perhaps we have been wonder-
ing together if the library is open at this late hour, and I am
indicating the presence of many bicycles outside as a sign that
it is. (Tomasello 2008, 3)
So one interpretation oered by Tomasello is that the pointing means ‘Look!
Your boyfriend is still in the library!’ (given appropriate background as-
sumptions). Notably, there are an innite number of possible interpreta-
tions and, hence, objects, in the broadest sense, that might be denoted by
particular gestures, because there is an innite stock of background know-
ledge that might be shared by the participants in a discourse. As I already
said, this is no conclusive argument against the ordinary way of conceiv-
ing of primary meaning. It is just supposed to show that if you are ready
to call this ‘primary meaning’, you must be defending a very weak notion
of lexical meaning that allows for some atomic signs to possibly denote
almost anything.
Besides, the assumed ‘meaning’ of a pointing gesture is incomplete any-
way, I suppose. Because even if it worked, the only thing it would do is
determining the reference. While being one of the major components of
meanings, it is at least questionable whether reference really is everything
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interesting about semantics. Note also that some important details have
been skipped over by subsuming dierent things under the heading ‘point-
ing gesture’. The second example (‘construction site’) involves so-called
‘iconic gestures’, which contribute (propositional) content that goes bey-
ond mere reference. The question, then, is how to individuate dierent
gestures. How many are there? When are two gestures type-distinct? Are
the meanings of all types of gestures learnt separately? These are non-
trivial questions, which one needs to answer if gestures are supposed to
have primary meaning.
To sum up, gestures represent a second example of empirical evidence
against primary meaning conceived of as reference relations, given that
gestures are treated on a par with words. According to Davidson’s distinc-
tion between a prior theory and a passing theory (Davidson 1986), what
enters into the former are primary meanings, the things we know about the
meaning of a sign prior to a situation in which it is used. I have shown that
in the case of gestures this amounts to saying that primary meanings could
be so thin as to allow for just any denotation. Therefore, the quintessence of
the evidence collected above in regard to Davidson’s ‘prior/passing theory’
distinction is that one’s ‘prior theory’, i.e. the kind of information available
before one enters into a specic communication situation, can’t possibly
consist solely of knowledge of reference relations and truth-conditional
functions.
2.2.3 Multimodality
Keeping the above discussion of gestures in mind, it seems natural to link
these results with the discussion of compositionality. The semantic frame-
work that will emerge throughout this book is based on the assumption
that utterance meaning, as opposed to mere ‘sentence meaning’, plays a
crucial role in semantics. In this view, describing the mechanism by virtue
of which actual referents of referring expression are determined is part and
parcel of a theory of meaning. In this regard, gestures gure prominently,
as they ‘contribute’ essentially to utterance meaning. More importantly,
gestures contribute to utterance meaning in virtue of having speciable
meaning. In light of these considerations, there seems to be an interesting
link from compositionality back to gestures, which will be discussed be-
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low by contrasting it with classical views about reference xing. Gestures
thus far have played a very marginal role in linguistic semantics and espe-
cially in philosophy of language.55 The only theme occurring from time to
time in work on indexicals is indeed reference xing.56 A typical instance
of which would be:
That <pointing gesture> is a table.
Actually, starting from pointing gestures used to x reference gives me a
good opportunity to motivate the relevance of gestures for semantics in
general. In the above example, a pointing gesture—which deliberately is
not specied any further—serves the purpose of singling out an entity in
the immediate visual vicinity. The semantics of indexicals is commonly
given in terms of a token-reexive description along the lines of
“This” used in context c refers to the entity that, when “this”
is uttered, is the most salient entity in c.
The means employed to ‘achieve’ salience are diverse. In the easiest cases,
the linguistic context (i.e. usually the immediately preceding sentences)
uniquely qualies a specic entity as the most salient one relative to this
particular context. In cases where the linguistic context does not suce
to disambiguate “this”, reference is typically xed by accompanying ges-
tures, normally a pointing gesture. A third possibility, of course, is that a
given entity is the most salient one in a context even without being made
so either by verbal nor non-verbal signs. A simple example of this variant
would be a thunderstorm suddenly approaching in an otherwise average
situation: for example, two people standing on a meadow on a sunny after-
noon when one of them, shortly after a loud noise, gives a quizzical look. If,
in such a situation, the other person were to say “That’s a thunderstorm”,
55 Though see Gärdenfors & Warglien (2013).
56 For example, Newen (1996) points out that
If one of a variety of equally salient objects is highlighted by a pointing
gesture of the speaker, then the deictic expression occurring in a corres-
ponding demonstrative utterance refers to that object that is highlighted by
this pointing gesture. (1996, 87, my translation)
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the reference of “that” would not need to be xed by any extra means, be
it verbal or non-verbal. The context makes the thunder salient all by itself.
All this, to be sure, requires a lot of additional theory ‘in the background’
in order to work properly. Most importantly, one would need to have an ac-
count of ‘standard contexts’, which is hard to get anyway. Also, the mech-
anisms by which entities ‘increase’ their salience relative to contexts are
not suciently clear up to now. Most remarks in the literature are suggest-
ive at best in this regard. For instance, if the context is altered accordingly,
it is not that clear any more that a pointing gesture to a table, executed by
the current speaker, makes the table the most salient entity. Altering the
context means altering the standards according to which something counts
as more or less salient. Besides the issues involved with standard contexts
and salience, it is, in general, unclear whether the object referred to is the
most salient one in the rst place. For example, Borg (2004b) discusses the
relevance of speaker intentions in determining referents. Her conclusions
dier from my own, since, for example, reference xing for her is not a
proper aspect of semantics.57 Be that as it may, reference xing seems to
involve a lot of dierent aspects: standard assumptions, salience, speaker
intentions.58 However, all these background assumptions are not particu-
larly relevant for the present issue. For the moment, allow me to just take
for granted that some account or other can be developed that can handle
these problems.
A pointing gesture can be conceived as bearing its own semantics. See-
ing pointing gestures (and other gestures) that way helps in understanding
how they gure in human communication and is indeed a necessary con-
57 Her basic idea here is that establishing actual referents is a matter of utterances and,
hence, important only for communication. Actual reference, in her view, can only be
resolved ‘post-semantically’ via intention-reading processes. The realm of semantics
is restricted to just those aspects of meaning that are ‘available’ independently from
contexts of utterance, i.e., roughly, Kaplanian characters. In the present context, what is
relevant is that Borg acknowledges that, still, actual referents are determined by contexts,
broadly construed (including intentions and intention ascriptions).
58 Whereby I do not want to invoke the impression that speaker intentions can directly alter
meaning (as in Humpty Dumpty scenarios). Rather, the claim is that the use of indexicals
can only be explained by assuming that speakers are guided by certain intentions (and
assumptions about which intentions are recognisable by typical interlocutors, and so
on), and that hearers’ interpretations are intention-guided as well. I return to this in 8.3.
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dition for understanding gestures at all. To see what we are getting at,
let me rst recapitulate how pointing gestures gure in classical semantic
theories in philosophy. The meaning of “this”, as I illustrated above, can
be determined independently from what exactly determines salience in a
context. Its meaning can be stated in terms of a rule that relativises its
reference to a particular context. The pointing gesture, on the other hand,
contributes to the semantics of the overall utterance only by chance: any
other means that similarly would have increased salience in that context
would have had the very same eect.
Compare this with the semantics of “() is a table”, which arguably in most
philosophical accounts of meaning is an open sentence which requires only
one more constituent, which determines the reference, to make a full sen-
tence. Truth-theoretically speaking, “() is a table” is true i the entity to
which the expression that lls the argument position refers is a table. The
pointing gesture does not contribute to the semantic value in any reason-
able sense. The only thing it ‘does’ is make some entity or other salient (or
more salient at any rate). The semantic contribution needed to turn “() is a
table” into a complete sentence—and hence, in a particular context, into a
complete utterance—is the one by “this”.
This view underestimates the semantic contribution of gestures to the
semantics of whole utterances. The thing is that many gestures are signi-
cantly more complex than mere pointing gestures (Mittelberg & Waugh
2009, Müller 2013a). Many gestures even have properties that are typically
considered dening features of verbal signs (e.g. conventionality). Gestures
interact in very dierent ways with verbal signs and contribute in interest-
ing ways to the semantics of utterances. Still, let me start with pointing
gestures rst. Pointing gestures are never used without communication
intentions. Classifying arm movements as ‘pointing gestures’ implies that
these arm movements serve certain purposes.59 It might even be true that
their main purpose is increasing the salience of particular objects in given
contexts (the ones pointed to, probably). Be that as it may, pointing ges-
59 For the moment I will be focusing specically on arm movements. These are the most
important pointing gestures. It is possible to point to some entity by using other parts
of the body, e.g. by moving one’s eyes or legs. For sake of simplicity, I restrict myself
to arm movements though. Everything I shall say is intended to equally apply to other
bodily movements.
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tures, qua being pointing gestures, do not occur outside of communication
contexts. In other words, classifying something as a pointing gesture im-
plies that what matters is communication.
2.2.4 Compositionality Applied to Multimodality
My above comments are based on the assumption that dierent types of se-
mantic units (words, gestures, intonations, postures, facial expressions, and
so on) share a common sense in which they are meaningful. Put another
way, since meanings are ultimately nothing over and above descriptions,
meaning statements concerning dierent meaningful types are theoretic-
ally on a par.
Ultimately, the objects of study of a theory of meaning are utterances.60
Several types of ‘signals’ contribute to the overall meaning of utterances.
This aspect of semantics is called multimodality. A problem arises as soon
as one tries to link multimodality with compositionality. In classical the-
ories of meaning, the meaning of a word like “pet” (i.e. ‘pet’), when it gets
compositionally combined with the meaning of “sh” (i.e. ‘sh’), must be
‘pet sh’ (that is, the meaning of “pet sh”). Considerations like these nor-
mally serve the purpose of defeating particular theories of meaning: since,
for example, a prototypical pet is a dog and a prototypical sh is plaice, the
prototype theory is claimed to be false (Fodor & Lepore 1996), for a proto-
typical pet sh is a goldsh.61 For the present purposes, these considera-
tions are irrelevant though. The point is just the following: “pet” and “sh”
belong to the same domain (linguistic signs). So it is relatively straight-
forward to see how they can be combined to form larger units. When
it comes to multimodal compositionality, however, the question is: how
can semantic descriptions of dierent modal domains be integrated into
one compositionally combined semantic description of a full utterance?
60 This is highly controversial. I give a detailed justication in 8.2.3 and 8.3.
61 There are a lot of tacit assumptions at work here, all of which, however, are irrelevant
in the present context. For example, one central assumption in the argument is that
compositionality ensures that, e.g., prototypes combine compositionally: the meaning
of a compound expression is, or so the argument goes, the ‘sum’ of meanings of its
constituents. I ignore these niceties here, as ‘ordinary’ examples of compositionality are
mentioned here only to serve as a starting point for my discussion of gestures.
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The only reasonable solution seems to be reverse engineering, because the
only available information to start with is utterance meaning, i.e. the ‘end
product’ of communication processes.
Reverse engineering is a method of ascertaining the production process
of an object by deconstructing the end product. For example, (there are
people who think that) Chinese engineers copy German cars (e.g. Mer-
cedes’s GL) by rst trying to nd out how the end product was built. They
have no access to the relevant construction plans; they are thus forced to
work with the car itself as their only source of evidence. In the present case,
the end product is utterance meaning; the construction plans are the atomic
semantic constituents and their mode of composition. Reverse engineering
applied to linguistics means: deconstructing utterance meaning—which is
given—into its constituents. In the case at hand, the task is ‘simplied’ by
the fact that parts of the ‘construction plans’ are already known. We know
the meaning of the verbal constituents of multimodally composed utter-
ances. This amounts to saying that in these cases, the meaning contributed
by a gesture must be utterance meaning minus verbal aspects.
Here is a toy example that illustrates this. Instantiations of “that” in
conjunction with a particular pointing gesture have (relative to specic
background assumptions) a determinate referent. Typically—though not
necessarily—the object referred to is the object pointed at. Notably, estab-
lishing reference is achieved by combining the interpretations of pointing
gestures and of the word “that”. Reference is an integral part of semantic
theories; therefore, assigning interpretations to gesture and verbal sign in
such a way that their combination can uniquely determine a particular ref-
erence is primarily a semantic task (and does not belong to pragmatics).
Given that the reference is known, determining the semantic contribution
of verbal and gestural sign means nding two appropriate interpretations
that, if combined, yield the desired output (the object referred to, which,
by assumption, is given).
The solution along the lines of classical theories in philosophy is quite
boring, though illuminating. It will serve as my starting point. Semantic
theories that are particularly designed to handle indexicals often use in-
dexes (see above). In indexicalist accounts, indexicals are expressions with
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certain indices (of which the obvious ones are time, place, speaker).62 The
index values determine the context of utterance. The indexical “that” is a
function from contexts of utterances to extensions. In natural language,
the character of “that” can be characterised thus:
“That”, uttered by speaker S, usually refers to the entity that is
most salient in the relevant conversational context.63
In this reading, “that” is a term whose semantics is somehow unsaturated.
In particular, one is in a position to gure out its referent only relative to
the relevant contextual cues.64 The semantics of “that” in conjunction with
the semantics of the pointing gesture determine the semantic value of a par-
ticular “that” utterance. Accordingly, the semantics of a pointing gesture
thus must be something like the following:
62 In fact, time, place, speaker, and anaphoric reference are typically the only contextual
features that get incorporated into a formal theory of meaning. Borg (2004b, e.g. pp. 52–
62) stresses that intentions, in particular, are dicult to handle in formal approaches. I
think, though, that her reservations apply, in eect, to all potentially ‘interesting’ contex-
tual cues such as common ground, world knowledge, plausibility assumptions, default
assumptions, co-text, knowledge concerning one’s interlocutors, social conventions, and
so on (i.e. interesting in that they are relevant for xing actual reference).
63 For ease of presentation, I omit other potentially relevant contextual factors such as time
and place. Also, I simply take for granted here that “salience” can be dened rigorously.
This, of course, is a topic on its own.
64 Cf., for instance, Higginbotham (1994, 92–93):
[. . . ] the truth conditions of sentences with context-dependent elements are
themselves conditional, dependent upon the satisfaction of conditions that
are not in general represented in utterances of those sentences. Consider an
utterance with demonstrative ‘this’ in subject position, a form that places
no categorial limits upon the referent, and is limited in context only by the
requirement that the referent be appropriately proximate. If the utterance
is, say, ‘This is red’ then (ignoring tense) the conditional truth conditions
are [as follows]:
If the speaker of ‘this is red’ refers with the utterance of ‘this’
therein to x and to nothing else, then that utterance is true if
and only if x is red.
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A pointing gesture, in the majority of cases, serves the pur-
pose of increasing the salience of the object towards which it
is directed.
This leads to the intermediate result that an instance of “that” plus point-
ing gesture towards object x supposedly refers, ceteris paribus, to x.65 Note
two things: rstly, my description of how “that” gets its reference can be
considered to be more or less uncontroversial, for everything said thus far
is just making explicit what is implicit in, e.g., Kaplanian semantics, any-
way. Secondly, it is not particularly dicult to ‘combine’ two descriptions,
although they concern two totally dierent domains (linguistic sign vs ges-
ture). I will illustrate below how easily this generalises to other cases.
Crucially, the eect of executing a pointing gesture can sometimes be
achieved by linguistic means. One could just equally increase the salience
of an entity by, for example, describing it. Still, it is important to bear in
mind that modal-specic signs are not equivalent in meaning to the lin-
guistic expressions that are their corresponding descriptions. An immedi-
ately evident example is irony. Metaphorically speaking, irony ‘reverses’
65 The CP clause is required here because the ‘meaning’ of a pointing gesture is, by its
nature, underspecied. That is, the salience of which object exactly is increased by
a given instance of a pointing gesture necessarily depends on further, potentially un-
known, factors. To take a variant of Borg’s (2004b, 178) example: if I point at a CD
cover, whereby I increase, very roughly, the salience of this cover, the addressee still
does not know to which object my corresponding “that” tokening refers. Exactly this is
at stake here: the meaning of pointing gesture in conjunction with an indexical. I could
be referring to the CD cover, the artist, the picture, the music style, and so forth. All
of which depends on my—the speaker’s—intentions, and the recognition thereof. In this
particular example, there are arguably two further ‘classes’ of information that might be
relevant. One is the question as to which kind of thing is salient in this particular context
anyway—independently from the pointing gesture as such. For instance, which topics
did I mention in the previous conversation? Another one is the basis for my decision to
consider this specic pointing gesture an appropriate means of directing the addressee’s
attention to a particular object (cover, music style, etc.). For example, am I familiar with
the addressee’s background knowledge (‘world knowledge’), and am I justied in think-
ing that, on the basis of this knowledge, the addressee is likely to be able to gure out
the actual referent? So there are a variety of factors that inuence the actual referent of
an indexical in conjunction with gestures, which are at least partly underdetermined by
the two clearly identiable constituents. In other words, the process of reference xing
of indexicals is context-dependent in a way that goes beyond those features of contexts
of utterance that are formally speciable such as time, place, and speaker.
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the propositional content that is expressed ‘literally’. There are certain typ-
ical triggers for irony, one of which is intonation. A linguist might describe
the meaning of an intonational pattern that typically triggers ironic read-
ings by saying that this particular pattern means ‘What I’m saying is meant
ironically’. Everyone would understand such a description. And everyone
would understand, based on this description, the use of the intonational pat-
tern at hand. However, saying that ‘what I’m saying is meant ironically’
has quite a dierent eect on one’s audience than using this pattern.
Hence, although gestures and the like sometimes substitute linguistic
signs, they are denitely not equivalent to them all the time. The linguistic
description is always just an approximation. The better my interlocutor
is able to understand a gesture (or the like), based on how I describe its
meaning, the better the description. Which is to say that the problem of
compositionality in the domain of multimodality can’t be solved by simply
‘substituting’ the gesture with a semantic description that corresponds to
or approximates it. Gestures, in other words, have their own semantics.
Salience as the link in reference xing between the semantics of index-
icals and the corresponding ‘contribution’ of gestures is just one option
among many. For instance, Borg (2004b, passim) repeatedly emphasises
that nding out about actual reference is a matter of communication (not
semantics), in particular a matter of reading and ascribing intentions. In
regard to indexicals, she defends the view that ‘[c]ontext-dependent ex-
pressions have a lexical entry which merely species a rule for generating a
token expression’s truth-conditional contribution’ (2004b, 166). This works
quite well for her own example, “I”: if x utters “I”, then this token refers to
x. It is also relatively straightforward for the case of “that” relativised to sa-
lience: if x is the apparently most salient object in the vicinity of a speaker
uttering “that”, then this token refers to x. By itself, the assumption that
determining reference is primarily a matter of intention-reading66 seems
very plausible to me. The problem lurking here is that one needs to specify
the ‘conditionalised T-sentence’ for “that” (analogously to “I”). In partic-
ular, if intentions are the pragmatically relevant factor in determining the
actual referent in a specic context, then the conditionalised semantic rule
associated with “that” must inevitably recur to intentions as well. Roughly,
66 See, e.g., Borg (2004b, 209).
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along the following lines: if x is the object an utterer of “that” wanted to
refer to, then this token refers to x. In this case, the ‘contribution’ of a
pointing gesture might not be increasing salience (as such), but rather to
indicate the particular object to which the speaker wanted to refer.67 At this
point, I only want to span the logical space of possibilities. So I shall leave
the detailed discussions to later chapters. Let me just note here that this
example already shows that incorporating gestures into one’s semantics is
far from trivial.
For compositionality to start o, a common format of meaning represent-
ation is required. This common format might be descriptions of use in nat-
ural language. I showed how straightforward it is to ‘compose’ utterance
meaning, given the context-related, underspecied meanings of “that” and
pointing gestures. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine alternative, more
sophisticated possibilities that would not recur to use. I have concentrated
on the simplest possible case, and even in this case, use plays the essential
role in that it determines which factors increase salience and thereby x
the relevant reference. It is even clear that this salience-increasing factor is
implicitly taken for granted in classical theories of meaning, which lends
further support to it.
Now for more complicated cases. Examples include:
• Emphasis (gesture, pause, intonation) (e.g. Bartels 1999)
• Referential/iconic gestures (e.g. Indefrey & Gullberg 2010)
• Code-switching sign language/natural language (e.g. Emmorey, Bor-
instein & Thompson 2005)
• Multimodality in general (e.g. Cienki & Müller 2008, Müller, Cienki,
Fricke, Ladewig, McNeill & Teßendorf 2013)
• Gestures expressing propositions (e.g. Streeck 2009)
In prefaces, introductions, and the like, people very often declare that their
respective theories only deal with ‘meaning’ in a specic, limited sense.
The above list of examples of cases of multimodal compositionality is likely
67 To be sure, increasing salience is one way of doing this.
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to invoke the impression that ‘meaning’ is understood here in a sense that
deviates from this standard. The worry could be that the present proposal
might be too permissive. Accordingly, my aim in the following is to show
that the way I employ the term “meaning” crucially accords with the es-
tablished practice.
To be sure, showing this amounts to nothing less than saying a few
words about what a semantic theory is in the rst place. First and foremost,
a semantic theory is a theory that is about the meaning of communicat-
ive acts (cf. section 7.2.1). Accordingly, without even dening “meaning”
more precisely, one may already exclude cases like “This means the end
of the Cold War”, which clearly involve the metaphorical sense of “mean-
ing”. The really interesting cases concern, for example, facial expression.
I want to defend the view that facial expressions have meaning in exactly
the same sense as words have meaning. This is, to say the least, not ob-
vious. However, the refusal to accept anything as meaningful units other
than words, sentences, phrases, and morphemes, for example, is rooted
in biases, I think. The three most important ones are probably: focus on
declaratives; focus on written language; focus on literal meaning. Focus-
sing on these three elements gives a distorted picture of which underlying
properties one expects to nd in the area of semantics.
From a pre-theoretic stance, the central notions of modern theories of
meaning—intension/extension, truth-evaluability, inferential validity, etc.—
look somewhat counter-intuitive. At least pre-theoretically, one would
think that a theory of meaning should cover the whole range of avail-
able evidence in the realm of meaningful entities. That is to say, a theory
(i) should be guided by all available evidence and (ii) should account for
all observable phenomena in the semantic domain. An unbiased view on
language includes, among other things, recognising that a large amount
of human communication takes place orally; that a great portion of hu-
man communication is non-verbal; that truth-evaluability is relevant for a
minority of cases even in written language; and that language use is, to a
large extent, often imperfect, rhetorical, ad hoc, etc. This is pretty close to
a moral that Tarski drew in his classic 1944 paper, in which we read that:
The problem of the denition of truth obtains a precise mean-
ing and can be solved in a rigorous way only for those languages
79
2 Meaning: Primary, Pragmatic, and Others
whose structure has been exactly specied. For other languages—
thus, for all natural, “spoken” languages—the meaning of the
problem is more or less vague, and its solution can have only
an approximate character. Roughly speaking, the approxima-
tion consists in replacing a natural language (or a portion of
it in which we are interested) by one whose structure is ex-
actly specied, and which diverges from the given language
“as little as possible.” (Tarski 1944, 347)
The crucial point in this polemic is that he acknowledges that he considers
his theory to be fundamentally inapplicable to natural languages (in their
present form). For a start, English seemingly contains ‘its own’ truth pre-
dicate, i.e. a predicate that is applicable to sentences of the very same lan-
guage it itself belongs to. In this sense, Davidson’s project of turning a
Tarskian theory of truth into a Davidsonian theory of meaning seems to
contradict one of Tarski’s most basic assumptions. The problem is not just
that the ‘natural’ truth predicate diers from the one envisaged by Tarski.
The more fundamental problem is that even the most basic theoretical
ingredients—the meaning stipulations for singular terms and predicates—
are disentangled from natural language semantics.
A quite illustrative example is vagueness. The ‘base clause’ for “chair”,
for example, is: x satises “() is a chair” if and only if x is a chair. But
whether that is actually the case in English depends on which objects people
actually apply “chair” to, i.e. it depends on use. Probably, the verbal beha-
viour of many people diverges with respect to “chair” and chairs. That
is to say, whether the cited base clause is accurate depends on whether
the meaning we as theoreticians attach to its right-hand side matches the
meaning of “chair” in the idiolect of that person to whom knowledge of the
base clause is ascribed. Davidson assumes that features like productivity
can only be accounted for if we assume that people have implicit know-
ledge of Tarskian theorems.68 Davidson’s solution to this, namely to posit
68 In Davidson’s own terms:
[. . . ] a theory of meaning for a language L shows “how the meanings of
sentences depend upon the meanings of words” if it contains a (recursive)
denition of truth-in-L. And, so far at least, we have no other idea how to
turn the trick. (1967, 310)
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that both sides of the T-biconditionals are semantically equivalent by den-
ition (Davidson 1967, 314–318)—i.e. to say that we are dealing with inter-
preted sentences—amounts to saying that we are not dealing with (actual)
natural language after all. This is because only formal languages are inter-
preted languages in the relevant sense.69 People just have passed on certain
expectations that shape their denition of “meaning”. My justication for
taking a more liberal stance towards this denition is: we need to clarify
the appropriate order rst. That is: let us examine the phenomena rst,
then start theorising, not the other way around. The phenomena—some of
which I just listed—simply require that we recognise that certain elements
have meaning.70
Consider the following example: someone says “Nice weather!” By mak-
ing an accompanying facial expression, she indicates irony. Accordingly,
her respective interlocutor would understand that she, the speaker, is under
the impression that the weather is bad (here and today). The facial expres-
sion must mean ‘Attention, irony!’ because if the whole utterance means
‘Bad weather!’ (as it does by assumption) and “nice” and “weather” can’t
be solely responsible for this (which, again, they can’t by assumption, since
“nice” plus “weather” means, all else equal, ‘nice weather’), then something
else must be in charge of eliciting this interpretation. Nothing is simpler
than assuming that the meaning at hand is composed of the meanings of
“nice”, “weather”, and the facial expression.
Thus, in the conception of “meaning” defended here, people, when they
understand other peoples’ signals, do nothing more than implicitly associ-
ate a certain use with these signals. Building on this understanding, it is not
hard to see how people ‘compose’ meaning across several modalities. They
just use facial expressions to indicate, e.g., irony, just as they would use any
other means with which they could achieve the same aim, including utter-
ances of the form “I mean this ironically”. Concerning multimodality, the
original problem is thus not solved but postponed. Since description of use
already is a common format of meaning representation, it is not more prob-
69 I am assuming “interpreted sentences” dened along the lines of, e.g., Stalnaker (1999,
36).
70 Chapter 8 is devoted to a detailed discussion of this.
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lematic to combine dierent intermodal descriptions than it is to combine
ones from the same modality.
2.2.5 Constructionist Primary Meaning: The Case of
Malapropisms
Taken together, there are theoretical considerations that speak in favour of
‘ordinary’ primary meanings (e.g. in referential terms), while at the same
time empirical evidence suggests the contrary. This means: on the one
hand, I should incorporate into my theory of meaning the theoretical intu-
itions that lead to the assumption of primary meaning. On the other hand,
however, I should try to avoid doing this by actually postulating reference
relations (and related ‘meanings’), because the empirical evidence speaks
against it. The rst thing to do, therefore, seems to be to examine pragmat-
ics and compositionality more closely in order to nd out whether there is
any other way of accommodating both features. In other words, the task
is to do without ordinary primary meanings and, at the same time, to an-
swer the intuitions that give rise to them in the rst place. In the case of
the semantics/pragmatics distinction, people typically—albeit implicitly—
assume that this—omitting primary meaning–is in fact impossible (as the
distinction requires lexical word meaning). Regarding compositionality,
many theorists take for granted that there are no alternative ways to con-
ceive of compositionality (especially Fodor).
Showing that an alternative approach, which does not involve reference
postulates, is achievable amounts to presenting a framework for a new ac-
count of meaning. In the next section, I will be discussing particular cases
that can’t be handled appropriately within classical frameworks. The dis-
cussion will be particularly focused on the semantics/pragmatics distinc-
tion. Compositionality will be dealt with separately; here I only need to
show that compositionality is compatible with my own approach. In order
to keep things simple, I stick to the terminology I already introduced above.
That is, instead of doing away with ‘primary meaning’ altogether, I propose
a redenition that is capable of accommodating the empirical results that I
have discussed above.
Malapropisms will serve as a starting point for the following discussion.
Here is an example of a (German) malapropism:
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(2.1) Wir
We
sollten
should
hier
here
ein
a
Exemplar
sample
stationieren.
position.
‘We should do something as a warning.’
The classical picture sees the intended meaning as parasitic on the con-
ventional meanings of the expressions used. In comic terms the story goes
like this: the hearer of the utterance computes the meaning of the sen-
tence on the basis of the meanings of its parts. This literal interpreta-
tion is: ‘We should position a sample here’, which hardly makes any sense
(under normal circumstances). The hearer then gures out that by repla-
cing the phonetically similar “Exempel” for “Exemplar” and “statuieren”
for “stationieren”, the sentence would make perfect sense. Given certain
background assumptions (in particular concerning world knowledge), the
hearer, therefore, is able to gure out that ‘We should do something as a
warning’ is the most reasonable interpretation of the sentence. This mean-
ing of the whole sentence is computed from the parts of the sentence (and
their possible combinations) exactly as in the case of the rst ‘try’, save for
replacing the two ‘inappropriate’ terms with the ‘correct’ ones and assum-
ing their primary meanings instead.71
The classical source for such inferentialist, neo-Gricean approaches to
semantics/pragmatics is Bach & Harnish (1979). Their framework takes
classical primary meaning for granted; the relevant inferences they posit
operate on the full content ‘literally’ conveyed by a given speaker. Thus
we read:
We view linguistic communication as an inferential process.
The speaker provides, by what he says, a basis for the hearer
to infer what the speaker intends to be thereby doing. [. . . ] In
general, the inference the hearer makes and takes himself to
be intended to make is based [. . . ] on mutual contextual beliefs
[. . . ], as we call such salient contextual information. (Bach &
Harnish 1979, 4–5, my emphasis)
The idea here is that whatever language users de facto convey, their con-
veying something at all is always parasitic on their competency in a lan-
71 Malapropisms became famous in philosophy of language due to the ‘later’ Davidson,
who discussed them extensively in his A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs (1986).
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guage (i.e. lexical knowledge), their interlocutors’ corresponding compet-
ency, and their shared beliefs about these competencies. For instance, hear-
ers are said to rely on the so-called ‘presumption of literalness’, which is
The mutual belief in the linguistic community CL that when-
ever any member S utters any e in L to any other member H,
if S could (under the circumstances) be speaking literally, then
S is speaking literally. (Bach & Harnish 1979, 12)
In general, the basis of inferentialist approaches to utterance meaning is
always ‘literal’, i.e. context-independently speciable sentence meaning.
First evidence supporting the claim that there must be an alternative
way of how we arrive at the meaning of an utterance without the detour
via reference postulates comes from the observation that the procedure
just described is simply not applicable across the board. There are cases
of successful human communication that do not seem to operate on sen-
tential meaning. This suces to establish the claim that there must be an
alternative route. To begin with, the example above is somewhere in the
middle on a continuum of cases to which the classical picture is more or
less applicable. For example, the obvious inappropriateness of “Exemplar”
could trigger the relevant inferences. Irony is another very good example
of cases where one could easily get the impression that the classical picture
gets at least something right. This is because the intended reading of an
ironic utterance is the ‘opposite’ of the literal meaning. In the “Exemplar”
example, the strategy seems still quite plausible, because world knowledge
can be exploited in nding out that “Exemplar” is used inappropriately
here, which, in conjunction with the phonetic similarity of “Exemplar” and
“Exempel”, might cause the hearer to conclude that the speaker mixed up
the two. So the gist is this: there are cases (e.g. irony) in which inferential-
ist strategies work quite well and others (e.g. a slip of the tongue) in which
they work fairly well. Accordingly, the most interesting cases are those in
which people are able to determine utterance meaning without accessing
the alleged literal sentence meaning.72
72 This is an area of research in which people seek answers on the basis of empirical data.
Typically, the underlying idea here is that shorter reaction times for specic interpret-
ations of sentences (e.g. Recanati’s minimal proposition) indicate that language users
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To see what is actually happening, it will help to look at examples in
which the goings-on are not obscured by contingencies like phonetic sim-
ilarity. That is, examples which resemble malapropism, irony, etc. in that
their pragmatic meaning is recognisable; but in which that fact can’t be
explained in terms of primary meaning. The idea here is: if recognition of
pragmatic meaning can be explained suciently for these cases, the same
strategy—which by assumption must be a strategy that does not recur to
primary meaning—might be similarly applicable to other cases. The fol-
lowing example will serve as a starting point for the discussion:
(2.2) Das
The
Wetter
weather
ist
is
heute
today
aber
however
usellig.
cold.
‘It is cold today.’
The peculiarity here is the word “usellig”, which is unknown in Standard
German (unknown, at least, beyond the borders of the Ruhr area). In a con-
text in which speaker and hearer are debating the weather, and in which
it is obvious to both of them that the weather is bad (and obvious that this
is obvious to the respective other, etc.), an otherwise competent speaker of
German is able to recognise the meaning of “usellig” in this specic con-
versational context. Of course, this is partly due to the fact that the hearer
understands “Das Wetter ist heute aber ___”. But the relevant point here is
that, by assumption, “usellig” (and hence the whole utterance) can’t be un-
derstood by the hearer on the basis of its primary meaning (for this would
require this meaning to be known in advance).
Following Horwich here, to understand a word is to implicitly know its
use. Understanding in actual communication situations has, trivially, two
aspects: the hearer’s and the speaker’s perspective. From the hearer’s point
of view, understanding lies in the ability to recognise the speaker’s use
of a given term in a given context (e.g. to recognise that “usellig” means
‘cold’, ‘unpleasant’, ‘misty’). It is the speaker’s ‘responsibility’ to enable
such understanding—e.g. by taking into account what is common ground
between them. Which sources, so to speak, enable the hearer to understand
‘access’ these interpretations more directly—vice versa for longer reaction times. For
some (more or less) recent research in this area, see Nicolle & Clark (1999) and Noveck
& Reboul (2008).
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a given utterance is secondary from the theoretician’s perspective, as long
as understanding can be established. In the malapropism case, it is possible
to give an inferentialist explanation for how understanding is established
(due to phonetic similarities). In the “usellig” example, this possibility is
no longer given, since “usellig” is unknown to the hearer and shares no
commonalities with familiar words.73 Which is to say: if there were any
inferential processes involved (in order to arrive at the intended interpreta-
tion), these are not processes operating on “usellig”. What the Tomasellian
programme, quite plausibly, suggests here is that a hearer is able to under-
stand the utterance in question because the involved interlocutors engage
in a cooperative activity (e.g. informing the other about one’s impression
regarding the weather outside).
So even if certain classes of linguistic eects—like malapropisms—can be
explained in terms of primary meaning, namely by recognising the inappro-
priateness of the term actually uttered, there remain other cases for which
such an explanation is unavailable. This, in turn, might be interpreted as
indirect evidence against primary meaning even in the former cases. Be-
cause the latter kind of explanation—which, to be sure, is up to now only
a sketch of an explanation—is equally applicable to malapropisms and the
like. This is an issue I will return to in 8.3. In the present context, let
me just note that if one tries to explain malapropisms (and similar eects)
without ordinary primary meaning, the relevance of cues such as phon-
etic similarities does not vanish. In other words, the inferential processes
that lead from, say, “Konifere” to “Koryphäe” must and can be kept in a
modied framework. The upshot is this: there seem to be cases in which
hearers know what a speaker meant, although they do not primarily rely
on primary meaning, i.e. on what is literally said. In fact, in these cases
pragmatic meaning seems to be retrievable without any prior knowledge
of the primary meaning of relevant constituents. A satisfying theory of
meaning has to accommodate this result.
Thus far I have really only hinted at a solution to the problem of how
hearers achieve understanding in cases where they can’t rely on their prior
semantic knowledge. A more detailed picture will emerge in the course of
73 Save for the hearer’s syntactic bootstrapping capacities (Gleitman 1990). For example,
the ending “-ig” signals that “usellig” might be an adjective.
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this book. The purpose of the present chapter, rather, is to present a range
of examples that question the status of primary meaning in semantic the-
ory. The above discussion was focused on primary meaning in general.
However, primary meaning in terms of reference/satisfaction is specically
relevant for varieties of truth-conditional approaches to semantics; they
require reference, whereas usage-based theories contingently employ ref-
erential terms. This severely limits TCS’s explanatory resources. A very
illustrative case at hand in this regard is language acquisition, an issue to
which I shall turn now.
2.2.6 Constructionist Language Acquisition
Language acquisition is a dicult issue for Davidsonian and neo-David-
sonian approaches, since these frameworks are rst and foremost theories
that are specically designed to handle competencies of uent natural lan-
guage speakers. Remember, one major motivation for Davidson is the prob-
lem of explaining productivity, which, in his view, can only be solved by
assuming that people master recursively dened rules that compute sen-
tence meaning from given atomic meanings of the relevant constituents.
This explanation, however, concerns what people allegedly know now. It
is blind as to how they learnt to ‘associate’ word forms with meaning. For
example, it is silent on the obviously learnt ability of human communic-
ators to associate “bank” with either ‘riverbank’ or ‘nancial institution’.
There are many problematic aspects in this context that TCS faces, one of
which is that the relevant base clauses (e.g. that “snow” refers to snow) are
either known or unknown. Spelling out semantic knowledge in terms of
knowledge of reference relations does not allow for intermediate steps in
the ontogeny of semantic abilities (i.e. degrees of knowledge).
Emma Borg, in a recent attempt to defend neo-Davidsonian semantics,74
addresses the problem of learnability very briey. She says: word learning
seems to be intimately bound to one’s mindreading ability, i.e. one’s ability
to recognise others’ mental states, in particular intentions (Borg 2004b).
This, it seems, contradicts her own theoretical framework insofar as she
assumes that semantic competence is completely disentangled from inten-
74 Her most relevant works include: Borg (2004b, 2004a, 2012a, 2012b).
87
2 Meaning: Primary, Pragmatic, and Others
tions and the speaker’s or hearer’s ability to ascribe or recognise them. But,
she claims, this apparent conict may be solved thus:
Any appeal to intentionality as a fundamental element in ac-
quiring a lexicon is, I believe, compatible with a modular the-
ory of linguistic (and specically semantic) understanding
which claims that appeal to speaker intentions is not necessary
in order to grasp literal linguistic meaning. This is because the
conditions necessary to set up the linguistic system in the rst
place need not be the same as the conditions subsequently re-
quired to be in place for the proper functioning of that system
after it has been set up. Even if we ultimately decide that lan-
guage acquisition is an essentially inferential process requir-
ing sensitivity to speaker intentions, there is no direct move
from this idea to the claim that linguistic understanding per se
is such an inferential process, appealing to such a sensitivity.
(Borg 2004b, 139, emphasis original)
The crucial step here is the claim that ‘there is no direct move from this idea
[language acquisition requires usage-based explanation] to the claim that
linguistic understanding per se is such an inferential process’. Trivially,
that is true in the sense that the concession concerning language acquis-
ition does not imply TCS’s falsity. However, it does reveal that there is a
huge explanatory gap, which is not easy to bridge.
In the quoted passage, Borg concedes that some plausible current theor-
ies of word learning make usage-based assumptions.75 Although, in fact,
there is no ‘direct move’ from this concession to a usage-based theory of
meaning (in contrast to, for example, a usage-based theory of word learn-
ing), it places the burden of proof on the formal semanticist’s or minim-
alist’s side. Two reasons are especially relevant in this context. Firstly,
if usage-based explanations are already required for language acquisition,
75 More precisely, she talks about intention-reading capacities and hearers’ inferential pro-
cesses operating on those capacities. I think it is legitimate to call the approaches that
she summarises here ‘usage-based’, as the philosophically relevant point is that children
associate a given word with a particular meaning only due to the acquaintance with that
word type in specic contexts of utterance. See, for example, Borg’s quotations from Bloom
(2000).
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there must be really good reasons to give an alternative, potentially contra-
dictory explanation for ‘linguistic understanding per se’. Secondly, without
further support there is absolutely no reason to think that suddenly—in the
blink of an eye—understanding develops from being based on mindreading
capacities to being based on knowledge of reference relations.
Here is one small argument in support of the last claim. Suppose that
Borg is right in assuming a fundamental distinction between understand-
ing in language acquisition and understanding per se. Then there are two
possibilities for diachronic meaning shifts. One is that meaning shifts in-
volve abilities dierent from mindreading capacities; which is absurd, for
that would further complicate the picture. Or meaning shifts rely on the
very same abilities that are employed in language acquisition (e.g. mindread-
ing); which is also implausible, for in this case the minimalist explanation
of ‘linguistic understanding per se’ would become even more superuous.
Either way, one quite severe problem with Borg’s picture seems to be the
idea that word learning lies in recognising which word forms belong to
which referents—lexical knowledge which is xed, once it is learnt.
More generally, the problem seems to be Borg’s deep conviction that se-
mantics is an area of study that is ultimately disentangled from the study of
communication and utterance comprehension.76 She acknowledges with-
out much hesitation that utterance comprehension clearly involves prag-
matic processes. As just seen, she even goes as far as to acknowledge that
language acquisition recurs to essentially the same mechanisms that are
relevant for utterance comprehension in general. Here, I think, Borg un-
derestimates the scope of her ‘no direct move’ claim. The problem is that, in
eect, her thesis is this: understanding in word learning contexts involves
only pragmatic processes; but once word meaning is learnt, the very same
processes are not sucient any more for understanding. This is implaus-
ible, if anything is. Let me elaborate a bit. For conceptual reasons, lan-
guage acquisition must be possible without semantic knowledge regarding
the words the acquisition process is concerned with. (Otherwise it is not
word learning.) Crucially, Borg—rightly, I think—assumes that the acquis-
ition of lexical knowledge depends on one’s ability to comprehend utter-
ances in which the relevant word occurs (cf. her short review of Bloom’s
76 See especially the second chapter of her 2004 book and her 2012 book, respectively.
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experiment; Borg (2004b, 136–138)). Taken as a whole, this amounts to
saying that the areas of language learning and language application es-
sentially require usage-based explanations; but what is learnt (i.e. what
constitutes understanding) is not (knowledge of) use but (knowledge of)
usage-independent reference relations.
It is important at this point to remember that usage-based theories do
not deny that competent speakers rely on lexical knowledge. Horwich,
for example, would be perfectly happy to acknowledge that the mean-
ing of “snow”, for example, depends on snow (e.g. due to the frequency
with which people use the word “snow” in the presence of snow). He
would even claim that his theory is able to explain, in usage-based terms
though, why and how “snow” refers to snow. The point here is that lex-
ical knowledge—knowledge concerning stable word meaning—is a cent-
ral ingredient of mainstream usage-based theories. Bearing this in mind,
Borg’s conviction that usage-based explanations are required for language
acquisition and communication but that nevertheless lexical knowledge is
usage-independent looks even more implausible.77 The underlying prob-
lem is that evidence in favour of Borg’s conclusion that is based solely
on the observation that human behaviour is specically guided by lexical
knowledge is unavailable, as the rival theory (usage-based semantics) pos-
its lexical knowledge too. The only remaining option that I see here is to
argue that the explanation of lexical knowledge itself fares better in truth-
conditional terms than in usage-based terms. I do not see this. On the con-
trary, there is good reason to assume the opposite: if language acquisition
and communication require usage-based explanations—as the minimalist
acknowledges—and lexical semantics can be accounted for in terms of use
as well, then the by far most elegant explanation is based on the assumption
that lexical knowledge lies in implicit knowledge of use.
77 To be sure, talking about ‘usage-independent’ here is a bit tricky. Borg certainly does
not want to say that what terms actually mean is independent from use (after all, use
determines that “bank” means either ‘riverbank’ or ‘nancial institution’). Furthermore,
she certainly also does not want to say that lexical knowledge as such is use-independent
(e.g. acquiring lexical knowledge involves mindreading capabilities). Rather, her claim is
that the lexical knowledge people have, once they acquired it, is use-independent in the
sense that they know something about the meaning of a given term, independently of
how it is applied in specic communication situations (e.g. the knowledge that “snow”
refers to snow).
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A related worry in the context of language acquisition is that neo-David-
sonians who acknowledge that acquiring lexical knowledge is facilitated by
utterance comprehension face the following diculty. Toddlers are able to
comprehend whole utterances, but they do so by treating them (rst) as
unanalysable units. This phenomenon is usually labelled ‘holophrase’ or
‘frozen phrase’. The basic idea here is that although toddlers can understand
and apply these phrases in accordance with their interlocutors’ use, they
do not see the underlying (lexical and syntactic) structure of these phrases.
From a philosophical point of view, the problem here is that this obviously
undermines Davidson’s conviction that the human ability to understand
well-formed complexes is tightly linked with one’s prior knowledge of re-
cursive rules. Tomasello (2003a) summarises his view as follows:
[. . . ] children’s early one-word utterances may be thought as
‘holophrases’ that convey a holistic, undierentiated commu-
nicative intention, most often the same communicative intention
as that of the adult expressions from which they were learnt
[. . . ]. [In the case of frozen phrases] there is dierent syn-
tactic work to do if the child is to extract productive linguistic
elements that can be used appropriately in other utterances,
in other linguistic contexts, in the future. For this the child
must engage in a process of segmentation, with regard not
only to the speech stream but also to the communicative in-
tention involved—so as to determine which components of the
speech stream go with which components of the underlying
communicative intention. (36 and 38, all emphases mine)
Such a view is perfectly compatible with what Borg, for example, says
about word learning, i.e. that it crucially involves being capable of read-
ing minds. However, this is incompatible with the Davidsonian ideas in at
least two respects. Firstly, it undermines Davidson’s view that language
comprehension proceeds from the bottom up, so to speak. Rather, in the
view advocated by Tomasello, language comprehension is primarily a top-
down process, i.e. children rst understand utterances in context and then
begin to deconstruct utterance meaning into its (context-independent) lex-
ical and syntactic constituents. Secondly, Tomasello’s remarks on holo-
phrases and frozen phrases also question the idea that the result of such
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abstraction processes might be anything like (knowledge of) the Tarskian
base clauses that, Davidson thinks, underlie adults’ cognitive abilities. To
summarise, language acquisition is, in several respects, highly problematic
for Davidson and his disciples. The fundamental issue is that, with concep-
tual necessity, language acquisition (as opposed to language application)
requires that structures (i.e. constructions at several levels of description,
especially words and syntactic structures) are learnt on the basis of a prior
understanding of the complexes that are built according to those structures.
That is to say, language acquisition must primarily be explained in terms of
abstraction. But if Davidson’s story about utterance comprehension fails
in the case of the acquisition process, then there is no reason to assume it
will fare any better in the ‘ordinary’ cases of regular language use.
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3 Usage-based Theories of
Meaning
The central idea underlying this book is that usage-based approaches in
the philosophy of language are worthy of being reconsidered for two op-
posed reasons. On the one hand, recent developments in relevant empirical
disciplines clearly support a usage-based approach to semantics—either by
being based on usage-based assumptions themselves, or by implicitly as-
suming such a theory framework. On the other hand, the currently by far
most successful theory in that area—Paul Horwich’s ‘use theory’—is be-
ing severely challenged due to its restriction to truth-evaluable content.
In simple terms, the most reasonable strategy, therefore, seems to be to
take the ‘use theory’ as a starting point and suggest possible improvements
with respect to classes of words (sentences) that hitherto have been hard
to handle in that theory (eectively, all classes of words that lack truth-
evaluable content).1
I divided this chapter into two and a half sections. First, I shall introduce
the basic idea of accounting for meaning in terms of use (3.1). This also in-
cludes a very brief overview of Wittgenstein’s private-language argument
and Kripke’s interpretation thereof, the reason for this being the relation-
ship between acceptance properties and private-language. In 3.2, I briey
explicate Horwich’s notion of ‘understanding’, as that will become highly
relevant in the following chapters. The main section, then, is the third (3.3),
in which I shall highlight some obstacles to clarifying the claim that ‘mean-
ing is use’. As I already mentioned in the Introduction, I reserve the term
“use theory” exclusively for Horwich’s approach; the umbrella term for his
and related theories is “usage-based theories” (and their cognates).
1 The only alternative here is to propose an all-new theory, which for obvious reasons is
beyond the scope of this book.
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3.1 Use
Famously, the later Wittgenstein is known for having popularised the idea
that meaning is use. In the Philosophical Investigations, he says:
One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at
its application and learn from that. (Wittgenstein 2009, 116e,
emphasis original)
All mainstream theories in philosophy that consider themselves ‘usage-
based’ see Wittgenstein as their most relevant predecessor. The common
assumption of all these theories is easy to state: meaning is use. The dif-
culties arise when it comes to specifying what this claim amounts to. I
would like to keep this chapter very focused. So there are several things
that I will not try to do here. Most importantly, I will not delve into exeget-
ical issues.2 Furthermore, I will omit a detailed discussion of usage-based
approaches other than Horwich’s. For instance, inferentialism (à la Bran-
dom) is a very inuential theory of meaning and a prominent exponent of
the usage-based camp (Brandom 1994, 2001). However, instead of giving
a comprehensive overview of usage-based approaches, I would rather fo-
cus on one specic theory in order to discuss some more details. Anyway,
Horwich’s theory is pretty much in line with my own view that I outline
in chapters 6, 7, and 8. Discussing his theory will therefore serve as a back-
drop against which I can present my own ideas by explicating important
dierences. In 3.1.1, I will introduce Horwich’s main thesis that the use of
a word can be traced back to some underlying acceptance property. Then,
in 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, I discuss some critical aspects of this view.
3.1.1 U Equals A(x)
The overall use of each word stems from its possession of a
basic acceptance property. For each word there is a small set
of simple properties which (in conjunction with other factors
and with the basic properties of other words) explain total
2 I refer the interested reader to the impressive work of Peter M. S. Hacker, which is an
invaluable source in this regard (e.g. Hacker 2013).
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linguistic behaviour with respect to that word. [. . . F]or each
word, w, there is a regularity of the form
All uses of w stem from its possession of acceptance
property A(x),
where A(x) gives the circumstances in which certain specied
sentences containing w are accepted. (Horwich 1998, 44 and
45, emphasis omitted)
The basic idea in so-called ‘usage-based’ accounts of meaning is that the
meaning of a given term is—in a sense to be specied—constituted by how
the term is used (in a given language community). In slogan form: meaning
is use. This, of course, is misleading. Clearly, not all aspects of a term’s use
can alter its meaning. But the simplied slogan helps to see what is com-
mon to all usage-based theories, namely that they all acknowledge that lan-
guage is rst and foremost a means of communication.3 And that therefore,
3 This might sound a bit trivial but it has been widely neglected (and denied) in much of
the history of philosophy of language. The study of language as a philosophical sub-
discipline has always been the study of (context-free) declarative sentences, detached
from concrete situations, in which they could possibly be uttered or asserted: ‘The
mainstream approach to semantics—almost universally accepted amongst linguists and
philosophers—is truth-theoretic’ (Horwich 2008a, 233, my emphasis). Interestingly, pro-
ponents from both camps consider themselves lonesome heroes defending the minority
view. For example, Borg (2004b, 15) begins her discussion of truth-conditional semantics
with this:
What kind of thing must an agent know to be a competent language user and
what kind of cognitive architecture might lie behind our linguistic abilities?
The answer I want to give [. . . ] is not, perhaps, especially fashionable at the
moment. For I want to argue for a kind of formal approach to the study of
language, which [. . . ] continues through into such approaches as the truth-
conditional theory of meaning of Davidson et al., and the model-theoretic
approach championed by Kaplan and others. (My emphasis)
Philosophically speaking, it is relatively unimportant which side is correct here. Based
on the number of publications and prominent current proponents, I have the impression
that Horwich is right in this regard. What is more important is that the (real or merely
felt) dominance of TCS has left its mark with respect to what people think semantics
is all about: context-free speciable meaning of word/sentence types. This inuence
is present even in theoretical frameworks that are subsumed under the heading ‘usage-
based’ such as Horwich’s use theory or Brandom’s conceptual role semantics. In chapter
7, I shall be defending the following two claims: (i) that philosophy of language as an
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roughly speaking, meanings are determined according to how they gure
in actual communication situations, i.e. how they are in fact used.
Particular theories dier in the way they cash out the idea that meaning
is use. So, in order to get to grips with what is meant by saying this, I shall,
by way of example, examine Paul Horwich’s view on the matter. This will
then serve as a good starting point to develop the basis of a new framework,
as Horwich incorporates many correct insights into his theory. Yet, the use
theory suers from some specic diculties. These diculties, however,
can be handled without omitting the general idea of Horwich’s theory.4
First of all, Horwich introduces, as a theoretical device, a ‘capitalisation
convention’, according to which the meaning of “dog” is DOG, the mean-
ing of “tea” is TEA, and, generally, the meaning of a term can be referred to
by writing the word in capital letters.5 It is important to bear in mind that
a capitalised word is nothing more than a name. By denition, this name
denotes a meaning. If you were asked ‘What is the meaning of “dog”?’, the
answer “DOG” would be perfectly correct. Yet, the capitalisation conven-
tion is only a means of metalinguistic description. It goes without saying
that one who is able to apply this tool does not, by virtue of this ability,
automatically know the meaning of the term to which it is applied. This
is the point of introducing the convention in the rst place. It enables us
theoreticians to refer to specic meanings, irrespective of how they can be
individuated.
Writing words in capital letters is a way of referring to meanings, but
the interesting question is how to determine them (in principle). Horwich
pursues a two-step strategy in this regard. Firstly, he claims that mean-
ing properties are constituted by use properties. Secondly, he then goes
independent discipline is better o if it focuses on actual communication rather than on
the corresponding abstractions thereof; and (ii) that language is primarily a means of
communication and, hence, its theoretically most interesting aspect is use. For the time
being, I take the results of this discussion for granted.
4 The most important resource here, in which the so-called ‘use theory’ is presented in
full detail, is his 1998 book Meaning. Further elaborations of particular objections raised
against this theory are collected in Horwich (2004, 2005, 2010). Horwich’s most recent
defence of (parts of) the use theory is his 2012 book.
5 In accordance with Horwich’s style, I use capital letters to indicate placeholders for
meaning—but only in quotes and paraphrases from Horwich. See also the Terminolo-
gical Preliminaries (1.2).
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on to say that the use properties of a given word are determined by cer-
tain acceptance properties associated with sentences in which that word
occurs. Actually, Horwich’s line of argument is a three-step strategy, for
his intermediate thesis is that, ultimately, the meaning of natural-language
expressions can be identied with the corresponding concepts (1998, 44).
Horwich treats the term “means” as approximately synonymous to “indic-
ates”. Thus the use of “dog” by a given speaker indicates the presence of
(the concept) dog in the speaker’s mind. Mutatis mutandis, for any other
word of the speaker’s idiolect. The other two steps of this ‘three-step ac-
count’ are exactly the same as in the two-step version. Some avoidable
diculties are incurred by choosing the three-step strategy. This is why I
read Horwich as actually defending the simpler picture.
If meanings are concepts, then concepts either play an explanatory role
in one’s theory of meaning or they do not. If they do, then what one is do-
ing in specifying the underlying non-semantic properties that constitute
meanings (read: concepts) is specifying a theory of mental representation
(and the origin of these) rather than a theory of meaning proper. Horwich
himself suggests this reading by comparing his theory of meaning with,
for example, the ‘Informational Theory’ (see Dretske 1986) or the ‘Tele-
ological Theory’ (see Millikan 1989) (Horwich 1998, 52). Taken seriously,
this amounts to saying that what a term means, in the sense of specifying
the underlying properties of meaning, is determined by a theory of mental
representation. This, I think, obscures the debate at best. Even if, in the
end, utterances of words ‘indicate’ the presence of corresponding concepts
in the speaker’s mind, this should be largely independent from one’s the-
ory of meaning. Otherwise the question of the underlying (non-semantic)
features of meanings is simply moved from the philosophy of language to
the philosophy of mind. At worst, this strategy might even be completely
misleading, because it is dubious whether there really is such a simple one-
to-one connection between concepts and the corresponding words usually
used to express them. On the other hand, if concepts play no explanat-
ory role in the theory of meaning, then to identify them with meanings
seems superuous. For even if such an identication may be relevant to
make one’s theory compatible with certain theories of mental represent-
ation, the identication of meanings with concepts, if it is explanatorily
insignicant, is irrelevant to a theory of meaning as such. In such a case, it
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seems strange to include the ‘identity thesis’—meanings are concepts—into
the list of the theory’s main principles (as is done in chapter 2 of Horwich
1998).
I shall briey summarise in somewhat more detail what it means to re-
duce use properties to acceptance properties. First of all, the notion of ‘con-
stitution’ applied here means that both properties are co-extensional, but
that their corresponding predicates are not synonymous (Horwich 1998,
18–27; in particular p. 25, n. 8). So, to say that meaning properties are
constituted by use properties is just a very careful way of expressing the
idea that ‘meaning is use’ or that ‘what a word means is determined by
how it is used’. The more interesting thing is how use properties can be
characterised appropriately. The solution developed by Horwich is unique
to his account. It is worth taking a look at how it works in greater detail.
‘Use properties’ are really only placeholders in the use theory of mean-
ing. The explanatory work is done by those properties with which use
properties are identied, i.e. by acceptance properties. Now, what are ac-
ceptance properties? The basic idea is this: there is, for each word, a basic
acceptance property that can be expressed by a single sentence (maybe
a complicated conjunction) which is normally accepted by speakers of a
given language and in which the word in question occurs. The acceptance
of other sentences in which this very word occurs can be explained on the
basis of acceptance of the former sentence. This is why it is called the ‘ba-
sic’ use property. Specifying his use of “use”, Horwich explains that the use
property is
[. . . ] some property of a word type. This property is specied
by a generalization about tokens of that type—by the claim that
they are all explained in terms of a certain acceptance property,
a property specifying the circumstances in which designated
sentences containing the word are held true. [. . . For example,]
that we have the disposition to assert “That is red” in the pres-
ence of evidently red things [. . . ]. (Horwich 1998, 57–58, em-
phasis omitted)6
6 Please note the apparent similarity between Horwich’s way of spelling out acceptance
properties and Peacocke’s remarks on concept possession:
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Taken together, the main thesis of Horwich’s use theory of meaning is that
meaning properties (of word types) are constituted by acceptance prop-
erties (of the same word types). I will be discussing the postulated close
connection between use and acceptance further down. For now, I end the
exposition of Horwich’s theory and turn to some characteristics of it that
might seem problematic. In the process I focus on those features that are of
general interest for my own framework. In particular, I shall briey present
Wittgenstein’s famous private language argument, as Horwich’s explica-
tion of ‘use’ along the lines of ‘privately accepted sentences’ seems to be
at odds with the impossibility of private language.
3.1.2 The Private Language Argument
The [use theory of meaning] is focused on the semantic fea-
ture of a word. The distinctive form of that feature is that it
designates the circumstances in which certain specied sen-
tences containing the word are accepted [. . . ]. For example, it
may be that
the acceptance property that governs a speaker’s over-
all use of “and” is (roughly) his tendency to accept “p
and q” if and only if he accepts both “p” and “q”
[. . . ].
A possession condition for a particular concept species a role that indi-
viduates that concept. The possession condition will mention the role of
the concept in certain transitions that the thinker is willing to make. These
will be transitions that involve complete propositional thoughts involving the
concept. In some cases they are inferential transitions; in others they are
transitions from initial states involving perceptual experience. (1992, 107)
Which, if applied to an example, gives us that
For a thinker to possess the concept square (C) [. . . ] he must be willing to
believe the thought Cm1 where m1 is a perceptual demonstrative, when he
is taking his experience at face value, the object of the demonstrative m1 is
presented in an apparently square region of his environment, and he experi-
ences that region as having equal sides and as symmetrical about the bisectors
of its sides [. . . ]. (108)
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[. . . ] Think of all the facts regarding a person’s linguistic beha-
viour—the sum of everything he will say, and in what circum-
stances. [. . . ] It is not implausible that something like [this reg-
ularity is] what explain[s] our overall use of the [word] “and”
[. . . ]. (Horwich 1998, 45, emphasis added)
The highlighted passages of this quote indicate that the theoretical scope
of the use theory of meaning is to account for the linguistic behaviour of
linguistic communities (and thereby to state the meaning of the words de-
ployed by that community) by listing the acceptance properties of the in-
dividual speakers. This by itself—the switch from speakers to language
communities—may be questioned. It involves some important background
assumptions that would need to be justied independently. For instance,
one would need to assume that dispositions to accept certain sentences are
distributed more or less homogeneously among individuals that belong to
one single linguistic community. Also, one would need to allow for dier-
ences in dispositions that reect no corresponding dierences in meaning:
when, for example, a blind person is not disposed ‘to apply “red” to an
observed surface when and only when it is clearly red’.7 All this will be
largely ignored in what follows. Instead, I would like to focus on the ques-
tion: doesn’t this y in the face of Wittgenstein’s famous ‘private language
argument’?
To begin with, the private language argument might be considered prob-
lematic for a usage-based account (formulated in terms of acceptance prop-
erties) because, as is shown by the above example, acceptance properties
are individuated in terms of individual dispositions to accept certain sen-
tences. According to a popular reading of the later Wittgenstein, this can’t
7 “Red” is Horwich’s favourite example. Note, however, that colour predicates are a par-
ticularly dicult class. You might want to argue that the semantics of “red”, used by a
blind person, diers indeed—even if only slightly—from its ordinary semantics. In this
case, replace “red” with a proper name: intuitively, the meaning of a proper name like
“Aristotle” can’t have a dierent meaning in the mouth of a seeing person compared
with a blind one. Either, then, you still want to maintain the claim that meanings corres-
pond one-to-one to dispositions, which would result in plentiful new meaning postulates
(e.g. dispositions of blind people to apply a given term as opposed to allegedly dierent
dispositions of seeing people), or you make sure your dispositional descriptions are as
general as to be applicable to seeing and blinded people alike (to name just two groups).
Theoretically, disjunctive analysis might be a third, viable option.
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be right.8 An individual speaker can’t tell a case where he follows a rule—
say, to accept “p and q” only when he also accepts “p” and “q”—from the
case where it only seems to him as he would follow this rule (although he
actually follows a dierent rule or no rule at all). In Wittgenstein’s terms,
following a rule and thinking to follow a rule fall into one and the same cat-
egory in regard to private language. This means that an individual speaker
as such would not know whether he follows a ‘rule’ correctly.
The original argument, in the Philosophical Investigations, is presented
in §§ 243 and following. The literature on the topic is fairly independ-
ent from the actual source, i.e. the literature on the private language ar-
gument is not just exegetical but also, to a large extent, concerned with
the content, with the pros and cons of the possibility of private language
per se (Stern 2011). This holds in particular for the most famous and most
inuential interpretation by Saul Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and
Private Language (1982). The interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work that
Kripke oers is sometimes considered to be fairly independent of the ori-
ginal, which is why it usually goes under the name “Kripkenstein”. Kripke
describes Wittgenstein’s worries in terms of dispositions that match past
use. The basic idea is that if one takes into account one’s whole past use
of a given term, then there is no fact of the matter as to whether this term
had the meaning that one typically thinks it actually has (now and in the
past). This is because there are always many competing rules that accord
with past use. Here is Kripke:
Given [. . . ] that everything in my mental history is compatible
both with the conclusion that [by “plus”] I meant plus and with
the conclusion that I meant quus [i.e. answer “5” for all sum-
mands greater than 57], it is clear that the sceptical challenge
is not really an epistemological one [i.e. rooted in insucient
available data]. It [i.e the problem] purports to show that noth-
ing in my mental history or past behavior – not even what
an omniscient God would know – could establish whether I
meant plus or quus. But then it appears to follow that there
8 The Wittgenstein works that are most relevant here include his Philosophical Investiga-
tions (Wittgenstein 2009) and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Wittgenstein
1967).
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was no fact about me that constituted my having meant plus
rather than quus. [. . . ] There can be no fact as to what I mean
by ‘plus’, or any other word at any time. (1982, 21)
So, Kripke’s worries seem to be even more relevant for Horwich’s accep-
tance-based approach, as there seems to be no way to determine whether
any dispositional analysis of the meaning of a given term is ever correct.
3.1.3 Acceptance in Usage-based Theories
For our present purposes, I largely ignore exegetical issues. The main aim
of this chapter is to give a rough overview of the possibilities and limita-
tions of usage-based theories of meaning. A discussion of Wittgenstein’s
and Kripke’s contribution to the rule-following problem is a good starting
point, as there is reason to think that dispositions will gure prominently
in any promising philosophical account of usage-based semantics. In other
words, there is simply no other reasonable way than to spell out usage-
based semantics in terms of the relevant dispositional analyses. Therefore,
it will be worth looking more closely at how these two thinkers, Wittgen-
stein and Kripke, inuence contemporary discussions in the eld. Specic-
ally, two questions or concerns are relevant in the present context:
(1) Following Kripke, one might want to say that it is impossible to ‘read
o’ particular dispositions that one (supposedly) had in the past from
the facts alone, i.e. a given past use of a term is always compatible with
a variety of dispositional analyses. In other words, there is more than
just one ‘correct’ interpretation of past use.
(2) Similarly, Wittgenstein emphasises that one can’t follow a rule privately,
for in that case rule-following and attempting to follow a specic rule
would fall into one. This seems to contradict Horwich’s approach,
for Horwich construes the analysis of core use properties in terms of
privately accepted sentences.
Discussing these two ‘aspects’ of Wittgenstein’s criticism will help to illu-
minate one of the most crucial challenges that today’s usage-based theories
still face.
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Ad (1): In Horwich’s version of the use theory of meaning, use properties
are constituted by acceptance properties. In the sense in which water may
be identied with H2O, use properties may be identied with acceptance
properties. Acceptance properties, again, are stated in terms of disposi-
tions: they are ‘tendencies to accept’ specic sentences. Tendencies are
dispositions. But then, it seems, Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein
can be read as a direct criticism of the use theory.
Consider the word “plus”. The use theory of meaning tells us that the ac-
ceptance properties (disposition) associated with “plus” determine all uses
of that word (except occasional mistakes). Suppose, for the sake of argu-
ment, that this procedure works in principle. In particular, suppose that if
we—linguists, philosophers of language—know the exact acceptance prop-
erties of “plus”, we would know how the word is used.9 The upshot of
Kripke’s argument, if correct, is that all this is compatible with the claim
that “plus” might mean something completely dierent. Because the ad-
equacy constraint on dispositional analyses is dependent on conformity
with the available evidence, which is past applications in this case. The
problem here is that, even if the theorems of the use theory are correct in
this sense—i.e. if they conform with past verbal behaviour of members of
a given language community—a broad variety of competing analyses are
also still correct. However the use theorist analyses the alleged acceptance
properties that constitute one’s overall usage, Kripke could always—given
the plausibility of his argument—claim that “plus” might mean ‘quus’ in-
stead.
To be sure, it may be that “plus” means addition. It is just that we can
not know. Even God does not know this, or so Kripke claims. This is my
reply: well, maybe we can’t tell from our past dispositions that by “plus”
we mean addition (now). So Kripke is right in claiming that these past dis-
positions do not uniquely x the meaning of the term. But it is an apparent
phenomenon that we mean addition by “plus”. In order to show this, one
may, for example, take a look at how Kripke himself describes the situation:
9 Which is to say that all tokenings of “plus” can be traced back to a person’s basic tendency
to apply “plus” to such-and-such things in such-and-such circumstances.
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I, like almost all English speakers, use the word ‘plus’ and the
symbol ‘+’ to denote a well-known mathematical function, ad-
dition. (1982, 7)
This quote is from the opening paragraphs of Kripke’s essay. It illustrates
quite nicely what Kripke explicitly admits in a later section: that his scepti-
cism in regards to dispositional analyses of usage concerns not our present
dispositions but our convictions about the dispositions we had in the past.
What is interesting about this passage is that Kripke is using the only
available possibility to formulate one major premise of his argument here:
the premise that “plus” in English means ‘plus’. The only way to achieve
this is by referring to ‘a well-known function’. The point I should like
to emphasise is that this reveals something important about the status of
a ‘theory’ in philosophy. The ‘theory’ of meaning, whatever its precise
form, is not supposed to show that, say, “plus” means ‘plus’. Rather, it is
just the other way around. “Plus” de facto means ‘plus’—this is the fact
the philosophical theory needs to account for. In other words, the ques-
tion is not, which dispositional analysis is correct (irrespective of whether
it concerns past or present use) but why a particular one is correct. To be
sure, this view per se is not sucient to argue against Kripke’s Wittgen-
stein or Quine’s (1960) inscrutability of reference. My point here, rather, is
that, given one’s specic intellectual interests—e.g. designing an empirically
validated, philosophically informed theory of meaning—certain problems
can simply be bracketed out. Given that we want a theory that ts with
our pre-theoretic assumption that “plus” means ‘plus’, we do not need to
consider scenarios in which it meant ‘quus’. Given that we want a theory
that ts with out pre-theoretic assumption that “rabbit” refers to rabbits,
we do not need to consider scenarios in which it referred to undetached
rabbit parts.
Ad (2): A related obstacle, which, in particular, applies to the specic
variant of usage-based semantics defended by Horwich, is Wittgenstein’s
observation that one can’t follow a rule privately. The way Horwich for-
mulates his idea of ‘core use properties’ sounds as if his account could fall
prey to the Wittgensteinian objection:
The regularities of use that (I am suggesting) constitute the
meanings of words concern the circumstances in which spe-
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cied sentences are privately accepted (i.e. uttered assertively
to oneself). (Horwich 1998, 94, emphasis omitted)
The gist of Wittgenstein’s private language argument is that ‘private’ rule-
following is not rule-following after all. Proper rule-following requires a
corrective; e.g. a language community that ‘sanctions’ obvious deviant be-
haviour. According to the Wittgensteinian argument, one can’t privately
accept sentences and thereby conform to a particular regularity. Applied
to the use theory, the argument amounts to saying that there can’t be reg-
ularities like Horwich’s ‘tendencies’ that explain the overall use of a given
word by a given speaker. This is because all competing dispositional ana-
lyses could be just as correct.
It is not exactly clear what the private language argument is an argu-
ment against. In a natural reading, it is an argument against the possibility
of a ‘private language’, where this is a language of a single individual. This
aects the quoted aspect of Horwich’s theory only insofar as we conceive
of it (i) as being concerned with the meanings of words as they are used
by individual language users and (ii) as referring only to individuals when
it comes to meaning constitution. Neither condition is met in the present
case. Firstly, although the quoted passage suggests an individualistic read-
ing, it is clear from the outset that the use theory of meaning is a general
theory about natural language. It is not directly concerned with idiolects
(only to the extent that they aect semantics within language communit-
ies). A fortiori, it is not concerned with languages independently from the
communities in which they are embedded. It is, if you like, merely a styl-
istic choice to state the properties that constitute the use of a given word in
terms of individual dispositions. This does not aect the fact that the the-
ory applies only to complete natural languages, and, hence, its adequacy is
measured relative to them. One idea behind the ‘individualistic’ formula-
tion of Horwich’s dispositional analysis is surely the following. There is a
very close link between individual tendencies to accept certain sentences
and meaning in language communities, because the relevant dispositions
are clearly shared by a signicant proportion of people. In this respect, it
makes sense to say that meaning is constituted by individual tendencies
(had they been dierent, the relevant meaning would have been dierent
as well); but the meaning to which this analysis applies is still meaning
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in communities. Within a community, people share particular tendencies
such as the tendency to apply “red” to red objects.
A second relevant clarication in this context is the following. Although
the sentences Horwich talks about are privately accepted sentences, the
relevant tendency is determined and corrected by the language community
that the person who accepts sentences participates in. So, although it is
surely correct, and in fact quite accurate, to say that the basic disposition
that constitutes my overall use of the term “red” is my tendency to ap-
ply it to red objects, my motivation behind this use—i.e. the corrective at
play here—is that other members of my language community have a sim-
ilar tendency. From this point of view, Horwich’s dispositional analyses in
terms of privately accepted sentences concern language use in communit-
ies. For this very reason, Horwich’s appeal to privately accepted sentences
is immune to Wittgensteinian private language objections. In a similar
fashion, Kripke himself notices that
What is really denied [with the private-language argument] is
what might be called the ‘private model’ of rule following, that
the notion of a person following a given rule is to be analyzed
simply in terms of facts about the rule follower and the rule
follower alone, without reference to his membership in a wider
community. (Kripke 1982, 109)
Applied to the use theory of meaning, this amounts to the following: mean-
ings are constituted by individual dispositions to accept certain sentences.
These dispositions, in turn, are inuenced by the language community in
which the individual speaker participates.10 In this sense, the private lan-
guage argument is no threat to the use theory of meaning, since it is a the-
10 In the passage quoted above, Kripke is dealing with meaning ascriptions, rather than
meaning itself. But there is an immediate link between our actual ascription practice and
meaning constitution. Due to this link, Kripke’s remarks are immediately relevant also
for meaning constitution. If a given community ascribes certain meanings to the words
used by a given speaker whenever he is following a particular rule (and refrains from
doing so otherwise), then the person in question, if he wants to be understood, will try
to conform to the behavioural expectations of others. For example, when the language
community expects me to apply “red” only to evidently red things (under appropriate
conditions), and I recognise this expectation, then I will—on the whole—make sure that
I apply “red” accordingly, i.e. I will, normally, apply it only to red things. The mean-
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ory about language communities. This ensures that individual speakers do
not privately follow rules (i.e. conform to specic dispositions), although they
privately accept certain sentences.
In light of this specication, the problem with Horwich’s core use pro-
perties—as far as the private language argument is concerned—seems to be
that it invokes an unjustied individualistic reading of his examples. How-
ever, this weakness might be repaired quite easily by emphasising the two
issues that I just mentioned. Given these, one could say that the meaning
of a word is determined by the set of acceptance dispositions that an in-
dividual speaker has with regard to certain sentences in which that word
occurs. Words have meaning only relative to language communities: in
particular, the respective sets of dispositions are, on the whole, distributed
homogeneously among a community. They are accommodated by speak-
ers according to the behavioural expectations of others. Of all possible
word meanings that are in accordance with the set of ‘compatible’ disposi-
tions (e.g. ‘plus’ vs ‘quus’), a word de facto has just that meaning that is also
in accordance with the ascription practice within the relevant language com-
munity. This last proviso answers Kripke’s worry that there might be com-
peting dispositional analyses that accord with past use. However, Kripke
himself acknowledges that in regard to present usage we all seem to agree
that by “plus” we mean ‘plus’ (as opposed to ‘quus’). If that is correct,
then, by the same token, the same is true of past use—since we all agree
that we meant ‘plus’ in the past. The sceptical philosophical reply—‘You
can’t know for certain that this is the correct interpretation of your past
dispositions!’—is inadequate here, for the alleged ‘epistemological’ prob-
lem is a rhetoric trick. We know which interpretation of past applications
of “plus” is correct (just as we know which interpretation is correct con-
cerning present use); so, if Kripke’s argument indeed shows that this fact
can’t be captured by certain dispositional analyses, then there is indeed
a need to improve the relevant analysis. But there is no need to worry
whether our interpretation, on which we agree anyway, was correct in the
rst place.
ing ascriptions of other participants of a language community thus constantly inuence
one’s dispositions to apply certain words.
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Independently from the plausibility of construing a usage-based theory
of meaning in terms of acceptance properties, in this section it has been
shown that such an account can be defended against objections that focus
on the private language argument. Basically, it is just a matter of precise
formulation. A clear answer to the question whether private-language ar-
guments are capable of undermining the plausibility of Horwich’s theory
depends on the exact formulation of acceptance conditions. If it is appro-
priately relativised to linguistic communities, roughly like in the above for-
mulation, then the argument does no harm to the theory. Nevertheless, this
intermediate result leaves it entirely open at this point whether there could
be any further problems associated with acceptance-based approaches in
general. I return to this question in section 6.2.2.
3.2 Understanding
“Understanding” is a notoriously vague term. In Horwich’s theory, it means
to have implicit knowledge of the use associated with a given term. I adopt
this view in what follows. Therefore, I shall discuss this notion at some
more detail in this section.
3.2.1 Understanding and Knowing the Meaning
Now I should like to look in detail at how a use theory in the spirit of Hor-
wich’s can be combined with the apparent conceptual equivalence between
‘knowing the meaning of x’ and ‘understanding x’. Both concepts are
closely linked, and examining their exact relationship will reveal import-
ant aspects of the notion of ‘understanding’, which gures prominently in
usage-based semantics in general, and in the ‘use theory’ in particular.
‘Knowing the meaning of a term’ implies understanding it. To see this,
it is crucial to rst look more closely at the two involved notions, “know-
ing (a meaning)” and “understanding”, respectively. Horwich’s suggestion,
which I shall adopt in the following, is that to ‘understand a term’ is to
know how it is used. For instance, if the relevant term is in my active
vocabulary, I know how to use it, or else, I would know how other speak-
ers use the term. ‘Knowing how to use a term’ implies, in turn, that one
knows the term’s inferential role; that one’s use is roughly in accordance
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with the established use within the corresponding community (i.e. that it is
correct);11,12 that one is able to answer appropriately if asked for the mean-
ing of the term; and maybe a bit more, depending on the theory-specic
notion of ‘use’ involved.
To state when exactly somebody can be said to ‘know the meaning of
“x”’ is slightly more complicated. On a very natural, albeit somewhat naïve,
reading, it might mean that one is simply able to state the meaning of “x”.
This is surely one important aspect. True as it is, without further restric-
tions this is essentially valueless. To name but one problem here, whether
statements are appropriate meaning statements depends crucially on the
semantic theories considered. In general, there at least as many permissible
variants to state the meaning of a given terms as there are semantic the-
ories. What is required here is a theory-independent notion of semantic
knowledge. Such a theory-independent conception is likely to be pretty
similar to the description of ‘understanding’ explicated above. Because
knowledge of meaning involves essentially knowledge that manifests itself
in observable verbal behaviour: which inferences one draws from which
sets of premises; which answers one gives to certain questions; how one be-
haves non-verbally in response to others’ behaviour; and so forth. Pressed
in this direction, one easily gets the impression that understanding is in-
deed very similar to semantic knowledge, and that the only thing that is
undoubtedly very dissimilar is explicit knowledge of the underlying prop-
11 In this sense, I agree with Horwich that understanding comes in degrees (see Horwich
1998, 17–18).
12 The idea that understanding a term implies that a speaker’s use of that term is roughly
in conformity with how the word is used within her language community (or by ‘the
experts’) goes back to Putnam (1975). He discusses this restriction in the context of ref-
erence xing. Horwich expands this restriction and relates it to meaning (as opposed
to mere reference); he sees agreement (of use) with the group of ‘experts’ as a measure-
ment of understanding. In general, a person fully understands a given term when his
use is ‘correct’ in the sense that it is in accordance with the experts’ use. The other end
is marked by the threshold at which a person can be said to use the same word type as
his language community. It is a dicult matter to determine where exactly to drawn the
line here. If someone uses “tiger” and does not know that a tiger is an animal, this would
surely be below the threshold (Putnam 1975). Still, the threshold for what is appropriate
might in fact be substantially low, so that, if one is asked what the meaning of “demo-
cracy” is, “a kind of regime” might already count a suciently informed answer (in the
sense that one ‘talks about the same’).
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erties of meaning. In other words, the expression “knowledge of meaning”
in the former sense, in which every competent language user knows the
meaning of the terms that he masters, is by its very nature tightly linked
to the use associated with the term, i.e. tightly linked to understanding.
3.2.2 Horwich on Understanding
The niceties that are relevant in the area of understanding are worth dis-
cussing, since they reveal important aspects of Horwich’s use theory. So
just like before, when Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument served as
the starting point for the discussion, understanding and knowledge of mean-
ing will now be vehicles by which I would like to present some details of
the theory at stake. The most problematic aspect of Horwich’s theory in
the context of ‘understanding’ surely is the so-called capitalisation conven-
tion. Because as has already become clear above, it is quite ‘easy’ to tell the
meaning of a word (in a very weak sense of “telling”). If really only naming
is concerned, it is sucient to master the convention. The tension between
his account and the closely connected concepts of knowing the meaning
of a term and understanding it forces Horwich to admit some ambiguity
when it comes to what it is to ‘know the meaning of a term’. Ocially,
the meaning of “dog” is just DOG, which in turn is specied in terms of
a use property u. However, since no understanding of “dog” is required
in getting there, this can’t be the whole story, of course. Accordingly, in
the passages dealing with understanding, Horwich species his notion of
‘knowing the meaning of a term’ in such a way as to directly referring to
use properties, instead of taking the route via meaning properties:
The degree to which an individual understands a word is con-
stituted by the degree of similarity between what it means in
his idiolect and what it means in the communal language. And
this degree of similarity in meaning is in turn constituted by
the degree of similarity between the explanatorily basic use
property, u(x), that determines the word’s overall deployment
in the community and the use property that determines its de-
ployment by the individual. (Horwich 1998, 17–18)
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These facts concerning use properties are known only implicitly, Horwich
claims. This allows him to say that somebody can understand a given term,
without being able to explicitly state more than the obvious fact that “dog”
means DOG, which, in principle, is knowable independently from under-
standing.
But there is a problem lurking here, because in Horwich’s account, evid-
ence to the contrary notwithstanding, ‘understanding’ and ‘knowing the
meaning’ must fall apart. Horwich seems to admit that there is a very close
connection between the two, in particular that, as we assume, knowledge of
meaning implies understanding (no matter whether the reverse holds). He
claims that ‘those who do not understand the word (i.e. do not know what
“dog” means) . . . [do such and such]’, and that there is a ‘conceptual equi-
valence of “understanding a word” with “knowing what it means”’ (1998,
16 and 18, respectively). So, in a way he treats both notions as synonymous
or approximately synonymous. It makes sense to take Horwich as having
the everyday notion of semantic knowledge in mind here. This is, as I said
above, distinct from the knowledge associated with the constitutive prop-
erties of meaning.
In Horwich’s account, almost all knowledge concerning meaning that
he discusses in his work is implicit knowledge. The only meaning facts
explicitly known (if any) are those about capitalised expressions, i.e. what
a speaker might know explicitly is the name of the meaning of a given
term, but not the meaning itself. This allows him to equate understanding
with knowledge of meanings: investigation into meanings (for example,
by analysing uses in order to list relevant acceptance properties) does not
aect one’s understanding. Understanding varies with the degree of simil-
arity between one’s own use of a given term and how it is used within the
corresponding community—and so does knowledge.
So there are at least two senses in which one can be said to know the
meaning of a given term. One is the usual, implicit understanding of the
notion. On the other reading, ‘knowledge of meaning’ concerns the meta-
linguistic knowledge philosophers and linguists try to gather when they
examine the constitutive basis of semantics. It seems plausible that the
former notion can’t be dissolved from the notion of “understanding”, for,
as already indicated above, they share a common evidence basis: use. In
a usage-based understanding of meaning, then, use is the commonality
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between the two notions. If I investigate the use that constitutes the se-
mantics of my own language, I explicate—provided I work accurately—a
body of information that I already knew implicitly before.
There is just one problematic aspect of Horwich’s theory that I would
like to mention in the present context. His favourite example of a mean-
ing statement that is based on acceptance properties is this: ‘that our use
of “red” can be explained in terms of ‘the disposition to apply “red” to an
observed surface when and only when it is clearly red’ (Horwich 1998,
45). This itself is surely correct, or at least very close to the truth. But
the example term “red” oversimplies things here, since its meaning can
be analysed—as the example illustrates—largely independently from the
meaning of related terms. Semantic holism in its simplest form is the claim
that the meaning of a given term is dependent on (or can’t be stated in-
dependently from) the meanings of other terms that are ‘linked’ to it (cf.
Devitt 1993). The idea here is that language is a ‘semantic net’ into which all
meaningful expressions are embedded. In this view, the meaning of a term
changes as soon as any other term in the semantic net is altered (provided
they are linked appropriately). Holism is a relatively old idea; its most in-
uential proponent in 20th century philosophy was probably Quine, who
famously claimed ‘that our statements about the external world face the
tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body’
(1951, 38). Today, there is a variety of dierent distinctions in the area of
holism, none of which, however, is particularly relevant to my point here.
“Red”, being a colour term, is a word whose meaning is—even if semantics
is a holistic enterprise—explicable more or less independently from what
related terms mean. This, in turn, means that the ‘knowledge of meaning’
involved here is in fact quite self-contained. Other examples will probably
turn out to be far more complicated than this one.
By way of summary, it seems—in light of the previous discussion—rea-
sonable to dene “knowledge of meaning” and “understanding” as follows.
A person knows (explicitly) the meaning of a given word i that person is
able to state the circumstances in which that word may be applied in con-
formity with the standards of the respective language community. A per-
son understands a given word i that person knows its use, i.e. she knows
how to use it ‘correctly’ herself (ability of correct application) or how it is
used by others (ability of correct interpretation). This knowledge includes:
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(i) knowledge of the inferential role of the word; (ii) the ability to use the
word roughly in accordance with how the word is used within one’s lan-
guage community; and (iii) the ability to answer (more or less appropri-
ately) questions regarding the meaning of the word.
3.2.3 Understanding and Knowledge Covary
The above discussion, hopefully, shows two things. Firstly, that under-
standing and semantic knowledge are indeed tightly linked notions. Second-
ly, that there are several readings of ‘knowledge of meaning’ at work. Let
me summarise the argument by recapitulating these two issues.
The phrase “knowledge of meaning” is ambiguous, it seems, in several
respects. One important dierentiation proposed by Horwich is between
implicit and explicit knowledge. This, however, is problematic insofar as
it presupposes a theory-bound understanding of the body of information
that is implicit (e.g. knowledge of conceptual role). I think the direction of
Horwich’s line of argument is basically right, but it should better be formu-
lated in epistemological terms. The implicit knowledge concerning mean-
ing simply corresponds to ‘understanding’. Understanding is the ability
to employ one’s implicit knowledge of applying or interpreting particular
words, sentences, theories, and so on. This connection seems independ-
ent from the semantic knowledge itself. For instance, it could consist of
(knowledge of) Tarskian truth conditions. Explicit semantic knowledge is
knowledge about the constitutive basis of meaning: e.g. knowledge that the
meaning of “red” is essentially determined by a tendency to accept the sen-
tence “That’s red” in the presence of red objects, or knowledge that “red”
refers to a specic colour. Irrespective of one’s favourite theory of meaning
(i.e. irrespective of whether the postulated explicit knowledge gets formu-
lated in usage-based terms), the touchstone of both implicit and explicit
semantic knowledge is observable behaviour. Understanding is an ability,
as I just said. Abilities are ascribed on the basis of what people who seem
to have this ability in fact do.
So, what Horwich does when he claims that he only makes explicit the
implicit knowledge that every competent language user has anyway is
skipping one step in the above argument. He would need to claim that
the explicit knowledge that he postulates (e.g. sets of acceptance proper-
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ties) best explains the behavioural patterns that competent language users
show and which we take as evidence for their ability to understand. Sum-
ming this up in simple terms, use is not the common factor of implicit and
explicit semantic knowledge but it is the common factor in an epistemo-
logical sense, namely in the sense that the very same behavioural patterns
that justify ascriptions of understanding also justify assumptions concern-
ing a specic constitutive basis of meaning.
In light of these considerations, the link between understanding and
knowledge of meaning seems obvious. Understanding is just implicit know-
ledge of usage-based facts, i.e. knowledge of how words (and the like) are
applied and interpreted. One’s ability to understand a term is reected in
one’s overall linguistic (and non-linguistic) behaviour, but it is constituted
by one’s implicit knowledge of the use properties of that word. Given this,
Horwich’s proposal for ‘measuring’ understanding in terms of the similar-
ity of one’s use of a term with the overall employment of that term in the
corresponding linguistic society seems quite reasonable.13 For this allows
us to say, independently of any theory, some people understand certain
words better than others.
3.3 Explicating the Claim
The basic idea behind usage-based semantic theories is that ‘meaning is
use’. This, to be sure, is a motto or slogan at best. So, one step toward
a semantic framework whose value might be assessed appropriately is to
make clear what this claim amounts to, once it is spelled out. This is what
I would like to do in this section.
3.3.1 Core Use Properties
One argument against usage-based accounts of meaning focuses on the ap-
parent fact that if meaning were use (as such), then with every change in
13 Provided the involved background assumptions are plausible. In particular, one would
need to justify the assumption that complete understanding consists in perfect compli-
ance with the overall use in a given society.
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use, a word would alter its meaning.14 This is an undesired consequence,
for it is contrary to our intuitions. Intuitively speaking, not every new
instance aects the meaning of a term. Suppose, just for the sake of argu-
ment, that we spell out use properties in terms of acceptance properties.
In 2012, one would accept the sentence “Dr Angela Merkel is Germany’s
current chancellor”. A few years later, this sentence wouldn’t be accepted
any more. Now, if the meaning of “Dr Angela Merkel” depends on all its
uses (instantiations of the relevant type) and, hence, can be explained by
listing all accepted sentences in which that term occurs, then its meaning
has changed somewhere around the time of Merkel’s de-selection as chan-
cellor. Rather than accepting this radical result, we would want to explain
the dierence in use in terms of dierent facts in 2012 and, say, 2017.
Irrespective of whether one wants to dene use in terms of acceptance
properties, one needs an answer to this problem. Somehow, therefore, I
need to restrict the scope of “use” in my denition of “meaning”. On the
other hand, I certainly should allow that even small changes in use ‘result’
in altered meanings. The most obvious case is in which the change is based
on a new denition of the term. I shall illustrate this by the example of
“planet”. On planets, Horwich writes that
[. . . ] if a planet beyond Pluto were discovered, and we star-
ted to say “There are ten planets”, we would not thereby have
given the word “planet” a new use. [. . . ] [The opponent will
then ask in reply], what is the basis of the distinction that is
being assumed here between the use facts (like, perhaps, our
disposition to accept “Planets orbit stars”) which could plaus-
ibly be held to constitute the use of “planet”, and other use facts
(like our disposition to accept “There are nine planets”) which
surely could not? (1998, 59–60)
14 The details depend on the particular theory. For example, according to Horwich’s ac-
count, a word would—if the objection were correct—change its meaning if the change in
use resulted in a corresponding change of the list of accepted sentences (in which that
word occurs). See Horwich (1998, 59–60) for a—very short—reply to this objection. The
basic idea is to restrict the list of accepted sentences to those necessary to account for all
sentences in which the particular word occurs.
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There may be other reasons to decline acceptance of “There are nine plan-
ets” than the discovery of a tenth planet. In 2006, the denition of “planet”
was modied, so that according to the new denition, Pluto is not a planet
any more.15 This, of course, altered ‘our disposition to accept “There are
nine planets”’ (now there are eight planets in the solar system). Horwich is
surely right in noting that our disposition to accept “There are nine plan-
ets” is, if you like, an inessential aspect of our use of “planet”. However,
we are certainly inclined to say that our altered dispositions in the case
of redenition is due to a change in meaning. Redenitions are paradigm
examples of altered meanings.
While Horwich’s example shows that acceptance properties may dier
with constant meaning, the redenition of “planet” illustrates that, in re-
gard to the very same acceptance properties, altered dispositions may also
be the result of corresponding changes in meaning. This in itself does not
undermine the claim that this disposition does not constitute the use of
“planet”. But it shows that what makes this a case of irrelevant dispositions
is not—as is suggested by the example—that an empirical observation was
involved. It is true that such observations do not directly aect meaning.16
This, however, is not what sets these dispositions apart from others like
the disposition to accept “Planets orbit stars”. Horwich’s point is that he
wants to reanimate the analytic/synthetic distinction: our disposition to ac-
cept “Planets orbit stars” is left unaected by any minor redenitions (e.g.
the redenition that excludes Pluto) or empirical observations. In other
words, “Planets orbit stars” is an analytic truth about planets and therefore
our disposition to accept this sentence is among the essential dispositions
that constitute our use of “planet”. The basic idea here is that as long as the
analytic truths associated with a given word remain, its core use properties
remain the same as well.
It goes without saying that there are alternatives to the Horwichian ap-
proach. For example, instead of positing one word type “planet”, one could
acknowledge that there were two dierent words, before and after 2006.
15 See ‘IAU 2006 General Assembly: Result of the IAU Resolution votes’, http://
www.iau.org/public\_press/news/detail/iau0603/, accessed on:
18/06/2012.
16 Yet they might do so indirectly, as new observations might make a redenition of terms
necessary.
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This, however, would lead to further consequences beyond the scope of
this chapter. Many words alter their meaning more or less continuously;
compare, for instance, the semantic ‘stability’ of words like “because/’cuz”
or “war” on the one hand and “Aristotle” or “twenty-three” on the other
hand. It certainly seems implausible to posit arbitrarily new types here.
Accordingly, I shall leave all this aside and focus on the theoretical motiv-
ation for core use properties, rather than on their exact design.
Core use properties are, in fact, essential to any usage-based theory of
meaning. The mere claim that ‘meaning is use’ is so abstract and general
that, if it were true, it were vacuously true.17 One respect in which the
claim that ‘meaning is use’ must be specied concerns the apparent fact,
discussed above, that primary meaning—or its theory-specic equivalent—
plays an important role in a variety of linguistic eects such as irony, meta-
phor, implicature, etc. For example, the potential of “It’s nice weather
today” to mean ‘The weather is quite bad’ in certain circumstances seems
to be parasitic on the quite dierent potential of this particular phrase to
mean ‘It’s nice weather today’ in most other circumstances (what is com-
monly called ‘under standard conditions’). Now, if one takes the claim that
‘meaning is use’ all too seriously, then the problem is that the use of a term
simply seems to be the totality of all word type instantiations, among them
instances of, say, “nice” that mean ‘bad’, or ‘interesting, or ‘misplaced’, or
what have you. Yet, the potential of “nice” to mean ‘bad’ seems to be rooted
solely in the fact that “nice” primarily means ‘nice’, and nothing more. In
other words, usage-based theories of meaning are required to systematise
use in the sense that they need to distinguish a core of use properties that
accounts for use tout court (e.g. the core use property that constitutes the
potential of “nice” to mean ‘nice’).
More generally, semantics is not just the study of meaning of natural-
language expressions but also of abstractions thereof. Accordingly, se-
mantics not only explains that and why, for example, “nice” might mean
‘nice’ in a particular situation, and ‘bad’, or ‘interesting’, or ‘misplaced’ in
others. It also explains (or should at least be compatible with accompany-
17 Even proponents of truth-conditional semantics or formal semantics potentially agree
that use plays some role in determining meaning—e.g. they might allow that the type-
dierence between “bank”, referring to an institution, and “bank”, referring to a special
parts of rivers, is rooted in dierences in use.
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ing frameworks that explain) why the interpretation ‘nice’ is a particularly
relevant one and why other interpretations are derivative or peripheral.
The idea here is that core use properties can serve as a basis for explana-
tions that generalise over the totality of use. In Horwich’s theory, core use
properties are identied with distinct acceptance properties, where the lat-
ter are stated in terms of dispositional analyses: the core use properties of a
given term can, so argues Horwich, be stated by specifying a (singleton) set
of sentences which a competent language user would accept under appro-
priate conditions. For instance, a competent user tends to accept “That’s
red” in the presence of red objects. This explains his overall employment of
the term “red”. In this sense, the ‘theory’ is able to account both for literal
as well as peripheral, non-literal word-type instantiations.
The list of sentences the acceptance of which constitute one’s (core) use
of a particular word needs to be restricted somehow. As should be clear
at this point, sentences involving empirical claims certainly need to be ex-
cluded; that is, those sentences the acceptance or rejection of which can be
explained away by referring to empirical facts are inessential to meaning
constitution. In the rst example, the acceptance of “Dr Angela Merkel is
Germany’s current chancellor” depends on whether Merkel is taken to be
the current German chancellor. Similarly, for the rst “planet” example. In
the case of a redenition, there is no empirical fact (in the relevant sense)
that decides the matter. In other words, there must be some non-empirical
facts that distinguish essential dispositions from inessential ones. Or, in
Horwich’s own words: ‘[. . . ] the way to pick out the particular use prop-
erty of a word that comprises what we call “the use” is to nd the use prop-
erty that provides the best explanation of all the others’ (Horwich 1998, 60).
Far from being an answer, this is more like a re-description of the initial
problem.
An obvious alternative would be to bite the bullet and accept that the
use of a word really is the totality of its use. This option, however, runs
counter to our intuitions. Consider the redenition case again: “planet”
changed its meaning and we modied our use of it (‘How many planets
are there?’ ‘Eight!’). But this is not the whole story. We, language users of
English, have accommodated our use just because the meaning of “planet”
has changed. And this is incompatible with the claim that the total use of
“planets”—including our disposition to accept “There are eight planets”—
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constitutes its meaning. The interim conclusion, then, is something like
this: on the one hand, I can’t consistently maintain that the total use of
a term constitutes its meaning; on the other hand, there is no conclusive
solution yet as to where to draw the line between the dispositions con-
sidered essential and the rest.18
Another, admittedly less obvious alternative is to give up the idea that
(explanatory basic) use properties of a word can be individuated on the
basis of acceptance properties. This is because the whole problem concerns
only the quite specic issue of how to separate the use-constituting sen-
tences from the class of all accepted sentences. If I would omit acceptance
properties, I could also simply ignore the corresponding dispositions. This
solution has one further, important advantage. I have already mentioned
the problem that a usage-based account that focuses merely on acceptance
properties leaves out the huge class of truth-valueless sentences (or words
that do not contribute truth-evaluable content). Can we reasonably say
that in such-and-such circumstances sentences like “Hello!” or “What the
f**k?!” are accepted? The words occurring in these sentences surely have
their respective meanings, and it is likely that these are determined by how
the words are used as constituents in, inter alia, the cited sentences. But
you can’t accept “Hello!” in appropriate situations in a similar way that you
accept the application of “red” in the presence of an object that is clearly red
(if you do). Accordingly, in light of the problems facing ‘acceptance-based’
accounts, I suggest spelling out use properties not in terms of acceptance
properties but somehow more broadly (see chapter 6).
This strategy serves two distinct purposes. Firstly, it leaves open the
possibility to generalise one’s theory of meaning to truth-valueless sen-
tences and words occurring in them. Secondly, it sets issues of meaning
apart from the discussion of the analytic/synthetic distinction. The former
is a welcome result because it frees me from the need for yet another the-
ory that would then account for truth-valueless sentences. The latter is a
18 The solution that I suggest in part three of this book is to distinguish between semantic
descriptions and constitutive bases of meaning. The latter (total use) leaves the relative
‘stability’ of the former (dispositional analysis) intact, as it were. Typically, when we
are talking about ‘meaning’, what we mean is semantic descriptions, which is why the
intuition that total use does not aect meaning directly is indeed correct.
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virtue because this is an unsettled debate, and you better play safe and not
base your theory of meaning on such a controversial distinction.
3.3.2 Linguistic-Philosophical Terminology
Several disciplines contribute to the project of a ‘theory of meaning’, among
them philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, some branches of lin-
guistics, anthropology, cognitive psychology, etc. They all dier in their
theoretical aims and with respect to the ‘methods’ they employ. When it
comes to broad classications of semantic theories, several distinctions are
drawn, of which the distinction ‘truth-conditional approaches vs usage-
based approaches’ is just one.19
The term “usage-based” gures prominently across the literature of sev-
eral professions. The last common ancestor of “usage-based” and its cog-
nates is the work of the later Wittgenstein, especially the Philosophical In-
vestigations. This suggests that usage-based theories in dierent disciplines
have a set of basic assumptions they share. Still, “usage-based” as a tech-
nical term shows subtle dierences in meaning in philosophical and non-
philosophical literature. I should say a few words here about those subtle
dierences.
First, philosophy. In philosophy, usage-based approaches start with the
assumption that the meaning of a word is identical with its use. Accord-
ingly, a very simple and popular paraphrase of what use theories of mean-
ing claim is, in eect: meaning is use (see above). Of course, this slogan
form of the main axiom obscures many important details of the actual the-
ory. For example, take the ‘type vs token’ issue that is highly relevant in
usage-based considerations (see 8.2). I do not want to go into these niceties
here but rather illustrate the broader picture. Roughly, when philosophers
say that meaning is use they are making a programmatic claim. What they
mean is that, in principle, given enough cognitive resources, memory, and
information about the world and its history, it is possible to determine (i.e.
to state) the meaning of a given word. Philosophers are not particularly
concerned with nding out how a word is actually used. Their program-
matic claim is merely meant as a contrast to the view according to which
19 Other relevant distinctions are ‘semantic theories vs foundational theories’ (Speaks 2011)
or ‘theories of semantic content vs theories of communication’ (Borg 2004b).
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meanings of words are xed and can be stated without taking into account
particular situations in which language is actually applied. That is to say,
usage-based theories are counterparts to theories that approach semantics
independently from communication concerns.
What is at stake will become even clearer when I take into account some
example cases.20 Here is Horwich (1997b), talking this time about vague
predicates:
[The use-regularities of vague predicates] do not derive from
stipulation, but are implicit in our linguistic practice (insofar
as they provide the best explanation of that practice). (933)
And
[. . . ] the explanatorily fundamental regularity in our use of
[the vague predicate] “H” is approximated by a partial function
A(H) which species the subjective probability of its apply-
ing as a function of the underlying parameter n (i.e. ‘number
of grains’ for “heap”, ‘number of dollars’ for “rich”, etc.) [. . . ]
Such a use-regularity results from our having learned, regard-
ing various dierent values of the parameter n, that they con-
stitute clear instances of “H”, somewhat less clear instances,
cases in which “H” is denitely not applied, and slightly less
certain cases of inapplicability. [. . . I]nsofar as A(H) is really
the complete articulation of the basic regularity governing our
use of “H”, then no matter what else is discovered, it cannot
imply a condent application of either “H” or “‘-H” to the bor-
derline objects. (933–934, emphasis original)
Again Horwich, this time talking about meaning more generally:
The overall use of each word stems from its possession of a
basic acceptance property. For each word there is a small set
20 The theories listed in the following dier signicantly from each other. Here, however,
I am currently concerned only with the distinction ‘usage-based semantics vs truth-
conditional, formal semantics’. Keeping this distinction in mind, dierent theories—e.g.
conceptual role semantics (e.g. Block 1986) and the later Wittgenstein—are theoretically
on a par, as they all rest on the assumption that meaning is eectively determined by
how language is actually applied.
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of simple properties which (in conjunction with other factors
and with the basic properties of other words) explain total lin-
guistic behaviour with respect to that word. [. . . ] The present
theory is focused on the semantic feature of a word. The dis-
tinctive form of that feature is that it designates the circum-
stances in which certain specied sentences containing the
word are accepted; and the primary explanatory role of a
word’s acceptance property is to account for the acceptance of
other sentences containing the word. (1998, 44–45, emphasis
omitted)
Greenberg & Harman (2006, 242), discussing conceptual role semantics, say
that
Conceptual Role Semantics (CRS) is the view that the mean-
ings of expressions of a language (or other symbol system) or
the contents of mental states are determined or explained by
the role of the expressions or mental states in thinking. The
theory can be taken to be applicable to language in the ordin-
ary sense [. . . ].
And further down in the same article:
One way to investigate the contribution of use to meaning is to
consider how a thinker describes certain imaginary possibilit-
ies. For example, one aspect of Mabal’s use of concepts is her
rm belief that all cats are animals. Other aspects include her
rm beliefs that there are cats now, there have been cats in the
past, and there will be cats in the future. Another aspect is the
way she applies the concept cat to particular things. (305–306)
Block (1986), an early proponent of conceptual role semantics, summarises
his view thus:
The internal factor [as opposed to not further specied ex-
ternal factors], conceptual role, is a matter of the causal role of
the expression in reasoning and deliberation and, in general, in
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the way the expression combines and interacts with other ex-
pressions so as to mediate between sensory inputs and behavi-
oural outputs. A crucial component of a sentence’s conceptual
role is a matter of how it participates in inductive and deduct-
ive inferences. A word’s conceptual role is a matter of its con-
tribution to the role of sentences. [. . . E]lements of language
have a total causal role, including, say, the eect of newsprint
on whatever people wrap in it. Conceptual role abstracts away
from all causal relations except the ones that mediate infer-
ences, inductive or deductive, decision making, and the like.
(628)
Wittgenstein, characterising the notion of a language game, asks:
Are “there” and “this” also taught ostensively? – Imagine how
one might perhaps teach their use. One will point at places
and things, but in this case the pointing occurs in the use of
the words too and not merely in learning the use. – [. . . ] Now
what do the words of this language signify? – How is what
they signify supposed to come out other than in the kind of
use they have? And we have already described that. (2009, 9e)
And in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics he remarks that
The point of the word “all” is that it admits no exception.—
True, that is the point of its use in our language; but the kinds
of use we feel to be the ‘point’ are connected with the role that
such-and-such a use has in our whole life. (1967, 8e)
This cursory list of core aspects of dierent use theories is supposed to
show that no philosopher of language seriously intends to state the prop-
erties that constitute meaning. What most use theorists do is specify the
‘register’, if you like, in which such properties might be articulated best.
Horwich likes to have meaning properties articulated in terms of accept-
ance properties.21 Greenberg and Harman consider several possibilities for
21 Interestingly enough, this motif shines through even when the topic is vagueness (see
above).
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narrowing down conceptual roles, one of which is conceivability. Block,
who fancies a narrower variant of conceptual role semantics, tries to cap-
ture them in terms of inferential relations. Wittgenstein leaves the question
entirely open. This list can probably be extended ad libitum. The point is:
the commonality between all these dierent theoretical frames is that they
all try to narrow down the all too trivial slogan that ‘meaning is use’.
One key aspect of philosophical theories of meaning is that they draw
a general, abstract picture of how meaning statements are possible; real-
life meaning statements are not of primary concern here. A second key
aspect is that, in contrast to linguistic and psychological theories, specic-
ally philosophical theories of meaning are not designed to be especially
useful. To borrow Tarski’s phrase here, ‘[semantics] has no pretensions of
being a universal patent-medicine for all the ills and diseases of mankind,
whether imaginary or real’ (1944, 345). Theories in formal semantics, for
example, are typically meant to be implemented one way or other in com-
puter programs (for the purpose of translation, searchability in semantic
nets, voice input, etc.), theories in cognitive grammar are motivated by the
search for an integrated theory of cognitive capacities of which language is
just one aspect (such that one main purpose is that the theory is compatible
with related theories in cognitive science). There is no such practical mo-
tivation behind semantic theories in philosophy.22 They follow their own,
self-referential rules: typical marks of adequacy are naturalism, generality,
uniformity, and so on.
Eventually, a third key aspect of usage-based approaches to semantics
in philosophy is this: the notion of ‘use/usage’ employed in these theor-
ies is rather abstract, so to say. What philosophers mean when they say
that their theory is usage-based is not that they examine uses of a word
in order to nd out what it means. What a word means is—to philosoph-
ers at least—always clear pre-theoretically. In case of doubt, they will tell
you what a word means. In this respect, meaning statements in philosophy
of language inherit an important feature from the thought experiments in
which they appear. In thought experiments, there is no epistemological
barrier between the reader and the described situation. In order to nd out
22 The later Wittgenstein is a bit of an exception in this regard, as he stressed the therapeutic
aspect of his work.
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what is the case in a given thought experiment, one only needs to read the
description carefully. It describes all the relevant facts, or else leaves them
unspecied.23 Philosophers often construct thought experiments that take
a certain semantic interpretation for granted.24 Assignment of semantic
values often times depends on tacit assumptions in these cases.25 The claim
that ‘meaning is use’ is a programmatic or methodological statement: if one
wants to nd out what a word means, the best option is to scrutinise its use
(instead of its alleged reference relations). But the examples that are used
to underpin this programmatic claim typically presuppose a specic inter-
pretation that is only valid given certain specic background assumptions.
I shall briey contrast this notion of “usage-based” with the one em-
ployed in linguistics and related elds. When linguists claim their the-
ory is usage-based, what they typically mean is (i) that their research is
corpus-driven; (ii) that meaning is a social phenomenon, determined by
interacting language users; (iii) that the meaning of a word is constituted
by its instances; and (iv) that meaning can only be fully comprehended by
considering the situational context of utterances (Tomasello 2003a). To be
sure, all this is compatible with more philosophically minded use theor-
ies. Philosophical and empirical theories alike originate in Wittgenstein’s
later work. Yet, linguists’ and philosophers’ respective interests dier. Pro-
ponents of usage-based linguistics emphasise that they utilise ‘real’ data.
i.e. actual use instead of armchair examples. Philosophers, on the other
hand, hardly ever need to recur to real conversations in order to qualify as
‘usage-based’ theorists.
The gist is this: the term “usage-based” (and its cognates) is a tech-
nical term both in philosophy and in linguistics. Although there is al-
legedly a common origin, both terms dier signicantly in current theor-
ising. Roughly speaking, in linguistics the term is more or less synonymous
to “corpus-driven”, i.e. it expresses the idea that language must be scrutin-
23 Often, most things are specied, because most thought experiments include a clause that
says ‘this and that is dierent in the imagined situation; everything else is the same as
in the actual world’.
24 Indeed, there are also a lot of philosophers these days that argue by means of linguistic
data (cf. the so-called ‘X-Phi movement’).
25 For example, a relatively typical background assumption is that the laws posited by the
sciences are, by and large, correct.
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ised in relation to specic situations in which it is applied. In philosophy,
“usage-based” is an umbrella term for theories that deviate from the main-
stream idea of reducing semantics to reference relations and related notions
such as satisfaction, truth, etc. Crucially, though, the two research agen-
das complement each other. In fact, philosophical theories of meaning can
reasonably be conceived as philosophically informed foundations of the
empirical theories to which they correspond.
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Basically, there are a large number of dividing lines that can be drawn with
respect to competing theories of meaning. Here, I would like to focus on
just one possible divide; namely the distinctive characteristics of, on the
one hand, usage-based theories and, on the other hand, truth-conditional
semantics (TCS, henceforth). For the most part, I am going to concentrate
on neo-Davidsonian approaches to semantics. I think, though, that most of
my critical remarks concerning TCS apply equally to all similar approaches
that take explanations of referential relations of linguistic expressions to be
the hallmark of success in semantics. I have divided the present chapter
into two sections. In the rst of these two sections (4.1), I will be present-
ing the general idea behind truth-conditional semantics, which is, roughly
speaking, that specifying a sentence’s truth conditions is one way of stating
its meaning. My plan is to introduce the main motivation in favour of TCS
by taking a reconstruction of Davidson’s famous argument concerning sen-
tence comprehension as my starting point. I discuss this argument in detail
by distinguishing between two theoretically independent issues: Novelty1
and compositionality. The former is, roughly, competent language users’
ability to comprehend sentences that they have not heard before. The latter
is a well-known feature of natural languages, i.e. the (apparent) fact that
the semantic value of a sentence is a composition of the semantic values of
its constituents.
In the second part of this chapter (4.2), I explain why TCS is supposed
to be the theory that seems to t the bill with respect to Novelty. My criti-
1 In contrast to compositionality, Novelty is a phenomenon that is seldom discussed.
Whenever I refer to it, I use a capitalised word to indicate that I mean the particular
characterisation that I give below. I tend to call Novelty a ‘problem’, which is a short-
hand description for ‘the problem to explain how it is possible that Novelty holds’.
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cism will be based on a detailed evaluation of arguments pro TCS. Finally,
I will argue that usage-based approaches are not only also able to account
for human comprehension competencies, but that they are, in fact, better
suited for this purpose. This anticipates a methodological argument that I
present in the third part of this book (in 7.1.1 and 7.2.2)—an argument to
the eect that phenomena (as opposed to their corresponding abstractions)
have epistemological primacy. Applied to language comprehension, this
amounts to saying that sentence understanding can only be accounted for
in terms of understanding of utterances, and not, as the truth-conditional
semanticist is likely to suppose, the other way around.
4.1 Donald Davidson et al.
In this section, I give a short overview of truth-conditional semantics by
way of presenting one highly inuential argument in its favour. By far the
most important gure in this area is, of course, Donald Davidson. The ma-
jor part of the presentation below draws on his early writings, especially
Truth and Meaning. I am going to assume for the rest of the chapter that
my main target in this area is not Davidson’s theory per se but what his
heirs made of it, i.e. neo-Davidson semantics. Davidson’s work on meaning
is based on Tarski’s prior work on truth in formalised languages. Accord-
ingly, I shall briey present this framework as well. Many more recent
theories in philosophical semantics are inspired or directly inuenced by
Davidson’s early work. However, the main idea behind Davidsonian se-
mantics has remained unmodied since then: explaining linguistic capa-
cities in terms of postulates that correspond to the ‘rules of composition’
and ‘reference postulates’ in a Tarski-style theory of truth.2 Therefore, I
think it is safe to say that my general critique of TCS applies across the
board, so to speak, although it critically engages specically with one as-
pect of Davidson’s original argumentation.
2 Note that in modern theories in philosophy of language and in formal semantics, the
term “refers” replaces what was “fulls” in Tarski’s truth theory.
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4.1.1 Introduction to the Framework
The most relevant alternative to usage-based approaches to meaning is
truth-conditional semantics.3 Its most prominent proponent is Donald Dav-
idson, who elaborated and defended his theory of meaning in a number of
articles.4 In summarising the main ideas of truth-conditional semantics, I
shall mainly focus on the early Davidsonian way of presenting it.5 Why
is Davidson’s theory relevant for the present purposes? This is simply be-
cause TCS, in general, is a theory that is well suited to account for one spe-
cic problem: sentence comprehension. And, as will turn out in due course,
this problem is particularly hard to tackle from outside truth-conditional
approaches.
The problem, in short, is this: language users can understand and pro-
duce (in the respective languages that they master) a potentially unlimited
number of sentences, and they do so with only limited cognitive resources
(in particular, severely limited memory). The problem is how best to ac-
count for this astonishing ability. Most signicantly, competent language
users have (in fact, can have) only limited knowledge in regard to the mean-
ings of atomic expressions (words, morphemes, and so on). More precisely,
3 As already indicated above, a classication system of established theories always in-
volves some simplication. Insofar as this is true for all classications, I am not partic-
ularly worried by the simplications that I presuppose here. I think it is fair to say that
if one puts all broadly ‘usage-based’ frameworks into one group, then the most obvious
contrast group is theories that take reference to be the central semantic notion. In this
sense, (neo-)Davidsonian semantics seems indeed the most relevant rival theory.
4 The most important essays are collected in Davidson (1985). Out of these, Truth and
Meaning (Davidson 1967) is the central point of reference. Regarding his philosophy of
language, Davidson (2005) is another relevant collection. Therein, the reprints that are
most relevant to our present subject matter include: Davidson (1986, 1994). The earlier
works of Davidson dier in some respects from his later work. Besides the three articles
just mentioned, Davidson (1990) gives a comprehensive overview of his ‘later’ position.
5 The most inuential neo-Davidsonians are Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig (e.g. Lepore
(2006), Lepore & Ludwig (2005, 2006)). There are some strands both in linguistics and
philosophy that, although not dealing with Davidsonian philosophy itself, are heavily
inuenced by the core insights of truth-conditional semantics. Among others, these in-
clude: Bar-On, Horisk & Lycan (2000), Borg (2004b, 2012a), Fodor & Lepore (2002), Heck
(2007), Lycan (2010). A very comprehensive, critical interpretation of Davidson’s earlier
work is Hoeltje (2012), who argues, essentially, that Davidson’s conviction that a truth
theory can serve as a basis for one’s theory of meaning is not well justied.
129
4 Truth-conditional Theories of Meaning
the number of meaningful atomic expressions in a given natural language
is always restricted, whereas the range of propositional content that can be
expressed by means of language never is. Still, competent speakers know
what a given sentence means independently from whether they have heard
or read this sentence before (subject to their familiarity with all constitu-
ents and the relevant syntactic structure). Here is an example that illus-
trates this ability:
During the 2012 Olympic Games, Boris Johnson, then mayor
of London, cried out loud ‘Mother is the best’ before he jumped
head-rst into the Thames.
Chances are quite high that you never have read this sentence before. How-
ever, you are able to comprehend its content (I assume). You understand
that this sentence says that during the 2012 Olympic Games, Boris Johnson,
then mayor of London, cried out loud ‘Mother is the best’ before he jumped
head-rst into the Thames. Truth-conditional semantics is highly relevant
for the purposes of this chapter, because it sets out to provide an explana-
tion for this astonishing ability.
In fact, you hardly ever come across a theoretic justication of truth-
conditional semantics that would not refer to this specic ability. In light
of this, I think it makes sense to take this as an appropriate starting point for
a general discussion of the framework. For obvious reasons, this overview
will be kept relatively short.6
4.1.2 Understanding Sentences
When it comes to truth-conditional semantics and its advantages, two is-
sues must be kept apart. The rst is the phenomenon just described: the
ability of language users to comprehend potentially any novel sentence in
their language.7 The other important observation that TCS accounts for is
6 For a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of Davidson’s semantic programme, I refer the
interested reader to Lepore (2006).
7 This holds, given some—more or less uncontroversial—background assumptions. For
example, natural language sentences may be innitely long, i.e. the recursive character
of languages allows for sentences of any length. Particular sentences are always nite,
though. Human beings with their limited cognitive resources, however, can only under-
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that natural languages seem to be compositional—which, from Davidson’s
own perspective, is just the other side of the coin. There are several ways
of conceiving of compositionality,8 but the following denition will do for
our purposes. A language is compositional i the meaning of a sentence
is determined by the meanings of its atomic parts (words, morphemes, . . . )
and the way the sentence is structured. To take a simple example: the (lit-
eral) meaning of “Snow is white” is (fully) determined by the meanings of
“snow”, “is”, and “white” and the syntactic structure of the sentence, i.e.
stand sentences up to a certain length (depending on their memory). If one ignores these
limitations for a moment, one may say that language users can potentially understand
an unlimited number of sentences (all grammatical sentences of that language). Roughly
put, they may in principle understand every grammatical sentence of their language.
Davidson mentions some further important assumptions:
When we can regard the meaning of each sentence as a function of a nite
number of features of the sentence, we have an insight not only into what
there is to be learned; we also understand how an innite aptitude can be
encompassed by nite accomplishments. For suppose that a language lacks
this feature; then no matter how many sentences a would-be speaker learns
to produce and understand, there will remain others whose meanings are
not given by the rules already mastered. It is natural to say such a language
is unlearnable. This argument depends, of course, on a number of empirical
assumptions: for example, that we do not at some point suddenly acquire an
ability to intuit the meanings of sentences on no rule at all; that each new
item of vocabulary, or new grammatical rule, takes some nite time to be
learned; that man is mortal. (Davidson 1965, pp. 8–9 of the reprint)
A further issue, that I will briey touch upon below, is that Davidson and contemporary
scholars speak of sentences instead of utterances. The problem here is that, prima facie,
only utterances can be understood, since they are the relevant type of entity that plays a
role in understanding. On the other hand, utterances mean a variety of dierent things
in dierent situations and sentence meaning is just one factor that potentially inuences
utterance meaning. Taken together, the most plausible reading here is that utterance
comprehension always—i.e. independent from specic contexts of utterance—rests upon
one’s ability to comprehend the ‘literal’ sentential meaning rst. And for this ability
(neo-)Davidsonian semantics is supposed to provide the corresponding interpretations.
I will return to this in 7.2.2.
8 See Gendler Szabó (2012a) for a review. See also Pagin & Westerståhl (2010a, 2010b),
who give a nice, comparatively non-technical introduction to the topic. Cf. also Fulop &
Keenan (2002), Grandy (1990), Groenendijk & Stokhof (2005), Pelletier (1994, 2003), and
Robbins (2001). For a decidedly pro-TCS argumentation in the context of composition-
ality, see Higginbotham (2007).
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the meaning that is, for lack of a better description, ‘produced’ by writing
a noun, followed by a copula plus an adjective.9
To be better able to refer to the two topics just summarised, I suggest the
following characterisations:
Novelty Competent language users are typically able to understand sen-
tences that they have never read or heard before, given (i) that they
are familiar with the words and syntactic structures occurring in a
given sentence, (ii) that the length and complexity of the sentence
does not exceed the subject’s cognitive resources.
Compositionality Complex natural language sentences seem to be se-
mantically compositional in that the meaning of the whole complex
is exhaustively determined by the meanings of the atomic parts the
complex consists of (‘lexical meaning’) and the way in which these
parts form a complex (‘syntax’), provided the resulting complex is
well-formed.
Both issues are closely related, of course. Let me elaborate in some more
detail how. The overall picture seems to be this: Novelty is a fact, com-
positionality is not. The former is usually explained in terms of the latter.
Therefore, by construing an account of compositionality, you already indir-
ectly provide an explanation for the Novelty problem. Two further things
need to be noted that are implied by what I have said thus far. Firstly, there
are dierent possible explanations, or, to be more precise, there are at least
as many explanations for Novelty as for compositionality. And, secondly, if
something else explains Novelty, then there is no apparent need to account
for compositionality, since compositionality itself is no apparent fact at all
(at least not in virtue of the arguments put forth in favour of Novelty).
Why is Novelty a fact and compositionality not? I take it that it is pretty
obvious that competent speakers understand novel sentences.10 Concern-
ing compositionality, things are a bit more complicated. At least it seems
9 The underlying idea of setting up the procedure this way is probably that, eventually,
we may end up with a (possibly hierarchically ordered) inventory of sentence structures
that all uniquely determine sentence meaning, given the meanings of their atoms.
10 If the ‘Boris Johnson’ example does not move you, think of any other grammatically
well-formed English sentence and test it on your departmental colleagues.
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that English sentences are compositional. Especially if—as was common
practice in early modern philosophy of language—one focuses on simply
structured declarative sentences. Certainly, you might think, the fact that
“Socrates is white” means what it does depends, inter alia, on the further
fact that “Socrates” stands for Socrates; that “white” denotes a certain col-
our; and that the syntactic structure of copula sentences somehow ensures
that the whole expression ascribes the property denoted by the predicative
to the subject of the sentence (or something reasonably similar). This seems
natural and is quite plausible indeed. Philosophically speaking, however,
the crucial point here is this: whether natural languages such as English
really are compositional in the sense just sketched is an empirical ques-
tion. Compositionality does not follow from the fact that Novelty holds.11
The status of Novelty, on the other hand, is not similarly challengeable.
For it describes only a phenomenon, not an explanation. Novelty refers
to people’s alleged ability to understand. Of course, one could imagine a
scenario in which the observable phenomena are alike but in which no
understanding occurs, as we conceive of it. Still, this does not undermine
my present claim, since the relevant understanding referred to in the de-
scription is itself part of the phenomenon. For example, people respond to
questions by giving certain kinds of answers; they execute certain types
of actions in response to commands; they infer specic conclusions from
sets of premises; and so forth. This is what we—other speakers of the lan-
guage community—are able to observe and what we combine with our
prior knowledge of semantics and syntax. Therefore, the status of Novelty
can’t be challenged analogously to compositionality, for it is only about
what is observable independently of the theories anyway.
A variety of relevant examples that question the status of composition-
ality have been discussed in the current literature. The following two are
quite illustrative in this respect. Assume that the ‘semantic content’ of
“white wine” is composed of the semantic values of, respectively, “white”
and “wine” (just as the semantic value of “snow is white” is composed of
the semantic values of its constituents). Then there is a specic ‘part’ of the
11 Note that here and in what follows I do not presuppose that natural languages are not
compositional. My argument specically attacks the alleged justicatory relation from
Novelty to compositionality (and nothing else).
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semantic value of the complex expression—i.e. that it means, say, ‘white
wine’—that stems from the meaning of “white”. The relevant part, obvi-
ously, seems to be the alleged fact that “white” means ‘white’ (irrespective
of how this gets spelled out in specic theories). Now compare this with the
complex expression “white wall”.12 Apparently, although the expression is
complex (and, in fact, looks as if its semantic content were composed of the
semantic content of, respectively, “white” and “wall”), the contribution, so
to say, that “white” makes to the rst complex seems to be dierent from
the contribution it makes to the second one. From this, many authors de-
rive the conclusion that the lexical semantics of, say, “white” must be such
that it suits both complexes.
An even more impressive example is the genitive construction. To wit:
To understand what is said by ‘He has bought John’s book’,
one must identify the referent of ‘he’, of ‘John’ and (perhaps)
of ‘John’s book’. But one must also identify the relation that
is supposed to hold between John and the book. [. . . ] ‘John’s
book [. . . ] means something like ‘the book that bears relation x
to John’. To understand what is said by means of a sentence in
which ‘John’s book’ occurs, this meaning must be contextually
enriched by instantiating the variable ‘x’. (Recanati 1989, 297–
298)
The basic idea here is that the semantic content that the genitive construc-
tion contributes to the overall content of a noun phrase is seriously under-
determined. Philosophers of language with a refentialist bent are forced
to adopt the view that the genitive construction px′s yq conveys only the
‘information’ that x stands in some contextually speciable relation to y.
But then the further problem is that this does not specify a specic truth-
evaluable content, if the context that could serve to disambiguate between
dierent relations is left out. The context must be left out, since a context
that were ‘rich’ enough so as to specify a particular relation would entail
features that are explicitly forbidden in neo-Davidsonian accounts such
12 By the way, note that nothing hinges on whether we examine noun phrases, whole sen-
tences, or, indeed, any other type of complex expression. We could just as easily run the
example with “That is white wine” and “That is a white wall”.
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as common ground, intention-reading abilities, world knowledge, and so
forth. However, truth-evaluability is the most relevant threshold in truth-
conditional accounts (e.g. Borg 2004b, 33, note 25). From a formal semanti-
cist’s perspective, then, the problem is that one is forced to admit that the
genitive construction contributes specic content to the overall sentential
content, but in order to determine which content one would need to refer
to contextual features beyond those typically considered (e.g. intention-
reading abilities). To put it dierently, the crucial aspect of the genitive
construction is not its underspecication per se but rather the fact that no
truth-evaluable content seems to be retrievable solely on the basis of the
sentence. To achieve truth-evaluability, one would need to know which
relation is actually claimed to hold between x and y, which obviously re-
quires ascriptions of speaker intentions in many cases.
I only cite these examples here in order to illustrate that, in the linguistic
and philosophical literature alike, the exact status of compositionality is
controversial. In particular, it is controversial whether all areas of nat-
ural languages are semantically compositional, or whether some areas—
e.g. ‘peripheral’ phenomena like sayings—are non-compositional after all.
I do not argue for either side. My point is that Novelty is the problem one
needs to account for. And with respect to this problem, the argumentat-
ive step from here to compositionality is only valid under the assumption
that there could be no alternative explanation.13 The cited examples can be
interpreted as undermining the plausibility of this assumption. Both the se-
mantics of compound expression such as “white wine” versus “white wall”
as well as the semantics of the genitive construction, for example, sug-
gest that compositionality is at least not as straightforward as many people
think it is. There are examples that are supposed to show that languages
are non-compositional in certain respects (e.g. idiomatic expressions such
as “jemandem auf die Finger schauen”; Ziem & Staeldt (2011)). In con-
13 Davidson (1967, 23) is quite explicit about this; i.e. for him, no such alternative seems
possible:
[A] theory of meaning for a language L shows ‘how the meanings of sen-
tences depend upon the meanings of words’ if it contains a (recursive) den-
ition of truth-in-L. And, so far at least, we have no other idea how to turn
the trick.
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trast, the examples I just cited here do not undermine the claim that natural
languages are (entirely) compositional. Nevertheless, they show that the
lexical meaning must sometimes be specied in such a minimal way that—
irrespective of ‘actual’ pragmatic processes (e.g. Gricean inferences)—the
(truth-evaluable) meaning of a sentence can only be determined relative to
full conversational contexts.
The issues surrounding compositionality indirectly aect a related is-
sue that I have already touched upon in chapter 2: primary meaning. A
compositional language requires stable, lexical meanings of its atomic ele-
ments.14 Otherwise the semantic content of its well-formed complex ex-
pressions (e.g. sentences) can’t be determined on the basis of their atomic
constituents. In other words, primary meanings, attached to words, are the
starting point for semantically compositional complexes like sentences. As
I see things, there are basically two solutions here. One is to completely
abandon compositionality.15 The other option is to preserve a (redened)
notion of “primary meaning” that is capable of accounting for composition-
ality, but which at the same time does not presuppose a neo-Davidsonian
conception in terms of reference relations à la Kirk, Ludwig, Lepore, etc. I
will come back to this below.
4.1.3 Truth-Conditional Semantics
When it comes to truth-conditional semantics, two names are particularly
relevant. The rst is Donald Davidson, who ‘invented’ and popularised
truth-conditional semantics in the second half of the last century.16 The
other highly important gure in this context is Alfred Tarski. His work
is the basis for a great deal of Davidson’s own work, especially Tarski’s
highly inuential articles The Semantic Conception of Truth (1944) and Der
Wahrheitsbegri in den formalisierten Sprachen (1935). For sake of simpli-
city, I mainly use the term “truth-conditional semantics” in this chapter
14 ‘[T]he interpretation [of sentences] in terms of truth values requires the existence of
tight boundaries [. . . ] between literal and non-literal meaning’ (Kayser 2003, 1262).
15 Which seems highly implausible, as most areas of language do seem to be compositional.
This even holds for problematic aspects such as underdetermination that I have just
mentioned.
16 See the references in note 4, page 129.
136
4.1 Donald Davidson et al.
when referring to the theory sketched in Truth and Meaning. Other terms
used in the literature include “truth-functional semantics”, “truth-theoretic
semantics”, “referential semantics”, or simply “(neo-)Davidsonian seman-
tics”.17
Being a logician and mathematician, Tarski was interested in dening
the notion of ‘truth’ for formal languages, and in particular in developing
adequacy constraints for such projects, most notably Convention T (see be-
low). Although his way of dening “truth” is often referred to as a ‘theory
of truth’, his aims diered from the typical aims of current truth theories
(clarifying the nature of truth; exhaustively describing the term “true” in
natural languages; accounting for truth with respect to related notions like
realism, scientic success, etc.; justifying the choice of particular primary
bearers of truth; and so on). From the perspective of today’s theories of
truth, Tarski’s theory is concerned only with a tiny area of what modern
theories are dealing with. For example, Tarski was not primarily concerned
with the layman’s use of “truth”, nor did he try to explain why natural
languages tend to develop a truth predicate in the rst place (questions
that are paradigmatic examples of what one would typically expect these
days from a theory of truth).18Be that as it may, Tarski’s ‘truth theory’ was
highly inuential and is inuential still. Most importantly, Tarski’s theory
17 “Davidsonian semantics” is self-explanatory. “Truth-conditional” emphasises that neo-
Davidsonian approaches to semantics aim at (i) showing that stating the truth conditions
of a sentence is a way of stating its meaning and (ii) demonstrating how sentential se-
mantic content (truth condition) systematically depends on atomic semantic content (ref-
erence relation). “Truth-functional” might be a bit misleading here, since, strictly speak-
ing, only connectives can be truth-functional: the truth value of a sentence containing a
connective is a function of the truth values of the sentences connected. “Truth-theoretic”
and “referential”, in contrast, do not invoke this connotation.
18 Tarski explicitly denies that his theory aims at being in accordance with natural lan-
guages:
[. . . ] the very possibility of a consistent use of the expression “true sen-
tence” which is in harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of everyday
language seems to be very questionable, and consequently the same doubt
attaches to the possibility of constructing a correct denition of this expres-
sion. (Tarski 1935, 279, quoted according to the translation by J. H. Woodger
(1983) in J. Corcoran, ed.,‘Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics’, Hackett, In-
dianapolis, p. 165.)
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lay the ground for Davidson’s work, which is based on the assumption that
a Tarski-style theory of truth can be ‘converted’ into a theory of meaning
(Kölbel 2001, Newen & Schrenk 2008).
Central to Tarski’s work is the so-called Convention T, which is the re-
quirement that the theorems of one’s truth theory should take the form of
instances of the following schema:19
(T) “p” is true i p.
Let me rst very briey explain how it works. First of all, with (T) comes
the distinction between object language and metalanguage. Let German
be the object language, i.e. the language we talk about in the following
statements. Then a simple instance of (T) is
(T1) “Schnee ist weiß” is true i snow is white.
The corresponding metalanguage, then, is the language one uses to talk
about sentences of the object language (here: English sentences that deal
with the truth conditions of German sentences). Notably, (T1) as a whole
is written in our metalanguage, English. The expression
“Schnee ist weiß”20
is part of English, it is a name21 for the German sentence “Schnee ist weiß”.
Much confusion in regard to the schema stems from many authors’ tend-
ency to use English both as their metalanguage and object language. Things
are far easier to explain if one chooses dierent (natural) languages for the
respective purposes. Especially since we actually use a meta-metalanguage
when we describe the relationship between the ‘lower’ two languages.
I said that
“Schnee ist weiß”
19 The schema is called ‘T-schema’, its instances are ‘T-sentences’.
20 Note my use of meta-metalanguage here.
21 I emphasise “name” here, because competent speakers of a natural language (in particu-
lar, speakers who master German) often times can’t help themselves seeing a structure
here. But this is misleading. The quoted expression is technically just a name, i.e. a
non-decomposable semantic atom.
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i.e. the result of writing double quotation marks, followed by the sentence
“Schnee ist weiß”, and again followed by double quotation marks is a name
(in the metalanguage) for the German sentence that says that snow is white.
There are other ways of referring to object-level sentences. Using quota-
tion marks and the ‘original’ sentence of the object language is the most
convenient and usual one, however.22 Another option would be to say that
the German sentence built by writing the sequence of letters (and spaces)
“S”, “c”, “h”, . . . , “e”, “i”, and “ß” is true in German i snow is white. That is
to say, one could employ a structural description of the sentence at hand
(in terms of German letters). This is the method originally suggested by
Tarski. All this, in any case, is part of the metalanguage. The underlying
idea that everything expressible at the object-level must also be express-
ible at the meta-level is often expressed by saying that the metalanguage
must ‘contain’ the object language.23 Using two dierent natural languages
when describing what is going on helps understanding the diculties.
An example will illustrate this. Suppose now that I use English both
at the object-level and at the meta-level. The probably most often quoted
instance of the T-schema then reads:
(T2) “Snow is white” is true i snow is white.
This is misleading, because there is actually no structural similarity be-
tween the right-hand side and left-hand side of this instance. This was
somehow transparent in T1, but in T2 it seems that “Snow is white” occurs
two times actually. This is not the case, since the expression on the left-
hand side of the copula is an unstructured entity, a name for an object-level
expression. So, since instances of “Snow is white” at both levels express the
proposition <snow is white> (as they do by assumption), the meta-level
sentence must be a step-by-step translation of the object-level sentence.
This is what Putnam means when he says that when we determine Eng-
22 It is clear what I mean here; yet, strictly speaking, it is not the original German sentence
that I use here, for the whole expression in question is in the present metalanguage.
23 A bit more precisely formulated: (i) it must contain the relevant part, i.e. translations of
the sentences one wants to insert into the schema; (ii) it must contain names of the rel-
evant object-level sentences (or otherwise a method of referring to these sentences, e.g.
structural descriptions); (iii) it must contain a certain amount of logic, “i” in particular.
In sum, it must be ‘semantically richer’.
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lish to serve a double-purpose as both metalanguage and object language
we ‘[decide implicitly] that each sentence of [object-level English] is to be
translated “homophonically” into [metalevel English]’ (1985, 69).
It is in the same paper that Putnam claims that Tarski’s theory fails to
be an account of our colloquial “true” (as if that were Tarski’s intention):
Now, pay close attention, please! This is just where, it seems
to me, philosophers have been asleep at the opera for a long
time! Since (2) [(for any sentence X) If X is spelled S-N-O-W-
SPACE-I-S-SPACE-W-H-I-T-E, then X is true in L if and only
if snow is white] is a theorem of logic in meta-L (if we accept
the denition—given by Tarski—of “true-in-L”), since no ax-
ioms are needed for the proof of (2) except axioms of logic and
axioms about spelling, (2) holds in all possible worlds. In par-
ticular, since no assumptions about the use of the expressions
of L are used in the proof of (2), (2) holds true in worlds in
which the sentence “Snow is white” does not mean that snow
is white. In fact, “true-in-L,” as dened by Tarski, is a notion
which involves only the primitive notions of L itself [. . . ]. So
if L does not have notions which refer to the use of linguistic
expressions, there is no way in which “true-in-L,” or, rather, the
notion to which Tarski gives that name, could involve the use
of expressions in any way. The property to which Tarski gives
the name “true-in-L” is a property that the sentence “Snow is
white” has in every possible world in which snow is white,
including worlds in which what it means is that snow is green.
(Putnam 1985, 63–64)
The controversial bit is the very last claim; that a sentence like T2 is a the-
orem of Tarski’s theory in all worlds. That would be disastrous for the
theory, even if it is not designed to capture ordinary uses of the truth pre-
dicate. I will now show that Putnam is mistaken here.
Suppose you open any good textbook on astronomy. In the introductory
paragraphs you read this:
A position on the Earth is usually given by two spherical co-
ordinates.24
24 Karttunen et al. (1994), Fundamental Astronomy, Springer, Berlin, page 13.
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Now, if this sentence meant that ‘Hansel and Gretel went into the forest to
fetch some wood’, then the book you would be looking at would contain
rather a fairy tale than basic astronomical knowledge. In order to ensure
a ‘standard’ interpretation of his remarks, the author of this book needs to
do nothing. The same goes for books on truth. The whole description of
the theory (including the description of meta-L and how to derive theorems
in meta-L) is given in a meta-metalanguage, which is English in this case.
In this language, “white” denotes whiteness, “snow” denotes snow, and so
forth. This is precisely the interpretation that is in accordance with howwe,
writers and readers of English, use these terms. Like the astronomer, Tarski
does not need, therefore, enforce this interpretation explicitly. So when we
read (in meta-meta-English) that the object-level expression “snow” refers
to snow (cf. the ‘base clauses’ in Glanzberg 2013), this is enough to make
sure that “snow” at the object level is used to refer to snow. When Putnam
talks about ‘worlds in which what “Snow is white” means is that snow is
green’, the most straightforward answer to the problem he posits is this: if
the only thing that deviates from the actual world is that “white” refers to
the colour green, then in the metalanguage for this version of English
“Snow is white” is true i snow is white
would no longer be a theorem of the truth theory, since the axiom
“white” refers to the colour white
would be ‘replaced’ in that theory by the axiom
“white” refers to the colour green
and, hence,
“Snow is white” is true i snow is green
would turn out true in that modied theory.25 Which, by any standards, is
an unproblematic theorem relative to the assumptions mentioned above.
25 Cf. Patterson (2012, 136):
If the intuitive meaning of an expression of the object language changes,
Tarski’s denition needs to be reworked to capture the concept of truth for
the language so re-interpreted. This is a consequence of the fact that intu-
itive meaning is an “o table” matter to be kept in mind of the users of the
theory [. . . ].
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Note that something like the substitute axiom must come into play some-
where, for this is how the deviant variant of English is dened by Put-
nam in the rst place. He notes that in this specic world he is talking
about ‘it [the snow sentence] means that snow is green’, which is one way
of expressing the idea that specic axioms hold for the semantics of that
word (e.g. “‘white’ refers to the colour green”). Considering other worlds—
worlds in which words function dierently—is to allow for a dierent set
of T-sentences.
Another important thing to note in regard to (T) is that there are at least
a handful of varieties of how to state the schema.26 Dierent ‘stylistic’ vari-
ants of the schema are for the most part motivated by technical niceties,
most of which do not concern me here. The most important technical prob-
lem is this: in (T), I applied regular quotation marks; so, strictly speaking, I
quoted “p”. But “p” is a sentence variable, to be substituted by a declarative
sentence of the object language. This occurrence then gets quoted. When
I moved from the schema to a particular instance—i.e. from
“p” is true i p
to
“Schnee ist weiß” is true i snow is white
—I immediately applied the ‘intended’ reading of the schema. Some the-
orists circumvent this problem by using quasi-quotation; others use—like
Tarski—structural descriptions to denote sentences. Having said this, I
shall use the simple notation in what follows.
Last comment on (T): Tarski’s method introduces a hierarchy of truth
predicates. Truth, that is, may only be attributed to sentences at a lower
semantic level. This gives me a further reason to not use English both as
metalevel and object-level language (even if only for pedagogical reasons).
Suppose I did. Then the questionDoes English have a truth predicate? would
become ambiguous. Yes, it does, if used as a metalanguage. But as an object
language it does not, at least not the one needed to attribute truth to its own
sentences.27 This is obscured by sentences like
26 Cf., e.g., Priest’s (2006, 17).
27 The reason that in a Tarskian framework “true” is not applicable to sentences that belong
to the same (level of) language as “true” itself belongs is that this would lead us to para-
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“Snow is white” is true i snow is white
because such examples suggest that we may say in English that the English
sentence “Snow is white” is true, but we can’t if we accept the Tarskian idea
of hierarchically ordered languages. Whether this idea itself is plausible is
irrelevant for the present considerations. I am only interested in truth to
the extent that it aects theories of meaning. In this section, in particular,
I am only interested in truth to the extent that it aects Davidson’s and
neo-Davidsonians’ theory of meaning. If only to avoid unnecessary con-
fusion, it is worth employing at least two natural languages; one as object
language, and a dierent one as metalanguage (and meta-metalanguage).
Back, then, to where I began. I gave only a very brief overview of Tarski’s
work.28 What is most important in the present context is that Tarski takes
certain semantic notions for granted: “refers” and “satises”. One might
say that he presupposed a theory of meaning (as reference and satisfaction
can only be dened in terms of meaning), and built a ‘theory of truth’ on
it (i.e. he kind of reversed the Davidsonian programme). For example, we
read that
In view of the situation [i.e. in view of the need for a recursive
denition of “truth”], there is no method with which it would
be possible to recursively dene the investigated notion. On
the other hand, it is possible to introduce a general concept
that is applied to arbitrarily many propositional functions, that
is recursively denable, and that leads us immediately to truth,
if applied to propositions [‘Aussagen’]. It is the notion of satis-
faction of a given propositional function by given entities—in
the case at hand, satisfaction by classes of individuals—that
meets these requirements. (Tarski 1935, 307)29
doxes, most prominently the liar paradox. For a possible solution of how to reconcile a
hierarchical solution to the liar paradox with the intuition that natural languages have
(each) just one truth predicate, see Horwich (2010, 87–91).
28 For a closer look, see Patterson (2012).
29 My translation (of the German version), spacing omitted. The original publication in
1933 was in Polish. The German translation reads:
Angesichts dieser Sachlage lässt sich keine Methode angeben, welche es er-
lauben würde, den untersuchten Begri unmittelbar auf rekursivem Wege
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Tarski’s groundbreaking idea is to omit a full-blown denition of “truth”.
He circumvented the problem of providing such a denition by saying,
roughly, that all T-sentences of a given language that comply with Con-
vention T are partial denitions of the concept of truth. Patterson (2012)
summarises Tarski’s strategy as follows:
[. . . ] what we nd is that an expression for which the T-sen-
tences are theorems is, given the conventions governing the
object language and the metalanguage, forced to express the
content of the concept of truth as construed in the semantical
denition [for all x, x is a true sentence if and only if, for a
certain p, x is identical with ‘p’ and p]. Since the language of
the metatheory has intuitive meaning just as much as does the
object language [. . . ], each T-sentence is meaningful [. . . ] in
accordance with linguistic usage. In particular, a T-sentence
like:
[“snow is white” is true i snow is white
means that “snow is white” is true i snow is white]30. Now,
though the T-sentence itself says nothing of its own saying
that something is the case, a party to the conventions govern-
ing the metalanguage will recognize that in fact the T-sentence
does say [. . . ] exactly that. (119)
Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for ‘a party to the convention govern-
ing the object language’. Thus, the basic idea that Tarski put forward is
that someone who masters both object language and metalanguage will
accept T-sentences in such a way that the applicability of “true” corres-
zu denieren. Es ergibt sich aber die Möglichkeit, einen Begri von allge-
meinerem Charakter einzuführen, welcher bei beliebigen Aussagefunktionen
Anwendung ndet, sich schon rekursiv denieren lässt und, auf Aussagen an-
gewendet, uns mittelbar zum Begri der Wahrheit führt; diesen Bedingungen
genügt nämlich der Begri des Erfülltseins der gegebenen Aussagefunktion
durch gegebene Gegenstände und im vorliegenden Falle – durch gegebene
Klassen von Individuen.
30 I substituted the example sentence in order to simplify at this point.
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ponds perfectly to our pre-theoretic understanding of the truth predicate
(Patterson 2012, 117–122).
Davidson now reverses this order, or so many interpret him. For him,
truth is a self-evident, transparent concept (Newen & Schrenk 2008). In
other words, one does not need, says Davidson, other concepts (in the rel-
evant sense) to understand the meaning of “true”. One is asked to take its
meaning for granted and base a theory of meaning on it. A very clear way
of saying where we are getting at here is to say that Davidson’s claim is
that a Tarski-style theory of truth is a theory of meaning (cf. Lepore 2006).
My task in the following paragraphs is to explain what this methodological
dogma amounts to.
Tarski told us how to build a theory of truth for specic formalised lan-
guages (and how to test its adequacy). Its axioms determine the extensions
of all ‘atomic parts’ of this component of English. Thus, in regard to names,
for example, we might have a list that relates them to individual objects;
we might have another list that relates predicates to n-tuples of individuals;
and we have recursively formulated rules that determine the extensions of
all well-formed sentences as functions of extensions of the atomic parts of
the sentence in question. Here is an example to illustrate this: if “Aristotle”
refers to Aristotle (which is settled in an axiom list for names) and “x is a
human” is satised i the substitution instance of “x” refers to an entity
that belongs to the class of humans (again, set by an axiomatic list for pre-
dicates), then the sentence “Aristotle is a human” is true i Aristotle is a
human (i.e. actually true, if the formal theory is accurate).
Here is how Glanzberg (2013) summarises Tarski’s approach somewhat
more generally:
Tarski notes that truth for each atomic sentence can be dened
in terms of two closely related notions: reference and satis-
faction. Let us consider a language L′, just like L [i.e. a lan-
guage containing two specic well-formed sentences] except
that instead of simply having two atomic sentences, L′ breaks
atomic sentences into terms and predicates. L′ contains terms
‘snow’ and ‘grass’ (let us engage in the idealization that these
are simply singular terms), and predicates ‘is white’ and ‘is
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green’. So L′ is like L, but also contains the sentences ‘Snow is
green’ and ‘Grass is white’.
We can dene truth for atomic sentences of L′ in the following
way.
1. Base clauses:
1. ‘Snow’ refers to snow.
2. ‘Grass’ refers to grass.
3. a satises ‘is white’ if and only if a is white.
4. a satises ‘is green’ if and only if a is green.
2. For any atomic sentence pt is Pq: pt is Pq is true if and
only if the referent of ptq satises pPq. (Emphasis omit-
ted)
We see here that it is possible to construe a Tarski-style truth theory for
a small, formalised fragment of English, i.e. a theory that produces, for all
well-formed sentences of that fragment of English, T-sentences that spe-
cify truth conditions for these sentences. ‘Davidson is known for having
reinterpreted Tarski’s theory of truth as a theory of meaning, and for ap-
plying it to ordinary language’ (Newen & Schrenk 2008, 56, my transla-
tion). Instead of taking semantic notions for granted (e.g. “satises”) and
‘explaining’ truth in terms of these notions, Davidson did just the opposite
by taking ‘truth’ for granted in order to explain meaning. The idea here is
that the body of knowledge that we theoreticians need to postulate when
trying to account for competent language users’ comprehension abilities
must resemble the structure of a Tarski-style ‘truth theory’.
4.2 Truth-Conditional Semantics at Work
In the previous section, I presented the main ingredients of truth-conditio-
nal semantics by showing two things. Firstly, in preparation of this section
and the discussion in the next chapter I said a few words about one major
argument employed by Davidson (the argument from sentence compre-
hension). Then, secondly, I discussed the—admittedly, highly simplied—
Davidsonian programme of transforming a Tarski-style ‘theory of truth’
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into a theory of meaning. Accordingly, the aim of the present section
is to apply this framework to the initial problem (sentence comprehen-
sion). Again, I would like to show two things here. On the one hand, TCS
seem particularly likely to be a possible solution to the cited ‘problem’, i.e.
people’s capability to comprehend any well-formed sentence of their re-
spective languages. Showing why this seems to be the case is one of my
aims. On the other hand, there are good reasons to suppose that David-
son’s central claim—which is that his proposal is in eect the only possible
solution to the problem—is false. That is to say, there are viable alternat-
ives. Moreover, for reasons emerging throughout the book (especially in
the methodological part), the alternatives are the preferred options. Let me
now rst turn to the pros of truth-conditional semantics.
4.2.1 Linking Novelty and Compositionality
A closer look at why compositionality and Novelty are discussed together
in one chapter and why truth-conditional semantics seems adequate to ac-
count for both will help us to see the major advantages of this approach.
These advantages set the threshold for potential alternatives. According to
TCS, a theory that produces innitely many sentences of the form “‘p’ is
true i p” can be regarded a theory of meaning.31 Davidson says that what
an adequate natural language semantics should be able to do is stating truth
conditions for all well-formed sentences of the relevant target language.32
It can be considered controversial whether truth conditions represent all
there is to know about the meaning of a sentence. The classical passage on
this issue reads as if Davidson thought this were the case:
There is no need to suppress, of course, the obvious connec-
tion between a denition of truth of the kind Tarski has shown
how to construct, and the concept of meaning. It is this: the
31 Save for some exegetical niceties that I waive here: e.g. Davidson’s contention that truth
conditions and meaning are not the same, but that ‘giving the truth conditions of a sen-
tence’ is one way of stating its meaning.
32 See Davidson (1967, 34–35) for some remarks on demonstratives and, accordingly, on
what roles utterances might play in his account. Even if we would take into account
sentences relativized to formally speciable contexts of utterance, we would still leave
out most semantically relevant aspects of utterances that I mentioned above.
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denition works by giving necessary and sucient conditions
for the truth of every sentence, and to give truth conditions is a
way of giving the meaning of a sentence. (Davidson 1967, 310,
emphasis added)33
The following, I think, is uncontroversial: rstly, it is true that a the-
ory of meaning should at least be compatible with Convention T, or more
specically, with the view that every sentence somehow ‘indicates’ its own
truth conditions (‘sentences bear their truth conditions on their sleeves’, as
it is often put). Secondly, truth conditions are important aspects of meaning
that are relevant in many areas of theorising. Thirdly, everyone who un-
derstands a particular T-sentence knows something, albeit very little, about
the meaning of that sentence.34 I deny, however, that it is a necessary con-
dition for an adequate theory of meaning that it entails all, or indeed any,
relevant T-sentences.
Moreover, it can be doubted that truth conditions are all there is to know
about the meaning of sentences. To argue for this is to say something about
when one is usually satised with an answer to the questions of the type
“What does sentence x mean?” Suppose you learn that “Snow is white”
is true i snow is white. Essentially, two possibilities are available here:
either you knew in advance what “snow”, “is”, “white”, and the syntactic
structure ‘S-C-P’ (S=subject; C=copula; P=predicative) mean, or you did
not. In the rst case, you did not ‘learn’ anything because you already knew
33 The widespread conviction that Davidson identies meaning with truth conditions prob-
ably stems from this passage. It seems natural to interpret this paragraph accordingly
(cf., e.g., Saka 2007).
34 This holds with certain provisos: (a) Here I assume the Horwichian understanding of
“understanding”, namely that “understanding” means, roughly, ‘to know how to use’; (b)
furthermore, I presuppose that T-sentences are wholly formulated in a metalanguage, i.e.
that a sentence like “ ‘Το χιόνι εı΄ναι λευϰό’ is true i snow is white” is—in its entirety—
an English sentence; (c) I assume further that, e.g., one who merely understands this
sentence understands the Greek “Το χιόνι εı΄ναι λευϰό” only to the extent that he knows
that in Greek this sentence corresponds to the English “Snow is white” (and, hence, has
such-and-such truth conditions), which is to say that he does not know, from that bit of
information alone, how “Το χιόνι εı΄ναι λευϰό” is used in Greek. This is because “Το χιόνι
εı΄ναι λευϰό” plus quotation marks is an English name, and because of this everyone who
masters English and is familiar with the T-schema does not need any further competence
in order to understand the ‘Greek T-sentence’.
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the truth conditions of “snow is white” anyway (hence, asking would be
superuous). In the second case, you do not learn anything either because
you are unable to understand the proposed explanation.
The natural reply by truth-conditional semanticists is to say: ‘Actually,
I never claimed that T-sentences are in any way “interesting” or that you
learn anything about meaning with the help of my theory. I only say that
my theory provides meanings for all sentences—and this is what we ex-
pect of such a theory.’ Not quite. If T-sentences were all we could come to
know about sentence meanings, then the fact that “What does x mean?” is
a common question and normally demands an illuminating answer would
be inexplicable. For it is far too trivial for many grammatical sentences in
natural languages to work out their respective truth conditions. No one
would ever think of asking such questions if the only answers solely con-
sisted in truth-condition statements.
To be sure, this little argument is far from being conclusive. Neither Dav-
idson nor his followers are particularly concerned with the role of meaning
inquiries in layman’s usage. Still, the notion of ‘meaning’ that Davidson
is after can’t be conceived completely independently of the folk notion it
originates from, for this would render his whole argumentation implaus-
ible. Remember that the key step in Truth and Meaning is the presump-
tion that “is true” is an extensionally correct substitute for the allegedly
obscure “means that”.35 By the same token, it seems justied to require
of Davidson’s theory that, as far as non-metaphorical use of “meaning” is
concerned, it should resemble the folk notion as far as possible. And it is a
commonplace that locutions such as “What does x mean?” and their cor-
responding answers are among the most central applications of the notion
of ‘meaning’—locutions that seem incompatible with an understanding of
meaning based merely on truth conditions.
35 By which I do not want to suggest that Davidson aimed at replacing meaning by truth
conditions. I am only referring to the well-known, often-cited passage in which he says:
As a nal bold step, let us try treating the position occupied by ‘p’ exten-
sionally: to implement this, sweep away the obscure ‘means that’, provide the
sentence that replaces ‘p’ with a proper sentential connective, and supply the
description that replaces ’ with its own predicate. The plausible result is
(T) s is T if and only if p. (Davidson 1967, 23, emphasis added)
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What, then, is the alternative? In an abstract sense, the answer is simple:
one is typically satised with a ‘meaning statement’ if the corresponding
answer illuminates one’s understanding of the sentence in question, or,
otherwise, if it conforms with what one knows about the sentence’s mean-
ing anyway. This amounts to saying that we tend to be satised with an-
swers to meaning inquiries whenever they help us to see how the sentence
in question is (typically) used.
Here are a few examples. First example: if you do not know German,
then the (English) explanation “‘Schnee ist weiß’ is true i snow is white”
(read: “Schnee ist weiß” means ‘Snow is white’) helps you to understand
(i.e. indicates how to use) “Schnee ist weiß” to the extent that you would
fully understand it once you understood related sentences.36 Second ex-
ample: if two people are in front of a library and one of them says “This is
Tom’s bicycle” and I say to you, describing this situation, that this means
that the guy wants the girl to know that her ex-boyfriend is in the library,
then you probably understand this sentence (ceteris paribus). That is to
say, you would come to know that it is used to say something about the
whereabouts of Tom, albeit that the sentence is ‘about’ a bicycle and its lit-
eral truth conditions do not depend on Tom.37 Last example: if you are an
36 This last proviso is essential. Only when you know the use of all related sentences of
“Schnee ist weiß”, then you fully understand the sentence itself. If you learn only this
individual fact—that “Schnee ist weiß” means ‘Snow is white’—then your knowledge of
the use of “Schnee ist weiß” is, so to speak, potential knowledge. That is, you do not
really associate a particular use with this sentence, because you are unable to connect
this bit of information with other relevant knowledge. In the case of “Schnee ist weiß”,
the immediately ‘related’ sentences might be “Das ist Schnee” and “Das ist weiß”, for
example (cf. also Davidson 1967, 26, note 10).
37 This is essentially Tomasello’s example (from his 2008, page 3). The point of this example
is that it illustrates (for arguments, see below) that the context that determines content
is often times very wide. In this particular case, for instance, this content would have
been dierent two weeks earlier, or with another interlocutor, and so on. Generally,
the content would have been dierent with dierent shared background knowledge. In
Tomasello’s own words:
It is easy to say that what carries the meaning in these dierent examples
[i.e. variations of the one above] is “context,” but that is not very helpful
since all of the physical features of the immediate communicative context
were (by stipulation) identical in the various scenarios. The only dierence
was our shared experience beforehand [. . . ]. (2008, 3–4)
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otherwise competent speaker of English but do not know the word “apple”,
and you’re told that “apple” means ‘a round fruit with rm juicy esh’,38
then you understand will “apple” (or sentences containing “apple’, for that
matter), because you know how it is used in sentences whose other con-
stituents you are already familiar with, like “This is an apple”, “Apple is
good for making cakes”, “I like apples” and so forth.
One possible reply is to point out that this way of arguing mixes up the
distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and that, in particular, too
much pragmatics enters into the presented examples. The argument here
would be along the lines of: the central locutions in which “means” occurs
is when semantics is at stake; which is clearly not the case in, for example,
Tomasellian common-ground scenarios. But this is grist to my mill, for
as I argued already in section 2.2, this distinction is blurred (at least) in
recent empirical work in construction grammar. Moreover, to say that se-
mantics covers only truth conditions is clearly an exaggeration, for many
much more ‘conservative’ approaches comprise (quasi-)pragmatic aspects
as well. See, for example, Recanati’s contextualism (e.g. Recanati 2007).
A further objection might be this: the semantic approach that is sugges-
ted by the above examples implies that one can’t know the meaning of a
term or sentence tout court but that understanding essentially comes in de-
grees. True, but this is actually a virtue of my view. Here, again, I can oer
no waterproof armchair argument; I only say that this is the most plaus-
ible way to make sense of our de facto ‘meaning discourse’. It is perfectly
reasonable to say things like “She has only a vague idea of what we are talk-
ing about”; “More and more he understood what they said”; “I don’t know
what it means precisely”, etc. If meaning were an all-or-nothing game, this
part of our discourse would not be intelligible at all. Also, meaning hol-
ism already suggests that people learn word meanings one step at a time.39
38 Hornby, A. S. (1995), Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Oxford University Press,
London, p. 46.
39 Meaning holism is here understood as the thesis that the meaning of a word depends on
the meanings of other words of the same language. There is a vast range of theoretical
possibilities when it comes to holism, most of which I will simply neglect at this stage.
For a concise overview, the reader is asked to consult Pagin (2006). There are also some
illuminating passages in Horwich, or in Fodor, or in Quine. The main idea, though, is
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Competent speakers know the meaning of a term only to the extent that
they are familiar with (more or less) related terms. Since one can’t learn a
whole language at one go, people improve their knowledge as they learn
more and more words (or, in general, broaden their linguistic competence).
Eventually, natural language speakers’ way of dealing with technical terms
also shows that knowledge of meaning comes in degrees. Think of a term
like “full employment”: probably every competent language user of Eng-
lish knows the meaning of this term in the sense that he is able to use
it appropriately and knows how others typically will (potentially) use it.
Very few of us, however, are familiar with the available exact denitions
of “full employment” and that, hence, the term varies in its extension de-
pending on the particular theoretical background applied. So, if an average
speaker is not sure as to whether “full employment” applies to a situation
where, say, 3 % of a particular population are unemployed, then this un-
certainty is neither due to vagueness (all denitions of “full employment”
have strict boundaries), nor due to incompetence (he would know that “full
employment” means ‘that almost all are employed’), but due to his restric-
ted knowledge as regards the relevant meaning. That is to say, he knows
the meaning of the term merely to a certain extent, which is to say that his
semantic understanding comes in degrees.
4.2.2 Truth-conditional Semantics Does the Trick
For the reasons I pointed out in the previous subsection, TCS seems to be
particularly well-suited to account both for the Novelty problem as well
as for compositionality. The simple reason is that both issues are basically
treated as two sides of the same coin: since Novelty can only be explained
via referring to compositionality (or so Davidson argues), providing a solu-
tion for the latter means solving the former as well. Now I would like so
show in some more detail why this seems so. First of all, I assume for
simple and always remains the same: given meaning holism, it is impossible to assign
meaning to atomic elements of a given language independently of the meanings that get
assigned to related elements of the same language. In this sense, learning a language
stepwise and holism always come together: holism implies the epistemic constraint that
knowledge of the meaning of a particular term depends on one’s potentially restricted
knowledge of the meanings of related terms.
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the sake of argument that the following holds: (i) meanings are truth con-
ditions, i.e. there is no semantic information of a given sentence exceed-
ing its propositional content; (ii) truth-conditional semantics ‘works’, i.e. a
broadly neo-Davidsonian approach can be applied to a reasonable sample
of natural English.
The compositionality principle requires us to provide a mechanism that
computes the meaning of a sentence, given the meanings of its atomic parts
and the way they are put together. By assumption, TCS—certainly so in
neo-Davidsonian approaches—is a theory that connects words of English
with meanings.40 Furthermore, a Tarski-style theory of truth tells us in
which way the truth conditions of any well-formed sentence depend on
the meanings of its parts. Here is a simple example. I begin with meaning
statements for atomic units of a given language:41
r1 “Snow” refers to snow;
r2 “Socrates” refers to Socrates;
. . .
f1 “x is white” is a function that is satised if x is white, otherwise
false;42
. . .
c1 A sentence of the form “x is F” is true i x satises “x is F”.
. . .
A brief look at the relevant complex sentence “Snow is white” reveals that
one can easily combine the above basic information. The result is
40 These meanings are referents in the case of names, functions in the case of predicates, and
so on. The two above assumptions ensure that all (or a signicant portion of all) English
words are covered and that the kind of meaning provided captures the full meaning of a
term.
41 The presentation of these ‘base clauses’ in a Tarski-style framework is adopted from
Glanzberg (2013). Again, I do without quasi quotation.
42 For ease of presentation, I simplify a bit. For example, one would actually need to rst
state the meaning of “white” and then explicate the meaning of predication (or “be” when
used as a full verb). The combination of the two is the meaning of “x is white”.
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“Snow is white” is true i snow is white
which is, relative to the above assumptions, an exhaustive description of
the meaning of “Snow is white”. In short, it is relatively obvious that it is
a direct consequence of my second assumption (‘TCS works’) that truth-
conditional semantics can successfully handle compositionality issues.
Things get a bit more complicated when I now turn to Novelty. The
problem is that there is a discrepancy between the potential innity of
well-formed (grammatical) sentences of natural languages that language
users are basically able to understand and the nitude of cognitive re-
sources that can explain this. To bridge this gap, says Davidson, one needs
recursion/recursiveness. Tarski’s apparatus that I employed above when
demonstrating how the meaning of a sentence depends on its parts essen-
tially involves a recursive strategy. The rules for determining the meaning
(truth conditions) of complexes may be applied ad libitum. In particular,
the rules may be applied several times in building sentence meanings. This
ensures that by using this method, one is able to determine the meaning of
declarative sentences of any length.
To account for the fact that language users are typically able to under-
stand sentences they have never encountered before, truth-conditional se-
manticists assume that a competent speaker (implicitly) knows such re-
cursive rules roughly as described by Tarski.43 The meaning of any com-
plex sentence can be built recursively with these rules. By analogy, the
same mechanism is supposed to explain language users’ ability to compre-
hend novel sentences. All this is pretty straightforward and well estab-
lished, so there is no need to go too much into the details. Especially so,
since what is really interesting is not the argument as such but rather the
plausibility of its main premises. The two premises that, for the sake of ar-
gument, I assumed above were these: (i) meanings are truth conditions; (ii)
truth-conditional semantics is a successful enterprise. I shall now consider
both premises in turn and argue that they are unwarranted.
43 To be fair, this is, to my knowledge, never stated explicitly. But this is the only way I can
think of to make sense of Davidson’s claim that his semantic theory provides the only
solution to the problem that natural languages must be learnable (Davidson 1965). Note,
though, that the status of Davidson’s project as aiming at psychological reality is at least
debatable (Röska-Hardy 2005).
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Ad (ii): I start with the claim that TCS is successful. To be sure, there are
many relevant respects in which theories can be more or less successful. I
shall here concentrate on one particular mark of adequacy: a theory should
in fact be able to explain all phenomena that it ocially says it is applic-
able to. Semantics is the study of meanings of sentences.44 If you like, you
may even add the restriction that semantics proper is solely concerned with
sentence meanings irrespective of context. This problem can be bracketed
out for the moment. Yet, semantics supposedly is the study of all sen-
tences. One crucial decit of TCS is its initial restriction to a particular
class of sentences, namely declaratives.45 There are quite a lot of attempts
to enlarge the class of sentences covered by classical truth-conditional or
broadly formal semantics. This holds in particular for formal treatments of
questions.46 The central diculty remains, though, namely that all broadly
formalist approaches to the semantics of non-declaratives are attempts to
extend a theory designed for declaratives to other forms (not like usage-
based theories, which are intended to apply across the board from the very
beginning). The simple reason for excluding other types of sentences is
that only truth-evaluable sentences can have truth conditions.
It can be considered uncontroversial that declarative sentences is the
only class of truth-evaluable sentences, i.e. only sentences belonging to that
class can reasonably be assigned truth values. Think of questions, exclam-
ations, emotional expressions, imperatives, and the like. They can hardly
be said to have truth-evaluable content, although much ink has been spilt—
44 This, at least, is probably the most widespread position in philosophy and certainly an
undisputed truism in linguistics. As usual, there are people who deny even truisms:
Syntax studies sentences, semantics studies propositions. Pragmatics is
the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are per-
formed. (Stalnaker 1970, 275)
According to this characterization of semantics [i.e. semantics as the study
of propositions], then, the subject has no essential connection with lan-
guages at all, either natural or articial. (274)
45 I ignore for the moment that within this restricted class there are probably further areas
that are not accounted for satisfactorily in Davidsonian semantics; e.g. underdetermina-
tion as exemplied by the genitive construction discussed above.
46 Belnap (1982), Higginbotham (1996), Krifka (2007, 2012).
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especially in linguistics—on complementing truth conditions with condi-
tions of fullment or use conditions.47 So, at best, TCS covers a wide range
of sentences but is at the very least not directly applicable to many other
types of sentences. If this is right, an alternative semantics for the remain-
ing sentences is required. Prima facie, there is no reason to suppose that
this alternative would lack the resources to account for declarative sen-
tences, too. To be sure, the status of TCS as a semantic theory of declarat-
ive sentences remains unclear as long as there is no reasonable alternative.
But if there were such an alternative, the restriction of truth-conditional
semantics to a particular class of sentences would speak against the the-
ory.
Otherwise, truth-conditional semanticists might want to argue that they
conceive of their theory as a universal semantic theory. It is just that so
far no one has fully worked out the details for sentences that involve non-
truth-evaluable content. This seems equally problematic, for why should
we think that the existing theory sketch would be applicable to questions,
imperatives, and the like? In fact, there is ample reason to doubt this. Ques-
tions will serve as an example. Similar reasoning could be applied to other
types of sentences though. Propositions are the primary bearers of truth
and hence determine the corresponding truth conditions for sentences that
are used to express them.48 In this view, declarative sentences are truth-
evaluable because they express propositions. Consider the question “Is red
47 Classically, propositions are considered primary bearers of truth. Declarative sentences
are said to express propositions. In this view, declaratives are truth-evaluable derivat-
ively: they directly inherit their truth values / truth conditions from the propositions
they are used to express. For example, “snow is white” expresses the proposition <snow
is white>. Questions do not express propositions in this sense, hence they lack truth
value, which, however, is not to deny that questions do not relate to propositional con-
tent. It is just that there is no 1-to-1 correspondence as in the case of declaratives. Hence,
the mechanism, if any, that relates propositional content (“that p”) to the semantic con-
tent of a question (e.g. “Is it the case that p?”) must be something dierent. Be that as
it may, no matter what the exact relation is here, due to conceptual reasons questions
as such can’t be truth-evaluable. The same holds for commands, etc., which can only be
satised but can’t be true.
48 At least, I will assume this in what follows. See Horwich (1998, 16–17, 86–90) for a
justication. The argument, however, is independent of specic views on truth; it may
easily be redescribed in terms of sentences as primary truth bearers.
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Tom’s favourite colour?” What would be an appropriate way to associate
this question with a proposition?
Irrespective of how we might connect the question with a corresponding
proposition and, by doing so, with its alleged ‘truth conditions’, the obvi-
ous candidate for this job is the proposition <red is Tom’s favourite colour>.
But whereas the sentence “Red is Tom’s favourite colour” is (as per TCS)
true i red is Tom’s favourite colour, things get slightly more complicated
when we now turn to questions. What actually does have truth conditions
(or is truth-evaluable) is the answer to the question. Roughly put, an af-
rmative answer is true i <red is Tom’s favourite colour> is true, false
otherwise, and vice versa for negative answers. The problem, though, is
that if we associate answers in this way with truth conditions, we still do
not know the truth conditions for the question itself (for there is none).
Even worse, if we take wh-questions into account, we not only do not know
the truth conditions for the question itself (as opposed to the correspond-
ing answer); we do not even know how to associate a question with a (set
of) proposition(s) at all. As in the case of yes-or-no questions, the the-
ory would need to refer to the answer. But since there are innitely many
(or at least a whole lot of reasonable) answers for specic wh-questions,
the theory would need to ‘build’ truth conditions out of ‘the question’ and
‘the answer’ (i.e. the relevant parts thereof). Roughly along the following
lines: the answer “Red” to the question “What is Tom’s favourite colour?”
is true i red is Tom’s favourite colour; the answer “White” to this ques-
tion is true i white is Tom’s favourite colour; and so on ad libitum. As of
today, Davidson-inspired semantics for non-declarative types of sentences
still tends to be a rather unsatisfying endeavour.
Ad (i): I have shown that there are good reasons to question the general
success of the truth-conditional paradigm. This undermines the plausibil-
ity of the second of the two original assumptions. It is now time to turn
to the rst assumption (meaning is truth condition). Likewise, I shall now
demonstrate that this assumption is also unwarranted. Truth conditions
are an important aspect of meaning, but only aspects, nevertheless. Many
other aspects of meaning are not covered by theories that, like TCS, focus
solely on truth conditions. There are even many circumstances in which
it seems irrelevant what the truth conditions of sentences are (or the refer-
ential ‘facts’ concerning singular terms, for that matter).
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All dierent varieties of truth-conditional semantics seem so attractive
because of their purity and technical rigour. If the meaning of “snow is
white” is that it is true i snow is white, what else, then, can you ask for, if
your main aim is clarity in meaning statements? The concepts employed
by TCS are unambiguous: a word “w” either refers to its referent or it does
not; a sentence “s” is either true in such-and-such circumstances or it is not;
a predicate “F” either denotes a certain set of individuals or it does not; a
proposition <p> is either true or it is not. Language is dierent. Language is
vague, not only in regard to a concept like “bald” but in general. Language
is, as we have known since Wittgenstein, vague in regard to “chair”, for
example, which is a term that serves not exactly as a paradigm example in
the literature on vagueness. People’s disposition to apply “chair” to a given
entity develops over time, it varies between individuals, and it is context-
dependent. Unlike truth conditions: “This is a chair” is either true or false
if applied to a given object, and it is true only if the entity referred to by
“this” is actually a chair.
To be sure, sentences seems to wear their truth conditions on their sleeves.
That is to say, even if the meaning of “chair” is not a xed set of individu-
als (the chairs) but varies with certain contextual factors including time,
idiolect, conversational situation, etc., then “This is a chair” is still true i
this is a chair (corrected for time, idiolect, situation, etc.).49 So the prob-
lem is not epistemological in nature. Rather, the problem is that the only
plausible explanation for the varying meaning of “chair” is a correspond-
ing variety of use in speakers. (Neo-)Davidson semantics is strictly bound
to the Tarski-style framework summarised above. In this framework, the
referents of individual terms and general terms are xed (as in “‘Aristotle’
refers to Aristotle”). This implies that, for each new meaning of a term,
one would need a new ‘base rule’ stating its meaning, which amounts to
an all new theory.50 This is implausible if TCS is put forward as a solution
49 The theory that most explicitly denies such a stance on truth conditions is called occas-
sionalism (Travis 2008). That is clearly a minority view.
50 Actually, the underlying problem of formal approaches to semantics is that the meaning-
determining context is particularly wide, as exemplied by Tomasello’s ‘Tom’s bicycle’
case (see above). For example, it may include common ground, world knowledge, speaker
intentions, etc. Formal approaches may cope with some specic contextual factors such
as time, place, and speaker, but it is virtually impossible for them to formally specify
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to the Novelty problem, as it is far easier to assume that people’s ability to
understand new sentences derives from their implicit knowledge of how
the terms occurring in them are used than it is to assume that this ability
derives from their learning new theories every now and then.
4.2.3 Novelty and Usage-Based Theories of Meaning
The basic idea defended in the present chapter is that compositionality
and Novelty are, in eect, two completely distinct issues. In particular, I
have argued that the immediate step from Novelty to compositionality is
unwarranted, i.e. that the alleged compositionality of natural languages is
not the only option when it comes to reasonable solutions to the Novelty
problem. In a way, this line of reasoning might seem anti-compositional.
Although nowhere in my argument do I presuppose that languages are not
compositional, I at least assume that one crucial argument in favour of the
compositionality of natural languages fails. Anyway, the received view
of how Novelty is to be explained is in terms of compositionality. Hence,
denying the alleged strict relation between the two issues eventually leads
to a certain tension between the two explanatory needs.
Here is not the right place to formulate a fully edged alternative to the
received view. Rather, I would like to highlight some methodological con-
cerns and roughly indicate a possible solution to the problem just sketched.
One potential problem in Davidson’s own argumentation seems to be this.
From the (apparently correct) observation that people understand any in-
stantiation of a well-formed sentence (of a language that they master), Dav-
idson more or less directly concludes that TCS holds. This line of reasoning
essentially relies on the strategy of explaining abilities concerning sentence
comprehension in terms of lexical and syntactic capabilities. Crucially, this
kind of argument amounts to saying that sentence comprehension involves
knowledge of composition rules and recursion. The thing is that this ar-
gument as such does not favour TCS nor, in fact, any other theory. An op-
ponent of TCS could perfectly well accept the whole argument (up to this
point) and argue that composition rules and recursion might be accounted
contexts in regards to, e.g., the knowledge shared by hearer and speaker. Accordingly,
such frameworks would typically emphasise that these ‘non-formal’ features of context
do not aect literally expressed content of sentences (e.g. Borg 2004, 2012).
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for somewhat dierently (e.g. in terms of usage-based facts). Which is to
say that there is no direct step from the assumption that natural languages
are organised recursively to the denial of usage-based semantics.
Another potential problem is that people—for no obvious reason—tend
to think that usage-based approaches to semantics are incompatible with
the compositionality principle. From this perspective, then, it looks pretty
straightforward to directly infer from Novelty that some form or other of
truth-conditional semantics must hold. Throughout this book, I continue
to distinguish, in terms of the philosophy of language, only between two
broadly construed camps: usage-based vs truth-conditional. Although this
distinction, as any categorisation in philosophy, simplies things a bit, I
think it is reasonable to suppose that it does not oversimplify. If you buy
into this distinction, then the claim that usage-based approaches are in-
compatible with the compositionality principle amounts to saying that all
compositionality-involving explanations (e.g. with regard to Novelty) must
be essentially truth-conditional. An example that nicely illustrates this po-
sition can be found in Fodor & Lepore (2002, 3–4):
The line of our argument is that since mental representation
and linguistic meaning are de facto compositional, we can re-
ject out of hand any theory that says that concepts(/word mean-
ings) are Xs unless Xs are the sorts of things for which compos-
itionality holds. That is, there must be a distinction between
primitive and complex Xs, and the syntactic/semantic proper-
ties of the latter must be inherited from the syntactic/semantic
properties of the former. [. . . ] It’s our belief that [. . . ] only very
few [candidates]—perhaps only one—can meet this composi-
tionality condition; it’s the bull in almost everybody’s china
shop.
With the above methodological considerations in mind, there are now
two theoretical possibilities available to a usage-based theoretician who
wants to refute the Davidsonian learnability argument. One option is to
deny the assumption that usage-based approaches are incompatible with
the compositionality principle. In other words, one could concede the ma-
jor portion of the argument up to the intermediate conclusion that Novelty
can only be explained in terms of composition rules and recursion (or, that
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this at least holds for the majority of cases). Accordingly, one would then
need to show that usage-based accounts can be construed composition-
ally/recursively51. There are indeed some explicit attempts to reconcile
the compositionality principle with usage-based semantics (e.g. Horwich
1997a). So this seems to be a viable strategy indeed.
A further option is to object to the line of reasoning one step earlier.
The way I presented the argument is supposed to show that only Nov-
elty has the status of a phenomenon, which is to say that it is indisputable
in a way. It would require some really weird assumptions to describe the
objectively observable phenomena in such a way that people, in fact, do
not understand each other. Compositionality, on the other hand, is not
equally immune; the fact that we typically describe languages as being
fully compositional might be an artefact of academic training. Even if
some (or most) parts of natural languages are compositional, some might be
non-compositional. In eect, Construction Grammar suggests something
along these lines. Importantly, in this case the whole learnability argument
fails. If people are able to understand some classes of semantically non-
compositional complexes (e.g. holophrases, sayings, certain syntactic con-
structions, idioms, etc.), then, by all means, compositionality can’t account
for Novelty in the way suggested. This would undermine that argument as
a whole, since the point of invoking compositionality considerations is to
account for Novelty tout court.
Here I can only very briey indicate the basic direction that such a stra-
tegy would need to take take. In general, the claim that understanding
is possible in cases in which the alleged knowledge of recursively dened
composition rules plays no role whatsoever can be established quite easily.
A highly pertinent example in this context is holophrases:
[. . . ] most children begin language acquisition by learning
some unparsed adult expressions as holophrases—such ex-
pressions as I-wanna-do-it, Lemme-see, and Where-the-bottle.
(Tomasello 2003a, 38)
51 Here, I do not discuss recursiveness and compositionality separately, because the learn-
ability argument itself presupposes that the relevant composition rules get formulated
recursively (for otherwise they could not help explaining the human ability to under-
stand an innity of well-formed expressions).
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Holophrases show that phrases that are semantically compositional from
the adult’s perspective (and are supposedly construed with that knowledge
in mind) can be understood by children who lack the relevant syntactic
knowledge (in appropriate circumstances, that is). From a philosophical
point of view, two questions are especially pressing. What is the rela-
tionship between the (non-compositional) understanding of holophrases
in children and the (supposedly compositional) rules that adults employ in
uttering them? What is it that explains comprehension abilities if not the
familiarity with composition rules?
In line with the Tomasellian paradigm, I suggest pursuing the following
strategy. As regards the rst question, holophrases are particularly inter-
esting in two respects. They not only pose a problem for explanations (of
Novelty) that recur to compositionality/recursion. Moreover, they them-
selves hint at the solution to the problem they pose (if that much metaphor
is okay). Let me explain. Postulating knowledge of composition rules is not
only the alleged solution to the Novelty problem but elicits further prob-
lems: namely the problem that the postulated body of information must be
acquired in the rst place.
A plausible solution here is to suppose that language learners learn com-
position rules by experiencing them instantiated. Simply put, the only way
for learners to gure out the ‘workings’ of recursively dened composition
rules (e.g. the semantics of relative clauses) is by observing how they are
used. Holophrases are a particularly illustrative example in this context
because they are interpreted non-compositionally by denition.52 How-
ever, the basic mechanism of utterance interpretation is probably alike in all
cases of language comprehension. The strategy that gets employed when
inferring composition rules from a given set of utterances is, of course,
well-known: abstraction (cf. Tomasello 2003a). What mechanism, other
than abstraction, could explain language learners’ ability to acquire syn-
tactic knowledge?53 This argument does not even presuppose a specic un-
52 If you assume that children who understand holophrases apply rules of composition you
are either redening “holophrase” or changing the subject matter.
53 I mean, supplemented with further constraints. Abstraction per se (whatever that is)
does not help here, for one rst needs to ‘guess’ what the relevant entities were relative
to which one needs to abstract from contexts of utterance. For example, it helps if you
have reasons to suppose that a particular verb is a verb, that a particular noun is a noun,
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derstanding of ‘abstraction’; for the purpose of this short section, it suces
to say that abstraction is one’s ability to recognise commonalities between
contexts and infer generalisations on the basis of this ability.
Remarkably enough, most of the entities that theories of meaning deal
with are abstract entities such as propositions, sentence types, lexical mean-
ing, inference rules, conceptual roles, semantic nets, etc. That is remark-
able insofar as this coerces language learners to familiarise themselves
with abstract entities (e.g. sentence types) by examining concrete objects
(e.g. utterances). Given the degree of abstractness that linguistic descrip-
tions have, it is no wonder that people argue about issues like the bot-
tleneck problem (e.g. Kirby 2002), the poverty of the stimulus argument
(e.g. Chomsky 1965), language faculty in the broad sense and in the nar-
row sense (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002), e-language and i-language
(Chomsky 1986), and the like. More importantly, given that the only avail-
able data for learners is utterances (i.e. context-bound instantiations of sen-
tence types), they have no other choice than to use that data to determine
the semantics of the abstract entities they are supposed to learn. For ex-
ample, language learners might infer that “chair” refers to chairs from the
observation that most of their already competent interlocutors use “chair”
to refer to chairs.
The above argument strongly suggest the following interpretation of
language acquisition: rather than relying on knowledge of composition
rules in order to interpret utterances, learners seem to do just the oppos-
ite. They are forced to acquire linguistic knowledge, including knowledge
concerning recursive composition rules, on the basis of their prior under-
standing of utterances. In this view, the error in explaining Novelty in terms
of compositionality lies in the negligence of the fact that the composition
rules at hand must be acquired rst. As I have shown, the possibilities are
rare here. One option is to assume they are innate, which seems implaus-
etc.; it helps if you can narrow down the logical space for novel semantics by taking into
account known semantics (Ferguson, Graf & Waxman 2014); it helps if you are able to
delineate word boundaries (Tomasello 2003a, 59–61); it helps if you can tell whether it
is a particular (absent) object that your interlocutor is focusing on (Liszkowski, Schäfer,
Carpenter & Tomasello 2009); it helps if you are capable of recognising syntactic struc-
tures (Brent 1994); and so on and so forth.
163
4 Truth-conditional Theories of Meaning
ible for a variety of reasons.54 The alternative is that they are learnt. How-
ever, if they are learnt, they are learnt on the basis of the available data. And
the source data is utterances, which—from a metatheoretic perspective—
are compositional complexes.
One of the currently most inuential neo-Davidsonians, in discussing
mindreading abilities, frames the problem thus:
A rst point we need to consider concerns how the nascent
language user acquires their lexicon initially. That is to say,
since presumably normal speakers are not born with a dictio-
nary-like body of knowledge, pairing natural language words
with their meanings, we need to explain how competent lan-
guage users come to learn such information. [. . . I]n order to
learn a language in the rst place (for example, to nd out which
publicly available sign one’s linguistic community has chosen to
attach to which object or property) it may well be that a grasp of
speaker intentions is necessary. [. . . ] Yet all that the modular
theory [Fodorian modularism, upon which Borg’s Minimalism
is based] is committed to claiming is that once this system is in
place, that is, once a lexical item has been acquired, then the
use of this item no longer need rest on recognition of any kind
of speaker intention. (Borg 2004b, 136 and 139, both italics
mine)
The problem that Borg discusses here is that there seems to be no place
in her theory for intention ascriptions and mindreading abilities. Let us
ignore this issue for the moment. I identify at least three important points
in the quoted passage. Firstly, Borg acknowledges that although semantics
‘takes place’, so to speak, at the level of types (in particular, lexical mean-
ing), acquisition of (alleged) semantic facts necessarily takes place at the
54 For example, one insurmountable problem in this context is the speed with which mean-
ing shifts, grammaticalisation processes and the like take place. At both the syntactic
and the semantic level, natural languages morph within periods of time that are incom-
patible with innateness theses. It might be that the processes that constitute language
acquisition are innate to a large extent (e.g. things like gaze-following ability; cf. Brooks
& Meltzo (2005)). Innateness of these processes does not aect the present argument
though.
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level of tokenings. This is tantamount to saying that language learners face
the problem of simultaneously abstracting away from all factors that con-
tribute towards utterance meaning, e.g. from speaker intentions. Secondly,
Borg indicates here that she wants to defend a rather naïve conception of
the continuity of natural-language semantics. Describing the problem of
word learning along the lines of nding out which words ‘one’s linguistic
community has chosen to attach’ to particular objects clearly neglects the
dynamics of actual language use. I will return to this in a minute.
Thirdly, Borg suggests a strict boundary between semantics and lan-
guage acquisition.55 I think this last point and the second one are, ef-
fectively, two sides of the same coin. If you think that word semantics
works as if it were written down in a social contract, then you probably
also think that word learning processes are completed once they are n-
ished. Such a strict boundary seems unwarranted, given the rapidity with
which, for example, words change their meaning in actual linguistic soci-
eties. It seems far more plausible to assume instead that the mechanisms
underlying language acquisition keep being used even in competent speak-
ers. This picture is, to a surprisingly large extent, congruent with Borg’s
view; the only dierence being that I would assume that language ‘acquis-
ition’ is not completed at some point but is rather a continuous process.
Simply put, word learning—or, in general, learning of new constructions—
is a process that happens with each acquaintance with a particular instan-
tiation. It is just that most words have a relatively stable lexical mean-
ing which might invoke the impression that learning processes concerning
55 In other parts of the book, she also distinguishes between semantics and language use
(i.e. communication). This enables her to allow for things like mindreading abilities not
only in language acquisition but also in language use, although they are not allowed
in her actual theory. That is to say, mindreading abilities (and the like; e.g. plausibility
considerations, world knowledge, cotext, default assumptions, etc.) do aect language
acquisition and language use, but, in her view, they do not aect semantics proper. For
the specic relevance of default assumptions in semantics, the reader may consult the
work of Jaszczolt, who says that
Starting with salient meanings of lexical items [. . . ], interlocutors proceed to
the interpretation of larger units either assigning meanings to them auto-
matically or processing them through conscious inference, depending on
contextual factors. (2011, 14)
See also Jaszczolt (2005).
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these words are nished at some predened point in time, i.e. once one had
‘found out’ which words attach to which objects (cf. the use of “and” today
and ve-hundred years ago). However, other words change their meaning
rather rapidly, which undermines the claim that learning processes regard-
ing them (or, in fact, any other term) can be completed once and for all (cf.
the use of “to twitter” today (2014) and ten years ago).
There is one more general worry that I would like to raise in regard to
the above quotation. The passage clearly invokes the impression that any
specic semantic theory could be reconciled with just about any theory of
word learning. The basic idea seems to be that allowing for mindreading
(and the like) at the level of acquisition does not aect the plausibility of
denying that such capacities play an explanatory role at the level of se-
mantics. Again, ‘[e]ven if we ultimately decide that language acquisition
is an essentially inferential process [. . . ], there is no direct move from this
idea to the claim that linguistic understanding per se is such an inferential
process [. . . ]’ (Borg 2004b, 139, emphases hers). But this seems problematic
as the object of the relevant acquisition processes are the abstract entities
postulated by semantics (e.g. sentence meaning as opposed to utterance
meaning). So the link between the two realms is rather tight. Borg expli-
citly characterises herself as neo-Davidsonian (2004b, ch. 1, passim). By
virtue of this conviction, the basic elements postulated by her theory must
concern knowledge of referential relations, for the simple reason that these
relations are the dening feature of Davidsonian semantics.
This implies, though, that a theory of word learning (or, generally, an ac-
quisition theory) is compatible with Borg’s minimalism only to the extent
that the objects postulated by the former theory comply with the objects
postulated by the latter theory. I begin with the latter theory (Borg’s). Be-
ing a neo-Davidsonian approach, the basic elements postulated correspond
to the so-called Tarskian ‘base clauses’ discussed above (“‘snow’ refers to
snow”; “x satises ‘is white’ if and only if x is white”; et cetera). I dub these
‘referential facts’. If one combines all this, the following picture emerges.
Firstly, Borg herself suggests that word learning can only be explained
in terms of use. Secondly, a strict boundary between acquisition theor-
ies and semantics seems unwarranted, since ‘word learning’ is an ongoing
process. You can’t delineate the class of cases in which you learn from
the class of cases in which you merely interpret. Hence, word learning is
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usage-based and it is not clearly separable from mere semantic interpreta-
tion. Given this, it seems highly unlikely that the theoretical objects that
a theory of language acquisition should postulate are beliefs concerning
referential facts rather than beliefs concerning usage-based facts.
This concludes my discussion of the relationship between theories of
acquisition and theories of meaning. A related worry that I already raised
above concerns relevant alternatives: what kind of explanation accounts
for Novelty if not ascription of knowledge about recursive rules of com-
positions à la Davidson? Here, my answer will be even more tentative (i.e.
shorter), as this question actually requires a book-long treatment. I think
Davidson’s strategy is to combine the two problems reected in composi-
tionality and what I call Novelty. His proposal, essentially, is to provide a
single solution for both issues. Given all the reasons cited above in favour
of the distinction, I accordingly suggest that an answer to the question at
hand involves distinguishing between these two projects rst. That is to
say, the alternative explanation we are after primarily concerns Novelty,
not compositionality.
Presumably, competent language users construe their utterances partly
on the basis of the rules of composition that they master. This, however,
does not imply that language learners employ the very same rules in or-
der to interpret those utterances. Nor does it imply that language users
employ only those rules in conjunction with lexical knowledge whenever
they interpret (for what hearers potentially understand is utterances, not
sentences). Which mechanisms play a role in interpretation is, at the end
of the day, an empirical question. It thus does not concern me here. David-
son, I think, is quite right in noting that the ability of competent language
users to interpret novel ‘sentences’ is somehow rooted in their prior lin-
guistic understanding. Yet, as the above discussion shows, this does not
speak (solely) in favour of his theory. The very same ‘correlation’ between
prior linguistic knowledge and understanding could be explained relative
to the assumption that the recursive rules of composition get formulated in
usage-based terms. The above argument concerning language acquisition
(and the continuous process of ‘acquisition’ due to the dynamics of natural
languages) suggest that, in fact, those rules (as well as lexical knowledge)
should be thus formulated.
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The philosophically most relevant point in this context is, I think, that
language learning reveals a general constraint on how the Novelty problem
should be best approached. Language learners (e.g. children) understand
‘novel sentences’ just like we do. In contrast to competent speakers, they
do this despite their lack of prior linguistic knowledge. In Borg’s terms,
they do not know yet which expression has been chosen by the society
to attach to which object or property. Fortunately, the ascription of un-
derstanding is fairly independent from what we suppose constitutes this
understanding. Whether we are justied in ascribing understanding con-
cerning a given utterance to a given child in a given situation depends
on the overall observable behavioural patterns that the child shows. This
is essentially independent from the linguistic knowledge that we typically
presuppose in adults. By assumption, children lack this kind of knowledge.
Given that, nevertheless, they are able to understand (which is justiable
on the basis of what they do), something else must explain their abilities.
As I said, I will not try to give a comprehensive answer here. The philo-
sophically relevant point is just that whatever one’s explanation might be,
it can be given independently from the fact that the ‘thing’ that is supposedly
understood (i.e. an utterance) is semantically compositional from the point
of view of competent speakers or theoreticians. For example, “Gimme-it!”
seems compositional from the adult’s perspective. But typical evidence for
a child’s understanding of that expression would be its satisfaction when
it receives the object that it asked for. This holds even if we had independ-
ent reason to assume that the child does not understand the underlying
compositional structure of the expression (for example, if we knew inde-
pendently that the it does not understand or apply “give” in other linguistic
contexts).
These considerations are essentially methodological. The interesting is-
sue still remains: what explains understanding if not prior linguistic know-
ledge? The currently by far most inuential paradigm in the area of lan-
guage acquisition is Tomasello’s. The basic idea is to shift the theoretical
focus from language as such to the social settings in which language takes
place. More precisely, the Tomasellian idea—put in philosophical prose—
is to focus on human cooperative behaviour by viewing language as one
means among others that enable or foster cooperation in the rst place. In
contrast to the Gricean paradigm, language is not conceived as a cooperat-
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ive endeavour but as a means to achieve cooperative goals.56 This suggests
the direction that a plausible answer to the present question would need
to take. A theory of meaning starts with a theory of communication, as
communication is the point of having a language. What cognitive agents
are primarily interested in is achieving their respective ends. Using lan-
guage ‘correctly’ is only interesting insofar as it fosters success in achiev-
ing these ends. According to Tomasello, language is basically a means that
helps achieving goals in cooperative settings (Tomasello 2008).
When it comes to language acquisition, the question accordingly is not:
why do children understand certain utterances? Rather, the relevant ques-
tion is: by which means do humans achieve cooperative goals in general?
Or, rather, what are the prerequisites under which cooperation occurs?
Applied to the holophrase example, the idea then is to rst explain the
prerequisites for the achievement of particular goals (here: ‘getting it’).
Such an explanation probably recurs to common ground, joint attention,
mindreading capacities, and related notions, i.e. notions that are not primar-
ily designed to explain language but cooperation. Semantic explanations
would then start, if you like, from the ‘communication-theoretic’ fact that
the child is able to recognise the specic meaning of “Gimme-it!” in particu-
lar situations (i.e. in situations that are such that uttering “Gimme-it!” leads
to ‘getting it’). Generally, approaching language comprehension this way
makes it possible to explain the quite counter-intuitive eect that it seems
possible to understand utterances without ‘understanding’ the instantiated
sentence type in advance. This is what actually happens in language ac-
quisition. In a nal step, the semantic explanation in the strict sense (i.e.
explanations concerning lexical and syntactical knowledge57) presumably
recur to the child’s abstraction abilities (whose exact nature is, again, an
empirical question). For example, in order to acquire knowledge of lex-
ical meanings, a child needs to recognise similarities between the semantic
contributions of the same word across dierent conversational contexts.
56 This is my supervisor’s way of putting it.
57 Remember that construction grammar—the theoretical framework that serves as a back-
drop for this book—assumes that syntactic constructions bear their own meaning, which
is why I list them here in the context of semantics.
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This chapter draws directly on the results of the previous chapter. There,
I proposed that we distinguish clearly between genuine phenomena and
their corresponding theoretical explications, which, by their very nature,
lack the specic—indisputable—epistemic status of the former. The Nov-
elty issue, I suggested, is such a phenomenon. It can’t possibly be explained
away. There is really a need to account for it. Prima facie, compositionality
looks like a phenomenon, too. In contrast to Novelty, though, this seems
wrong-headed. I argued that impressions to the contrary stem from the-
oreticians’ tendency to present the Novelty problem in such a way as if
it concerned compositionality itself. People understand complex expres-
sions due to their underlying compositional structure. Therefore, it seems
that what we need, rst and foremost, is an account of compositionality.
However, compositionality is (i) primarily a feature of language, not of
communication (as such it is a phenomenon only in the derivative sense in
that it is exemplied in communication)1 and, therefore, (ii) it is a means
to account for certain abilities (i.e. comprehension capacities), rather than
itself something that gets ‘discovered’ and requires explanation.
1 This, again, anticipates my reasoning in the methodological part. The basic idea here is
simply this: of course, there is a tight link between language and communication to the
extent that some features of the latter can only be explained with recourse to the former.
Crucially, though, language is an abstract system that involves the postulation of entities
that are not ‘out there in the world’ (e.g. sentence types). This implies that the entities
(and features; e.g. compositionality) postulated with respect to that abstract system are
not themselves phenomena but merely means to account for the actual phenomena out
there. As regards communication, the phenomenon is utterance comprehension. Postula-
tion of knowledge concerning the semantics of sentences (including knowledge concern-
ing recursive rules of composition) is only required to the extent that it helps explaining
utterance comprehension. This is because there is no independent reason to assume that
people understand sentences irrespective of our evidence that they understand certain
utterances (written or verbal).
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My aim in the present chapter is to underpin these claims by relating
them to a critical discussion of the prevalent conviction in philosophy that
the literal meaning of words and sentences is the primary object of study
in a theory of meaning. In particular, I am going to question the wide-
spread assumption that the relevant property of referring expressions is
their referring to something (i.e. singular terms refer to objects, predicates
to classes thereof), where “relevant” means that this property is required
to explain certain features of language (especially non-literality). On the
contrary, my argument in this chapter is that all that is required to full
the job of ordinary ‘primary meaning’ dened in terms of reference re-
lations is an alternative denition of the term that operates only on ex-
pectations. I explicate my re-denition of the term “primary meaning” by
proposing to reverse the order of explanation in semantics and pragmatics.
Fundamentally, meaning in context (arguably a matter of pragmatics) can
explain context-independent meaning (semantic meaning). For example,
people would argue that “cold” means ‘cold’, and that by virtue of that prop-
erty “cold” might mean something else, given appropriate circumstances. I
argue instead that what people always understand (if they understand) is
pragmatic meaning, i.e. meaning in context. The expectations that they ar-
rive at by virtue of their ability to understand pragmatic meaning is enough
to account for linguistic features that require a literal/non-literal distinc-
tion (like irony). Looking at it that way, the explanations for non-literality
might, in the end, be very similar to the original explanation (e.g. Grice’s),
for the expectations that one would typically acquire arguably very much
resemble the ‘primary meanings’ ordinarily postulated (e.g. people would
typically expect that “Aristotle” is used to refer to Aristotle, and so on).
All this is the topic of section 5.1. In section 5.2, I then discuss com-
positionality and recursiveness2 in the context of construction grammar,
especially with respect to Tomasello’s work on language acquisition. The
motivation behind this is this: if I argue—as I do in the present chapter
and the previous one—against Davidson’s ideas regarding primary mean-
ing and compositionality, I should rather show that an alternative (con-
structional) account of compositionality is viable and indeed worth pursu-
ing. In eect, I will argue that Tomasello’s framework based on the notion
2 I use “recursiveness” and “recursion” as stylistic variations of each other.
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of cooperation is already a good basis upon which an account of utterance
comprehension can be built.
5.1 Literal/Non-Literal Interface
The foregoing chapter was, to a certain extent, anti-Davidsonian in that
it criticised major elements of truth-conditional semantics. Undeniably,
though, there seems to be a rather strong connection between truth and
meaning. What is the connection between these two notions if one as-
sumes a usage-based approach to meaning? Obviously, there are dier-
ences to TCS. For example, in truth-conditional semantics one would sup-
pose that the meaning of a singular term is its reference, i.e. one would
assume that, for example, the meaning of “Aristotle” is (the person) Aris-
totle.3 One would also assume that the meaning of a predicate like “() is
wise” is a function from possible worlds to a set of individuals (or just a
set, if one takes into account only the actual world). Then a complex ex-
pression like “Aristotle is wise” would be true (for “is true i” ‘replaces’ the
ordinary “means that”) if and only if the individual denoted by “Aristotle”
(Aristotle) is among the individuals in the set of things denoted by “() is
wise” (the wise entities). In short, “Aristotle is wise” is true if and only if
Aristotle is wise.
Truth is a property of propositions, or, derivatively, of sentences (see
above). It is not ascribable to atomic expressions. In truth-conditional se-
mantics, the role played by truth at sentential level is fullled by (other)
extensions at sub-sentential level. In the orthodox view, truth values are
extensions of sentences. So, the meaning which “Aristotle” contributes to
the meaning of a sentence is the fact (if any) that it refers to Aristotle. The
meaning which “() is wise” contributes is the fact (if any) that it refers to a
set of individuals (or that it is a function from worlds to sets of individuals).
In other words, reference at the sub-sentential level corresponds to truth
at sentence level.
Among the commonplaces in the philosophy of language is the assump-
tion that almost all (non-logical) elements of natural languages, if they are
3 More precisely, one would need to say that one way of stating the meaning of “Aristotle”
is by saying that “Aristotle” refers to Aristotle.
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meaningful at all, have a literal meaning. Atomic as well as complex ele-
ments (typically, words and sentences) have, it is claimed, a type-speciable
meaning that can be studied more or less independently from the token-
ings of these elements. Davidson (1986) denes “rst meaning” as ‘what
should be found by consulting a dictionary based on actual usage’ (159),
given certain standard conditions. Knowledge about ‘rst meanings’ in this
sense belongs to one’s ‘prior theory’, i.e. roughly the theory that one has
before entering a conversation. There is a huge variety of notions related
to “rst meaning” that all more or less serve the same purpose, including
“semantic meaning”, “literal meaning”, “truth-evaluable content”, “actual
meaning”, “lexical meaning”, and so forth. For what follows, I shall use the
term “primary meaning” only (as above). I call the opposite concept “prag-
matic meaning”. Normally, the distinction between the two is presented in
terms of the intuitively compelling dichotomy of what is said versus what
is meant. What is said by using a certain sentence is what this particular
sentence means, given the ‘standard’ interpretation of all terms occurring
in it. Before I continue with a rough characterisation of what is meant
by a particular sentence, let me look at some examples rst. My plan in
what follows is this: rst, I present some examples and discuss the ordin-
ary notion of ‘primary meaning’ in the sense of literal meanings as they
are assumed in truth-conditional semantics. Then I argue that a rened
denition of “primary meaning” that is solely based on expectations (i.e.
is dened use-theoretically) is capable of accounting for those phenomena
that typically motivate the assumption of a literal/non-literal divide. Since
there is no reason to assume this divide other than the classical examples
(e.g. irony, metaphor, etc.), I conclude that my redened notion of “primary
meaning” is theoretically adequate.
Here is the rst example. Suppose that a speaker of an utterance of
“James is waiting at the corner” thinks that Will is called “James” and there-
fore intends to refer to Will by uttering “James”, then the ‘literal mean-
ing’ of “James” nevertheless is ‘James’. Hence, the sentence means that he,
James, is waiting at the corner. The speaker’s intentions, if any, come into
play only when it comes to pragmatic meaning. Given the assumptions,
one common interpretation of the sentence as regards what is meant is
that Will is waiting at the corner. And the explanation for this is that this
is the intended interpretation of the speaker. Literal meanings are taken
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to determine the truth conditions of a sentence. If so, “James is waiting
at the corner” is true i James is waiting at the corner, irrespective of the
speaker’s intentions (and beliefs, for that matter). Although there is also
some evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to suppose that the
usual view on this matter is that—save for obvious candidates for context
sensitivity, especially indexicals—the truth conditions of a given sentence
can be determined without any further world knowledge such as speaker
intentions, world knowledge, belief ascriptions, etc.
For the sake of argument, I need to assume provisionally the distinction
between literal/primary/lexical meaning and derived/pragmatic/utterance
meaning. Accordingly, I sometimes speak as if words really have primary
meaning in the traditional sense, e.g. in terms of reference.4 Following
the classical Gricean example (Grice 1989), the assumption of some plaus-
ible background assumptions ensures that the non-literal meaning of “It’s
cold in here, isn’t it?” could—under appropriate circumstances—be para-
phrased as ‘Could you close the window, please?’ (or something reason-
ably similar). This view, usually referred to as ‘two-step’ or ‘inferentialist’,
will be explained in some more detail in the next section. The idea of two-
step strategies is to delineate between two distinct interpretative processes.
Roughly, the rst process is semantic interpretation, which computes sen-
tential meaning on the basis of sub-sentential elements. The non-literal
meaning is then inferred on the basis of the literal interpretation derived at
the rst stage (i.e. by recognising that maxims of conversation (Grice 1975)
have been violated). From the current perspective, two-step interpretations
of non-literal meaning are highly relevant as they presuppose that senten-
tial primary meaning can serve as ‘input’ to the actual inferential process
that allegedly guides utterance interpretation.
5.1.1 Intuitive Propositional Content
This rst overview of the distinction between primary and pragmatic mean-
ing should suce for present purposes. I do not want to go too much
4 For most of this book, I adopt an established convention from linguistics when I talk
about derived meaning. In linguistics, people tend to use single quotes to indicate para-
phrases, i.e. rough characterisations of the most probable non-literal interpretation of
utterances. I do the same in what follows.
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into the details at this stage. What is important to note here is that the
last example hints at the very close connection that exists between prag-
matic meaning and pragmatics. The textbook story runs like this:5 primary
meanings are xed, so “John” refers to (the person) John, etc. When con-
fronted with a given utterance, a hearer interprets the utterance against
the backdrop of general pragmatic principles (e.g. Grice’s maxims). Given
the literal meaning of the utterance plus pragmatic principles plus a little
world knowledge, the hearer is eventually able to infer what is meant.
When it comes to pragmatic and primary meaning and to the motiva-
tion for that distinction, a reasonable strategy seems to go just the other
way around. It makes sense to start with the observation that pragmat-
ics abound in everyday conversations. You have irony, metaphor, socio-
culturally determined word choice and what not. There must, therefore,
be something that explains these phenomena. Semantics deals with lit-
eral meaning (I assume for the sake of argument). But these meanings
can’t explain the relevant phenomena. So there must be something else—
namely ‘pragmatic principles’—that account for these phenomena, or so
most people claim. So far the easiest way for pragmatics to achieve an
explanation is to take primary meanings as starting points, because they
exist anyway (says the semanticist). The job of pragmatics then is just to
explain how what is meant can be determined on the basis of literal mean-
ings. What is relevant from the current perspective is that if all this is
a successful strategy, then the distinction semantics/pragmatics seems to
justify the distinction literal/non-literal meaning.
One of the most striking examples in regard to the connection between
primary and pragmatic meaning is irony. The meaning of an ironic ut-
terance is, people typically assume, just the opposite of what the expres-
sion would ‘actually’ mean. For instance, “This is a nice building!” means,
according to the inferentialist’ interpretation, that this is a nice building.
However, if one knew that it was stated in an ironic manner (whatever the
evidence might be), then one would also know that in this case it means
5 For example, Akmajian, Demers, Farmer & Harnish (1995). They provide a neo-Gricean
explanation of how pragmatic meaning is derived. The explanation starts with primary
meanings and, if certain ‘presumptions’ are violated, ends up with some derived meaning
or other, depending on the ‘strategies’ (irony, metaphor) involved. The ‘classic’ in this
area is Bach & Harnish (1979).
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(non-literally) that this is not a nice building at all. Prima facie, it seems that
pragmatic meaning is parasitic on literal meaning. Therefore, the former
kind of meaning seems to presuppose the latter.6
This admittedly very brief overview of two-step approaches to utter-
ance meaning shows that an important motivation for primary meaning
is a certain underlying conviction about the boundaries of semantics and
pragmatics. The distinction is not undisputed but widely accepted. By the
same token, many people accept the assumption of primary meaning as
well. Taken together with the undisputed acceptance of the composition-
ality principle, the following picture seems to emerge. Two main reasons
seem to support the classical conception of primary meaning. One is com-
positionality, which apparently requires that words have a stable, lexical
meaning that can serve as the basis for a composition process (more on
this in the next section). Another reason obviously is a prevailing idea of
the semantics/pragmatics divide that is underlying particular approaches
to pragmatics, especially neo-Gricean paradigms. These convictions con-
cerning a clear-cut semantics/pragmatics divide and formally identiable
primary meanings (i.e. the idea that words ‘wear their meanings on their
sleeves’) t nicely with neo-Davidsonian approaches to semantics. For ex-
ample, Borg repeatedly emphasises that her theory is not at all concerned
with communication; hers is a semantic view that perfectly maps onto a
broadly Gricean conception of pragmatics. Hence, questioning the status
of these just-mentioned convictions implies questioning the status of truth-
conditional semantics in general. In the following section, I shall go into
the details of Davidson’s ‘sentence comprehension’ argument. I will argue
that his assumption that sentence comprehension can only be explained by
recurring to compositionality and recursiveness is unwarranted. This ar-
gument is based on the idea that ‘primary meaning’ need not be spelt out,
as Davidson assumes, in terms of referential relations but, rather, might
6 The debate between contextualists (e.g. Recanati) and minimalists (e.g. Borg) is, to a
certain extent, a debate about whether formally described meaning statements accord
with the ‘intuitive’ propositional content that a typical language user would ascribe to
a given utterance (see Borg 2004b, ch. 4.3). Borg’s view contrasts nicely with Recanati’s
so-called Availability Principle, according to which there is a ‘level at which we nd both
what is said and what is implied, which level is characterized by conscious accessibility’
(2004, 13).
179
5 Theories of Truth & Meaning
simply be spelt out in terms of expectations. Accordingly, I propose a re-
denition of this term that ts these purposes.
5.1.2 Functions of Primary Meaning
Classical primary meaning is taken for granted by virtually everyone in
philosophy and linguistics. The reasons in its favour are legion. On closer
examination, it seems that most arguments boil down to mere plausibil-
ity considerations. Most of these arguments, again, derive their plausib-
ility from the plausibility of the more fundamental compositionality prin-
ciple and arguments for recursion in natural language.7 The argument for
primary meaning remains implicit. Still, it falls o as a by-product if the
argument for recursiveness in natural languages is construed roughly as
follows:8
(i) Humans are able to comprehend any new sentence they hear or read
(empirical observation);9
7 The historically relevant source for the notion of ‘recursion’ is Bar-Hillel (1953). A fairly
recent overview article is Clark (2006).
8 Davidson hints at such a strategy in Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages (1965),
when he says that ‘[supposing that language lacks recursion]; then no matter how many
sentences a would-be speaker learns to produce and understand, there will remain others
whose meanings are not given by the rules already mastered’ (388). In this context, cf.
also Patterson (2005). However, I need to emphasise here that the presented argument is
a straw man that rst and foremost serves the purpose of showing that I have a viable
alternative to classical primary meaning. An alternative, that is, which is applicable to
the Novelty problem discussed in the previous chapter, i.e. the ‘problem’ that compet-
ent speakers are able to comprehend unknown, well-formed sentences in the language
they have mastered. Note that in the argument reconstruction (construction, rather) I
keep using “sentence” instead of “utterance”, although, of course, only the latter can be
understood or comprehended by speakers/hearers (cf. also my remarks on understanding
in the previous chapter). However, this way of speaking accords quite nicely with the
Davidsonian jargon. The idea here is that since sentences (like words) are supposed to
have a stable meaning that can be assigned to them relative to contexts of utterances
(e.g. in order to resolve indexicals), but independently of conversational situations (e.g.
irrespective of intentions), these sentence meanings can be understood (Borg 2004b). In
line with this assumption, I continue to speak of ‘sentences’ in this chapter.
9 Provided (a) they are competent in a natural language L, (b) the sentence at stake is a
sentence of L and is grammatically well-formed, (c) the sentence consists only of words
and syntactic operations the hearer is familiar with, and (d) no constraints in regards
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(ii) Humans have only limited cognitive resources (empirical observa-
tion);10
(iii) Comprehending sentences of any length with nite means is only
possible via recursively dened rules (assumption);
(iv) Recursively dened rules in the sense of functions from atoms to sen-
tence meaning operate on literal meaning (analytic truth);
(v) The only way to account for humans’ linguistic abilities is via primary
meaning (from (iii) and (iv)).
(i) is uncontroversial.11 (ii) is equally uncontroversial as (i) (probably
even more plausible). (iii) is the ‘only game in town’ assumption that I will
be discussing at length below. (iv) must be an analytic truth, since func-
tions have determinate values for certain arguments. Take, for example,
the function “f(x) = 3x”. This is the function it de facto is because it
yields the value 3 for the argument 1, the value 6 for the argument 2, and
so forth. This is why it is the 3x function. If it ‘behaved’ dierently, it
would not be the 3x function any more. It yields certain values because
the values of the arguments are xed, i.e. “1” means 1, “2” means 2, and
so forth. No xed values, no function. The same holds for ‘functions’ in
to computational power and time apply. Note that the last constraint is not essential
to the argument. Reformulating the argument without it would just complicate matters
unnecessarily, roughly along the following lines: Suppose there is a limiting number
of symbols per sentence people can comprehend (or maybe an absolute length limit of
sentences). Then, still, people are able to comprehend almost innitely many sentences
(because there are almost innitely many ways to construe words with the resources
of the alphabet, and almost innitely many ways to combine words). But it is similarly
implausible to assume that people use (almost) innitely many dierent ways to link
symbols with meanings, i.e. even in languages with such a sentence length limit speakers
would probably rely on the very same resources to compose meanings as in languages
without such limits. That is, they would also employ recursively dened rules (according
to the present argument).
10 That is to say, limited resources in regards to the number of ‘rules’ they employ for
linking symbols with meanings, not with respect to computational power and time (cf.
previous footnote).
11 You may convince yourself by continuing to read this book.
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Tarski’s framework.12 “() is white”, for example, yields the value True for
the argument “snow”, False otherwise. If this is so, it is because “snow”
and “white” have xed meanings. “Snow” means snow; and snow, let us
suppose, is white (in a given theory). The theory could not have yielded
the value True for “Snow is white” if “snow” (or “white”, for that matter)
were interpreted in other ways or had somehow ‘indeterminate’ content
(whatever that would mean here). So, if the above is conceived as a David-
sonian argument for Tarskian recursion (that is, for the idea that semantic
knowledge is implemented in humans in a way that corresponds to the re-
cursive rules in Tarski’s theory of truth), then this implies an argument for
stable, primary meaning as well. Only stable meanings can serve as input
to recursive rules of composition.
Given these considerations, it seems relatively hopeless to question the
validity of the argument.13 I acknowledge that it leaves some aspects un-
derspecied: for example, I could possibly specify more precisely what it
means to be able to comprehend a sentence (or utterance, for that mat-
ter). In particular, I should probably say a bit more about what counts as
evidence in this context. Be that as it may, it seems reasonable to suppose,
with Davidson, that people obviously have some such ability, if only for
the sake of argument. Also, the premises all look pretty plausible. From
my perspective, the only premise that can reasonably be attacked here is
the third, i.e. the assumption (or intermediate conclusion) that only recur-
12 The ‘recursively dened rules’ are often identied with rules in Tarski’s truth theory (see
Davidson).
13 I mean, valid if you allow that I omit some obvious intermediate steps. For instance, it
would be logically invalid to take the step from (i) and (ii) to (iii). But this can be repaired
quite easily by further assuming that recursive rules are in fact a plausible solution for
the Novelty problem and that they are the only available solution. Fiddling with the
validity of the argument unnecessarily complicates matters. What is really interesting
from a philosophical point of view is whether the premises are true. Actually, ensuring
validity in an argument is really cheap. For example, it is always possible to transform an
invalid argument into a valid one by introducing further premises: “A; ergo B” is invalid,
“A; when A then B; ergo B” is not. So, if the ‘missing’ premises are obvious enough (as
they presumably are in my reconstruction), then, I think, it seems reasonable to simplify
as far as possible.
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sion can account for human comprehension abilities.14,15 To begin with,
it is an observable fact that the ability of language users to understand
novel sentences correlates strongly16 with their familiarity with the words
occurring in those sentences (plus syntactic knowledge). Or, reversely, if
someone is ignorant with regard to the words (or syntax) that constitute
a sentence, she is unlikely to understand it—even if she is otherwise com-
pletely competent concerning, in general, the language used and, in par-
ticular, the syntactic structure (or words) employed. This suggests—and it
is often concluded—that someone’s ability to understand a simple declar-
14 In line with Davidson’s argumentation in Truth and Meaning, I suppose that the ‘re-
cursively dened rules’ we are talking about correspond to Tarskian composition rules
that specify truth conditions of sentences on the basis of the atomic meanings of their
constituents.
15 Basically all semantic accounts that base their justication on considerations concern-
ing human comprehension capacities do so by invoking ‘classical’ primary meanings in
terms of reference relations. For example, the ability to understand “That’s an apple”
is, or so the arguments go, partly determined by my knowledge that “apple” refers to
apples.
One might argue that my criticism of the third premise does not apply to Fodor’s lan-
guage of thought, since semantic values of sentences are traceable to their syntactic
structures. Therefore, the atomic parts of sentences do not need to have primary mean-
ing (e.g. in terms of reference); in fact, they need not have meaning at all. (Alexandros
Tillas pointed out to me this possibility.) However, Fodor points out several times that,
regarding the view on the semantics of words, he advocates just the position that is at
stake here. We read:
[. . . ] the assumptions we have been defending can be abbreviated as: learn-
ing [a natural language] L involves (at least) learning its truth denition.
Now, one way of formulating a truth denition [. . . ] is this: We distinguish
between a nite set of elementary predicates of L, for each of which the
appropriate determination is actually listed [. . . ]. (Fodor 1975, 79)
Consonant with the general methodology of this study, I shall endure what I
don’t know how to cure. In particular, I shall continue to assume that learn-
ing a natural language is learning the rules which determine the extensions
of its predicates [. . . ]. (82)
16 Although not strictly, as proven by children’s ability to understand holophrases, for ex-
ample.
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ative sentence like, say, “Snow is white” is parasitic on her understanding
of “Snow”, “to be”, “white”, and the ‘copula sentence structure’.17
As a matter of fact, it would be absurd to deny this correlation. How-
ever, two further independent claims may be questioned. One is the step
from mere correlation between word knowledge (knowing the meaning
of a given word) and sentence comprehension (being able to understand
novel sentences) to the claim that sentence meaning is a function of word
meanings. The other is the implicit assumption that a Tarskian framework
is the only reasonable solution for going from word meaning to sentence
meaning, where the important part is, of course, that a Tarski-style theory
is eshed out in terms of reference, satisfaction, and truth conditions (as be-
ing, respectively, the meaning of singular terms, predicates, and sentences).
Since I have already criticised some general elements of truth-conditional
semantics in the previous chapter (4), the focus in this chapter lies on the
role ‘primary meanings’ play in my own framework. In particular, I would
like to show in the following which role the redened notion of ‘primary
meaning’ can play in the task of relating atomic meanings with complex
meanings.
The intuition that the (conventional/literal) meaning of “cold” is cold-
ness seems very strong. Interestingly, this intuition seems to persist irre-
spective of the sentential context in which “cold” occurs. In the famous
Gricean example, it is shown that an instantiation of (α) “It’s cold in here”
can be used to express a particular wish or command (under appropriate
circumstances). The mentioned intuition is relevant, since the pragmatic
meaning—for instance, ‘Please close the window!’—can, Griceans say, only
be ‘inferred’ by hearers if they have a prior understanding of α’s constitu-
ents. But the intended/conveyed meaning (roughly, ‘what is meant’18) is
17 This, of course, is just a reprise of a well-known theme in Davidson (especially 1965 and
1967).
18 “What is meant”, like “what is said”, is a notoriously controversial notion. I will try to
avoid using both in what follows as far as possible. The phrase “what is meant” (in Grice’s
terminology) corresponds to what I call pragmatic (or conveyed) meaning in this chapter.
I particularly like the term “conveyed” in this context, as it bears the connotation that
the intention to get a particular meaning across is fullled or successful—a connotation
that “what is meant” lacks. That is, in my terminology pragmatic meaning depends on
what people actually do in their eort to coordinate their behaviour. The phrase “what
is said” is especially problematic since Recanati’s proposal to conceive of what is said in
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not in any reasonable sense made up of the components “It’s”, “cold”, “in”,
and “here” (plus syntactic structure). Rather, or so the classical story goes,
what is meant is inferred from the meaning of the complete expression “It’s
cold in here” plus world knowledge (and more), i.e. the important interme-
diate step is to compute the complete literal meaning rst before going to
what is actually meant in a specic context. If one accepts that there are
good reasons against primary meaning (as I do), then one needs to provide
an explanation for why people are inclined to have the intuition in ques-
tion. Prima facie, you can’t directly go from hearing “It’s”, “cold”, “in”, and
“here” to the interpretation ‘Close the window!’ without the intermediate
interpretation ‘It’s cold in here’. I shall talk about this intuition rst and
come back to word/sentence meaning below.19
The explanation I am going to present is simple. I take it that the reason
why people come to think words have primary meaning is because they
commit a kind of statistical fallacy. The fallacy is triggered by the cir-
cumstance that pragmatic meaning (i.e. the actual content of a given ut-
terance) is, in the vast majority of cases, identical with primary meaning.
For instance, most of the time “dog” really means ‘dog’, i.e. it is used to
talk about dogs (or dog-like entities). There is no better way to express
this, I am afraid. Note that the claim is not that the literal meaning of
“dog” is that it refers to dogs (or doghood). Rather, it is a claim about how
“dog” is standardly used. This has nothing directly to do with reference,
although standardly “dog” is in fact used to refer to dogs (or dog-like en-
tities). Lastly, note that I am not assuming, as Fodor does (1975, esp. ch.
2, 1987, ch. 4, 1994), that there is a fundamental dierence between the
two cases of failed vs successful reference (in the sense that the meaning
of ‘unsuccessful’ tokenings of dog (and hence of “dog”) is asymmetrically
dependent on ‘successful’ ones). Natural language semantics is concerned
with how language is actually used. And in the actual world, tokenings of
“dog” are triggered by dog-like entities (which, again, usually happen to
terms of intuitively available propositional content (cf. his Availability Principle, cited
above).
19 Today, there is a whole industry devoted to questions such as whether people rst in-
terpret ‘literal’ meanings and then metaphors, enriched propositions, implicatures, im-
plicitures, indirect speech acts, etc. Cf., e.g., Nicolle & Clark (1999), Noveck & Reboul
(2008), and Noveck & Sperber (2007).
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be dogs). A usage-based theory that accounts for the actual use of “dog”
should not posit any dierences between successful and unsuccessful uses
(read: referentially successful), unless this alleged dierence indicates cer-
tain regularities in the use of “dog” that are not graspable otherwise. The
fundamental importance of successfully referring with “dog” to dogs lies
in its contribution to the truth (falsity) of an utterance (or proposition, for
that matter). But truth (falsity) is not needed in order to exhaustively de-
scribe the use associated with “dog”. To put this point even more cautiously,
whether truth (falsity) is a concept that has explanatory value regarding
language use is eventually an empirical matter. My modest claim at this
point is merely this: by saying that the use of “dog” is such that most of
the time it is used to refer to actual dogs, I am not, by virtue of this claim
alone, committed to the view that the meaning of “dog” is that it refers to
dogs.
From the point of view of the use-theoretic framework defended in this
book, the dichotomy between ordinary primary meaning and pragmatic
meaning is misleading. Because sentences have only meaning in context,
all sentences pragmatically mean something, e.g. under appropriate circum-
stances (an utterance of the sentence) “It’s cold in here” might mean, for
example, that it is cold in here. In this view, ‘primary meaning’ is a very
special subset of pragmatic meaning. I therefore propose to dene the term
“primary meaning” thus: primary meaning, in my view, is the meaning that
utterances have if the sentence used is used standardly, with ‘standard uses’
being the homogeneous majority of uses (if any) averaged over all actual
instantiations of a given word/sentence type.
I now go through the details of this denition step by step. To begin
with, the reason I emphasise that all sentences pragmatically mean some-
thing is that they also have ‘pragmatic meaning’ (if you want to talk that
way) in cases where primary and pragmatic meaning ‘fall into one’. To
see where this is getting at, let me briey take a look at how this admit-
tedly marginal point—indeed, supercially this looks like a terminological
concern—is handled classically. Standard semantic theories in philosophy
would say things like: “It’s cold in here” means (literally) that it is cold in
here. If someone uses the sentence in order to express the corresponding
proposition <It is cold in here>, they use the sentence literally (i.e. ‘what
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is said’ corresponds to the conveyed meaning).20 In certain other cases,
given certain background conditions, a speaker might express their wish
to close the window by uttering the very same sentence type. In these
cases, it is said, the sentence literally means the same as before but, since it
is used non-literally, now also means (on top, so to speak) ‘Please close the
window!’ In this view, all sentences have literal meaning (what is said is
always the same), but they have non-literal meaning ‘on top’ under certain
circumstances. That is, literal sentence meaning is what sentences wear on
their sleeves; “snow is white” means ‘snow is white’, etc.
In contrast, in the view advocated here, pragmatic meaning is explan-
atorily basic. The alleged primary meaning of linguistic signs will be ex-
20 Generally, I try to avoid talk about propositions as far as possible in this chapter. Pro-
positions are a useful means in many elds (King, Soames & Speaks 2014). For example
in the area of truth theories, propositions are often justied thus: if person a thinks that
p is the case and person b thinks that it is not, then there is something—namely <p>—
about whose status (truth value) a and b disagree. These reasons are perfectly legitimate,
I think. In philosophy of language, propositions are often justied analogously, e.g. in
regard to translations. If “snow is white” expresses the proposition <snow is white> and
“Schnee ist weiß” does as well, then “snow is white” is a good translation of “Schnee ist
weiß”, and vice versa. And just here lies the crux with propositions in theories of mean-
ing. They can easily invoke the misleading impression that there is an intimate relation
between sentence types and the corresponding propositions that they express. In fact,
however, people disagree widely about which propositions are expressed by which sen-
tences (“snow is white” being an exception here). For instance, truth-evaluability is often
considered to be a threshold for the content that is literally expressed by sentence types
(cf. the treatment of indexicals by, e.g., Borg (2004b)). Roughly, the idea is to say that the
most minimal content that is truth-evaluable is that content literally expressed by a given
sentence. But this strategy leads to further problems. One is that this minimal content
is often times by default trivially true (false), hence the explanatory advantage of truth-
evaluability seems dubious here (cf. the classical example “Jill can’t continue”). Another
one is that minimal content does not always match with the propositional content that
must be known in order to determine the truth value of a given sentence, hence the worry
is that minimal content involves a somewhat misleading notion of truth-evaluability (cf.
the Kaplanian character of “here” (e.g. the place of the speaker), which leaves the relev-
ant place particularly underspecied). In order to avoid these diculties, I stick to my
strategy of indicating meanings with single quotes, which by denition can’t be o the
mark. If someone means ‘snow is white’ by a given utterance, then he means that con-
tent (whatever it is) he typically expresses by uttering “snow is white”; irrespective of
whether <snow is white> is typically the content that he expresses by utterances of this
type. This strategy is pretty similar to Horwich’s placeholder approach (capitalisation
convention), which also can’t go wrong.
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plained in terms of pragmatic meaning, rather than the other way around.
Utterances show a certain systematics in what they mean. Principally, sen-
tences can (under given circumstances) virtually mean anything. For ex-
ample, “It’s cold in here” might mean ‘Please close the window!’ or ‘Store
the food in this room!’ or whatever. In most cases, “It’s cold in here” means
simply that it is cold in here. This peculiarity of language—that within the
class of all utterances of a sentence there is a specic subset of uses in
which a sentence always means the same—leads to the impression that this
is the literal meaning of this sentence, with “literal” indicating that other
uses derive their meaning from this standard. However, the class of uses
of α in which it means that it is cold in here is just a very frequently recur-
ring, entrenched variant that is theoretically on a par with other uses. Note
that this does not imply that the regularity among uses of α is arbitrary.
Many words (and sentences) have one core of uses that can be singled out.
Others—homonyms and homophones—have two or more cores; they are
therefore two word types.
There are even words (or, generally, signs) for which no clear core use
can be singled out. A rule of thumb might be: the more technical a term, the
more clearly determinable its core use properties. For example, “alkaline
phosphatase” is probably only used to denote alkaline phosphatase.21 So,
its core use is pretty quickly determined: no variation in regards to mean-
ing, all occurrences considered. On the other hand, certain gestures (see
sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4) have a ‘semantics’ that is so indeterminate that
it hardly makes any sense at all to speak of primary meaning any more.
Most cases, however, lie in between these two extremes. These symbols
have a core meaning; yet sometimes the actual meaning deviates from this
core. For instance, “cold” (I guess) is used most of the time to denote cold-
ness (i.e. in sentences like “I think it’s cold in this room”; “Yesterday it was
colder than it is today”, etc.), whereas sometimes it is used, given some
background conditions, in sentences that can express one’s wish to close
a window. It is not within the scope of a philosophical theory of meaning
to determine the core use properties of words.22 It is, however, philosoph-
21 Exceptions might prove the rule.
22 There are interesting ndings by, e.g., Bonini, Osherson, Viale & Williamson (1999) in the
context of vagueness about the exact demarcation line for applying “tall” to people. They
found out that native speakers of English tend to apply “tall” to people above 181.49 cm
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ically important to note that core use properties are not what constitutes
the meaning of words across all instances (as in Horwich’s account). Core
use properties are just a particular, surely important, subset of overall use
properties of a word. What is typically called ‘meaning’ is constituted by
the latter, i.e. determined by total use.
At present, it does not matter in which ‘register’ the core use proper-
ties are formulated. What is important is this: there is what I call a ‘ho-
mogeneous majority of uses’, e.g. the tokenings of “cold” used to refer to
coldness. However, this core use does not fully predetermine the meaning
of ‘non-literal’ uses. If the majority of uses of a term forms no theoretic-
ally prior class, then, you might ask, what is the reason for having such a
core at all? To put it simply, why is it that “dog” is almost always used to
refer to dogs, i.e. is used ‘literally’? Here I can oer no conclusive answer
but neither can truth-conditional semanticists. The likely explanation is
that this has something to do with speakers’ expectations. People typically
have successfully referred to dogs in the past by using “dog” (let’s suppose).
Their inclination to use “dog”, if they need to talk about dogs, is relatively
high—due to their past success in using “dog” and their expectations about
others.23 The fundamental reason why there is no theoretically important
dierence between core uses of “dog” and ‘deviant’ uses is that both can
equally well be described by paraphrasing particular uses in more famil-
iar terms (as described above). The fundamental dierence, again, between
“dog” and “alkaline phosphatase” is that the latter is used relatively seldom,
and, hence, the contexts in which speakers are able to expect particular re-
actions from their respective hearers by uttering this word are rare. This
explains why technical terms are used standardly most of the time. This is
not to say that there can’t be deviant uses. Here is a very simple example.
Suppose John is a chemist, Mary is a literary scholar.
of height. These results are astonishing, but their philosophical signicance is rather
marginal. What is relevant in the discussion about vagueness, and in philosophy of
language more generally, is whether, for any vague predicate, there is such a strict line
or not. (Some say Yes, some say No.) Where to draw this line is of no help, because it
does not explain anything of philosophical relevance.
23 This is, of course, basically Lewis’s (1969) story about how conventions get established.
See Millikan (2008) for some interesting remarks on how Lewis’s work ts in with the
basic ideas of CxG.
189
5 Theories of Truth & Meaning
John: Look here! I use alkaline phosphatase to make this liquid
start bubbling. Nice, innit?
Mary: Yeah, John, I also always use alkaline phosphatase to do
this.
Mary, let’s further suppose, means ‘I don’t understand a single word’, or
‘Whatever’, or some such. It does not matter; further information about the
context would tell. By assumption, she does not mean that she also uses
alkaline phosphatase, a fortiori she does not refer to alkaline phosphatase
by uttering “alkaline phosphatase”. Nor does the pragmatic meaning (e.g. ‘I
don’t understand what you’re saying’) derive its ‘content’ from the alleged
literal content of the words she is using. Much the same conversation could
have taken place if John had replaced “alkaline phosphatase” by a similar
term (similar with respect to its ‘sounds technical’ potential) that he just
made up. The truth conditions of both sentences would have been dier-
ent, but this does not matter in this context. Mary’s conveyed meaning
depends on her successfully mirroring the utterance of a technical term
that John understands and Mary does not. In order to convey the mean-
ing she de facto conveys, Mary does not need to presuppose that “alkaline
phosphatase” means ‘alkaline phosphatase’, nor does John need to assume
this. Pragmatic meaning is established as soon as the hearer (John) under-
stands what the speaker (Mary) wants him to understand (here: ‘I don’t
understand’). In the example, relevant contextual cues might be intona-
tion, information about Mary’s academic background, co-text, etc. The
literal content of the utterance, however, plays no role here in determining
pragmatic meaning. Hence, given certain circumstances, it is possible to
successfully convey a specic pragmatic meaning independently from any
assumption about literal content.
If I now try to delineate primary meaning from pragmatic meaning by
recurring to homogeneity, I immediately face the problem that—since there
are innitely many ways to individuate conversational contexts—all word
type instantiations are similar in at least some respects. This would make
it seem impossible to single out a homogeneous subset of instantiations
that could qualify as exemplifying primary meaning. That is, in fact, prob-
lematic for the current account, but only insofar as it is problematic for all
semantic theories. The distinction ‘literal/non-literal’ (like ‘primary/non-
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primary’) is merely presupposed in the literature, and I shall simply do the
same in what follows. When a theorist describes tokenings of words as
‘metaphorical’, ‘ironic’, ‘misapplication’, and so on, he is always presup-
posing the complementary set to these uses, i.e. the standard use—and that
the reader is able to recognise them as such. The situation is similar here:
I also presuppose such a distinction and I assume that the reader is able to
recognise it. For example, I assume that the reader is able to see that the
tokenings of “dog” that are used to talk about dogs form a homogeneous
majority of uses in that they are similar in respects that account for their
ability to refer to dogs and dissimilar in other respects. Therefore, relying
on pre-theoretic understanding in order to tell primary from non-primary
meaning seems unproblematic. This is less clear when it comes to another
controversial notion involved in the characterisation of “primary meaning”
given above: “instantiation”.
The alleged problem is that one can’t simply ‘count instantiations’. For
example, it is obviously the case that the conversational context is highly
relevant to what word/sentence type instantiations actually mean. Accord-
ingly, the worry would be here that it is unclear how much ‘context’ I as-
sume needs to be included in counting instantiations. If there were, say, 5
billion instantiations of the word type “dog” and in 4.7 billion cases the
tokenings referred to dogs, then I would arguably be committed to the
claim that the primary meaning of “dog” is that it is used to refer to dogs.
But this will not help, for I said above that language users derive primary
meaning on the basis of pragmatic meaning by identifying homogeneous
sets of instantiations. That is to say, the description of instantiations of
“dog” must necessarily include a description of those contextual features
that were relevant for the reference to dogs in 4.7 billion cases. Ultimately,
these features justify talk of homogeneity here. I think that this worry can
be relatively easily met. The relevant contextual features that need to be
included in ‘counting’ instantiations are simply those features an other-
wise competent speaker would consider when forming his dispositions to
apply a given term on the basis of what he learnt how the term functioned
in previous cases. In section 6.2.1, I will introduce the notion of ‘ideal dis-
positions’, i.e. that disposition a language user would arrive at if he were
familiar with all previous instantiations of a given word type. Thus, the
principle according to which contextual features need to be mentioned in
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a description of tokenings can be stated schematically: exactly those fea-
tures of conversational contexts of a given set of tokenings are relevant that
an otherwise competent language user would consider as being relevant in
deriving dispositions on the basis of familiarity with that set.
People sometimes remark that it can’t be actual tokenings/instantiations
of a word that constitute its meaning; one reason for this being that mean-
ing would be indeterminate a concept then. The present account is based
on just the opposite assumption: that it is actual use—more accurately, all
uses of a word taken together (specications, see below)—that determine
the semantic content of a word. That sounds counter-intuitive at rst but
has indeed some neat advantages over its rivals. Firstly, unrealised tokens
of “dog” have, or so one might argue, the same meaning as actual ones.
Accordingly, it is the type that has meaning, the instantiations of “dog”
have meaning qua being tokenings of that type. But this can’t be right
on a usage-based account of meaning,24 for if meaning is determined by
(or is) use, then the dispositional power of possible tokenings of “dog” to
mean ‘dog’ (or whatever) depends on the meaning (i.e. use) of actual “dog”
tokens. Metaphorically speaking, non-actual tokens are never used. The
same holds for types.
Secondly, the alleged disadvantage that meaning changes with every
new token of a word is, on closer examination, actually an advantage. It
allows me to say why meaning change over time (on diachronic scales)
occurs: because the instantiations of one word type in 1450, for example,
dier from its instantiations today. Furthermore, it allows me to say why
the meaning of one and the same term in dierent social groups, in dierent
registers, on dierent occasions, and so forth sometimes diers in meaning:
because actual tokenings of these words have occurred and still do occur
with systematic dierences relative to social groups and other factors.25 On
a related note, it explains why meaning is sometimes indeterminate within
a given group, when, due to a very limited number of actual instantiations
of a word type, no statistically relevant core has evolved yet.26
24 Assume for the sake of argument that the theoretical superiority of usage-based theories
has already been shown independently.
25 I return to this point in 6.2.1.
26 Example: the use of the verb “wulen” in German during the rst two months (or so)
after the beginning of the so-called ‘Wul aair’ in Germany in December 2011.
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Thirdly, the assumption that the meaning of a given word is constituted
by all its actual tokenings explains why “meaning” is such a vague no-
tion. I said that the standard use of a word is the homogeneous majority of
uses averaged over all uses, read: instantiations of that word type. No one
can know all tokenings of a word. Therefore, no one can know the exact
meaning of a word.27 That is how it is. Semantic theories that suggest oth-
erwise obscure matters. The clearest case is theories that (plus minus some
modication) identify meaning with reference. Meaning would be an easy
business if meaning were reference, since a term x either refers or it does
not, and x refers denitely either to y or to z but nothing in between. Un-
fortunately, meaning is not reference (as Frege, to name but one illustrious
name, already told us). Of course, one might base one’s semantic theory of
meaning on the notion of reference. But that is just replacing the problem-
atic term with a well-dened technical term.28 Such a clear-cut notion of
meaning is an illusion. A similar example would be Horwich’s capitalisa-
tion convention: up to the point where he needs to redeem the placeholder
in form of a capitalised word, the meaning of a word is, albeit vacuously,
nameable: e.g. “dog” means DOG. But this kind of technical elegance is ar-
ticial. The actual statement of acceptance properties that goes in for the
placeholder is not that clear-cut any more.29
27 To be sure, one can know the meaning of a just-coined word, or of names, or of technical
terms, and so on. That is, the exceptions that prove the rule are terms whose use is
signicantly restricted.
28 Note Davidson’s choice of words in this often-cited, crucial passage in ‘Truth and Mean-
ing’:
As a nal bold step, let us try treating the position occupied by ‘p’ [i.e. the
right-hand side of the T-schema] extensionally: to implement this, sweep
away the obscure ‘means that’, provide the sentence that replaces ‘p’ with
a proper sentential connective, and supply the description that replaces ‘s’
[accordingly, the left-hand side of the schema] with its own predicate. (1967,
309)
29 Acceptance properties are rst introduced in Horwich (1998, 94–96). An example—
already cited above—would be: ‘the explanatorily fundamental acceptance property un-
derlying our use of “red” is (roughly) the disposition to apply “red” to an observed sur-
face when and only when it is clearly red’ (Horwich 1998, 45). The dierence in terms
of technical rigour between this and “‘red’ means RED” should be obvious.
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These, then, are the reasons that speak in favour of my modied deni-
tion of “primary meaning”. In the following section, I shall use this den-
ition in order to argue against (the reconstruction of what I think is) David-
son’s argument for recursion. This argument operates on classically dened
primary meaning. Accordingly, by arguing against recursiveness I show
that one important reason for assuming classical primary meanings is un-
warranted.
5.1.3 Novelty Only Via Recursion
Accordingly, it is now time to return to the issues surrounding recurs-
iveness. In my short argument (re-)construction above, it was the third
premise that I said seemed dubious: the only way to comprehend sentences
of any length with nite means is via recursively dened rules. The em-
pirical data from a range of disciplines suggests otherwise. On the con-
trary, the data shows that very often language users are able to understand
sentences the meaning of which they can’t have determined on a ‘words
and rules’ basis.30 In philosophical terms, recursively dened rules operat-
ing on atomic semantic units can’t account for all cases of language users’
ability to comprehend sentences. At least sometimes they understand sen-
tences by dierent mechanisms, e.g. during language acquisition.
My argument against recursion is twofold. One main claim, to be de-
fended further below, is that communication is not itself a cooperative
activity—as most theorists assume—but instead a means to enable and foster
cooperative behaviour. This subtle dierence partially explains our ability
to understand other people’s utterances: because implicit agreement about
common goals is established previously and can be taken to be commonly
known (see below for details). The other main claim is that the ‘recursive
explanation’ is on the wrong track even in cases where, judging from the
knowledge about word meaning and syntax available to the subject, such
an explanation would accord with the evidence. In slogan form, sentence
comprehension goes top-down, not bottom-up.
For a start, this line of thought is partly motivated by holophrases and
frozen phrases. In these cases, children hear—and apparently understand—
30 For some general critical remarks on ‘words and rules’ approaches in semantics, see Ziem
& Lasch (2013, 90–95).
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utterances of sentences they have never heard before. The reason why they
are called ‘holophrases’ (as opposed to normal sentences that contingently
happen to consist of just one word) is that they are syntactically complex31
from the point of view of descriptive linguistics. Here is an example from
Tomasello (2003a, 38): “I-wanna-do-it!” Call this sentence β. If one looks
naïvely at at the data, one sees—simplifying a bit—the following situation.
A child understands β (all else equal). β is syntactically complex, i.e. its
overall meaning can be traced back to atomic meanings plus syntax. As
per the argument above, the child must have learnt the words and the rules
beforehand in order to be able to understand the sentence. Judging from
the available empirical evidence, this is not the case. Even more import-
ant, explaining the child’s abilities in terms of knowledge of syntax would
only be necessary if that were the only option. This is often assumed to
be indisputable (see especially Fodor). If, however, an alternative explan-
ation were indeed possible, then, without further ado, this would qualify
as the preferred explanation, for there is no independent evidence that the
assumed syntactical knowledge is available to children in advance (they
need to acquire their language rst).32
It is the aim of this section to establish such an alternative view. The
basic idea, supported by the cited evidence, is that the hearer of an ut-
terance infers the meaning of an uttered sentence from contextual factors
that are available to him. In this sense, a hearer knows the meaning of an
uttered sentence immediately—as soon as enough information is at hand.
What I would like to do now is this: by applying my own denition of
“primary meaning” to another group of cases that have been discussed
extensively by Davidson (malapropisms), I show that it is possible to ac-
count for sentence comprehension—the crucial factor in the argument for
31 Keep in mind that I am formulating this in a way that it would get formulated classically.
Whether a sentence that would be classied as syntactically complex counts as complex
in CxG as well, where dierent ‘rules’ probably apply, is unimportant in the present
context. Simply put, “syntactically complex” here means ‘syntactically complex from
most theoreticians’ point of view’.
32 To be sure, this claim concerning preferred explanation assumes that people typically
aspire for what is called ‘psychological reality’. If you are not primarily interested in
psychological reality, then the alternative does not qualify as the preferred option all
by itself. Note that ‘particular constructionist approaches dier in [. . . ] the degree of
emphasis on usage and psychological reality’ (Goldberg 2006, 18).
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recursiveness—without the assumption that words always in fact have their
conventional meaning. Malapropisms only serve as an example here. Other
examples would do just as well. The important point, though, is that if it
can be shown that sentence comprehension is independent from primary
meaning, then Davidson’s argument for recursiveness fails. This is because
it relies crucially on the assumption that sentence comprehension can only
be explained by means of recursion.
The philosophically interesting aspect of malapropisms is that language
users are able to comprehend sentences that involve unknown words, or
words, at least, that do not ‘t’ with the rest of a sentence or a whole con-
text.33 Example: “Er ist eine Konifere auf seinem Gebiet” (literally: ‘He
is a conifer in his subject’; likely interpretation: ‘He is an expert’, where
the German counterpart of “coryphaeus” is used to denote experts). The
classical, intuitively plausible, explanation is along the following lines: in a
given (average) context, saying that someone is a conifer in his area is non-
sense. A typical hearer would appreciate this. He would know that there
is a phonetically very similar word to “Konifere”: “Koryphäe”. Exchanging
the two words would render the utterance plausible. Therefore, the typical
hearer’s ‘passing theory’ (Davidson 1986) is that for the speaker the word
“Konifere” has the same meaning as has “Koryphäe” for him, the hearer.
Hence, the hearer infers that what the speaker meant was that someone is
an expert in his subject. That is the ‘classical’ view defended by Davidson
(1986). In promoting this view, Davidson seems to be motivated by pre-
serving the distinction between what he calls ‘rst meaning’ and conveyed
meaning.34 Without this distinction, one is confronted with the problem
of how a hearer can understand the utterance, if it is conceded that what
he understands is that some person or other is an expert. This problem is
especially pressing due to the fact that this ability is somehow parasitic on
the phonetic similarity between “Konifere” and “Koryphäe”.35
33 See also section 2.2.4, where I rst discuss malapropisms.
34 At least in his earlier account (e.g. his 1965 and 1967), “Er ist eine Konifere auf seinem
Gebiet” means that he is a conifer in his area.
35 I do not argue that, in general, phonetic similarity is a necessary prerequisite for re-
trieving the intended meaning in malapropisms. However, I would argue that in this
particular example, phonetic similarity undoubtedly is important.
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To state the alleged problem clearly: in the account advocated here,
“Konifere” in the example above means ‘Koryphäe’, i.e. is used as “Kory-
phäe” would be used in other contexts (as per Davidson’s framework) but
does not (contra Davidson) literally mean ‘Konifere’ in this context. How
is it that hearers are still able to understand the sentence in question? Be-
fore I proceed with an answer to this question, let me emphasise that in
this part of the overall argument I am not concerned with the plausibil-
ity of usage-based theories as such. Rather, I am only concerned with the
question as to whether there is a usage-based explanation to the problem
of malapropisms. Having said that, I admit that the solution will look very
similar to Davidson’s. In fact, the only signicant dierence is that it fore-
goes primary meaning and the distinction ‘prior/passing theory’. In the
example, “Konifere” is used like “Koryphäe” would be used in other con-
texts, which is uncontroversial. Meaning in use-based theories is use. In my
view, meaning is nothing over and above a paraphrase that allows other-
wise competent speakers to understand how the word in question (i.e. the
word for which a meaning statement is given) is used. A ‘legitimate’ such
paraphrase was just given. There is no need to posit reference relations.
But that is just one part of the explanation, as it is still unclear why the
hearer is able to understand “Konifere” in the sense of ‘expert’. Assume,
for the sake of argument, that Davidson’s explanation is correct in sup-
posing that the hearer’s inference exploits the phonetic similarities of the
two terms.36 Assume further that the semantic content that the speaker
wants to express is that what Davidson’s passing theory says, namely that
someone (‘he’) is an expert in his area.
It seems natural to suggest that the speakerwants to express this by saying
that he is an expert in his area. What he utters, though, is “Konifere”. There
are several possibilities why he might do this, most of which are mentioned
by Davidson himself. These reasons are irrelevant for present concerns.
The important point here is that the relevant explanations for how hearers
determine conveyed meaning do not presuppose a prior theory that would
involve knowledge of referential facts. My suggestion would be that we
36 The argument, though, does not depend on that assumption. Anyway, since the opposi-
tion’s argument works on that presumption, it seems likely that the opponent will not, at
least, argue against this part of the argument. Besides, as I said already, the assumption
looks undeniably plausible.
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only need to recur to expectations, i.e. knowledge of usage-based facts—a
suggestion that I have only briey hinted at in the above; I shall pick it up
again in 6.1.1.
5.2 Cooperative Contexts
At the core of the present chapter lies Davidson’s argument—especially in
Truth and Meaning—that the only way to make sense of the human ability
to understand unknown sentences is by way of recurring to knowledge of
recursively dened rules of composition. In the foregoing section, I argued
that Davidson’s premise that there is no viable alternative to this seems
unjustied. There are alternatives. One prominent alternative proposal is
to start investigating utterance comprehension by looking at the precon-
ditions that led to the development of human communication in the rst
place. Arguably, the most innovative and inuential proposal in this area
comes from Tomasello, who argues, roughly speaking, that the drive to
act cooperatively and achieve common goals is the key to understanding
human communication (i.e. language). In this view, language is primar-
ily a tool to foster success in language-independent areas. Utterance com-
prehension, therefore, must not be viewed independently of extralinguistic,
cooperative aims. Quite on the contrary, an appropriate basis for an explan-
ation of utterance comprehension is presumably the insight that—rst and
foremost—language users acknowledge that their respective interlocutors
try to achieve some common goal by means of using language. In other
words, the crucial step towards determining the meaning of a given utter-
ance is not to understand its underlying syntactic structure, but to under-
stand the extralinguistic aims that a given speaker is trying to achieve. In
the present section in general and in subsection 5.2.4 in particular, I discuss
some details of such an approach to language understanding.
5.2.1 Playing Unfair
In many cooperative contexts, utterance meaning can be ‘read o’, as it
were, from the relevant context. This is the basis of my claim that lan-
guage users immediately understand utterances of sentences if they are
otherwise competent. A natural response would be to say that all this
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presupposes genuine cooperative contexts. Imagine a scenario in which
a mother teaches colour terms to her daughter. In such a situation, a co-
operative context would require that the mother really aims at teaching her
daughter the colour terms ‘correctly’ (as she herself would use them). The
mother, however, could play foul and teach her child the terms in an ‘un-
conventional’ way. She could, for example, point to clearly yellow objects
and say “That’s blue” (assuming she correctly recognises yellow as yellow).
Would that alter the meaning of “blue” (as used by the child/as used by
the society)? Doesn’t this show that nothing in the proposed account en-
sures that language acquisition is successful? Doesn’t this presuppose that
everyone acts cooperatively? How can someone ‘immediately understand’
wrongly used sentences in the rst place?
I hope to clarify my account by answering these questions in turn. Firstly,
would ‘incorrect’ applications of “blue” by the mother alter the meaning of
the term? Yes and no. As used by the child, “blue” means ‘yellow’, be-
cause, by assumption, the child systematically learns to associate “blue”
with the property yellow. Relative to the society the child is part of (i.e. the
English-speaking community), the term “blue” is used to denote the col-
our blue (even by the mother). Relative to this reference class, the child is
simply an exception. Of course, one might argue about how many children
it would take to alter the meaning of “blue” with respect to societies, but let
us bracket this for the moment. Given that the child is the only exception,
“blue” means ‘blue’ relative to the society, even if uttered by the child.
Secondly, nothing in the proposed word-learning scenario ensures suc-
cessful language acquisition. That is how it is. Language acquisition nor-
mally is successful, to be sure. But to explain this fact is not necessarily
part of a theory of meaning. Even more importantly, most of the time
people do de facto act cooperatively—especially mothers teaching colour
terms to their children. Given this, a (framework for a) theory of mean-
ing that presupposes that language acquisition is successful, and that it is
successful due to the cooperative eorts of all language users is, ipso facto,
not an idealised framework relying on implausible assumptions. Rather, it
only relies on the assumption that, all else equal, people act cooperatively
in contexts of language acquisition. If the accusation is that, in this case,
the theory works only for the actual world, a reasonable reply seems to be:
a theory that works for the actual world—this is what I am aiming at.
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Thirdly, the account presented here is not entirely incompatible with
the Gricean idea that once the language system is in place, it is possible
to act ‘cooperatively’ in a merely linguistic sense. Every otherwise ab-
solutely uncooperative person could be ‘linguistically cooperative’ in this
sense. Consider the most uncooperative context you can think of; say, a
bank robbery. The robber says “Put the money in here!” (as is likely in
a bank robbery). “Over my dead body!” the bank assistant replies. Now,
this is clearly a quite uncooperative context, in the original sense of the
term. The respective (non-linguistic) aims of the robber and of the assistant
are incompatible. Linguistically, however, robber and assistant ‘cooperate’:
their communicative aims converge in that both want to be understood
and want to understand. The most reasonable step to take for the robber
in order to make clear that he wants the money is by uttering “Put the
money in here!” (or anything). Conversely, the assistant conrms to the
robber that his choice of words was appropriate (relative to his aims) in
this context. In Wittgenstein’s terms, they are playing the same language
games. They thereby strengthen (or entrench) the meanings of “to put”,
“money”, etc. Note that this line of reasoning does not necessarily require
that “money”, for example, conventionally means ‘money’. In other words,
it is not required that the assistant recognises the robber’s intent on the
basis of their alleged conventional meanings. Rather, “money” could mean
virtually anything (given particular contexts). It is just that in this con-
text, the overwhelmingly most plausible assumption is that by “money”
the robber indeed means ‘money’.
To take a less exciting example, consider a mother who is, in interaction
with her child, uncooperative most of the time by rejecting most of the
child’s wishes. The mother does not feed the child when it asks; she does
not hug the child when it wants to be hugged; and so on. The mother is, if
you like, perfectly uncooperative. From time to time, though, the mother
hugs the child, feeds it, and so on. Also, there are other people who regu-
larly take care of the child and behave in a more friendly manner towards
it. When the child asks its mother for something, most of the time the
mother replies “No!” The important point is that concerning the semantics
of “no”, the mother is absolutely cooperative. The child learns (not unlike
the bank robber) that the words (or actions) chosen to express its wishes
were appropriate, because the mother refuses to give what was asked for
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after uttering “no” (and the child’s ‘working hypothesis’ is that “no” means
’no’). Others full the child’s wishes after uttering “okay” (or whatever).
Thereby, the child learns that, for example, uttering “I want food” is an ap-
propriate strategy to ask for food, even in uncooperative contexts in which
request for food remains unsuccessful. Along the same lines, one can argue
that the child thereby learns that “no” means ‘no’ (i.e. is used to express re-
fusal of a request). Assuming that the child’s working hypothesis is that “I
want food” means ‘I want food’, it will notice the correlation between “no”
utterances and refusals—especially in uncooperative contexts. Generally,
it is hard not to be cooperative when it comes to semantics.
Fourthly, “to understand” is a success verb. An objection to the pro-
posal then would be: how can the child immediately understand “blue”, as
taught by her mother, given that “blue” actually means ‘blue’ (i.e. denotes
the colour blue)? The answer is quite simple: the child is successful, be-
cause in the envisaged situation (mother–child interaction) the linguistic
community consists, for the time being, of the mother and the child. Rel-
ative to the cues available for guring out the meaning of “blue”, the only
option for the child is to assume that it means ‘yellow’. In this situation,
“blue”, if uttered by the child, really means ‘yellow’, since the child uses it
this way and the mother understands her child accordingly. Still, it is un-
problematic that “blue” in the whole English-speaking community means
‘blue’. There are enough counterbalances in the form of other participants
in the language game that ensure that apparently ‘deviant’ uses would be
corrected. Those deviant uses that are not corrected accordingly are called
‘language change’.
5.2.2 Good and Bad Reasons for Primary Meanings
I have already mentioned some general concerns about classical concep-
tions of ‘primary meaning’ in the Introduction and in the previous chapter.
Taken together with my reservations voiced in this chapter, the picture
emerges that primary meaning in the classical sense of knowledge of ref-
erence relations seem to be poorly justied. However, it is important to
note that they are typically not merely postulated. Quite on the contrary,
they are very well motivated. Above I construed Davidson’s argument for
recursion as an indirect argument for primary meaning. I argued that it
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fails eventually, as its central premise (only recursion can explain sentence
comprehension) seems unjustied. Yet, the problem remains that primary
meaning can’t be simply abandoned but rather has to be replaced by an al-
ternative notion. It remains to be shown that my expectation-based altern-
ative possesses the right explanatory capacities. This is what I demonstrate
in this and the following two subsections.
If one were simply to abandon primary meaning without substitution,
the systematic success in using particular words if a particular interpreta-
tion is intended would remain obscure. In general, the alternative pro-
posal must be able to account for all systematic eects that rely on the
distinction between primary/non-primary meaning: e.g. metaphor, irony,
etc. For instance, the fact that people are (given a certain context) particu-
larly successful in evoking the interpretation ‘Please close the window!’ by
instantiating the sentence type “It’s cold in here” demands an explanation.
Gricean approaches suggest here that the potential of “It’s cold in here” to
mean ‘Close the window!’ is parasitic on its primary meaning ‘It’s cold
in here’. I argued above that it is possible to give an alternative explana-
tion. This alternative would necessarily involve a systematic regularity of
core meanings that can (potentially) be ascribed to the majority of uses,
all instantiations considered.37 This sounds more or less similar to clas-
sical (inferentialist) conceptions, since the meaning of “red”, for example,
would still be ‘red’ in most cases (i.e. in ‘standard contexts’). However, the
above argument shows that the assumption of reference relations and sat-
isfaction conditions is superuous in terms of the explanation. The same
eects in regard to malapropisms, irony, etc. can be explained by ‘primary
meanings’ that merely refer to ‘core use properties’ (Horwich 1998) instead
of reference.
The three most important features that dierentiate core use properties
from ordinary primary meanings are the following. Core use properties
are universally applicable. For instance, gestures commonly have a very
wide applicability with varying semantics in dierent contexts. The se-
mantic variety of gestures suggests that many gestures have virtually no
37 The proviso “potentially” covers the case for words that lack such a core meaning. The
meaning of such words can only be accounted for in terms of their conversational func-
tion; e.g. placeholders (“thing”), caring for social relations (“hello”), etc. I return to this
below.
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stable lexical meaning at all. In my framework, this can be accounted for
by the absence of any homogeneous majority of uses. Moreover, core use
properties are perfectly compatible with the fact that in many situations
people are able to infer the intended reading of an utterance without ac-
knowledging the alleged primary meaning rst. Lastly, core use properties
make it possible to explain why, in principle, any word can be used to mean
anything, given the correct context. At the same time, not all meanings (or,
more precisely, utterance interpretations) are equally probable. The prob-
ability for a word like “and” to be used as a conjunction is very high (though
not certain), because the ‘homogeneous majority of uses’ covers virtually
all instances.
The gist is this: there is place in semantic theories for a certain semantic
core in order to explain why word choice is often systematic, strict, and
successful. However, positing (ordinary) primary meanings in the sense
of semantic knowledge comprising reference relations is neither necessary
(as shown by core use properties) nor supported by the data (as shown,
for example, by frozen phrases). This concludes my discussion of primary
meaning. I now return to the overarching topic of the present chapter:
sentence comprehension. Before I discuss compositionality in the context
of CxG frameworks in 5.2.4, I very briey make sure that we are all on the
same page regarding compositionality as such.
5.2.3 A Very Brief Overview of Compositionality
Compositionality is one of the most central concepts in philosophy of lan-
guage. For obvious reasons my discussion of compositionality will be rather
brief. I just want to make sure that my background assumptions concern-
ing compositionality are suciently transparent. Especially because, in
the next chapter, I shall say a few words on recursion, which is an issue
that is tightly linked with compositionality. Moreover, since this whole
book is more or less in favour of construction grammar and construction
grammar is sometimes characterised as being partly non-compositional, I
need to clarify the relationship between CxG and compositionality as well.
Good overview articles are (Gendler Szabó 2012b) and Pagin & Westerståhl
(2010a). The standard textbook on compositionality is Werning, Hinzen &
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Machery (2012).38 A comprehensive collection of some rather tentative
articles on this topic is Fodor & Lepore (2002).
As a rst approximation, compositionality is an alleged feature of natural
languages that posits that the meaning of a complex expression is determ-
ined by the meanings associated with its syntactical constituents (lexical
meaning) and the way these are put together (syntactic composition). This
approximation is more than sucient for present purposes. To say the
least, more rigorously dened formulations of the principle will be vari-
ants of this approximation, i.e. the basic idea is always the same. When it
comes to compositionality, there are some subtle dierences between lin-
guistics and philosophy. For instance, non-compositionality (e.g. idioms)
is an area that is widely neglected in philosophical areas, whereas it plays
a crucial role in linguistics. On the other hand, philosophers are concerned
with issues such as reverse compositionality,39 which, in turn, is a topic
that seems less prominent in linguistic circles.
In section 5.1.2, in which I presented my reconstruction of Davidson’s
argument regarding utterance/sentence comprehension, I mostly talked
about recursiveness. I assume that the connection to compositionality is re-
latively obvious: the ‘recursively dened rules’ discussed there make sense
only if they are understood as ‘rules of composition’ that take atomic mean-
ing as input and give complex meaning as output. Recursiveness per se
is comparatively uninteresting in the context of language comprehension.
So, although recursiveness and compositionality should not be identied,
there is still ample reason to discuss them together here.
From the point of view of CxG, the most relevant objection in the context
of compositionality is that, in general, usage-based approaches are said to
be unable to incorporate compositionality into their respective frameworks
(Fodor & Lepore 2002). For instance, Fodor & Lepore (1991, 334) claim that:
It turns out that compositionality is an embarrassment for the
kind of New Testament semantics [conceptual role semantics
à la Block 1986] that identies the meaning of an expression
with its inferential role. In particular, it invites the following
kind of prima facie argument:
38 See also Werning (2005).
39 Johnson (2006), Patterson (2005), Robbins (2005).
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• meanings are compositional
• but inferential roles are not compositional
• so meanings can’t be inferential roles.
Conceptual role semantics exemplarily represents usage-based approaches
here; the structure of the argument may easily be adopted to construe ob-
jections against related theories (cf. Fodor & Lepore 2002). Hence, the un-
derlying concern is that usage-based approaches in general lack the re-
sources to account for compositionality. In contrast, it is, as I have shown,
quite easy to incorporate compositionality in truth-conditional semantics
(or, for that matter, any other framework based on reference relations).
So, if denying compositionality is not a viable option, one would need to
show that usage-based approaches can indeed be construed composition-
ally. This, I take it, is beyond the scope of this book project. At this point,
I refer the interested reader to Horwich (1998, ch. 7). There, Horwich con-
vincingly shows that the compositionality principle is compatible with just
any kind of property that could possibly constitute meaning (e.g. some kind
of use property). In general, the framework he proposes takes the following
form:
Consider an arbitrary complex expression “e”, and suppose that
it is constructed by combining certain primitive terms (some
of which are schemata) in a certain order. That is,
“e” is the result of applying combinatorial proced-
ure P to the primitives 〈“w1”, . . . , “wn”〉
My proposal is that the meaning property of “e”—namely, ‘x
means E’—is constituted by the construction property
x results from applying procedure P to primitives
whose meanings are 〈 W 1, . . . ,Wn〉
(where W 1 is the meaning of “w1”, etc.). Assuming this consti-
tution thesis, it is clear how [. . . ] we can explain why “e” means
what it does from the facts about what its primitive constitu-
ents mean and from the fact about how it is constructed from
those primitives. (Horwich 1998, 158)
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There is thus good reason to suppose that the general concern directed
against usage-based theories that they can’t incorporate compositionality
is de facto unjustied. In the following subsection (5.2.4), I shall strengthen
this position by arguing that, since usage-based approaches oer the only
plausible theory about what it means to acquire knowledge of rules of com-
position, there is some plausibility in the claim that this kind of knowledge,
in turn, is essentially associated with use.
5.2.4 Sentence Comprehension & CxG
Construction grammar in general and Tomasello’s theory of language ac-
quisition in particular take for granted that sentence comprehension works
fundamentally dierently than assumed in many established philosophical
theories of meaning. Just to remind you of the background of the discus-
sion above concerning recursion: Davidson repeatedly claims that one im-
portant, if not the major phenomenon regarding language is that people
understand innitely many well-formed sentences. This is one major ar-
gument in favour of truth-conditional semantics. Given my criticism of
this argument in 5.1.2, it makes sense to now take a look at what we are
getting at with use oriented approaches with respect to the Novelty issue.
The starting premise is: given some background conditions (memory,
cognitive resources, mastery of a language, etc.), language users are able
to understand any utterance of a well-formed sentence they have never
heard before. From a philosophical point of view, the problem is not to
nd an explanation for this. The explanations are legion in the empirical
literature, especially in the work done and inspired by Michael Tomasello.
Rather, the actual problem is that virtually no existing philosophical theory
of meaning seems to be compatible with Tomasello’s theoretical frame-
work, or, in fact, with construction grammar in general. I aim to show that
the framework that evolves throughout this book ts nicely with what I call
the Tomasellian paradigm. Accordingly, it is essential to briey introduce
the basic ideas of this framework here. This is what I would like to turn to
now. I concentrate on the bits of the theory that are particularly relevant
for philosophical theories of meaning, especially on recursiveness.
Fundamentally, the empirical data suggests that philosophers have been
wrong in assuming that a certain set of capacities must explain the ability
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to comprehend novel sentences. The alternative is to take just the opposite
direction. In other words: people rst are able to understand novel sen-
tences; then, later on in their psychological development, they acquire the
capacities that classically have been reckoned to be responsible for this
ability (e.g. knowledge concerning composition rules). Besides being able
to comprehend novel sentences, people surely are also able to state the
composition rules according to which the semantics of a sentence can be
computed from the semantics of its constituents (or, alternatively, they
know these ‘rules’ implicitly). It therefore seems natural to assume that
the very same ability might account for the ability to understand novel
sentences, if combined with appropriate lexical knowledge. This simple
picture is no longer tenable in light of the increasing success of construc-
tion grammar, which is a movement of which Tomasello’s work is an in-
tegral part (Ibbotson, Theakston, Lieven & Tomasello 2012). People do in
fact know (if only implicitly) the ways in which the meaning (or semantic
value) of a sentence depends upon the meaning of its parts (or their re-
spective values). From an empirical point of view, though, this knowledge
is posterior to their ability to comprehend sentences (Tomasello 2003a). Ac-
cordingly, one step towards an empirically informed philosophical theory
of meaning is to solve the Novelty problem independently of composition
rules. Interestingly enough, this leaves explanations of compositionality
mostly unaected, as I shall demonstrate later on.
It is a fact that young children understand sentences. From their ability
to understand sentences with unknown words one can infer that sentence
comprehension at least sometimes does not rely on knowledge about com-
position rules. For the latter require that one is familiar with the words
‘stuck into’ those rules. Hence, something else must account for it. In
Tomasello’s account, it is the children’s mindreading abilities—more spe-
cically, their ability to recognise intentions—that account for their ability
to understand sentences. Here’s Tomasello’s own summary:
The evolutionary adaptation for understanding others as in-
tentional agents like the self becomes manifest in human on-
togeny today at around 9–12 months of age. [. . .A]t around
their rst birthdays infants become able to:
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• establish with adults various joint attentional frames that
create a common intersubjective ground for communic-
ation;
• within these frames, understand communicative intentions
as they are expressed in utterances; and
• engage in role reversal imitation to acquire symbolic con-
ventions rst used toward them in these frames. (2003a,
40–41)
Davidson’s theory is a very straightforward explanation for how people
(children) comprehend complex expressions. If one takes for granted that
the meaning of sentences is indeed determined compositionally, then it is
hard to believe that children, who lack this knowledge, can understand
these sentences. Two things help here. Firstly, compositionality is an as-
pect of language that can be accounted for within a constructional frame-
work. I will come back to this in a minute. Secondly, compositionality as
such, as already indicated in 4.1.2, is not a genuine phenomenon that ex-
ists in the real world. Rather, it might be an artefact of how professional
linguists describe certain things like utterances. In any case, it is in fact
possible to account for Novelty without taking the route via composition-
ality.
It is quite unproblematic to determine when people understand an utter-
ance. It manifests in their behaviour, including their verbal and non-verbal
behaviour. In contrast, it is relatively hard to argue that the available lin-
guistic evidence suggests that language is compositional (ignoring formal
language). The fact that (at least parts of) natural languages can be de-
scribed compositionally does not make them so. Regarding understanding,
there does not seem to be an analogue to this. If a person’s behaviour is
such that one would describe that person as understanding a specic thing,
then there is no other evidence that could possibly undermine that claim
(save for further behavioural evidence). Whereas in the case of composi-
tionality, there might be such evidence. For example, if it is possible to ‘lin-
guistically’ characterise a language as compositional, then there could still
be psychological evidence that might suggest otherwise; e.g. if the com-
position rules thus posited do not t with what we know about what com-
petent speakers are in fact able to know.
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Bearing this in mind, the constructional language acquisition story does
not look that mysterious any more. It is obviously the case that children at
a certain age understand utterances. Explaining this in terms of composi-
tion rules is just one option among a variety of alternatives. The construc-
tionalist explains understanding in terms of mindreading (this, at least, is
what Tomasello does). Children develop the crucial capacities for language
comprehension a few months before their rst birthday (see above quote);
at around their rst birthday they understand rst utterances (Tomasello
2003a). An important piece of evidence in favour of this view is that they
seem to regard some complex sentences as unanalysable units, whereas
they are still able to comprehend its content. Another, more philosoph-
ically minded reason is that in order to learn the meaning of words, chil-
dren must rst understand them in sentential (and situational) contexts.
One reason for this is that they seldom hear individual words in isola-
tion but rather almost always embedded in sentences, i.e. as parts of ut-
terances. It takes them some time to ‘isolate’ words in sentences, and they
use quite sophisticated methods to do this: among them information about
typical distributional patterns of phonology; information about the sound
of known words; information about intonation and emphasis (Tomasello
2003a, ch. 3). They utilise prior semantic knowledge in order to nar-
row down the possibilities of the semantics of unknown words (Ferguson
et al. 2014).40 Being confronted with whole utterances, a child’s rst task is
therefore to determine the meaning of sentences (in contexts). According
to the theoretical framework relied upon here, this is tantamount to saying
that, to a large extent, nding out about the type-level meanings of words
involves determining the intentions of communicative partners rst.
Compositionality ts in nicely with this view of language. First of all, if
natural languages really are compositional, this does not by itself require
language users to be familiar with composition rules in order to determine
the meaning of complex expressions. Their competency in understanding
new sentences might still rely primarily on their intention-reading skills.
Moreover, compositionality is built into the Tomasellian account of lan-
guage acquisition in two ways: (i) it explains how language learners ac-
40 Cf. also the vast literature on bootstrapping: e.g. Gleitman (1990), Pinker (1994), and,
relatedly, Steels & Kaplan (2002).
209
5 Theories of Truth & Meaning
quire composition rules, and (ii) it is perfectly compatible with the view
that once competent speakers have successfully acquired those rules, they
then, of course, use them both for comprehension and for production.
Ad (i): As a psychologist, Tomasello is highly interested in aiming at
‘psychologically real’ descriptions, i.e. descriptions that do not merely make
sense of a certain phenomenon but which pick out real cognitive capacities
of speaker-hearers. He thus argues ardently against approaches that assign
meaning to atomic constituents and conceive of compositionality as func-
tions from these semantic atoms to complex units. His general worry is
that
[. . . ] formal linguistic approaches [. . . ] characterize natural
languages in terms of formal languages, using as basic theor-
etical primitives meaningless algebraic rules and meaningful
linguistic elements that serve as variables in the rules. [. . . F]or
usage-based theorists the fundamental reality of language is
people making utterances to one another on particular occa-
sion of use. When people repeatedly use the same particular
and concrete linguistic symbols to make utterances to one an-
other in “similar” situations, what may emerge over time is
a pattern of language use, schematized in the minds of users
[. . . ]. (2003a, 98–99)
Hence, my above claim that the Tomasellian paradigm can explain how
language users acquire the relevant rules of composition seems, strictly
speaking, wrong. At least, that is, if it is understood as referring to the
very same kind of rules, i.e. otherwise meaningless rules that have meaning
only in virtue of mapping simple (or simpler) semantic units onto complex
(or more complex) semantic complexes. For our present concerns, though,
the slightly more interesting aspect is whether ‘rules of composition’ in
general t with Tomasello’s framework. And here the answer is a clear
‘Yes’. Thus,
[The] construction grammar perspective provides a more plaus-
ible account of the interaction between the concrete and the
abstract [e.g. syntactic construction] in language development—
because it focuses on abstractions across whole utterances—than
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does a lexical rules approach in which all depends on the mean-
ing of the particular verbs involved [. . . ]. The current proposal
[of how children construct abstract constructions] is that they
do this using the pattern-nding skill of analogy, which ba-
sically categorizes together complex wholes on the basis of
commonalities in their relational structures. It is very import-
ant to emphasize that abstract analogies—for example between
two structures that have no elements in common—can only be
drawn if children use their intention-reading skills to discern
the function of those elements in the larger structure. It is only
by doing this that children may align the elements that corres-
pond to one another—the elements that do the same commu-
nicative job—across the two structures [. . . ]. (Tomasello 2003a,
193, my italics)
So, Tomasello is absolutely ne with a semantic theory that postulates re-
cursively dened rules, or, generally, rules of composition. For these simply
fall under the heading ‘abstract construction’. The thing is, though, that
the mechanisms that, according to him, underlie the acquisition of syn-
tactic constructions are radically dierent to mechanisms compatible with
TCS such as innateness. As the above quotation demonstrates, Tomasello
conceives of language development as essentially token-based, abstraction-
based, and—most crucially—intention-based. Syntactic constructions (i.e.
the ‘rules of composition’ in CxG) are learnt only on the basis of under-
standing in particular instances of their application how they work, which
involves being able to attribute appropriate intentions to one’s respective
interlocutors.
Ad (ii): Thus, intention-reading is a possibility for children (or language
users generally) to circumvent the problem of determining the content of
utterances at stages of their development at which they lack relevant know-
ledge of word meaning and formal rules of composition. Over time, chil-
dren’s knowledge of constructions increases, including knowledge about
syntactical constructions. Syntactical constructions are, in a way, the com-
ponent of construction grammar that corresponds to syntactical rules in
more classical grammar theories. Eventually, these rules determine the
way in which the semantic value of a particular sentence structurally de-
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pends on the semantic values of the atomic sentential parts. ‘Like words,
constructions are symbolic entities in which a particular meaning or func-
tion is mapped onto a particular form (i.e., a particular conguration of
structural and/or lexical elements)’ (Diessel 2013, 349). Many relevant fea-
tures of compositionality can be covered in construction grammar by simply
incorporating them into (or equating them with) syntactic constructions.41
Here is an example that illustrates this:
Consider the sentence What did Michael send Miriam?, which
involves the combination of a number of dierent construc-
tions; rst, each of the ve words are constructions; then there
are the VP construction, the NP construction, a Subject-Au-
xiliary Inversion construction, the wh-construction, and the
Ditransitive construction. [. . .W]hile the VP and the NP Con-
structions combine larger phrases out of individual words (con-
structions), the wh-construction licenses the argument of the
verbwhat in sentence-initial position, and the Ditransitive con-
struction is understood to encode the grammatical relations by
pairing a particular form/function with a particular meaning.
(Boas 2013, 240–241)
When it comes to meaning, the explanatory ‘dead end’ in a broadly To-
masellian framework of language comprehension is intention-reading, i.e.
the basis for explanations in the area of semantics (pragmatics) would be
the observation that infant humans have the ability to attribute intentional
states to their (prospective) interlocutors. In this respect, Tomasello’s work
41 I formulate this cautiously because compositionality plays a dierent role in construction
grammar than it plays in other theories. Firstly, language is not fully compositional ac-
cording to construction grammar (Ziem & Lasch 2013). Secondly, in Goldberg’s rst for-
mulation (Goldberg 1995, 4) non-compositionality is employed as a feature that singles
out constructions (cf. also section 2.2):
According to Construction Grammar, a distinct construction is dened to
exist if one or more of its properties are not strictly predictable from the
knowledge of other constructions existing in the grammar.
This denition is widened in more recent publications as to cover constructions that are
thus predictable but which at the same time are suciently entrenched, i.e. used regularly
and invariably.
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is theoretically on a par with, for example, Davidsonian accounts that see
meaning rooted in reference and truth conditions (which are also explan-
atory dead ends in their semantic frameworks). Neither account is itself
an ‘ultimate’ explanation of the semantics of sentences: both explanations
again call for further explanation in related research areas. I now briey
summarise what I think are the three main reasons for questioning the
Davidsonian framework in this context.
Firstly, Davidson (like his adherents) has no developmental story to tell
about how children learn the prerequisites necessary to determine senten-
tial truth conditions (i.e. meaning). It seems implausible to assume that
they have an inborn interest in learning reference relations (e.g. that “dog”
refers to dogs). Secondly, even if they had such an interest—which is un-
likely since ‘referential knowledge’ as such is of no help to them—it prob-
ably would be fostered by their actual, underlying interest in understand-
ing others (in which case we are back where we started). Besides, although
Davidson’s main motivation for truth-conditional semantics, mentioned
repeatedly in his work, is a psychological fact, he is never explicit about
claims concerning what is commonly called ‘psychological reality’, i.e. the
status that knowledge about reference has remains unclear. Lastly, the
only possible way for children to learn facts regarding reference and rules
of composition is via utterances, since these are the only data available to
start with. In other words, abstract types can, with nomological necessity,
only be learnt on the basis of context-bound tokenings of that type, which,
again, derive their semantic values not just from formally speciable ‘con-
texts of utterance’ (time, place, speaker), but also essentially from contex-
tual factors beyond the reach of formal theories (world knowledge, inten-
tion ascriptions, common ground, etc.).42 But, from a Davidsonian per-
spective, it is exactly the other way around—for which case, however, there
is no plausible developmental story. Assuming that knowledge about refer-
ence and rules of composition is not innate, a Davidsonian theory of mean-
ing looks pretty much unlearnable.
I should say a few words about why it is particularly easy to decide
whether a person understands, whereas it is relatively problematic to ar-
gue for compositionality (/recursiveness) as the underlying cause of under-
42 See also section 7.2.2.
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standing. In philosophy, “understanding” is sometimes used as a technical
term. In that case it is understood as a counterpart to “explaining”, emphas-
ising the dierence between the two. I bracket this discussion here. For
present purposes, ‘understanding’ is simply a certain ability, a knowledge-
how.43 It is the ability to show appropriate behavioural responses to spe-
cic situations. In linguistic contexts, these responses paradigmatically in-
clude verbal behaviour, e.g., answering questions in a certain way.44 Al-
though verbal behaviour is indeed important in some context, the ulti-
mate mark of correctness for understanding is overall behaviour. Gener-
ally, overall behaviour is the mark of correctness in any social ascription
practice. If, for example, a caregiver says to her child “Please give me the
red ball!”, and the child responds by giving the red ball to the caregiver,
then it seems reasonable—all things considered—to assume that the child
understood the command (maybe after the child repeatedly showed struc-
turally alike behavioural patterns in similar situations). So, understanding
is quite straightforwardly ascribable. Note that an attribution of under-
standing is always revisable only on the basis of new evidence. In the case of
the child, evidence might be that you nd out that she gave back the red
ball by chance (she would have given just any ball in the vicinity).
The gist is this: revising the attribution of understanding requires fur-
ther evidence. This is dierent when it comes to recursion. The classical
(Davidsonian) explanation for why children can, in principle, understand
“Please give me the red ball!” is because this sentence consists of individual
words, which have their own meaning (e.g. “ball” refers to balls, “x is red” is
satised i x is red, etc.). These words are put together in such a way that
there is a corresponding set of recursively dened syntactic rules which
compute the semantic value of the whole sentence based on the semantic
values of its constituents. This is, from the (neo-)Davidsonian point of view,
a plausible explanation for understanding. As opposed to understanding,
43 The following explanations demand certain charity on the reader’s side. I shall keep
the examples short, and therefore omit some more or less obvious niceties. The same
holds for my characterisation of “understanding”, which involves the notoriously vague
notion “appropriate”. I think, though, that the examples are suciently clear to get the
basic idea. For ‘knowledge-how’, cf. Jung & Newen (2010).
44 Cf. Gibbs (2002, 2005), Gibbs & Perlman (2010), Gibbs & Tendahl (2006), Nicolle & Clark
(1999), and Noveck & Sperber (2007).
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however, recursiveness is not warranted by the observable phenomena as
such. That is, an attribution of knowledge of recursive rules can be revised
without further evidence45. This concession was already implicit in David-
son’s own formulation of the argument: he construed it as an inference to
the best explanation based on the assumption that no other solution to the
Novelty problem was available apart from his own (see especially Learnable
Languages).
So, Davidson’s argument in favour of recursiveness is threatened from
two ends. Firstly, his ‘only game in town’ assumption seems rather dubious
(see section 5.1.3). Secondly, not only is there a relevant alternative; this
alternative even seems to be the only serious contender. This is because,
simply put, from a developmental perspective, children must acquire their
mastery of a particular language on the basis of their prior ability to under-
stand utterances, the constituents of which they did not know in advance
(see above). Therefore, if we require of a philosophical theory of meaning
that it should either involve a plausible developmental account, or, altern-
atively, be at least compatible with current such accounts, then Davidson’s
theory seems seriously threatened. The broader theoretical background
that inspires my own approach to semantics, which I pursue in this book,
is construction grammar. Tomasello’s ideas do not really need to be shown
to be compatible with CxG; they are part of the CxG movement. Hence,
this part of motivating a particular theory of meaning—i.e. by showing that
it is compatible with an established theory of language acquisition—can be
dropped. Accordingly, my emphasis in this chapter was on undermining
Davidson’s claim that TCS is particularly likely to account for human cap-
abilities of successful sentence comprehension. Rather, I argued, it is just
the other way around: a plausible developmental theory starts with the
assumption that children lack the abilities suggested by Davidson. They
then continuously acquire semantic knowledge by rst understanding ut-
terances. The basic mechanism that they presumably employ is abstrac-
tion. The alleged semantic knowledge postulated by TCS (especially refer-
ence) comes into play at the end of language acquisition, if at all.
45 I mean ‘data’ in the narrow sense of the term. Metaphorically speaking, armchair reas-
oning might count as one’s ‘new evidence’ here.
215

6 Dispositional Analyses
Now that I have discussed language acquisition at length it is time to re-
turn to the core topic of this book: meaning. In this chapter, I indicate the
rough outline of what I think an empirically validated theory of meaning
in philosophy might look like. The starting point will be a brief return to
primary meanings (in 6.1) and the role they play within the framework that
I develop here. The major part of this chapter, then, is section 6.2. There,
I will be piggybacking on Paul Horwich’s idea to spell out the (relatively
empty) claim that meaning is use by means of dispositional analyses. I
think that this is exactly the right strategy to be dealing with use prop-
erties, i.e. the right strategy to counter the problem that constitutive use
properties must eventually be identied with something else. Otherwise,
there would be no ‘access’, as it were, to those use properties. In other
words, if I only say that meaning is use without providing a corresponding
method of stating the relevant use properties, I would be making a possibly
true, but uninteresting claim. Associating use properties with something
else (here: acceptance properties) provides an opportunity to evaluate the
thesis in the rst place.
Given a usage-based approach to meaning, dispositional analysis is with-
out any alternative. However, I think that identifying use properties with
acceptance properties is a mistake, as it easily leads to the impression that
only truth-evaluable content can have meaning. One can’t plausibly accept,
for instance, sentences like “Hi there!” So, if one goes for a usage-based
account that is supposed to be universally applicable to all areas of natural
languages, one should indeed pursue dispositional analyses, but without
the unnecessary constraint that all meaningful units have to be analysed
with recourse to acceptance. This is what I will be proposing in the second
half of this chapter.
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6.1 The Role of the Refined Notion of Primary
Meaning
The paradox that I discussed in the previous chapter was this: there are
good arguments against classically dened primary meanings; yet, a se-
mantic theory that simply does away with primary meaning (and, thereby,
the literality/non-literality distinction) seems highly implausible. As I have
shown, one needs ‘something like’ ordinary primary meanings in order to
account for such systematic eects as irony. Accordingly, I proposed—in
5.1.2—a rened denition of “primary meaning” that is acceptable from
the point of view of CxG and usage-based approaches more generally, but
which at the same time can be utilised in explaining literal/non-literal ef-
fects. There is some similarity between my ‘primary meanings’ and Hor-
wich’s ‘core use properties’, which are those ‘explanatory basic properties’
(Horwich 1998, 60) that account for the overall use of a term. The basic idea
in both cases is that there must be some suciently general description of
the meaning of a given term that can capture how this term gets employed,
all things considered. This section is about how primary meanings gure
in my own theoretic framework.
6.1.1 Again, The Case of Malapropisms
The core of the classical Davidsonian strategy of explaining the inferential
mechanisms involved in processing malapropisms can be kept in my the-
ory framework. Instead of truth-conditional knowledge (concerning ref-
erential relations), the current proposal is based on expectations. But the
overall strategy is still pretty similar to Davidson’s, i.e. starting from (the
equivalent to) primary meaning, it ends with the very same ‘pragmatic
meaning’. For example, my proposal allows that one’s ability to interpret
a particular instance of “conifer” in terms of ‘coryphaeus’ is at least partly
rooted in semantic knowledge regarding “conifer”, that is, knowledge re-
garding ‘literal’ meaning. An obvious worry in light of these similarities
concerns my original motivation for giving up truth-referential meaning
in the rst place. In the new framework, the inferential process requires,
or so it seems, that its basis is primary meaning again: only expectations
concerning primary meaning can go wrong. I shall rst explain briey why
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this worry is unjustied. Following this, I shall point out why the proposed
framework fares better with respect to meaningless expressions.
The problem, discussed in 5.1.3, was this: in order for the inferential
process to get o the ground, it is necessary that there are expectations
about the use of the ‘wrong’ word, for example, “Konifere”. However, one
argument against TCS is that there are words whose meaning is such that
it can’t be explained by reference or by reference analogues such as sat-
isfaction. Most obviously, this holds for classes of words that can only be
semantically characterised by acknowledging their specic conversational
function: e.g. “hello”. Then there are also words that lack meaning entirely,
which, however, are still ‘comprehensible’. For instance, there are cases
in which malapropisms involve meaningless words, as Davidson himself
notes with respect to Lewis Caroll’s Jabberwocky. For conceptual reasons,
people can’t have any expectations about how these words might be used.
By assumption, meaningless expressions are such that people did not use
them before. To be sure, it may be that people are able to identify similarit-
ies between meaningless expressions and meaningful counterparts. For in-
stance, they might identify certain phonetic similarities; cf. “galumphing”
(a term coined by Caroll) vs “gallop” and “triumphant”.1 But if they do, they
derive expectations concerning those meaningless expressions from their
prior expectations concerning the meaningful counterparts. In any case,
given that meaninglessness here can reasonably be equated with absence
of prior use, there is nothing from which expectations possibly could have
emerged.
The solution to this is simply this: the alternative proposal allows us
to keep Davidson’s machinery to a large extent; but this does not imply
that understanding of malapropisms must always be inferential. The only
thing I wanted to demonstrate above was that if sometimes understanding
malapropisms involves inferences concerning, among other things, phon-
etic similarities between words, then this fact can be accounted for within
the proposed framework. But often understanding is non-inferential or, at
least, does not involve inferences concerning false expectations. Indeed,
1 Cf. the Wikipedia entry on Jabberwocky, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Jabberwocky\#Possible\_interpretations\_of\_words, accessed
on: 25/03/2014.
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“Er ist eine Konifere auf seinem Gebiet” is quite a good example in this re-
gard, since many people have no idea what a ‘Konifere’/‘conifer’ is. And
by this I do not mean that they are not familiar with the scientic deni-
tion. Many people do not know that a conifer is, for example, some kind of
tree. To put it another way, they form no expectations whatsoever about
how “conifer” might be used. Hence, if someone uses the term, their ex-
pectations can’t be false. Still, many people understand (utterances of) the
relevant sentence perfectly well.2 This means that the intended interpreta-
tion (‘expert’) must be directly available to otherwise competent language
users. In fact, this is what I want to argue for. People are able to imme-
diately understand utterances, without necessarily considering ‘literal’ in-
terpretations rst.
That something roughly along these linesmust be correct is evident from
the facts. If people who, by assumption, do not understand “Konifere” indi-
vidually are able to understand “Er ist eine Konifere auf seinem Gebiet”
(call this sentence “α”), then inferences operating on the primary meaning
(of “Konifere”) can’t be in play here. I claim that hearers immediately un-
derstand whole utterances, even if they are unfamiliar with certain ‘parts’
of it, because they engage in common cooperative activities with their in-
terlocutors, and communication is one of the means they employ in ex-
ecuting these activities. In a typical situation, a speaker who utters α tries
to convey the information that a particular person (‘he’) is an expert. The
hearer, of course, uses all available information to gure out whatαmeans.
Most importantly, in a typical situation he would know (i) that the speaker
intends to ascribe a ‘positive’ attribute to the person referred to by the pro-
noun “he”;3 (ii) that the construction “Er ist eine ___ auf seinem Gebiet”
means that he is a(n) ___ in his area; and (iii) that, from the context of the
preceding conversation, ‘he’ must be an expert in his area.
The third condition says, in eect, that a hearer already expects some-
thing like the intended interpretation. Bearing the following considera-
2 To be sure, this is an empirical claim that can’t be justied entirely in the current context.
However, I take it that, irrespective of the particular example, this phenomenon is com-
mon enough so that the reader is able to come up with examples that work analogously.
3 For instance, the speaker might employ an intonational pattern that suggests that a “Kon-
ifere” must be something positive. Also, the rest of the overall conversational context
might exclusively support this conclusion. And so on.
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tions in mind, this does not seem too implausible. Keep in mind that utter-
ances are always embedded in contexts. If the context is ‘poor’, i.e. if, for
example, a speaker starts a conversation by saying “He is a conifer in his
area” (to someone who does not understand “conifer”), the context oers
little evidence as to what this could mean. That is true but not in conict
with my proposal, for it is equally true in such a case that, for the hearer,
the intended interpretation is hard to grasp (if not impossible). If, on the
other hand, the context is ‘rich’, it would entail more information that the
hearer could exploit in guring out the intended reading. For instance, α
might be embedded in a larger conversational context:
Adam, you know, is a philosopher. He knows a whole lot about
the meaning of life, about just societies, and about the ethical
implications of animal experiments. He has written two books
and forty-seven articles. Man, he’s great. He is a conifer in his
area. For real.
In this situation, one may reasonably assume that (i)–(iii) (or some reas-
onably similar conditions) are fullled and that the hearer is able to gure
out the meaning (‘expert’) on this basis alone. In general, the overall con-
text cuts down—for speakers and hearers alike—the range of possible inter-
pretations of utterances. One might argue that the highlighted information
in (iii) is chosen arbitrarily (by me as an informed theoretician), and that
there are many more bits of information available in the abovementioned
conversation that could equally qualify as relevant for a given utterance
interpretation. For example, the information that Adam likes to write art-
icles, etc. Many dierent kinds of information could have played the role
of pointing the hearer to the most liekly interpretations. That is basically
right. This, however, is not a problem for the hearer but for us as theor-
eticians. The problem is that it is hard to state a general rule that picks
out the most relevant information that guides the interpretations of any
specic utterance.
The general, schematic ‘rule’ for the hearer is simply this: pick out the
interpretation that seems most probable. And given the ‘data’ in our little
thought experiment, the hearer picks out ‘expert’ as the interpretation that
seemed most probable. In a way, namely post hoc, the situation is simil-
arly simple for the theoretician: given the way the hearer in fact interpreted
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the utterance (an ascription that is independently justiable on the basis
of non-verbal behaviour), the information that Adam is an expert must
have been the most salient one. The only problem, so to speak, is that one
can’t state a rule in advance, independently from particular conversational
contexts that would uniquely determine the meaning of an utterance. But
that’s just ne if one accepts that a semantic theory is unable to achieve
this anyway. The only thing we can hope for is a theory that explains why
utterances have the meaning they in fact have. And the answer to this
question is: because speaker and hearer engage in common activities with
common goals, and hearers exploit all available information, in particular
contextual information, to determine utterance meaning.
In my example, the assumption is that the information that Adam is an
expert, which triggers the hearer’s inclination to interpret “conifer” as ‘ex-
pert’, was already implicit in the foregoing statement. Prima facie, this
seems to render my explanation trivial, for, apparently, most of the time
the decoded information is not implied by previous statements. In the case
of malapropisms, the hearer must have some cues as to how to interpret
a given utterance. My hunch is that if malapropisms are interpreted suc-
cessfully (i.e. as intended by the speaker), then the relevant information
was already implicit in the context. If it is not to be found in the utterances
preceding the one in question, then probably somewhere else. Consider
the following example:
One winter, I was looking out of my kitchen window. It was
raining heavily. I turned to my friend, who was about to leave,
pointed at the window and uttered (the German equivalent of)
“Would you like to borrow a whisk broom?” Without hesita-
tion, my friend pulled her umbrella from her backpack, waved
it at me, and said “No, thank you, I’ve got one.” Only after that
we both realized what I had in fact said, and burst out laughing.
(Glüer 2013, 347)
The information that was relevant for the hearer was, presumably, that she
herself was about to leave and saw her friend looking through the window.
Maybe Glüer also employed some more general information like that her
friend is concerned about her; that the overall weather conditions were
such that the hearer could easily assume that her friend could see that it
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was raining outside (even if the hearer was unable to see what her friend
saw); and so on. Similar to the example before, the (non-linguistic) context
was rich enough as to provide sucient information for determining the
content of the utterance.
The framework developed here suggests that if the (linguistic and non-
linguistic) context does not provide enough information, successful com-
munication is hampered or impossible. Again, it is virtually impossible to
state a general rule for this. In Glüer’s example such a condition might be
that the hearer did not see that she was looking out of the window, or if it
was highly unlikely to rain that day, or what have you.
Probably the most vital source of information for expectations about
how words might be used on future occasions is one’s familiarity with
their past instantiations. Accordingly, a very common reason for misunder-
standing or unsuccessful communication is when the respective knowledge
of word meanings diverge between speaker and hearer. In such cases—
e.g. in conversations between a professional and a layman—the context
is often too poor for the hearer to be able to interpret an utterance. The
reason is that under normal conditions, a given speaker would assume (im-
plicitly) that if the hearer shares some common semantic knowledge with
the speaker, the utterance itself would provide enough contextual clues to
gure out its meaning. Simply put, under normal conditions, speakers as-
sume that their English-speaking interlocutors understand, say, “The Earth
is round” as meaning that the Earth is round.
Speakers, therefore, very often accommodate their speech to ensure that
the shared semantic basis between them and their interlocutors is as broad
as possible.4 Also, speakers typically ensure that this shared basis is com-
monly known to be thus shared. A very familiar case is when you are
abroad and you speak to some random person. In order to nd out about
whether there is some overlap between what you think your words mean
and the semantic knowledge of the other person, you would typically ask
questions like “Do you speak English?” Depending on the answer, you
are justied in assuming that your utterances themselves (i.e. the linguistic
4 If they do not, their communication aim is probably not to convey the content of their
utterances. For example, one might just want to sound competent and therefore use
technical terms deliberately, assuming that their (exact) meaning is widely unknown to
one’s audience.
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context) will provide enough contextual clues to gure out their meaning,
without needing to provide further, non-linguistic clues such as, e.g. ges-
tures.
To see that the relevant context for successful communication is in fact
very broad, consider this. A special kind of communication is written com-
munication. Here, many factors that in serve purposes of disambiguation
oral communication are unavailable (facial expression, shared visual eld,
gesture, intonation, etc.). Also, the typical speaker’s sources for accom-
modating her speech according to the hearer’s reactions are missing. For
this reason many things that are possible in situations of oral communic-
ation are impossible, or severely complicated, in books and articles. Irony,
for example, is often accompanied in speech by certain intonational pat-
terns. These must be substituted by descriptions thereof in written work.
It is not always necessary to substitute non-linguistic clues, of course.
But it is necessary if the context is otherwise too poor to trigger a particular
intended reading. Metalevel descriptions, however, is not the only means
employed by writers to get their message across. Consider the following:
many statements in physics textbooks are presumably true (naïvely speak-
ing). Equally, many statements in the Sherlock Holmes Novels are probably
false (save for geographical facts concerning London). Anyway, textbook
authors and novel writers are both equally ‘successful’ in getting their mes-
sages across, i.e. their respective audiences read their works roughly as
intended.5 The example shows that even such abstract categories as text
genre are part of the context and determine the conditions under which au-
thor and readership communicate with each other. Genre is one of many
contextual factors that can determine a reader’s expectations about how
specic words or sentences might be used in what is reading.
I began with malapropisms, where the most interesting fact about this
phenomenon is that readers/hearers understand sentence tokenings largely
independently from the primary meaning of the falsely applied word (cf.
“conifer”). My explanation for this ability was that interpretation always
takes place in communication contexts in which producer and recipient
5 In construction grammar, there are even attempts to conceive of discourse units or whole
literacy texts as constructions, i.e. there are attempts to broaden the technical notion
“construction” accordingly such that it goes beyond the the borders of sentences: e.g.
Günthner (2009, 2010), Imo (2010), and Östman & Fried (2005).
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participate in some common activity or share some common goal, all of
which helps the hearer/reader to gure out the intended reading. The range
of linguistic and non-linguistic means that speakers use to enforce a par-
ticular meaning of their utterances and that hearers employ in determining
what a speaker meant—this range is so broad that it is impossible to state a
universal rule for how they do this. The only valid such ‘rule’ is the rather
non-specic: it is all down to the context.
6.1.2 Primary Meaning in the Current Framework
Before I turn to a more general discussion of dispositional analyses, let me
conclude this section with a few remarks on how the redened notion of
‘primary meaning’ ts into the broader picture. The slogan of usage-based
semantic theories is that meaning is use. In this book, I defend a specic
variant of this claim, namely that the constitutive basis of meaning is the
totality of actual tokenings of a given (word, sentence, etc.) type.6 ‘Mean-
ing’, in the ordinary sense of that term, is the most appropriate descriptions
thereof—for example, an analysis of relevant dispositions. Defending this
claim against some objections will help to show what I mean here more
generally.
It is important to stress right from the start that a whole family of ob-
jections can be forestalled by making clear that typing meaningful entities
might involve a lot more than taking into account their formal properties
plus relevant aspects of disambiguation. For instance, individuating the
meaning of “bank” might involve more than just saying that tokens of that
word type consists of such-and-such sequence of letters and that in certain
contexts it may mean ‘institution’ whereas in others it could mean ‘river-
side’. Typing words and other meaningful entities might require relativ-
isations to all sorts of things, including periods of time or social groups. I
ask the reader to bear this in mind when I talk about ‘all tokenings’ of a
given (word) type: this is always meant to be relativised to the appropriate
(i.e. meaning-aecting) circumstances such as the relevant social group,
the relevant period of time, the relevant conversational context, etc. (for
this, see especially 6.2.1).
6 Cf. also part three of this book.
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Generally speaking, foundational theories of meaning (reductionist the-
ories) are concerned with explicating the underlying non-semantic prop-
erties that constitute semantic properties. A theory that explains meaning
(a semantic property) in terms of use (a non-semantic property) is such
a theory. Understanding is typically identied with a certain ability. For
example, understanding a particular word is identied with being able to
apply and interpret instances of this word, i.e. to know what it means. Now,
if the meaning of a word were constituted by the totality of its past instan-
tiations, a variety of problems would arise. Firstly, there is the problem that
one typically wants to assume that all members of a specic language com-
munity (e.g. the English community) are competent in that they understand
what words of their particular language mean. Presumably, qua being com-
petent speakers, they must at least implicitly know the constitutive basis of
word meaning. Secondly, the claim that meaning is total use seems to im-
ply that the constitutive basis of word meaning is de facto not speciable.
There are innitely many ways to individuate contexts, hence there are
innitely many ways to describe the contexts in which a word is uttered.
Even if there were only one plausible context per utterance, the number of
actual instantiations of a given word type would be far too high to actu-
ally ‘list’ these instantiations. Thirdly, knowledge of all actual word type
tokenings, taken by itself, seems to be valueless anyway, i.e. such know-
ledge as such does not foster one’s understanding. Grasping the meaning
of a term is essentially an ability that involves abstracting from specic
instances and coming to know valid generalisations.
I think all three worries boil down to the objection that, as it stands,
“total use” is massively underspecied. I emphasise the totality of actual
uses due to technical reasons, some of which I will discuss in detail in the
following section. From a theoretical point of view, we are of course in-
terested in generalisations, not in mere lists of instantiations. Therefore,
I think it makes sense to make clear that—within semantics—we are typ-
ically dealing with, at least, two more or less dierent issues. There is a
divide between the constitutive basis of meaning and semantic description.
Typically, when people talk about ‘meaning’ in the folk sense of the term,
they are interested not in its constitutive basis but in adequate descriptions.
Constitutive bases constrain the range of adequate semantic descriptions.
This, however, does not imply that changes concerning a given basis must
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involve corresponding changes with respect to the adequacy of semantic
descriptions. Importantly, claims such as “meaning is total use” concern the
properties that constitute meaning; they are thus not directly concerned
with what is usually called ‘meaning’. In this view, claims such as “mean-
ing is total use” are abbreviated ways of expressing the thesis that ‘total
use determines meaning’. ‘Meaning’ itself is simply the most eective way
of describing this constitutive basis (e.g. total use). This amounts to saying
that ‘meaning’, as ordinarily conceived, is, strictly speaking, not total use
but the most appropriate description thereof.
Concerning the three objections just mentioned, it is important to note
that they oscillate between the two ‘readings’ of meaning. The rst two
objections say that equating meaning with total use prevents competent
speakers from understanding and theoreticians from stating meaning. How-
ever, what is in fact unknown is only the constitutive basis of the meaning
of each word. Neither ordinary speakers nor theoreticians know them. A
philosophical theory might still make perfectly justiable claims about the
metaphysics of semantics. Simply put, I do not need to know individual
tokenings of a word in order to justify the claim that individual tokenings
alter the constitutive basis of semantics. For example, one reason is that
each new tokening that a hearer/speaker is confronted with provides po-
tentially new evidence as to what specic words might be useful in the
future in order to reach specic aims (or recognise such aims in others).
“Dog”, for example, is used to refer dogs. This fact—assuming it is a fact—
is constituted by each new “dog” tokening. As a hearer/speaker, one can
infer this meaning on the basis of impoverished knowledge, without being
acquainted with the whole constitutive basis.
Thus, distinguishing between semantic metaphysics and semantics in a
more narrow sense helps us to see that understanding and semantic de-
scription are enterprises that are to a large extent independent of meta-
physics. Similarly, the third worry—‘listing uses without formulating gen-
eralisations seems valueless’—can be accounted for in terms of this meta-
physics/description divide. The semantic descriptions we are dealing with
are generalisations in the required sense (e.g. “hello” is used to greet some-
one). It is this type of knowledge that we would typically ascribe to com-
petent users (as opposed to familiarity with total use). Plus, it is this type of
knowledge that explains understanding in competent speakers or hearers;
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e.g. someone who knows that “hello” is used to greet someone arguably
understands this term. The adequacy of such generalisations depends on
the constitutive basis of all uses. If “hello” were to be used for dierent
purposes in the future, then the mentioned generalisation would become
invalid. The ordinary hearer/speaker does not need to consider the com-
plete metaphysical basis of meaning in order to understand. His only ‘re-
sponsibility’, so to speak, is to form generalisations only on the basis of
the segment of this basis with which he is familiar, i.e. the tokenings that he
uttered or heard in particular conversational contexts.
6.2 Meanings Are Dispositional Analyses
I reject the identication of use properties with acceptance properties. The
alternative I propose is twofold. Firstly, I think that it is best not to place
any constraint whatsoever on the form of dispositional analyses other than
that it must be ecient. Evaluating the value of a dispositional analysis (of
the use properties that constitute word meaning) is like evaluating a lex-
icon entry: it is good if it conveys a suciently precise idea of the use
associated with the term in question. In this sense, I think that there is
ample reason to acknowledge that Horwich’s sketches of analyses of terms
like “red” are good approximations, i.e. analyses in terms of acceptance
are perfectly legitimate in some areas. Secondly, I think that the ‘search’
for good dispositional analyses should start at the end of communication
processes. Arguably, the dispositions people usually arrive at depend cru-
cially on their interpretation of communication situations, i.e. the way they
ascribe intentions and the success of using particular linguistic expressions
relative to a given set of thus ascribed intentions. In 6.2.1, I say why I think
meanings are dispositional analyses. In 6.2.2, I explain the explanatory role
of intentions in semantics.
Relative to what I said at the end of the previous section, the title of
the present section is not to be taken all too seriously. Meanings are e-
cient ways of describing their underlying constitutive basis. In my view,
the latter is use. And my proposal is that the most eective method in
this regard is dispositional analysis. In this sense, the claim that ‘meaning
is dispositional analysis’ is not meant as revealing some irrefutable truth
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about semantics. Rather, the idea is that, considering all that is known
about attempts to describe use, the dispositional method—à la Horwich
but without the restriction to acceptance—is probably the most ecient
method currently available.
6.2.1 From Descriptions to Dispositions
Returning to the recursion issue serves as an excellent starting point for
the following discussion, which will lead to a more precise understanding
of what meanings are. The extensive literature centering around compos-
itionality and recursion is all inspired by the assumption that declarative
sentences are the relevant unit for studying semantics. The mainstream lit-
erature suggests that sentence types are the most important theoretical en-
tities when it comes to language comprehension. The paradigm examples
in philosophy of language are the simplest examples, consisting of just sub-
ject and predicate: “snow is white”, “Socrates is wise”, and so on.7 I have
already shown that such an approach is highly problematic in regard to
other types of sentences (e.g. exclamations).
The appropriate solution here seems to be the following, which is radical
but ecient. It does not really help to argue about sentence comprehension
in terms of usage-based approaches versus truth-functional approaches, or
anything like that. For they basically face the same problem in that they
try to explain language comprehension in terms of semantic knowledge of
constituents. I think it is a misconception to take for granted that ‘sentence’
is the unit that can be understood at all. Sentences (i.e. type-level, abstract
units) are theoretical artefacts. Roughly put, thinking of sentences as the
genuine objects of language comprehension is pretty much committing a
category mistake. Borg, in particular, is likely to object at this point:
I will see or hear a sentence as meaning what it in fact does
mean regardless of other things I believe or, in general, what I
hope a given speaker is going to say. If you, as an interlocutor,
7 As I note repeatedly throughout this book, the more general problem in the study of
semantics is that many people take written language to be their primary object of study.
In philosophy, claims concerning spoken language often seem heavily inuenced by the
prevailing dominance of written language. For the relation between written and spoken
language in linguistics see Linell (2005).
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decide to come up with the most surprising, most irrelevant
utterance you can think of, it will still be the case that any suf-
ciently competent language user, within earshot and paying
attention, could immediately interpret what the sentence you
produced meant, even if they can nd no relevant reason for
your having spoken as you do. [. . . ] Though I do not expect
there to be an alligator in the corridor of my philosophy de-
partment, still a cry of “There’s an alligator in the corridor!”
means that there is an alligator in the corridor and, though I
may have my doubts about the veracity of this report, it can
lead me, cautiously, to investigate the matter. Yet, if semantic
understanding were susceptible to expectations or to my gen-
eral view of the world and my current situation, it is hard to
see how this could happen. (2004b, 89–90)
As I see things, there are basically two possible counterarguments. One
is short; the other is shorter. The shorter reply is the following. What is
at stake here is apparently understanding. Ascriptions of understanding,
though, are dened in terms of what people do in specic situations. In
particular, understanding is dened relative to how people behave in re-
sponse to particular utterances. The abstract unit ‘sentence’ only comes
into play in order to account for what enables understanding in the rst
place (if at all). However, sentences are not the objects of understanding.8
In any case, explanations of language comprehension always begin at the
8 To be sure, Borg’s conviction that semantics is the study of context-independent meaning
is not new. In fact, she is in good company, as the following quote is supposed to show:
The justication which permits the grammarian to study sentences in ab-
straction from the settings in which they have occurred or might occur is
simply that the uent speaker is able to construct and recognize syntactic-
ally well-formed sentences without recourse to information about settings,
and this ability is what a grammar undertakes to reconstruct. Every fa-
cet of the uent speaker’s linguistic ability which a grammar reconstructs
can be exercised independently of information about settings [. . . ]. (Katz &
Fodor 1963, 173)
A slightly modernised version of this idea reads:
[. . . ] what is said is determined linguistically. When a speaker utters a given
sentence in a given context, the only intention that is relevant to what he is
saying is his semantic intention, i.e. his intention concerning the resolution
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level of utterances. Note also that it would not help either to point out that
someone who only knew that someone said ‘There is an alligator in the cor-
ridor’ would merely know that someone said something that means that
there in an alligator in the corridor. This is perfectly explicable in terms
of utterance comprehension. If the subject in question only understood (or
knew) what a specic utterance meant in respect of certain formal prop-
erties (e.g. that the utterance consisted of specic words), then this means
that the context was so poor that the subject was only able to retrieve in-
formation from that particular utterance on the basis of this utterance being
an instantiation of a specic sentence type. Nevertheless, it is still the utter-
ance that is understood (or is known to have a specic meaning).
I think it also would not help to point out that here we are specically
concerned not with understanding as such, but with semantic understand-
ing. Within the broader picture of Borg’s theoretic framework, the compre-
hension of ‘sentences’ (i.e. instantiations thereof) is a matter of processes
going on in one’s ‘semantic module’ (cf. Borg 2004b, especially chapter 2).
In this view, ‘semantic understanding’ is independent from ‘interpretation
of communicative acts’ (Borg 2004b, 90). Thus, what ‘semantic understand-
ing’ is is not explicable in terms of behavioural dispositions (though the
above quote might be read suggesting this), but only explicable in terms of
(mere) knowledge of truth conditions. That is to say, it would seem that
my objection might be a bit unfair, as I presuppose that utterances are the
only proper objects of understanding. I can only partially agree. Indeed, I
presuppose—and argue for the claim—that only utterances can be under-
stood and I have problems with seeing what it means to ‘semantically’ un-
derstand context-free tokenings of sentences. But I do not think that this
unfair or, in any way, could possibly undermine the claim that Borg did not
of any ambiguities and the xing of any indexical references. (Bach 2001,
28)
Cf. also Bach (1994). The most recent expression of the idea that semantics can be pur-
sued completely context-independent is this:
[. . . ] to know the meaning of a sentence δ is for there to be a type of speech-
act A and a form of content ψ such that one knows that in a literal and
unembedded utterance of δ the speaker is performing an act of kindAwhose
content is of form ψ. (Schier 2015, 78)
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show that she is able to understand ‘context-free’ sentence tokenings. My
general, methodological concern would be that if ‘understanding’ is com-
pletely detached from behavioural dispositions, as Borg suggests,9 then it
is hard to see what would potentially count as evidence for attributions of
understanding. On the other hand, if behavioural dispositions did play a
role in determining whether a given subject understood some tokening of
a specic sentence type, then it is unclear why that understanding should
concern merely the sentence type but not that specic utterance. This is
because the behavioural dispositions associated with the interpretation of a
given sentence type systematically depend on how utterances of that kind
are typically interpreted.
More generally, Borg seems to build her framework upon a certain ideal-
isation. The idealisation lies in the implicit assumption that competent
speakers all understand the same thing when they overhear a particular
utterance. And that is probably false, because what they understand de-
pends on a variety of dierent factors, including (i) which meaning they
associate with the particular words uttered; (ii) what they consider relev-
ant in a given context; (iii) on their overall cognitive abilities; and so on. In
general, what people understand generally depends on the actual utterance,
not on sentence types. There are several possibilities for Borg to object to
this line of reasoning (all of which I only extrapolate from her writings).
Firstly, she might object that I am confused about the explanatory end of
linguistics. Linguists, or more generally: empirical theorists, typically try
to capture generalisations. If I now explain understanding solely at the
level of tokens, I neglect the fact that competent language users have one
quite general ability, namely to recognise that someone who utters some-
thing of type x means something that is commonly expressed by tokenings of
9 Borg (2004b, 81):
If, for example, we treat grasp of literal linguistic meaning as the canonical
derivation of truth-conditions for sentences [. . . ], then semantic understand-
ing can form part of a genuine language module, for this is clearly a function
which is encapsulated and computational. Knowledge of meaning, on this
kind of account, consists of knowledge of a proprietary body of information
(the lexicon of the language) and knowledge of a set of rules operating only
on that information [. . . ].
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this kind (in case we were back at the level of types). One worry might be
that an utterance-based (usage-based) conception of understanding might
not be able to formulate generalisations (as it is individual utterances that
get understood in this framework). To be sure, sentences are essential in
order to formulate generalisations. But there is no contradiction here. If
we want to express the idea that people who overhear “There is an alligator
in the corridor” always understand that there is an alligator in the corridor,
then we could just do this. Such an assumption (that I doubt is true) means
that competent speakers of English understand utterances of this type sim-
ilarly. This is a claim that would need to be justied by evidence showing
that the behavioural patterns that people show as an immediate response
to those utterances are suciently alike.
Secondly, Borg might raise the worry that although there are behavi-
oural dierences between language users when it comes to how they in-
terpret utterances, it might still be the case that they interpret sentences
alike. For example, people might actually respond dierently to utterances
of “There is an alligator in the corridor”; but what is common between
competent speakers is that they, qua being competent, know that “There is
an alligator in the corridor” means that there is an alligator in the corridor
(which is knowledge that only partially determines their reaction). Com-
petent speakers have dierent idiolects; what they ‘know’ about the mean-
ing of a given sentence depends on what they ‘know’ about the words con-
stituting that sentence. If competent speakers can have dierent idiolects,
then there are two alternatives. One is to say that the phrase following
the “means that” locution is interpreted relative to individual idiolects, in
which case ascriptions of the form “S knows that instantiations of sentence
type ‘p’ mean that p” is true.10 But this can’t be true in Borg’s view as this
is specically anti-Davidsonian.11 A second option is to say that the phrase
following “means that” has a stable meaning, e.g. the one ascribed accord-
ing to the theoretician’s standards. However, in this case the ascription “S
10 I know that utterances of the form “There is an alligator in the corridor” (relative to my
idiolect) mean that there is an alligator in the corridor (relative to my idiolect).
11 Where by “Davidsonian” I mean that particular theory variant that takes Tarski’s theory
of truth as input and delivers a theory of meaning as output. As one of the readers of this
book rightly pointed out to me, the ‘later’ Davidson (especially Davidson 1986) seems to
defend the idea that, indeed, there are only idiolects, i.e. ‘passing theories’.
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knows that ‘p’ means that p” might turn out false, since its truth depends
on what people associate with a given sentence. For the sake of simplicity,
assume that what people associate with a sentence can be expressed in
terms of truth conditions. Then the truth conditions that people associate
with “There is an alligator in the corridor” might be dierent, depending
on what, e.g., “alligator” means in their idiolect (e.g. to which set of objects
it refers). If the associated truth conditions can dier, a generic ascription
such as the one proposed by Borg can’t be right.
A rather radical response would be to emphasise that the proviso “su-
ciently competent” ensures that the relevant semantic knowledge that lan-
guage users associate with a given sentence must be suciently alike. For
one thing, this is pretty circular, since presumably competency, again, can
be dened in terms of similarity of knowledge (e.g. the knowledge that “al-
ligator” refers to alligators). Also, if a reasonable number of speakers are to
count as competent, the standards for ascribing competency must be rel-
atively low. As already remarked repeatedly throughout this book, the dif-
ferences between individual ‘competent’ speakers are usually obscured by
philosophers’ tendency to discuss all too simple examples (“There is an al-
ligator”, “Snow is white”, “It’s raining”, etc.). If you consider more complex
examples (e.g. “Democracy is a goal worth pursuing”), you see quite easily
that even competent speakers are likely to disagree about what particular
sentences mean (independently of particular instantiations). And it does
not help either to say that by denition competent language users must
know what particular sentences mean, i.e. along the lines of: whatever
“There is an alligator in the corridor” means, competent speakers must at
least know that it means that there is an alligator in the corridor. Because
then you are either referring to idiolects again (which is specically anti-
Davidsonian)12, or you are referring to competent users’ ability to know
that any sentence means what it de facto means, which is an ability that is
fairly independent from their specic linguistic competency.
“Meaning” is a theoretical concept that refers to a particular state if it is
used in expressions such as “Subject S grasps the meaning of ‘p’ ”. It refers
12 Borg repeatedly remarks that her view is supposed to be a neo-Davidsonian one (e.g.
2004b, 3–4 and 2012a, 3–4). Which is to say that, until recalled, she is committed to that
Davidsonian perspective.
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to that very state subjects are in if and only if their behaviour correlates
in a specic manner with “p” utterances.13 What I propose, eectively, is
to think of meaning as dispositional analyses. Dispositional analyses are
approximations. When I say that “+” means addition, this does not mean
that a given subject S will answer my question “What is 1000+2?” by say-
ing “1002”. However, such an answer is the one that is most likely (all
things considered), given that the relevant subject is part of a language
community in which “+” de facto means addition. Kripke, in Wittgenstein
on Rules and Private Language (1982), discusses this at length in the con-
text of private language.14 As a brief reminder: the problem is that if use
(i.e. meaning) is couched in terms of dispositions, then one can’t ever know
with any absolute certainty the ‘correct’ set of dispositions (associated with
a particular word). Because the set of dispositions is derived from the -
nite set of past manifestations (of particular word types). For now, let me
just note that our actual success in conveying meaning ultimately determ-
ines that we are talking about the same dispositions. Kripke, when he says
things like that he ‘uses the word “plus” to denote a well-known math-
ematical function’ assumes that his readership understands him, thereby
presupposing that he and the audience associate the correct dispositions
with “addition”—for example, they would reply with “1002” rather than
“1004” to the aforementioned question.
Dispositional analysis is no end in itself. Its success hinges on how well
it ‘summarises’ the use of a given word, since the latter is what we are ac-
tually after. It is important to bear this in mind when weighing dierent
possibilities of spelling out dispositions. For instance, dispositions must
be attributed to objects.15 The obvious candidates for this are speakers
and hearers. Assuming that communication is for the most part successful
(people understand each other), I see no reason to think that there is a fun-
13 Or, alternatively, for words: statements of the type “Subject S grasps the meaning of
‘w’” refer to the particular state subjects are in i their behaviour correlates specically
with utterances that contain the word “w”. The reasoning behind this is simply this:
although utterance meaning is theoretically primary, it is reasonable to suppose that
many utterances that contain a word such as “apple” are structurally similar in some
respects, namely in those respects that account for the meaning of “apple”.
14 See section 3.1.2.
15 For a general overview of dispositions, I recommend Heil (2005).
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damental dierence between speaker- or hearer-centered descriptions.16 I
therefore focus, as is common practice in philosophy, on the speaker in
what follows. Accounting for the meaning of words in terms of the dis-
positions associated with its use has some neat advantages. I emphasise
four of them and explicate them in turn. Dispositional analyses are (i) re-
lativisable (to social groups, time, etc.); (ii) they are commonly accessible,
which is an essential feature of meaning; (iii) they provide a framework
for degrees of understanding; (iv) they can be designed in such a way that
diachronic development gets incorporated very easily.
Ad (i): Dispositions can be easily relativised to dierent social (and other)
groups and dierent historic times. This helps, for example, in describing
the individuation of dierent meanings of homophones. It also allows for
quite natural explanations for meaning shifts, which are dicult to handle
in truth-functional frameworks and related theories. To be sure, disposi-
tional analyses do not in themselves help to individuate meanings. How-
ever, they provide a quite straightforward means of modelling dierent
meanings or meaning shifts, given that these are known. I think it is relat-
ively fair to say that it is not the task of a decidedly philosophical theory of
meaning to uncover semantic dierences between homophones or shifted
meanings.
16 From the neo-Davidsonian point of view, the most problematic aspect of usage-based de-
scriptions is its reference to intentions; speaker intentions in a speaker-centred scenario,
mindreading in the corresponding hearer-centred framework. However, the dispositions
to utter or interpret a specic utterance in a particular situation must be systematically
alike. This is because natural language speakers are necessarily hearers, too. The dis-
positions of applying a word that I have as a speaker (relative to my intentions) are to a
large extent determined by my dispositions of word interpretation as a hearer (relative
to the intentions that I ascribe). Accordingly, if the overall success of human communic-
ation is given, then this success is probably due to the fact that speakers’ dispositions are
‘designed’ in such a way as to match the hearers’ disposition to interpret accordingly.
Simply put, if I want to refer to salt, my disposition to utter “salt” in order to achieve this
is determined by (i.e. matches with) those dispositions that, I suppose, I would have as
a hearer if I were in exactly that situation my current interlocutor is actually in (what
he is able to see from his point of view; what background knowledge he probably shares
with me; what the prior conversational context was; and so forth). Therefore, it does
not really matter whether the dispositions associated with a given linguistic sign are
described in terms of speakers or in terms of hearers.
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I have shown that it is possible to give a usage-based account of “primary
meaning” that does not presuppose that words actually ‘have’ their literal
meaning in all actual conversational contexts. Rather, it seems more plaus-
ible to go just the other way around by saying that “primary meaning”
must be spelled out in terms of uniform expectations, thereby picking out
specic subclasses of utterances (namely those that correspond to literal
uses in classical terminology). Also, I have noted that “primary meaning”
may be dened in terms of the ‘homogeneous majority of uses (if any)’.17
I should now spell out more precisely what this claim amounts to.
The qualication “homogeneous” in my denition is particularly import-
ant. Several utterances of a word qualify as having the same meaning by
exemplifying similarities; eventually, these structural similarities justify
counting several utterances as instances of one particular type. For ex-
ample, it has often been noted that some words have such a shallow ‘core
meaning’ that their actual—‘literal’—meaning diers eectively with each
new linguistic context.18 The classical example here is “cut”, presented by
Searle:
Consider the following sequence of rather ordinary English
sentences, all containing the word “cut”.
1. Bill cut the grass.
2. The barber cut Tom’s hair.
3. Sally cut the cake.
[. . . ] It seems to me the following is more or less intuitively
obvious about this list. First of all the occurrence of the word
“cut” [. . . ] is literal. There is nothing metaphorical or gur-
ative in our understanding of any of those sentences. (1980,
221)
17 The “if any” simply rules out those words that lack (what I call) primary meaning. There
are some words that are perfectly meaningful, yet lack proper primary meaning, since
no homogeneous set of its tokenings may be determined yet: for example, the German
term “wulen” during its rst two or three months of application.
18 In contrast to indexicals, what diers from context to context is not merely semantic
value (e.g. the referent) but meaning as such, i.e. the property that determines semantic
value.
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The most prominent, slightly more recent reconsideration of this topic is
in Recanati’s work. In discussing a variety of similar examples, he notes
the following concerning “red”:
What is it for a car, a bird, a house, a pen, or a pair of shoes
to count as red? To answer such questions, we need to appeal
to background assumptions and world knowledge. Linguistic
competence does not suce: pragmatic ne-tuning is called
for. [. . . T]o determine a suitable sense for complex expres-
sions, we need to go beyond the meaning of individual words
and creatively enrich or otherwise adjust what we are given in
virtue purely of linguistic meaning. We must go beyond lin-
guistic meaning, without being linguistically instructed to do
so, if we are to make sense of the utterance. (2005, 183–184)
The basic idea is always the same and indeed quite simple: “cut” (and
the like) seems to dier enormously in meaning, depending on what it
takes as object, so to speak. It goes without saying that something like
a ‘core’ meaning is common to all those variants. There are, though, dier-
ent things that can be literally cut (grass, hair, etc.) and dierent ways of
doing so. Hence, “cut” instantiations are to a large extent heterogeneous in
certain respects. Still, one is typically inclined to say that “cut” has primary
meaning. Thus, something must be in common between all literally inter-
preted “cut” utterances: the instantiations must be homogeneous in some
sense. The trick is to acknowledge that, due to the dierent varieties of
cutting, the homogeneity of “cut” utterances must be paraphrased in very
general terms,19 whereas the supercial heterogeneity is attributed to reg-
ularities in the use of those words that denote the things cut (“grass”, “hair”,
and so on). Ultimately, homogeneity of use is what determines that several
19 Along the lines of: “to cut” is a verb that often expresses a reduction of a certain mass
(of grass, hair, etc.), where the object that retains the remaining amount (of grass, hair,
etc.) is also its syntactical object (grassland, head, etc.). Note, though, that the underlying
problem that Recanati describes remains. A ‘liberal’ formulation of the relevant meaning
is incapable of solving it. The problem persists that the abstract meaning of “cut” as such
does not suce to determine sentential truth conditions in particular contexts. In order
to determine (literal) truth conditions, one needs to consider contextual features (e.g.
cotext, intentions, common knowledge, etc.) that are not ‘allowed’ at the ‘semantic’
level in truth-conditional theories such as Borg’s.
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tokenings of ‘words’ belong to the same word type. Because we would not
want to individuate word types solely according to their spelling or other
formal features. That would be absurd. Rather, we want word individu-
ation processes to be guided by dierences in use: for example, word type
1 of “bank” is used to refer to riverbanks; word type 2 is used to refer to
institutions. Thus, if “to cut” actually is one word (type), this must be re-
ected in at least some, albeit very general homogeneity of all its supposed
instances.20
The “majority” in “the homogeneous majority of uses” highlights the
fact that the “primary” in “primary meaning” makes sense only in sharp
contrast to some ‘derived’ or ‘pragmatic’ meaning. In my terminology,
‘pragmatic meaning’ is what all (meaningful) utterances have. In this view,
‘primary meaning’ is the meaning that words have if they are used (what
is typically called) ‘standardly’; e.g. “dog” in contexts in which it is used to
refer to dogs. These two things might look circular at rst sight. Firstly,
the use of “reference”, which might look as if I were smuggling referential
relations back into my account. This, I think, would be a misunderstand-
ing. Nowhere in the text do I say, for example, that the meaning of “dog” is
(or can be given by saying) that it refers only to dogs. On the other hand,
it is an empirical fact that very often people use “dog” in order to refer to
dogs. If I now pick out this particular fact in order to characterise the likely
primary meaning of dog, then this ‘citing of facts’ is fairly independent of
one’s underlying semantic theory, i.e. fairly independent of whether you
think that meaning is, for example, reference. Secondly, the way I describe
primary meaning might look dangerously circular. If using words with
their primary meaning is using them standardly; then what is using them
standardly? Supposedly, using them with their primary meaning. Again, I
20 In section 8.3, I link my discussion of the distinction between the ‘constitution base’ of
a word and its appropriate ‘semantic description’ with the question of what determines
that a particular expression token belongs to a specic expression type. In other words,
that section describes how, I think, tokens should be ‘counted’. In this sense, that section
also answers the question what it takes for any given set of expression tokens to be ho-
mogeneous: tokenings are homogeneous in the relevant sense i there is a theoretically
fruitful way of describing them as instantiations of a particular type. Of course, such a
notion of ‘homogeneity’ presupposes that words already have been typed accordingly.
But that seems justied, as it is not the task of a theory of meaning to provide its own
(full-blown) account of how expressions are typed.
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think this would be a misunderstanding as well. I dene “primary mean-
ing” in terms of majorities of use. Strictly speaking, it is perfectly possible
(i.e. in principle possible) to look naïvely, without prior theoretic under-
standing, at the whole set of actual word type instantiations. In sorting all
instances according to certain similarities among them, one could nd out
that most instances share a specic feature. For example, one might nd
out that most “dog” instances share the feature that people use them in or-
der to refer to dogs. Now, in characterising my own account, I presuppose
that competent speakers of English are, in general, aware of such empirical
facts. Presupposing such knowledge does not render the account circular.
Words ‘have’ their primary meaning in a subset of cases relative to all
actual instantiations of the corresponding type. It is relatively easy to recog-
nise a “dog” utterance as an instance belonging to a specic type, e.g. due
to phonetics, spelling, etc.21 Similarly, it also quite straightforward to de-
termine whether some such instances form a majority, given one’s ability
to recognise homogeneity. Accordingly, in my terminology associating a
primary meaning with a given term means forming expectations about the
future application of this word that is based on one’s ability to recognise
(implicitly) that there is a majority of past instantiations of this word type
that shared relevant commonalities. For example, the commonality might
be the circumstance that, in the majority of cases, “dog” utterances have
been used to refer to dogs.
Before I return to the actual topic—dispositions and relativisations—let
me very briey add a caveat. The ‘homogeneous majority’ that people con-
sider in order to form their expectations about ‘standard usage’ happens
simultaneously with or after disambiguation. Here is a very illustrative
example. “Bank” is a word whose instantiations are by and large distrib-
uted equally amongst its two major interpretations (‘riverbank’ and ‘insti-
tution’). That is why, strictly speaking, no clearmajority can be determined
here. So if I say that the ‘homogeneous majority’ of cases determines ex-
pectations, I have in mind the majority of cases within the set of tokenings
of one interpretation. This is because it is possible to have distinct non-
literal (i.e. minority) uses for both types separately. The same applies to
cases in which there are two or more possible interpretations, but one of
21 Müller (1996) oers some nice remarks on type recognition.
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them is so prominent that, in fact, it supplies the majority, all instances
considered (e.g. “great” as ‘excellent’ vs ‘large’).
Back to dispositions, then. Dispositions have the signicant advant-
age that they must be relativised in several respects, anyway. They thus
provide a natural framework for distinguishing homophones, distinct mean-
ings in particular social groups, dierent meanings according to contextual
factors, and so on. Let me explain. Relativisation to social groups will
serve as an example. In German, the word “Mongo” (eng. “mongo”) dif-
fers slightly in meaning depending on the social group within which it is
used.22 For sake of simplicity, I consider only its oensive usage. The or-
dinary, established variant is to use it, in appropriate circumstances, with
racist connotations. In the idiolects of today’s youth, “Mongo” means,
roughly, ‘idiot’—without any racist connotations whatsoever. Thus, we
have one word type that is associated with slightly dierent sets of dispos-
itions regarding today’s youth and prior generations. These dierences in
meaning trivially fall o any empirically informed dispositional analysis
of “Mongo”, as one needs to relativise dispositions to all meaning-relevant
factors. Simply put, one can’t just say that a particular word type w is as-
sociated with such-and-such dispositions simpliciter. Rather, dispositions
require objects to which they can be attributed (like properties) and cir-
cumstances in which they take eect (in philosophical prose, ‘antecedent
conditions’).
I can imagine that the most likely response to this argument is this:
trivially, if “Mongo” falls into two dierent types in modern German (as
secured by the description), then this is just as easy to account for in truth-
conditional semantics as it is in use theory. Either “Mongo” is actually two
types with two dierent intensions (and thereby extensions (e.g. the set of
idiots and something else), or it is just that two dierent connotations are
22 “Mongo” diers with respect to its use in adolescents and adults, though it is arguably
only one word type (a fortiori by classical standards). The following is a quote from a
recent newspaper article: ‘A spokesman of the ministry of defence said in Berlin that,
apparently, the colloquial [German] word “Mongo” can most likely be identied with
‘Idiot’. It does not in a pejorative manner refer to Asian people’, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 27/02/2013, my translation. For the record, the original reads: ‘Ein Sprecher des
Verteidigungsministeriums sagte in Berlin, das Slangwort “Mongo” sei oenbar in der
heutigen Jugendsprache am ehesten mit “Idiot” gleichzusetzen, es beziehe sich nicht in
herabwertender Weise auf Menschen asiatischer Herkunft.’
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associated with it. In the rst case, there are two words to which, respect-
ively, two dierent references can be attached. In ‘Tarskian’ terminology,
the two relevant types get associated with two dierent base clauses. In
the second case, truth-conditional semantics could just treat it as a single
word and leave connotations to pragmatics.23
The reply does not succeed for the following reasons. Treating “Mongo”
as one word whose dierent connotations become relevant only at a prag-
matic stage is highly implausible, since this would require that both variants
can be treated equally because of a common truth-conditional impact (rooted
in an alleged referential relation). That is absurd, for truth conditions are
absolutely irrelevant in determining the meaning of “Mongo”. Not only do
both variants not share a common intension (and thereby extension), they
both have no ‘extensional’ commonality. To see this, consider the most
likely candidate for the oensive reading: the intension that picks out the
set of idiots. It makes no sense to say that “x ist ein Mongo” is true i x is
an idiot, or anything reasonably similar. The reason is that this intension
is not even accurate for oensive use of the term: people typically do not
refer to anyone in these cases. Yet, the word is meaningful unless you dene
meaning in terms of extension. The meaning of “Mongo” can be explicated,
e.g., in terms of its conversational function: it is successfully applied if the
addressee feels discredited, etc.24
Given that “Mongo” has two distinguishable meanings in modern Ger-
man, this might be captured in truth-conditional semantics by simply pos-
tulating two types. One might even assume—if only for the sake of argu-
ment—that this could be done be postulating two dierent intensions.25 I
23 For example, by following Borg in claiming that pragmatics is only relevant for commu-
nication; which, again, is not to be dealt with by a theory of meaning, since the objects of
study in semantics have their meaning independent of the communication-related ends
they serve.
24 I suggest that, in general, some classes of words are best described by recurring to the
conversational functions that they full. These classes are particularly hard to integrate
into truth-conditional semantics, as they lack content that aects truth-evaluability. The
most relevant examples in this regard include words that contribute absolutely no such
content, but which at the same time have a very precise, easily speciable meaning: e.g.
“hello”, “come on”, “ouch”, etc.
25 The argument would run as follows: if you insist that there are two distinguishable uses
in younger and elderly people, then this necessarily implies that these assumed dier-
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will not argue against this possibility. Note, however, that the only possible
reason for postulating two word types is due to dierences in use. In this
regard, there is no dierence at all between use theorists and rival theor-
ies. A proponent of truth-conditional semantics is thus forced to claim that
there is a fundamental dierence between nding out what a word means
(the epistemology of semantics, if you like) and nding out what mean-
ings essentially are (semantic metaphysics). But this way out is blocked,
as there is nothing more to meaning over and above what is suggested by
empirical evidence, i.e. use.
Both ways, type dierences of words boil down to dierences in the
dispositions associated with them, i.e. the properties that constitute their
overall employment. Relativising dispositions to social groups is probably
the most eective way of attributing dierences in use to these groups (e.g.
youth vs elderly people). Further relativisations work absolutely similarly.
For instance, one could relativise the dispositions of using “cool” to dier-
ent situational contexts26 in order to distinguish two types: e.g. ‘cold’ and
‘awesome’. Or, one might relativise dispositions to time or region: think of
“tall person” in Asia vs in North America; or in 2014 vs in 311 BC. There are
probably many such dierentiations, contrary to what is suggested by the
typical, in fact obligatory relativisation to language communities. Which
relativisations are necessary to make is, of course, an empirical question.
My point is that dispositions are a particularly adequate means to meet this
need, as they have, so to say, an in-built demand for such relativisations.
Ad (ii): A recurring theme in the literature on the semantics of words
and concepts is public access to meaning. Here, I briey summarise the
relevant parts of the discussion. Theories that emphasise the importance
of the internal structure of speakers in the context of meaning determina-
tion (of words, of concepts) face the problem that for many dierent words
the speaker’s disposition to apply those is identical (cf. the narrow/wide
ences manifest themselves in attributing “being a mongo” to dierent sets of objects.
Subject to correction for misapplications, these attributions hint at dierent intensions
of the two involved types.
26 Here, I mean contexts that dier in regard to whether this “cool” variant is applicable.
Say, “cool1” is applicable in linguistic contexts that suggest that temperature is at stake;
“cool2” otherwise. (This is simplied and for illustration purposes only.)
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content debate, for instance)27; and that individual dispositions can’t de-
termine meaning anyway, for this would render successful communication
implausible (cf. also the debates on inferentialism or holism)28. The worry
is that the dispositions that presumably constitute speakers’ overall lan-
guage use are, with nomological necessity, not directly accessible to their
interlocutors (i.e. they can only infer them). That is a serious problem, be-
cause two equally legitimate aims collide. I propose to go something like a
middle way by claiming that both sides are right: meaning is determined by
individual speaker dispositions and, at the same time, meaning is publicly
accessible. Concerning the rst point, meaning simply must be determined
by speaker dispositions, because if meaning is use, then there is no way of
nding out about meaning other than scrutinising speakers’ dispositions to
apply language. Accordingly, I would suggest that dispositional analyses
are the most ecient way of capturing use. The second point is slightly
more complicated, which is why it is worth going into a bit more detail.
For the following argument, I take the tentative results of preceding sec-
tions for granted. The meaning of a word is determined by the totality of
actual past instantiations of this type. Barring some exceptions, this im-
plies that nobody can have perfect knowledge of meaning, for nobody is
familiar with all past instantiations of a given word type. Concerning dis-
positions, it is important to note that the individual dispositions to apply
(or understand) a given term are determined by acquaintance with only a
limited set of past instantiations.29 Yet, there is an ‘ideal’ set of dispositions,
namely the set one would associate with a given word if one had heard or
otherwise experienced all its past instantiations.30
27 Fodor (1987), Loar (1988).
28 For overview articles, consult Cohen (1999) and Pagin (2006). Devitt (1993) is a critical
discussion of meaning holism.
29 In linguistics, this is known as the ‘bottleneck problem’. The ‘bottleneck’ refers to the
circumstance that, roughly put, every speaker hears a dierent set of word instantiations
during their lifetime; still, every speaker (of a given language) ends up with the ‘same’
semantic knowledge. For each generation, the semantics of a given language (e.g. the
semantics of “snow”) goes through this bottleneck, whereby, interestingly enough, it
retains its relevant properties (cf., again, Kirby 2002).
30 I come back to this in 8.3.
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Regarding public access to meaning, there are two separable problems,
I think. Firstly, the meaning of words is a property of whole language
communities, while the relevant dispositions to apply words belong to in-
dividual speakers. I call this the ‘community problem’. Secondly, every
speaker has a slightly dierent set of dispositions to apply a given term,
while dierent people are nevertheless able to talk about the same thing. I
call this the ‘communication problem’. Now, the trick is to utilise the no-
tion of an ‘ideal set of dispositions’. To begin with, note that this is only a
terminological denition. Of course, the ‘ideal’ set is not ideal in the folk
sense of the term. Rather, it is ideal in that it is that particular disposition
one would arrive at if one’s overall application of a term were based on the
experience of the totality of all word instantiations of this type. My argu-
ment will be that the theoretical notion of an ideal disposition can explain
away both problems at hand.
I begin with the communication problem. Successful communication
requires, or so people sometimes claim, that two or more people are able
to talk about the same thing, e.g., snow, Johnnie Walker, the Seventh Sun,
etc. If meanings were dispositions, then nobody would ever be able to talk
about the same things, since, in fact, no two speakers ever share the exactly
identical set of dispositions (concerning language use). I think that the aw
in arguments of this type is that they presuppose identical dispositions for
communication success. Before turning to the key issues, let me begin with
a short remark on the terminology employed in this objection. Apparently,
the vocabulary that is used here is tendentious. Speakers’ ability to ‘talk
about the same thing’ is sold as the relevant hallmark for communication
success. This is clearly inspired by referentialism, i.e. the prevailing idea
that a theory of meaning is rst and foremost a theory of reference. Doing
away with this terminology will help to make clear what is actually at stake.
Communication success is, roughly put, a relation between a speaker’s
intentions and the results of his communication eorts. No matter what
philosophers believe that communication needs in order to be successful, a
communicative act such as “Could you please pass the salt?” is successful
if, and only if, the addressee passes the salt to the speaker (given that was
his intention).31 In particular, the success can be determined independently
31 See Pencil (1976) for a comprehensive review of the relevant literature.
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from whether “salt” successfully refers to salt.32 Thus, the ‘bridge prin-
ciple’ that is required to reconcile necessarily diverging dispositions with
successful communication is this: people are able to talk ‘about the same
things’ if the semantic properties of their respective idiolects are suciently
similar. Consider Wittgenstein’s prominent example. We all have dierent
concepts of chairs—and, hence, associate slightly dierent meanings with
“chair”. Our respective dispositions to apply “chair” to any given object are
(supposedly) never 100 % identical. Remarkably enough, communication is
still successful with respect to chairs. In other words, communication suc-
cess is based on similarities of our dispositions to apply terms (or interpret
others’ utterances), not in their identity.
In technical terms, this point can be captured thus: the dispositions of
two speakers, S1 and S2, concerning the applicability of a word w are sim-
ilar i there is a signicant overlap between the situations that specify w’s
applicability for S1 and S2, respectively. The more overlap between these
sets of situations, the more similar S1’s and S2’s use of w. The basic idea
here is this: success means success in specic situations. Signicant over-
laps of situations in which two speakers would apply given terms ensure
that their expectations regarding the use of these terms are compatible.
Again, compatible expectations lead to communication successes. Please
note that the descriptions of the respective sets of situations can be quite
specic (depending on one’s analysis interests). “Chair”, for example, is a
word whose applicability is somewhat vague. Interestingly, communica-
tion about chairs is still often successful. I am usually not surprised about
what people get me when I asked them to bring a chair. The obvious ex-
planation for this is that the set of situations in which a word is applicable is
determined, among other things, by the relevance of a potential tokening.
Roughly put, in the research on vagueness we can distinguish three dier-
ent cases (ignoring higher-order vagueness): ‘applicable’, ‘not applicable’,
and ‘unclear whether applicable’. Philosophically interesting questions like
reference-xing (and, thereby, truth conditions) are determined—one may
reasonably suppose—by one’s overall inclination to apply a term. How-
ever, in situations in which success is relevant, people’s dispositions are
probably guided by only the clear cases, where the clear cases are those
32 Whereby I do not mean that reference relations are never involved in explaining success.
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of which they think that their interlocutor’s dispositions are the same as
their own. This explains why even in cases that involve instances of such
words like “chair”, communication success might in principle be exception-
less. It is because people are capable of recognising those situations relative
to which their understanding of the applicability of a word is compatible
with the understanding of others. Accordingly, they are able to ‘conne’
themselves to these overlapping situations whenever the applicability of a
word is relevant for their communication success. In most cases, the range
of possible overlap is so huge that one is easily led to the impression that
communication is always successful, i.e. that we are always in a position
to ‘talk about the same things’.
Furthermore, our respective dispositions are, to a large extent, impress-
ively similar—especially concerning connectives, termini technici, proper
names, etc. This is because they converge to the ideal set of dispositions.
The individual sets of dispositions (of speakers) diverge, because particular
speakers are confronted with only a limited set of word type instantiations
(plus dierences regarding their belief sets and their remaining semantic
knowledge). Note, however, that the individual instantiations themselves
with which language learners get confronted are also very, very similar: for
example, “snow” is very often used to talk about snow. Thus, it is highly
plausible to assume that the similarity of actual “snow” utterances is passed
on to the individual sets of dispositions that language learners derive from
a particular subset of those utterances. It seems indeed plausible to assume
that this eect is fairly independent of the fact that the particular set of
instantiations with which individual speakers are confronted diers from
the corresponding sets of their interlocutors. Thus, ideal dispositions solve
both problems at once. Concerning the communication problem, it is im-
portant to acknowledge that communicational success can only be ‘meas-
ured’ in terms of fullment of intentions, for which similarity—as opposed
to identity—seems to be sucient. Concerning the community problem, I
have shown that it is possible to attribute meanings to the words of whole
language communities by abstracting from individual dispositions, which
is unproblematic because the latter are remarkably similar, anyway.
One last note on similarity. I assume that communication success is
rooted in similarities of individual sets of dispositions, which again is pre-
supposed to be rooted in similarities of individual tokenings. Granted this,
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it is easy to see that the strong, widespread conviction in philosophy of
language that the semantic knowledge between any two competent speak-
ers of a language such as English is identical stems from a biased choice
of example cases. The by far most obvious example that illustrates this is
logical connectives. One of the most popular examples especially in the
philosophically minded literature on theories of meaning is the connector
“and”. Supercially, choosing comparatively simple examples serves the
purpose of explaining in simpler terms mechanisms that work similarly in
more complicated cases. The meaning of “and” is supposedly simply its
contribution to the truth value of a sentence as a function of the truth val-
ues of its conjuncts (pp and qq is true i both p and q are true, false other-
wise). The following argument does not just concern truth-functional con-
nectives, which are somehow special in that they only ‘relate’ truth values.
The important point is theoreticians’ tendency to discuss word meanings
that are easily speciable due to their (relative) univocal use (e.g. the al-
leged fact that “snow” refers to snow). Up to a certain point, it seems that
exemplifying complicated issues (e.g. meaning) by using relatively simple
examples (e.g. “and” or “snow”) is a perfectly legitimate strategy. However,
it gets problematic as soon as the simplicity of the chosen examples ob-
scures what is actually happening. The assumption that communication
success is essentially rooted in the alleged identity of dispositions associ-
ated with individual words seems to be due to the fact that, as far as the
chosen examples are concerned, the similarity of individual dispositions is
indeed overwhelmingly obvious. When I say that example cases are chosen
based on biases, I do not intend to imply that the complexity of the chosen
examples does not go beyond the complexity of “and” or “snow”. It is only
that people—for good reasons, by the way—tend to choose examples that
have clear, unambiguous semantics. Anyway, it would be odd if that were
dierent. But a side eect of this strategy is that people often also tend to
think that the relevant dispositions to apply a certain term are more or less
distributed equally among competent speakers. And that certainly holds
only for the examples typically chosen, if at all.
Ad (iii): Obviously, some people understand some words better than oth-
ers. I have dened elsewhere (3.2), following Horwich (1998, 16–18), that to
understand is to have implicit knowledge of the use of a given term. Even
opponents must admit that knowledge of meaning comes in degrees, and
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that these degrees of understanding manifest themselves in how the term
is used. The most natural way to explain these dierences in use is by re-
ferring to the dierences in the sets of implicit knowledge every language
user associates with a given term. Even more importantly, not only is this
strategy unavailable to the opponent of usage-based approaches, but there
is no obvious alternative that may be oered.
Within a usage-based framework, it is—barring complete descriptions—
relatively easy to ‘model’ degrees of understanding. If meaning is total use
and use is described in terms of dispositions, then full understanding may
be equated with full, implicit knowledge of this use.33 Accordingly, degrees
of understanding can be understood in terms of divergence from this set of
knowledge. Apparently, to really model these divergences might be very
dicult or indeed impossible. But this does not undermine the present
framework, for the following two reasons.34 Firstly, it is an answer to the
question what degrees of understanding are (i.e. an in-principle answer),
whereas, as I said before, other theories do not provide such an answer.
Secondly, the underlying problem is not that modelling degrees as such
was especially dicult, but nding the right dispositions in the rst place.
There is an important area in which privileged semantic knowledge is
possible, namely self-knowledge. A person’s knowledge regarding the se-
mantics of his own idiolect is special in that introspection is available as
a possible source of evidence. I said that understanding implies implicit
knowledge of use. I have a particular, though not perfectly reliable, epi-
stemic access to my dispositions that I do not share with anyone else. The
least I can do is go through dierent imagined scenarios and ask myself
whether I would be disposed to apply a given term in such a situation.
33 This directly follows from how “understanding” has been dened plus the dispositional
analysis of what meaning is. By the way, note that, except for some rare cases (coinage,
omniscience, termini technici, proper names), full knowledge of this kind is impossible,
which is highly plausible.
34 A similar problem with modelling appropriate distances arises in the area of truthlikeness
(Oddie 2014). Issues concerning only the modelling leave unaected the intuitive grasp of
which propositions are ‘closer’ to the truth than others. For instance, if the actual amount
of rain was 50 cl, a theory that predicted 50.3 cl was closer to the truth than the one that
predicted 17 cl. Analogously, the diculties in modelling divergence from the ideal set
of dispositions leave unaected the intuitive grasp that some people’s understanding of
a given term seems ‘better’ (closer to the ideal) than others’ understanding.
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This ability explains both why one has the impression that self-knowledge
is possible (because my own dispositions are ‘transparent’, so to speak) and
why self-knowledge is a relatively reliable source of evidence. It is because
we continuously use language, hence we invariably check the applicabil-
ity of words according to our own standards.35 It would, however, be a
mistake to transfer this conviction that individual semantic knowledge is
relatively reliable in respect to the idiolects of others or to the semantics
of whole languages (i.e. the idiolects of a language community taken to-
gether). For here, one’s implicit assumptions about others’ use of a word
is always an approximation whose scope is limited by severe epistemic
restrictions. The restrictions result from the fact that every speaker of a
language community is familiar with only a limited set of actual token-
ings (cf. ‘poverty of the stimulus’ arguments), which indicates possible fu-
ture use. By the same token, this line of reasoning shows why perfect se-
mantic knowledge is possible in some cases. For example, it is possible to
completely understand proper names. The reason is simply that a limited
evidence basis will result in the same assumptions regarding future use as
familiarity with all available evidence would result in.36
Ad (iv): Diachronic developments are very important in semantics, gram-
mar theory, and general linguistics. Words, morphemes, and syntactic con-
structions might today have a dierent meaning than they had some time
ago. There is broad consensus that semantics develops on dierent times-
cales. In articial settings, meaning shifts occur quite frequently; very of-
ten they are even continuous (cf., for instance, the work of Simon Kirby).
There are some classes of words that are hardly ever aected by meaning
shifts, the most prominent examples of which probably include logical con-
nectives, as indicated above. Presumably, everything else lies in between
35 This is not to say that this proves that our assumptions concerning our own disposi-
tions or others’ dispositions need to be ‘correct’ in the Kripkensteinian sense. Still, we
‘continuously check the applicability’ of a term in the—relatively weak—sense that we
have certain assumptions about which expressions might be useful for which purposes.
For example, I usually suppose that “Kill this dog!” is, ceteris paribus, a good means of
convincing someone else to kill this dog. In this sense, the applicability of, e.g., “dog”
can be ‘checked’ regularly, for one can simply observe whether the application of “dog”
is successful relative to one’s prior assumptions.
36 This is an immediate consequence of the denition of “ideal disposition”.
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these extremes, i.e. signicant changes take a number of generations to oc-
cur.37 In a usage-based understanding, diachronic meaning shifts can be
conceived of as a special case of relativisation (cf. rst point). Meaning
statements must be relativised to particular times (independently of dis-
ambiguation of indexical expressions). I contend that they normally are
thus relativised (i.e. implicitly), and that this fact is obscured by choosing
example sentences that involve only terms which are unlikely to undergo
any signicant meaning shifts within reasonable periods of time.
Consider “snow is white”. Apparently, the ‘constituents’ of this sen-
tence did not mean anything else three hundred years ago than they mean
nowadays. Especially the ‘x is y’ construction is relatively stable in regard
to its semantics. Also, “white”, denoting a colour, is unlikely to shift its
meaning all too much within short periods of time (say, within a few gen-
erations). If anything, “snow” might undergo signicant semantic shifts,
for as we know from Inuit languages, it might be quite important to dif-
ferentiate between sorts of snow, depending on how much one needs to
interact with it. Overall, however, “snow”. “white”, and “x is y” have such
a stable semantics that one easily gets the impression that it has always
meant the same thing and always will mean the same thing, i.e. that snow
is white.
A quite impressive meaning shift on historic scales concerns “weil” (‘be-
cause’). Originally, “weil” simply functioned as a ‘subordinating conjunc-
tion’, i.e. as a conjunction that stands in initial position of a subordinate
clause (Uhmann 1998). This is one extreme end of its semantic scale. At the
other extreme, “weil” is used solely as a discourse marker, viz. as a means
of negotiating metalevel aspects of conversations such as turn taking. Sev-
eral shades of grey lie in between these extremes. From a philosophical
perspective, two features of the meaning shift of “weil” are particularly in-
teresting. Firstly, the shift happened—and still happens—astonishingly fast
(a few speaker generations). Secondly, the semantically relevant aspects
of “weil” in its discourse marker variety is hard to characterise as well as
37 Cf. today’s use of the German term “weil” as a discourse marker, parallel to its established
use as subjunction and conjunction; which is a possibility that, in this form, did not exist
fty years ago (see below). In English, a parallel development can be observed with
regard to “because” (or “cuz”) that may also be used as a discourse marker in today’s
English (Schirin 1987).
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it is hard to locate particular “weil” instantiations on the continuum from
subjunction to discourse marker. The rst observation does not speak in
favour or against any particular theory. It is only remarkable to the extent
that common philosophy of language very often presupposes that natural
language sentences express, plus-minus a bit, eternal contents (e.g. <snow
is white>), which requires that, if meaning change occurs, there must be
discrete steps in the shift from ‘one’ meaning to ‘another’. However, in
cases such as the meaning shift that aects “weil” such discrete steps are
hardly identiable.
The second observation is even more interesting in this regard. “Weil”
as subjunction and conjunction is more or less easily identiable:
While syntactic integration (nite verb at the end of the sen-
tence) indicates a close link between two clauses and is primar-
ily used to express factual causal relations (“des is besser, weil’s
schneller is”38), syntactic disintegration (verb following sub-
ject; V2) indicates a loose link between two clauses and contex-
tualises a “weil” sentence as an independent assertion. Accord-
ingly, “weil” in V2-position is typically associated with epi-
stemic (“der hat sicher wieder gsoen. weil sie läuft total dep-
rimiert durch die Gegend”39) or speech-act-related causal rela-
tions (“warum kauft Ihr denn keine größeren Müslipäckchen.
weil DIE reichen doch nirgends hin”40) (Gohl & Günthner 1999,
40, my translation, notation simplied)
As regards the use of “weil” as a discourse marker, though, its status within
that class can only be specied rather vaguely. Moreover, the semantics of
its discourse marker function is hard to specify. Most such uses seem to
‘inherit’—at least partly—the original semantics, i.e. they indicate reasons.
However, this only holds in a metaphorical sense: the explanations regard-
ing “weil” may provide reasons for mentioning specic information (as op-
posed to giving reasons for why a particular state of aairs obtains). Other
uses, again, lack even this ‘core’ semantics; they merely indicate that a
38 ‘This is better, because it is faster.’
39 ‘He must have been drinking again, because she looks so depressed.’
40 ‘Why don’t you buy bigger packs of muesli? Because these will never be enough.’
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speaker wants to postpone turn taking. Thus, the semantics itself is hardly
speciable. Even worse, often dierent functions of “weil” within the dis-
course marker class seem to overlap. Gohl & Günthner (1999) conclude
that
The boundaries between [. . . ] dierent discourse marker func-
tion associated with “weil” are sometimes uncertain. There are
clear cases as well as a lot of overlaps, which is due to the fact
that [. . . ] “weil” can operate at dierent levels of discourse or-
ganisation. (54–55, my translation)
Abstracting from the particular diculties of accounting for “weil”, the
philosophically interesting aspect here is that as soon as one turns to real-
life examples, it is hard to ignore that many terms simply lack a clearly
identiable semantics. Rather, the semantics of many terms is—more or
less—continuously evolving (on timescales of, say, decades). Describing
the semantics of genuine natural language terms is necessarily an approx-
imation. The development of “weil” shows, moreover, that referential rela-
tions—e.g. relating a main clause describing a state of aairs with another
clause describing the reasons for why that state of aairs obtains—are par-
ticularly irrelevant in some cases. Rather, the meaning of a term like “weil”
can be best described in terms of the conversational function that it fulls—
an element that is foreign to formal or truth-conditional semantics.
My primary intention is not to convince you of the ubiquity of semantic
shifts. Rather, my point is that meaning shifts, prevalent as they are, have
to be accommodated within a comprehensive theory of meaning. Usage-
based approaches that cash out their main thesis in terms of dispositions
are particularly likely to provide the easiest way of modelling meaning
shifts. Simply put, the exibility, mentioned above, to relativise disposi-
tions to social groups is equally applicable to dierent times. Words mean
and meant dierent things at dierent times due to the fact that people at
dierent times had dierent overall dispositions to apply them.
6.2.2 More On Dispositions
I now want to describe in some more detail what I think a good disposi-
tional analysis for word semantics might look like. To this end, I should say
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clearly that I think that Horwich’s insights are brilliant and that the mech-
anisms he employs are excellent means for this specic purpose. The main
worry that I have concerns the scope of his theory, i.e. my worry is that
by saying that dispositional analyses in semantics must eventually recur
to acceptance properties—i.e. the properties with which use properties get
identied in Horwich’s view—he is committed to a rather restricted theory
of meaning that leaves the semantics of wide areas unspecied.
Dispositional analyses consist of two parts: they state certain antecedent
conditions and they dene what, given that the antecedent conditions hold,
a manifestation of a disposition is.41 Horwich’s analysis depicts particu-
lar such antecedent conditions and manifestations, namely ‘the properties
that explain [a term’s] overall use and thereby provide it with the mean-
ing it has’ (Horwich 1998, 170). The problem here is that Horwich assigns
a special role to declarative sentences in that the semantics of any given
expression is identied with the role it plays in declaratives. Plausibly, the
semantics of questions, for example, can be ‘traced back’ to acceptance
properties. For example, the semantic contribution of “red” to “Is there a
red elephant behind the door?” can plausibly be traced back to one’s basic
inclination to accept “This is red” when looking at something clearly red.
But even if it is possible to employ this ‘tracing back’ strategy for some
areas in linguistics, there are probably large areas in which this strategy
fails. Examples include classes of words like “hello”, “thing”, “mongo”, “go-
gogo”, and so on.42 I come back to this in due course.
This is one reason for widening the scope of a Horwichian theory of
meaning. Another one is this: reducing use properties to acceptance prop-
erties is—although it works in some areas—a strategy that is detached from
what motivates language use in the rst place. Therefore, a promising
strategy to account for language use would be to ask rst what language
is used for, and then construe a dispositional analysis according to these
insights. The idea is to scrutinise rst which vocabulary gets employed in
describing communication success (where the background assumption is
that language use is primarily motivated by what leads to communicative
41 Sugar is soluble (disposition): if sugar is put into water (antecedent condition), then it
dissolves (manifestation).
42 Probably, the strategy fails for a variety of dierent reasons in each case.
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successes). Arguably, this tells us, without further ado, which concepts are
relevant for meaning statements. In a nutshell, the most important vari-
ables to which dispositional analyses arguably must be sensitive are situ-
ational circumstances, intentions, and language users. Let me now briey
justify my decision to take intentions into account.
As people have no direct access to the intentions of other people, do
they therefore, in a broadly ‘intention-based’ theoretic framework, only
know the meaning of their own words? No. Firstly, the intentions involved
here do not concern meanings themselves (as in the Humpty Dumpty cases
discussed by Davidson; see below for a discussion). The relevant inten-
tions concern states (e.g. the state in which the salt gets passed). Inten-
tions can’t be observed directly, but they can be inferred from observable
behaviour. That is to say, one may (i) reasonably hypothesise whether a
given speaker’s intention was to get some salt, and (ii) one may also ob-
serve whether an assumed aim was reached, i.e. whether some salt was
passed (in which case the hypothesised intention was fullled). Incorpor-
ating intentions into one’s semantic analysis is therefore not a constraint
on people’s possibilities to nd out what others mean.
Secondly, the regular expectations that I, or others, have regarding the
use of a word are governed by successful applications of the word in the
past. These past successes are observable by anyone (given they success-
fully guessed my prior intentions before; otherwise it would be hard for
them to distinguish successes from failures). The connection between ob-
servable behaviour and regularities in expectations is even stronger: the
observability of successes pushes expectations into a particular direction
(entrenchment). In other words: both from the hearer’s as well as from the
speaker’s perspective, intentions are important in guiding future applica-
tions of linguistic expressions. Roughly put, to determine the likelihood of
achieving one’s aims by producing particular utterances, one needs to take
into account the past success of similar utterances relative to the hypo-
thesised intentions (hearer’s perspective) or known intentions (speaker’s
perspective), respectively.43 I return to this further below.
43 Although I do not want to pursue this any further at this point, it may be worth consid-
ering whether this little argument can be extended to a more general argument in favour
of the relevance of intentions for semantics (as opposed to pragmatics). Horwich (1998)
says about the normative power of the factual: ‘[. . . ] the explanation [of the fact that
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Thirdly, expectations and intentions are, in eect, two sides of the same
coin. Hence, ‘Humpty Dumpty’-like cases can be excluded, because it is im-
possible to freely intend to mean something without taking into account
what one would expect how a given utterance might be interpreted. Here
is why. People want their intentions to be satised.44 Hence, deviant use,
combined with the intention to be interpreted in a specic manner, only
makes sense if this intention is made transparent.45 Otherwise, one would
need to expect that one’s utterances probably will be interpreted according
to the usual practice, by which the alleged prior intentions were dissatis-
ed.46
From an ontological perspective, intentions are peculiar. Especially so
if they gure in theories of meaning. For instance, it might be questioned
whether a specically intention-based theory of meaning is naturalisable.
An integral part of naturalism is the constraint that every theoretical state-
ment must be open to scrutiny by everyone. Applied to my project, this
one ought to mean DOG by “dog”] is plainly pragmatic: it is good for [someone] to give
words their English meanings because that is what member’s of [one’s] community do
[. . . ]’ (1998, 186). I take it that a certain actual use per se can’t enforce a particular future
use. The reason is the following. My observation that people, including myself, in the
past successfully ‘referred’ to dogs by uttering “dogs” is only interesting for me—i.e. a
factor that could possibly guide my future use of “dog”—to the extent that I (implicitly)
presuppose that this explains my past success in achieving dog-related aims and others’
success in reaching theirs. In other words, the past success in using “dog” lies not in
established reference (from “dog” to dogs) but in the achievement of dog-related aims
(killing a dog by uttering “Kill that dog!”; conveying the information that this dog is
brown by uttering “This dog is brown”; and so forth).
44 This is an analytic truth.
45 The ‘later’ Davidson (1986, 258) is quite explicit about this:
[Humpty Dumpty, who intends to use “glory” with the meaning ‘a nice
knockdown argument,] cannot mean what he says he means because he
knows that ‘There’s glory for you’ cannot be interpreted by Alice as mean-
ing ‘There’s a nice knockdown argument for you’. We know he knows this
because Alice says ‘I don’t know what you mean by “glory” ’, and Humpty
Dumpty retorts, ‘Of course you don’t—til I tell you’.
46 This is probably one major motivation that leads people to consider whether, e.g., text
types could be treated as constructions. For text types (and the like) systematically de-
termine certain, possibly ‘deviant’, interpretations. See note 5 for references.
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means: a meaning statement involving intentions is useless if, in prin-
ciple, language users are unable to check others’ intentions. But there is
no reason to assume this in the rst place. Consider an example already
cited above; the intentions underlying utterances of “Could you pass the
salt, please?” Here, the intentions themselves are not the direct objects
of investigation. However, it is possible to observe everything else. And
everything else surely is enough for having a reasonably broad basis of
evidence, from which intentions can be derived. In fact, describing partic-
ular kinds of situations (for instance, those involving the above question)
in terms of intentions just is a specic way of description. The only way
to deny ascriptions of intentions in action explanations is via an intention-
involving alternative description.47
To conclude, a theory of meaning should be open to involve explana-
tions that recur to intentions and intention ascriptions, as this provides
the opportunity to take into account the point of using language in the
rst place. The point of having language is, following Tomasello here, that
it is a means that helps achieving common goals.48 Accordingly, appropri-
ate dispositional analyses of individual terms are highly likely to recur to
intentions and mindreading abilities. My point here is not that appropriate
descriptions should generally involve intentions. Rather, this should be one
possibility among many. For instance, I have repeatedly emphasised that
the semantics of many terms can’t be stated in terms of acceptance (and a
fortiori not in terms of reference), but have to be described with regard to
their conversational function. The meaning of an utterance like “How are
47 Imagine that a person observes again and again that an utterance of “Could you pass the
salt, please?” is followed by salt passing from the addressee to the speaker. These are ob-
servable behavioural patterns (utterances and reactions), hence uncritical from a natur-
alistic point of view. Observance of these regular patterns—and the correlation between
the two actions—suces in ascribing intentions to a given utterer of the question. (He
probably intends to get salt.) From a naturalistic point of view, ascribing intentions is
an observance-based strategy to explain kinds of behaviour. In slightly more philosoph-
ical prose, one does not necessarily need to be realist about intentions in order to employ
them fruitfully in otherwise naturalistically uncritical explanations, i.e. explanations that
recur to observables only.
48 For constructionist frameworks of language acquisition, see Diessel (2007). For the rel-
evance of cooperation, see Birch (2014) and Reich (2011). For mindreading in the To-
masellian paradigm, consult Moore, Liebal & Tomasello (2013).
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you?” is to establish or cultivate a certain (temporal) social relationship.49
Correspondingly, a speaker understands “How are you?” if, in appropriate
circumstances, she is typically disposed to utter that phrase in order to es-
tablish or maintain such a relationship. Hence, at least for certain classes
of terms (phrases, etc.) it seems essential to allow that their corresponding
meaning statements involve intention-based vocabulary.
49 This is not to deny that “How are you?” also has a ‘literal’ reading, on which it can
be interpreted as a request. The point is simply that a semantics that, due to omission
of intentions, is restricted to describing this ‘literal’ meaning would fail to capture that
aspect of meaning that is most relevant.
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7 Semantic-Methodological
Concerns
The rst two parts of the book dealt with an overview of established main-
stream theories in philosophy and with my own thoughts about it. The
third part is a bit more ‘programmatic’. Here, I lay down the methodolo-
gical background that complements my arguments in the rst two parts
of the book. The present chapter is divided into two sections: In the rst
section (7.1), I present a variety of important background assumptions that
play a role in several places throughout the book; in 7.2, I summarise what
I think my methodological commitments are.
7.1 Background Assumptions
I would like to highlight three specic background assumptions. The rst
assumption is that, as a philosopher, it makes sense to take a liberal stance
in semantics. By this I mean that, to put it in Fodor and Lepore’s terms,
‘the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying’ (Fodor
& Lepore 1991, 328) and that, therefore, philosophy should rst and fore-
most simply observe the work the semanticists (and linguists more gen-
erally) are doing. For example, when ‘the philosophers do the worrying’
of nding an accurate denition of “meaning”, they should primarily be
concerned with taking into account the relevant notions of the term that
are employed in ourishing theories in linguistics (cf. the decline of the
semantics/pragmatics divide in CxG). The second assumption is that se-
mantics in philosophy of language and ‘semantics’ in the eld of men-
tal representations are two more or less independent research endeavours,
which are dened according to their explanatory goals. Since these goals,
again, might dier, there is reason to suppose that the study of the se-
mantics of natural language expressions should be pursued independently
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from the study of concepts. Finally, my third background assumption con-
cerns the (in-)compatibility of semantics and acquisition theory, which is
a recurring theme throughout the book. I repeatedly remark that, in par-
ticular, the Tomasellian paradigm in language development lends support
to a usage-based account of meaning in philosophy. In this section, I give
a detailed justication for this claim.
7.1.1 A Liberal Stance On Contrary Explanations
Some general remarks that situate my discussion in the discourse of theory
choice are in order. What makes a theory of meaning a good theory? And,
more to the point at hand, which adequacy constraints do apply to theor-
ies of meaning? In the previous chapters, I have implicitly assumed a very
liberal stance towards meaning in the sense that an appropriate denition
of “meaning” should be broad enough to cover a wide variety of dierent
established theories. This is particularly true of chapter 2, in which I gave
a very general review of some mainstream theories in semantics. I spe-
cied the notion of “meaning” that is especially relevant for philosophy
in chapter 6. Still, the view on meaning presented there is also pretty lib-
eral. In the present chapter, I will therefore look in some more detail at the
reasons for such a particularly liberal approach to meaning.
Some semantic theories (in philosophy and linguistics alike) are better
than others. There are many criteria by which one may decide between
two competing theories: generality, scope, simplicity, parsimony, elegance,
overall coherence, compatibility with related theories, etc. In light of these
criteria, it would seem odd to dismiss a particular theory merely because of
one’s denition of “meaning”: to dismiss, for example, possible world se-
mantics just because possible worlds do not t one’s pre-theoretic concep-
tion of meaning. Of course, if meaning were, for example, use—if meaning,
to use Kripke’s phrase, ‘turned out’ to be use—then a theory incompat-
ible with this could be dismissed just by being incompatible with a usage-
based conception of meaning. However, from a methodological perspect-
ive, one’s general approach should be as liberal as possible, because thus
far no semantic theory has been proven to be ultimately superior.
On the other hand: meaning can’t be just anything. To be sure, we are
free in dening “meaning” as we like. Some, for example, distinguish nat-
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ural from non-natural meaning; others dene the meaning of sentences
relative to worlds and models; again others claim that the reference of a
proper name exhausts its meaning, and so on. That is, there are a huge
variety of dierent denitions of “meaning” established in the literature.
Again, though, meaning can’t be anything. The meaning of “meaning” var-
ies enormously from theory to theory. So much that some think the notions
employed in dierent paradigms or schools are hardly compatible with
each other (e.g. Partee 1982). Be that as it may, the outermost boundary—if
that much metaphor is allowed—of using “meaning” is determined by com-
mon sense. For whatever purposes one construes semantic theories (ex-
plaining cognitive abilities; explaining language competence; explaining
inference patterns; explaining language acquisition; explaining diachronic
and dialectal varieties; explaining word order; etc.), it seems reasonable to
use “meaning” in a way that is at least remotely similar to common-sense
use. And this is exactly what my characterisation of “meaning” employed
in chapter 2 demands: the paraphrase that is supposed to be a meaning
statement must be illuminating to the (otherwise) competent speaker. Or,
in simpler terms, one must learn something about the meaning of a term
by hearing or reading an adequate semantic description.
I assume that meaning statements are rst and foremost reactions to
‘meaning questions’. Typically, one says that ‘“x” means y’ in cases when
someone else inquires the meaning of “x” beforehand. In these cases, people
are usually not satised with an answer if the meaning statement given in
response does not help them understanding what “x” means. People are
right in being not satised in such cases, for the question “What does ‘x’
mean?” serves just one single purpose: inquiring of the interlocutor about
the meaning of “x”. In line with this reasoning, it seems reasonable to say
that not only do people typically learn something from a given meaning
statement, it is also necessary that meaning statements are such that they
convey potentially new information. In other words, meaning statements
that are uninformative relative to any background assumptions—like “‘Pe-
gasus exists’ means that Pegasus exists”—are not proper meaning state-
ments in this account.
In truth-conditional semantics, no information that goes beyond the in-
formation included in the general principles of the theory is given in in-
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dividual meaning statements.1 This makes it particularly dicult, though
not impossible, to see why these statements are informative. Eventually,
the explanation will probably recur to compositionality again, since the ‘in-
formative’ aspect of meaning statements like “‘Paris’ refers to Paris” is that
it is supposed to explain competent speakers’ ability to comprehend utter-
ances containing “Paris” (all else equal). Actually, the situation is slightly
more complicated as it is not entirely clear what TCS’s meaning statements
are in the rst place. Presumably, one could argue that, strictly speak-
ing, the individual base clauses belong to a complete, spelled-out theory
of meaning for English. In a more narrow sense, Tarskian reference pos-
tulates are not part of the actual Davidsonian theory. His claims are more
programmatic. In this sense, claims along the lines of “Singular terms get
associated with individual objects via Tarskian reference postulates” be-
long to TCS, but statements like “‘Paris’ refers to Paris” do not. In the end,
my methodological concerns remain the same in either case though.
This, then, is the rst reason why I defend a decisive liberal stance to-
wards meaning. As long as there is no independently justied reason for
favouring one semantic theory over another, the denition of “meaning”
should be broad enough as to cover all established theories. Common sense
ensures that we do not get too liberal; e.g. common sense would prevent
us from thinking that “‘Pegasus ies’ means that Pegasus ies” is a proper
meaning statement.
A second methodological reason for taking the stance that I defend in
this book is what I dub ‘Primacy of Phenomena’. A good piece of advice
when construing a theory is to begin things naïvely, i.e. by not assum-
ing anything that is not immediately validated by the relevant phenomena
themselves. For example, it seems undeniable that people communicate
(for whatever purposes). On the other hand, the assumption that terms
refer is not obviously validated by the given phenomena.2 The adequacy
1 By “general principles” I mean rules such as that singular terms always refer to their
respective referents (where these relations are known before), and by “individual state-
ments” I mean the axioms such as that ‘“Paris” refers to Paris’.
2 Although one might want to argue that reference relations have indirect phenomena
status due to their role in ‘speaking about the world’. This terminology, I think, presup-
poses what is at stake here. Describing acts of communication in terms of our ability to
talk ‘about the world’ is interpreting the available data in a specic manner. If you just
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of given theories should be measured relative to their success in account-
ing for the phenomena they are designed to explain. The reason is that the
phenomena to be explained are the only reason for introducing a new the-
ory in the rst place. Concerning the case at hand, this means that without
human communication there would be no need at all for semantic theor-
ies. There is no semantics without language use. Accordingly, semantic
theories should be guided by what is required by the phenomenon, i.e. by
human language use. Referential facts, for instance, only enter into the
picture insofar as they are required to explain the phenomena that originally
required explanation.3 Approaches that acknowledge this accord with the
Primacy of Phenomena, as I shall put it.
This theoretical principle was applied in my discussion of Novelty and
compositionality (cf. 4.1.2 and following). There, Novelty is the phenome-
non to be explained. Interestingly, many people arguing for a specic view
on compositionality start by considering the Novelty issue rst. Here is the
opening paragraph of Truth and Meaning:
It is conceded by most philosophers of language, and recently
by some linguists, that a satisfactory theory of meaning must
give an account of how the meanings of sentences depend
upon the meanings of words. Unless such an account could
be supplied for a particular language, it is argued, there would
be no explaining the fact that we can learn the language: no
explaining the fact that, on mastering a nite vocabulary and
look at the ‘data’, without any theoretical background whatsoever in mind, you can only
determine that people act in certain ways and that their acts, including their uttering
noise, have certain speciable eects on others. Pre-theoretically, it is simply not a phe-
nomenon that people talk about the world. (Describing the available phenomena that
way might be one possible way of making sense of the data. But that’s another story.)
3 The part in italics is especially relevant here, for otherwise one would immediately face
the objection (i) that semantics is an area worth investigating independently of com-
munication (Borg 2004b), or (ii) that people who do semantics by applying pragmatic
conceptions seem to confuse the former with the latter. In a nutshell, I claim that pur-
suing semantics in the narrow sense (e.g. minimalism) might be justied if that were
suggested by the phenomena. However, given that the raw phenomena are necessarily
communication-related, you need independent justication for all semantic properties
that you might want to posit and which are not immediately warranted by the properties
of utterances.
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a nitely stated set of rules, we are prepared to produce and to
understand any of a potential innitude of sentences. (Davidson
1967, 304, emphasis added)
The important point is that Davidson makes several, arguably independent,
claims here. The passage in italics suggests that he implicitly accepts my
assumption that the phenomenon that needs explanation is humans’ abil-
ity to comprehend novel sentences (relative to the relevant provisos). This
suggestion, then, is mixed with further claims. The rst is that the only
solution to the Novelty problem is via a compositional theory of meaning.
Davidson attributes this view to others in the cited paragraph, but it is es-
sentially his. The second is that humans do ‘master a nite vocabulary and
a nitely stated set of rules’, which is, at least, not immediately obvious
in light of observable behaviour alone. The third is not even a proper as-
sumption but clearly a mere suggestion: namely that our mastery of (only)
a nite vocabulary is somehow related to our ability of sentence compre-
hension, if only to the eect that limited vocabularies and rules restrict the
range of possible solutions to the Novelty problem.4
The three assumptions just highlighted are widely accepted in the lit-
erature. Their truth, however, is not warranted by the phenomenon that,
as Davidson says, needs explanation. In particular, it is not clear that only
compositional theories can account for Novelty. Taking the Primacy of
Phenomena seriously, one should refrain from taking the link between
compositionality and Novelty for granted. In particular, one should bear in
mind that the link between these two problems (for which TCS is a unied
solution) is merely assumed. The compositionality of natural languages
is not among the phenomena. Which, by the way, is not to say that nat-
ural languages are not compositional. The Primacy of Phenomena, then, is
my second methodological principle besides the liberalism toward mean-
ing statements.
This principle indirectly suggests that we should handle contrary ex-
planations liberally. Prima facie, all explanations (or whole theories) that
4 The motivation for this rhetoric is that, from within a truth-conditional semantics per-
spective, an innite number of rules would allow us to get away without composition-
ality. The obvious alternative then would be that people who understand sentences do
so because they know the relevant truth conditions individually (i.e. ‘one rule per sen-
tence’).
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accord with the available data are equally good, so long as no independ-
ent reasons suggest favouring one explanation (theory) over another. Ap-
plied to semantic theories, this argument provides good reasons for the
following strategy: begin theorising by rst looking—naïvely, as it were—
at the established theories that are available on the market. In particular, a
philosophical theory of meaning should begin by evaluating the currently
most successful theories in relevant disciplines. In this view, establishing
an ordering of theories according to how well they can handle the data is
a dierent task altogether.
7.1.2 Meaning & Concept
It is common among philosophers of language to neglect or downplay the
dierences between concepts and (their corresponding) words. The most
common way of expressing such a stance on concepts is by saying that,
as far as a specic argument is concerned, talk of concepts and of words
is allegedly interchangeable (cf. especially Fodor). Others, who stop short
of equating both concepts, claim that, ultimately, words correspond one-
to-one to the concepts they express (e.g. Horwich 1998). I assume that the
connection is less tight, and I shall lay down my reasons for this in the
following few paragraphs.
To begin with, there is a lot of evidence favouring an explanatory role for
concepts in the area of semantics. Most importantly, concepts are needed
in philosophy anyway. So, postulating them does not expand one’s meta-
physics. According to the traditional understanding in the philosophy of
mind, concepts are just the ‘building blocks’ of thought (Weiskopf 2013).
That is, whenever there is evidence in favour of cognition operating on
distinguishable ‘blocks’, this evidence likewise lends support to the idea
of concepts. A very simple example of such evidence would be systemati-
city: everyone who is able to think John loves Mary is—ceteris paribus—
likewise able to think Mary loves John. Here is why: the thought John
loves Mary is structured and built up from atomic units. These are: John,
loves, and Mary. Everyone who thinks John loves Mary is able to re-
cognise the atomic units of her thoughts (the ‘building blocks’) and to re-
arrange them in accordance with the structure imposed on the thought by
verb semantics. (I simplify.)
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Apparently, concepts correspond to the words that express them. It would
be absurd to deny that there is some sort of correspondence relation. For
example, the concept dog corresponds—some way or other—to the word
“dog”. The usual way to express this connection is by saying that “dog” ex-
presses the concept dog. Likewise, sentences are typically said to express
propositions. Arguments involving, for example, systematicity are spelled
out in terms of concepts and, afterwards, are applied to words too, or the
other way around (Fodor & Lepore 2002). This depends on which type of
entity is taken to be basic. Now, the interesting bit is how exactly words
correspond to concepts (or sentences to propositions).
Concepts and words are similar in important respects. For instance, my
“dog” and my dog have the same meaning as your “dog” and dog. My in-
dividual “dog” utterances instantiate the same single word type (“dog”) as
yours: there is a big enough overlap between both uses (big enough, that
is, to ensure successful communication about dogs). Similarly, my dog
thoughts belong to the same type of thoughts as your dog thoughts, be-
cause there is a big enough overlap between our two behavioural patterns
in order to classify both as instantiating (the type) dog thoughts. So this
is one way of saying that you and I share one concept and one word for
dogs (i.e. by instantiating types). This is an important step in the argument
in favour of one-to-one correspondence between words and concepts, as
such a correspondence requires that a theory of meaning for words and
concepts applies equally to your words and concepts as to mine.
But here the analogy ends. The ultimate problem for theories that posit
too close a correspondence between words and concepts is that the re-
spective theories serve completely dierent purposes. That is to say, the
explanatory aims of both theories dier. I shall now argue that insofar as
this is true, there is no reason to suppose that a semantic theory for words
must, at any point, involve concepts.
Mental representations are required in philosophy of mind5 to account
for particular kinds of behaviour. To be slightly more precise, represent-
ations must be assumed to account for exactly those behavioural patterns
5 I explicate the argument using philosophy as an example. Of course, the argument
equally applies to empirical disciplines as well, provided similar identications of con-
cepts with words were applied in these areas.
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that would otherwise remain inexplicable (Newen & Bartels 2007). In par-
ticular, mental representations are posited to explain or predict exible
behaviour in humans. Crucially, there is absolutely no way to get away
without representations as that would, again, require tight links between
certain sets of inputs to a system (describable in terms of something like
nerve signals) and the corresponding sets of outputs of that system (be-
haviour). That, essentially, is the idea of behaviourism—an idea that is
virtually dead these days. As a matter of fact, certain behavioural pat-
terns are linked with certain inputs (e.g. being hurt is typically linked with
crying), but there are no strict connections, in that the presence of certain
antecedent conditions would necessarily lead to certain kinds of behaviour
(one can be hurt without crying, and vice versa).
Concepts are the units from which full propositional content is built. The
arguments that suggest that a comprehensive theory of the mind would be
incomplete without the notion of concepts runs parallel to the argument
above. There are behavioural patterns that can only be explained under the
assumption of concepts. For example, systematicity. In general, it seems
immediately obvious that when we attribute thoughts to someone, we do
so only in cases in which we would likewise be willing to attribute dierent
thoughts containing the same constituents to the same person (in relevant
circumstances). Here is an example: say, we attribute the thought North
and South are two distinct cardinal directions to Harry. It seems
unlikely that we would do so unless we also attribute him thoughts such as
I think North is that way (given appropriate circumstances, i.e. circum-
stances that suggest that Harry thinks that North is that way, etc.). And
similarly for endless other thoughts and other constituents involved.
I am concerned here with language, so I will give only a rough sketch
for an argument for the last point. Attributing thoughts to people is es-
sentially guided by the observable behaviour that they show (including
verbal and non-verbal aspects). Attributing North and South are two
distinct cardinal directions to a given person necessarily requires—in
order for the attribution to be justied—that the person in question shows
a particular kind of behaviour. In order for this specic attribution to make
any sense at all, attributors must assume that Harry has some idea of what
North and South are. That is to say, attributors must assume that he pos-
sesses these concepts. Similarly, one must also assume that Harry knows
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what cardinal directions are. Note that in the present context it does not
matter whether Harry has words for these concepts, or whether he is able
to articulate his thoughts. Still, the main point remains: assuming concept
possession is essential for attributing beliefs. Proof by counterexample:
imagine someone of whom you are sure that he does not know what North
is and try to consistently attribute to that person the thought that North
and South are two distinct cardinal directions. End of proof. The di-
culties here arise because all evidence in favour of your assumption that
a given person lacks the concept North (i.e. observable behavioural evid-
ence) would likewise count as evidence against the latter attribution.
As already said, philosophy of mind is not my primary concern here.
There is no need to develop the above arguments in any more detail. The
gist is just that these considerations apply across the board in the philo-
sophy of mind. One is not conned to particular theories by accepting
these assumptions. Even more importantly, these very broad and general
considerations serve as an excellent backdrop against which I can contrast
and illustrate the purposes of a semantic theory.
The idea many theorists start from is that a semantic theory is, in the end,
equally applicable to concepts and propositions as to words and sentences.
Indeed, there seem to be some remarkable similarities between both ‘sys-
tems’, such as systematicity, compositionality, reference, truth-conditional
content6, inference rules, and so on. Be that as it may, due to the signic-
ant dierences with respect to what, on the one hand, a theory of mental
representation and, on the other hand, a theory of meaning is supposed
to account for, the arguments stemming from philosophy of mind can’t be
applied to philosophy of language without further ado, and vice versa.
For instance, ascription of concept possession is mainly motivated by
the need to explain exible behaviour. That is to say, certain behavioural
6 In the area of truth theories, people usually assume that one kind of entity (proposi-
tion, sentence, belief, utterance, judgement, etc.) is a so-called primary truth bearer,
i.e. the type of entity to which, properly speaking, truth must actually be attributed,
and from which the remaining entities derive their respective truth values (/truth con-
ditions). In either account, the truth values (or, in general, propositional content) of two
corresponding entities will always be identical. For example, irrespective of one’s theory
of truth (including commitments to primary bearers of truth), the truth-conditional con-
tent of <snow is white> corresponds to the (derived) truth-conditional content of snow
is white and “snow is white”. This, at least, is what most people presuppose.
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patterns seem to ‘make sense’ only under the assumption that a given sub-
ject exemplifying this pattern possesses a specic concept. Knowledge of
words, in contrast, is posited for completely dierent reasons. For instance,
it is typically verbal behaviour that leads to the supposition of linguistic
knowledge. Accordingly, a tight link between concepts and words, for ex-
ample, can only be established on the basis of further arguments. One
might want to argue that systematicity is a feature of languages that they
inherit from the realm of thoughts. In this view, language is systematic by
virtue of the systematicity of its underlying thoughts for whose expression
language is employed in the rst place. By analogy, arguments designed for
being applicable to words do not likewise apply to concepts. Consider ref-
erence relations, for instance. These are arguably primarily—though cer-
tainly not exclusively—investigated in the philosophy of language. Take
Kripke’s causal-historical account of reference. No matter whether his ar-
gument is sound, if it were sound, then it would apply only to words, not
to concepts (at least not without further premises). Note two things in this
regard. Firstly, the causal-historical account presupposes that reference is
passed from generation to generation. But whereas I can reasonably pass
referential relations of words onto the next generation, there is no reason
to assume that I can do so likewise for concepts (at least not without fur-
ther premises). Secondly, the plausibility of the causal-historical story is at
least partly fostered by the circumstance that the continuity of reference
is ensured by language communities. Whereas members of language com-
munities continuously and implicitly correct their interlocutors concern-
ing their language use (especially during acquisition), there is no similar
possibility for correction when it comes to concepts (at least not without
further premises).
In sum, it seems reasonable to acknowledge that language and thought
share some remarkable similarities, but there is also ample reason to as-
sume that the correspondence is not as strict as many scholars in semantics
presuppose. From a methodological point of view, it is therefore important
to treat both areas separately and not to aim for a semantic theory that is
designed to apply equally to both areas of research.
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7.1.3 Compatibility of Acquisition Theories and Theories of
Meaning
In chapter 2.2.1, I defended the claim that a theory of meaning must be
compatible with any theory of language acquisition, ideally with the cur-
rently most widely accepted theory. In a nutshell, the argument is that the
latter theories deal with the languages we actually speak and that if a the-
ory of meaning is supposed to account for our languages (English, Italian,
etc.), not any other (e.g. articial languages), it better be compatible with
its corresponding acquisition theories.
In this section, I shall now lay down the overall picture of how such a
compatibility can be veried. First, though, I need to illustrate why this is a
problem at all. Generally speaking, the way to prove incompatibility is by
deriving contradictory sentences from each theory. For example, the type
identity theory in philosophy of mind is incompatible with certain theolo-
gical theories that assume souls. The identity theory implies, let us assume,
that there can’t be souls; so the contradiction between the two theories lies
precisely in the armation and denial, respectively, of the sentence “There
are souls”. The reason it is so easy to derive contradictions in this case
is because both theories deal with the same subject matter.7 Their ‘object
of study’—I simplify, of course—is mental properties. One theory provides
an explanation of these properties by identifying them with brain states,
while the other theory explains them in terms of abilities of a non-material
entity that somehow aects and is aected by the body.
The identity thesis does not itself contain the denial of the sentence in
question among its theorems. Rather, some background assumptions are
needed in order to arrive there. In this case, one needs to assume that the
identity thesis is a comprehensive thesis that accounts for all mental phe-
nomena that there are. No further entities, which were not already pos-
tulated by the theory itself, are needed for the explanation of the mental.
In this sense, the identity thesis implies that there are no souls. This is
7 If this particular example does not move you (because you think that either their re-
spective objects of study are not identical, or because both theories do not contradict
themselves), then you may replace it accordingly. I am here interested in showing how
inter-theoretic contradiction works in general, no matter whether identity theory, as in
my example, is a particularly good example to demonstrate this.
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exactly the kind of reasoning also involved in the historic case of incom-
patibility between oxygen theory and phlogiston theory. There is, as it is
often put, simply no place within either theory for the entities postulated
by the respective rival theory.
In the context of theories of meaning and acquisition, the problem is that
both kinds of theory do not apply to the (exactly) same subject matter. Both
deal with natural languages. But the aspects they are focussing on are com-
pletely dierent. I have described in some detail what theories of meaning
are dealing with. These theories are not particularly interested in how lan-
guages are acquired. Rather, they take the status quo for granted and as
their starting point. On the other hand, issues of acquisition are handled
relatively independently from what meaning is. This is particularly true if
“theories of meaning” is meant to refer to philosophical theories. Whether
such an approach is justied does not matter in the present context. What
is important is that this is how both kinds of theories de facto currently
proceed.
All this makes it hard to check their compatibility. One could at this
point reasonably ask why questioning their compatibility is relevant at
all if, as admitted, their respective subject matters dier anyway. I have
shown that in order to check for incompatibility one would need to de-
rive contradictions. In turn, the compatibility of one theory with another
is not shown that easily. When comparing two theories, one can’t, as in
formal logic, prove that no contradictions are derivable. At least, this is not
as easy as in the opposite case (i.e. proving incompatibility). This is partly
due to the structure of philosophical theories. To name only two virtually
insurmountable problems, consider the following. Firstly, in contrast to
many empirical theories, philosophical theories often draw on plausibility
considerations, which, in turn, means that very often there is no fact of
the matter that could decide between two rival theories. Secondly, philo-
sophers seldom produce genuine theories—which, by the way, is nicely il-
lustrated by the fact that in philosophy many people call their respective
theories ‘framework’, ‘theory sketch’, ‘account’, ‘approach’, and so on. For
instance, what is called ‘Davidsonian semantics’ or ‘truth-conditional se-
mantics’ is typically associated with Davidson’s Truth and Meaning. But
most people would probably deny that Davidson’s theory is simply what
he says in this article. On the other hand, most people would probably
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agree that the claims made in Truth in Meaning are the theoretical core
of Davidsonian semantics. The most important claim being, arguably, his
conviction that a Tarskian theory of truth can be transformed into a theory
of meaning. But, again, this claim is not ‘the’ theory.
Generally, compatibility between theories is hard to prove, as it is very
often not entirely clear what the relevant theorems are in the rst place.
Also, there is probably no help to be expected from the eld of theory re-
duction. One might very easily have this impression, because if one theory
were reducible to another, then these theories are (in this sense) compatible
(e.g. chemistry might be ‘proven’ to be compatible with physics by showing
the reducibility of chemistry to physics). But this is of no help here because
the phenomena that both theories account for—language use and language
acquisition—are almost completely dierent, so that for this reason alone
they are hardly reducible to each other. Their alleged compatibility con-
cerns only the notion of “meaning” employed in both theories. Hence, in
order to show that a particular theory of meaning ts well with a given ac-
quisition theory, the most promising strategy seems to be to demonstrate
that their respective notions of ‘meaning’ match. For the present context,
inter-theoretic compatibility is the most interesting case. I have already
demonstrated why compatibility between theories of meaning and of ac-
quisition is a virtue. However, one immediate problem is that one would
rst need to nd areas within the respective theories that qualify for com-
parison. The only reasonable candidate is meaning itself, or, rather, the
denition of “meaning” employed by the relevant theories. Two comple-
mentary observations justify this claim.
Firstly, acquisition theories typically rely on the assumption that words
(or other basic units) have particular meanings. They do so because nat-
ural language is rst and foremost a communicative means. Meaning-
less expressions can be seen as artefacts of highly developed languages
that are irrelevant for acquisition processes. Utterances of ‘meaningless’
expressions—“Das Nichts nichtet”—arguably appear relatively late in on-
togeny. It may be that this is because they serve no clearly identiable
communication purpose.8
8 Whether there really is no communication purpose at all involved and, hence, no mean-
ing is probably debatable. For example, it might be that such sentences are meaningful
in the sense in which poems are meaningful.
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“Mama”, for example, typically one of the rst utterances made by tod-
dlers, clearly serves some such purposes; in many cases it is probably used
to attract attention. The explanation for this communication action is para-
sitic on “Mama” having the meaning it has—for example, that it refers9 to
a particular person (normally the mother). Importantly, though, the com-
munication success does not depend on the referential ‘success’. What is
relevant, rather, is that speakers achieve their goals. Still, the semantic as-
pects enter the picture indirectly. The semantic fact about “Mama” that
it refers to Mama—provided this is a fact—can explain why, very often,
toddlers are very often successful in attracting their mothers’ attention by
uttering “Mama”.10 The baby’s utterance would not have had the desired
eect if, according to the linguistic practice of the community in which
the baby participates, “Mama” actually refers to dentists. This holds if cer-
tain background conditions hold, which I am tacitly assuming here. Most
of them, I think, go without saying. In this particular case, I assume, for
example: (i) the mother knows the convention that “Mama” refers to dent-
ists; (ii) there is no ‘private’ convention established between the baby and
her mother that “Mama” refers to mothers (in the baby’s idiolect). In other
words, language acquisition and language use are intertwined. Describ-
ing scenarios of language acquisition implies recurring to how language
is actually applied. This lends support to my conviction that the notion
of ‘meaning’ employed in theories of acquisition should correspond to the
notion of ‘meaning’ that is applied in theories of meaning.
Secondly, the theories of meaning that are most interesting from the
current perspective are so-called ‘foundational theories’ (Speaks 2011) or
9 In 8.2 and 8.3, I say a bit more about the distinction between semantic description and
constitution base. Bearing this distinction in mind makes it easier to see why I see abso-
lutely no problem in using “refers to” in a supposedly usage-based semantic description.
10 Note that there is no relevant epistemological problem here in the sense that their
‘mother’ maybe is not their mother. This is irrelevant to the case at hand. For if that
were a dierent person but the baby intends to attract the attention of the person in
front of her, we would certainly not wish to call her linguistic activity ‘unsuccessful’ just
because she did not attract the attention of the person to whom her words ‘actually’ re-
ferred. This person maybe absent. But, anyway, this is not the person whose attention
the baby wanted to attract. So her linguistic behaviour is successful if she gets what she
wants. In this sense, it is, strictly speaking, wrong to say that in such a case toddlers’
“Mama” refers to Mama.
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‘reductionistic theories’. Theories of this kind explain the semantic prop-
erties of linguistic entities in terms of their underlying non-semantic prop-
erties. They acknowledge that (certain) expressions have meaning: they do
not ‘explain away’ the phenomena but explicate constitution relations that
seem to exist between non-semantic properties such as use and semantic
properties such as reference. Put simply, at least some linguistic entities
seem to be meaningful. Somehow they became meaningful, since strings
of letters as such are meaningless. Acquisition theories provide explana-
tions for this process and naturally complement theories of meaning in this
regard.
These two observations are two sides of a coin. In eect, they demand
that theories from both elds share a common notion of meaning. This is
the litmus test for both. However, as I have already shown above, there is
a certain asymmetry between the two (see especially 5.2). However, there
is a methodologically highly important asymmetry between philosophical
and empirical theories. Either of these theories can be falsied empirically.
Acquisition theories from psychology or anthropology as well as grammar
theories in linguistics are empirically informed anyway, whereas the rel-
evant philosophical theories of meaning are based—mainly—on armchair
methods. This means that theories of meaning have to comply with the
‘demands’ set by acquisition theories, grammar theories, and the like. The
latter are, so to speak, free to postulate meanings according to their respect-
ive explanatory needs. If, to cite just one prominent example, the theory
entails that the meaning of
X let alone Y
is
‘stronger proposition, a fortiori weaker proposition’ (Fillmore,
Kay & O’Connor 1988, 528, emphasis omitted)
you better make sure that an accompanying philosophical theory of mean-
ing ts this requirement. In this sense, the denitions of “meaning” em-
ployed in philosophy are constrained in a way by empirical enterprise (e.g.
by grammar theory). The underlying assumption here is that a philosoph-
ical theory of meaning generally aims at being empirically adequate. Em-
pirical theories, qua being empirical theories, have a greater overall like-
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lihood of being empirically adequate. Evidence that could possibly falsify
‘empirical’ theories typically comes from the very same disciplines that
produce these theories in the rst place. Hence, empirical theories con-
strain the empirical adequacy of philosophical theories, which, in turn,
amounts to saying that philosophical notions of ‘meaning’ should at least
cover the denitional variants applied in empirical disciplines (as in “X let
alone Y”).
7.2 Methodological Commitments
The purpose of this section is twofold. In 7.2.1, I provide a detailed argu-
ment for why it is a virtue of my theory that I am committed to the view
that a theory of meaning is essentially a theory of communication. Corres-
pondingly, in 7.2.2, I complement this line of reasoning by laying down my
reasons for the assumption that utterances, or, generally, instantiations of
types of meaningful expressions, are the basic semantic unit (rather than
the corresponding types).
7.2.1 Unity of Science
One particular advantage of my semantic framework is that it gives a uni-
ed account of communication. I shall say rst what the unity consists in;
then I say a few words about why I think it is an advantage at all.
Mainstream philosophical theories of meaning usually conne them-
selves to written texts and to oral speech based on written texts. By the lat-
ter, I mean that, rstly, they are often restricted to declarative sentences (cf.
also chapter 4.2), and, secondly, they are concerned with the alleged prop-
erties attributed to sentences and words, independent of the correspond-
ing occasions upon which they are uttered. Both directions are wrong-
headed (Tomasello 2003b). In regard to theories based on declarative sen-
tences, I have already argued that they are unable to successfully account
for other sentence types (cf. also Horwich 2008b). This seems to be the case
even though especially neo-Davidsonians have spent quite some eort on
broadening their theories in this respect. It is remarkable how much eort
people spend on adjusting a theory in such a way that it gets applicable to
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all kinds of sentences, although it was actually designed to handle only the
semantics of declaratives.
The present proposal, on the other hand, applies (or is applicable) across
the board. This is true in two related respects. In regard to utterances, no
type of sentence is theoretically more relevant than any other. For instance,
it might be that the ‘unifying feature’ of communication (i.e. of utterances)
is that it fosters cooperation. In contrast, it might be that the semantics
of certain types of sentences can be explained in terms of the semantics of
other sentence types (e.g. questions in terms of declaratives). In this sense,
utterances are theoretically on a par in a way that types of sentences are
not. In another respect, the proposal is even more general. It is a sketch of
a semantic theory that concerns not only categories that traditionally have
been assumed to belong to the realm of semantics—written and spoken
sentences—moreover, it is also an approach that is concerned with all as-
pects of communication. Communication is viewed here as a means that
is embedded in other human activities. Accordingly, one idea underlying
the methodology of this book is rst to look more closely at the structure
of these activities in order to nd out about meaning.
Regarding this second point—exibility in emphasising dierent aspects
of a communication situation—the advantages of my own framework are
rooted in the liberal notion of ‘meaning’ in use here. If meaning were just
any description that is informative (relative to a given theory framework),
then many dierent things might count as more or less important in par-
ticular scenarios. In this context, it is highly relevant that, for example, the
dispositions that individual speaker-hearers associate with a given term
are dened schematically on my account. The dispositions actually ac-
quired are those that correspond to what an otherwise competent speaker
would take into account as relevant relative to her evidence. Another im-
portant point in my theory sketch is the emphasis on tokens or tokenings.
This allows me to say that in individuating the things that ultimately can
be said to be meaningful one can’t just focus on certain formal properties
such as sequentially ordered letters (“s”-“n”-“o”-“w”). Rather, individuating
meaningful units necessarily involves stating the conditions under which
sender (speaker) and receiver (hearer) act in a given communication situ-
ation. Amongst other things, the factors that inuence meaning are inton-
ation, gesture, facial expression, body movement, spatial context, visual
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eld (of sender and recipient), text genre, world knowledge, etc.—things
that are typically ‘not allowed’ in a formal theory (cf. e.g. Borg 2004b).
Both in terms of the phenomena that are covered as well as in terms of
the resources that are needed to account for these phenomena, the notion
of ‘meaning’ in the present framework is very broad. What are the advant-
ages of such a strategy? The following will be rather programmatic. I shall
argue for each point only very briey. In any case, I believe that—from a
methodological perspective—an approach that is as universal as possible is
marked by these merits:
(1) A universal theory covers areas that are left out by its more minimal
rivals, which, however, need to be dealt with somewhere in philosophy
anyway (e.g. communication, language evolution, diachrony, coopera-
tion, etc.).
(2) The phenomena a theory of meaning is designed to explain suggest a
unied approach.
(3) Inuential strands of current empirical research are based on a usage-
based understanding of language.
(4) A universal understanding of ‘meaning’ is implicitly assumed in a vari-
ety of established theories in philosophy.
(5) A range of dierent modalities that contribute to utterance meaning
can be accounted for within one theory of meaning (e.g. verbal, ges-
tural, contextual, and so on).
Ad (1): The framework developed here is more like a ‘theory of com-
munication’ than a ‘theory of meaning’ or a ‘semantic theory’ in the sense
of classical 20th century philosophy of language. Its scope is signicantly
widened as to include phenomena that thus far have been considered to
either belong to pragmatics (e.g. metaphor) or which have been widely
neglected by philosophers of language altogether (e.g. posture). One of
the most important points that, I believe, justies such a procedure is that
those aspects that have been neglected by traditional semantic theories still
need to be accounted for; for instance by an ‘accompanying’ theory of com-
munication. Gesture, posture, facial expression, etc. on the one hand and
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metaphor, malapropisms, irony, etc. on the other hand simply are import-
ant aspects of communication, though. Whereas I concede that semantics
in the classical sense is important in some areas (e.g. irony), I think that
it is fair enough to say that semantics is an area of research that can’t be
pursued independently of communication.11 But if that much is agreed on,
it seems quite natural to pursue a comprehensive theory of communication
rather than two independently developed theories. In any case, one needs
a theory that takes care of the mentioned phenomena.
The last claim is probably pretty uncontroversial. Everyone who agrees
with it could, of course, stress that this is just the point of having a theory
of pragmatics and a theory of communication, whose job is to complement
semantics. So, the problematic aspect of my claims is the other half of
the argument. If we only knew that certain aspects must be covered by
any theory, then it would suce to just have two appropriate approaches
for both areas (semantics and pragmatics/communication). First, build a
more or less minimalistic semantic theory. Then, in a second step, build
accompanying theories that, in conjunction with minimalistic semantics,
account for all ‘remaining’ aspects of communication.
However, a recurring theme in the foregoing chapters is that the given
phenomena demand rather a one-step strategy. One crucial aspect is that
all well-formed utterances necessarily mean something in some pragmatic
sense, whereas this meaning can only sometimes be traced back to mean-
ing in the semantic sense. Irony and related systematic eects are typical
example cases in which tracing back actually is successful. That there are
other areas in which such tracing back does not work means that, strictly
speaking, a semantic theory completely leaves out a rather wide eld of ut-
terances. Namely all those utterances that clearly have meaning, in which
case, however, this meaning does not systematically depend on the alleged
meanings of its constituents (see sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.4 for examples and
discussion). So, the rst step of a two-step strategy would be massively
and systematically incomplete in these cases, which is a rather unwelcome
result.
Ad (2): Moreover, in order to account for the pragmatic meaning of ut-
terances that can be traced back to some form of ‘primary meaning’, it
11 For example, because semantic meaning is parasitic on utterance meaning.
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is not necessary—and therefore not demanded by the phenomena—to as-
sume primary meaning in the sense that was relevant in the 20th century
philosophy of language (in particular, primary meaning dened in terms of
reference, satisfaction, and truth conditions). Rather, only a very minimal
notion of ‘primary meaning’ is required here (cf., again, section 5.1.2). From
this point of view, primary meaning can be explained in terms of pragmatic
meaning, rather than the other way around. At the same time, it is still
possible to explain why, for example, “hot”, if used ironically, means ‘cold’.
Simply put, this is because “hot” normally means ‘hot’. Due to its normal
meaning, “hot” has a relatively high chance of meaning ‘cold’ in specic
situations.12 Therefore, one major motivation for a two-step strategy (rst
semantics, then pragmatics) is dropped.
A related argument that is relevant in this context concerns the pre-
vailing emphasis on literal meaning in the philosophy of language. The
historical origin probably lies in the fact that philosophy was for a long
time concerned exclusively with written texts.13,14 Most communication,
however, takes place in the form of conversation. Written texts lack a lot of
the characteristic properties of conversations. In particular, texts lack con-
textual cues that normally help interpreters to determine the reading of an
utterance that they think is the most probable one, given what they are
able to gure out about the speaker’s intentions. Traditionally, a further
emphasis was on declaratives, which, again, form only a subset of actual
spoken communication. The example sentences that were most inuential
are exemplary for this tendency: cf. “Snow is white”, “Socrates is white”,
12 All things considered, the likelihood is higher than in the case of, say, “rectangular”.
13 A good starting point for getting an overview here is by consulting the relevant
‘literal/non-literal’ literature. Israel (2005) is an easy-to-read review article. Ravid & Tol-
chinsky (2002) discuss the distinction from a developmental perspective. Ariel (2002a)
is a rather critical discussion; cf. also her introduction to a special issue of the Journal
of Pragmatics on this topic (Ariel 2002b), plus the other articles therein. Historically,
Cresswell (1982) might be interesting as well.
14 One of the readers of this book rightly remarked that the prevailing emphasis on written
text was probably fostered by the fact that the study of language very often served pur-
poses other than studying it for its own sake. Rather, since ancient times people tended
to study texts in order to gain insights in areas that they thought were intimately related
to language such as ontology, epistemology, philosophy of mind, etc. Studying language
for its own sake is a rather modern phenomenon in philosophy.
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“It’s raining”, “The cat lies on the mat”, “The Earth is round”, “That man
over there is drinking a Martini”, “Nine is the number of the planets”, and
so on and so forth.
So, a theory of meaning should, rstly, recognise that most communica-
tion takes place orally, and, secondly, that declarative sentences are just a
subset of all actually uttered sentences. However, looking at history of ana-
lytic philosophy of language this way helps us to see more clearly where
its potential decits come from. Traditionally minded theories of meaning
have never ignored the research areas I am taking into account here. For
instance, much research into truth-conditional semantics is inspired by the
question how to incorporate questions into TCS (references in footnote 46
on page 155), to name just one prominent example. Ignorance is not the
issue. Rather, the problem with all these attempts that are supposed to x
established theories is the following. They are all based on the unfounded
assumption that written declarative sentences are somehow basic, and that
the semantics of all other types of sentences is derivable from the semantics
of declaratives, or can at least be modelled in analogy to them.
One hardly ever sees serious arguments for giving priority to written
texts (as opposed to conversation) or to declaratives (as opposed to other
types of sentences). When it comes to such methodological concerns, prag-
matic considerations are typically brought in. The reasons for starting
one’s theory of meaning with simple declarative sentences are, I think,
partly justied, and partly unjustied. It makes sense to study the se-
mantics of simple sentences rst, leaving complex issues out, and then ex-
pand these ndings to more dicult areas. For example, one often sees
that indexicals, adjectives, quantiers, colour terms, etc. are initially post-
poned, because taking them into account from the beginning would un-
necessarily complicate things (cf. Portner 2005). Subject to the possibility
of expanding one’s simple theory to more dicult areas, such a strategy
seems reasonable. Simplifying, however, can’t justify the recurring restric-
tion to declaratives and written texts in many theories. Especially bearing
in mind that declaratives or written texts per se are not ‘easier’ to study
than, say, commands or transcripts of conversations.
It is impossible to make context-free, meaningful statements. Meaning-
ful statements always involve context, i.e. descriptions of meaningful state-
ments necessarily involve contextual descriptions. Semantics, to be sure,
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is concerned not with statements but with sentences. Sentences, however,
are abstractions of contextually determined content. They are not out there
in the world (except as tokenings), and hence can’t be the data of our ob-
ject of study.15 The relevant data are written and spoken instantiations of
sentences. Which is to say that if one focuses on the available data alone,
one’s object of study necessarily involves context. To view semantics as
that area which is concerned with the part of human communication that
can be studied independently from context can mean two things (at least).
It might mean that semantics should not be concerned with statements
but rather with sentences (i.e. sentence types); or it might mean that se-
mantics should be concerned with statements, but instead of dealing with
particular statements it should be concerned with the general properties
of statements of a given type. I shall discuss both options in turn, arguing
that both are inadequate to make the point.
Semantics is an empirical project.16 As such, the ultimate source for
judgements about meaning must be tokenings (e.g. of sentences). Abstract
15 It is quite telling in this regard to consider again Borg’s example that is intended to
demonstrate that she is able to comprehend sentential content irrespective of context.
She says (2004b, 89–90) that without any contextual cues she is, in a situation in which
“There is an alligator in the corridor” was uttered, able to understand that this sentence
means that there is an alligator in the corridor (see section 6.2.1). But this is absurd. In a
situation in which contextual factors that could possibly trigger a specic interpretation
are completely lacking, this is the relevant context.
16 This is pretty much common sense in philosophy as well as, obviously, in linguistics.
In linguistics, there are basically two strands of research. One is intuition-based, which
means that the main source for determining, e.g., the grammaticality of sentences is the
scholar’s (i.e. trained linguist’s) intuition. This strand of research assumes that, broadly
speaking, the fact that all linguistic judgements (with respect to grammaticality, sentence
meaning, etc.) are based on intuitions anyway, and that this circumstance licenses an ap-
proach that is based only on one’s own intuition. The opposite to this is corpus-driven,
i.e. usage-based research (cf. section 3.3.2). The mark of corpus-based approaches is that
grammaticality judgements (and the like) are validated by looking at—usually quite big—
corpora. From a philosophical point of view, calling intuitions-based research ‘empirical’
may sound a bit odd. But viewed from within linguistics, everyone agrees that linguist-
ics should be conceived empirically; the dispute between corpus- and intuition-based
researchers just concerns the proper methodology. In philosophy, the situation is a bit
more complicated. I shall be going more into the details in the main text. Note, however,
that even Davidson construes truth-conditional semantics as an empirical endeavour
(1967, 311).
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entities such as sentence types can’t be studied directly. That is, even if
semantics is conned to the study of sentences, it ultimately needs to be
tested against the available evidence, which is utterances (or, concerning
written texts, tokenings). This, again, amounts to saying that semantics as
the study of sentence types can’t be pursued independently of contexts, i.e.
independently of utterances that instantiate the relevant types. The means
to validate meaning judgements are essentially context-bound.
The second option does not fare any better. The proposal would be to
focus not on particular utterances, which in fact are always embedded in
contexts, but on their general, non-token-specic properties. The problem
here is this: insofar as that means studying commonalities of utterances,
it amounts to the very same strategy defended in this book. For example,
the primary meaning of the word “snow” might be that it is, say, usually
used to refer to snow. Far from being a statement about the properties that
“snow” has independently from specic contexts, this only means that—
within the class of all actual “snow” tokenings—a homogeneous subset can
be determined, the most prominent property of which is that many of its
elements are utterances that have been used to refer to snow. That is a
generalisation (or abstraction17, if you like) concerning the utterances of
“snow” that is essentially bound to contexts, namely in that the general-
isation is true by virtue of the contextual properties of individual “snow”
tokenings.
In sum, the phenomena require that semantics takes into account con-
texts. In this respect, an approach that focuses solely on written texts, in
particular on declarative sentences, is inadequate, as it is based on an inac-
curate picture of how sentence/word types (abstractions of sentence/word
tokenings) get their semantics. Generally, focusing only on declaratives
is inadequate, given that one’s aim is a universally applicable theory of
meaning (Fotion 2013).
Ad (3): Empirical research and philosophical, apriori research develop
widely independently in the area of semantics. That is, both ‘strands’ share
a common subject of study, but the respective research agendas and meth-
odologies diverge signicantly. Allow me to take for granted that one ma-
jor keystone of philosophical thinking is its empirical foundation, or less
17 In Tomasello’s (2003a) way of using this term.
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poetically: philosophical theories of meaning must respect the develop-
ments taken by research in linguistics, psychology, anthropology, cognitive
science, etc. and must themselves develop accordingly. Given this, a third
argument in support of a unied theory of communication is that current
developments in empirical disciplines suggest such a theory.18
The most important developments in this regard are: the increasing
importance of construction grammar in grammar theory (Goldberg 2003,
Ziem & Lasch 2013); the theoretical framework of shared intentionality
inspired by Tomasello in language acquisition (Tomasello 2014); the To-
masellian paradigm in language evolution (2008, 2009); research on the
semantics of gestures and, in general, multimodality (Müller et al. 2013).
To be sure, the list is not comprehensive. But it concerns core areas of
semantics that just can’t be neglected. And although CxG, for example,
is certainly not entirely undisputed within linguistics, its importance has
increased so rapidly in recent years that philosophy of language needs to
acknowledge this.19
The philosophically important aspect of these developments—which is
also their common feature—is that they do not leave the semantics/pragma-
tics divide unaected. Relative to the underlying denition of “semantics”,
the cited research agendas either abandon the distinction altogether (many
areas within CxG) or, at least, shift the edge massively towards pragmatics
(Tomasello’s work). The latter means that elements which traditionally be-
longed to pragmatics are now considered part of semantics (for example,
world knowledge). This gives indirect support to a unied approach to
semantics, since frameworks that take declarative sentences as basic cru-
cially depend on a clear-cut distinction between semantics and pragmatics.
Strands of research that tendentiously neglect the semantics/pragmatics
divide or include context-sensitive elements into their semantics thus lend
indirect support to a unied theory.
18 To be fair, this is controversial:
The notion of communication has little demonstrated use in the develop-
ment of a synchronic theory of meaning. (Horisk 2004, 197)
19 Cf. also Homann & Trousdale (2013) and Michaelis (2006, 2012, 2013).
285
7 Semantic-Methodological Concerns
Ad (4): Established, philosophical theories of meaning pretend to indi-
viduate meaningful entities in terms of their formal structure. They thus
assume that the sequence “s”-“n”-“o”-“w” is relevant for identifying the
word type “snow”, which, again, is said to have a particular meaning. In
other words, the relevant unit of entities to which meanings can be at-
tributed are word types, which, from this perspective, can be individu-
ated strictly formally. The identity criterion of a given entity concerning
whether it belongs to a certain word type is, according to this view, a spe-
cic sequence of letters, for instance. Structurally, the same is true for
identity conditions of sentence types. Presumably, they can also be indi-
viduated formally.
The point is: in this view, sentences seem to be individuated without
taking any contextual factors into account.20 The latter are only mentioned
when extraordinary situations are discussed, or when pragmatics comes
into play. This underestimates the importance of context for determining
meaning. In contrast, in the view defended here, context is always relevant
for determining meaning. Even more importantly, the cited formal strategy
underestimates the importance of contexts in cases in which no context is
explicitly given. So, the gist of the present argument is: not mentioning
contexts is the only viable way to state context-free meaning.
If someone says that “snow is white” means <snow is white>, then, I take
it, there are essentially the following two options. One option is that she is
just plain wrong, for the sequence “s”-“n”-“o”-“w”-SPACE-“i”-“s”-SPACE--
“w”-“h”-“i”-“t”-“e” as such does not mean anything. Surely, the sequence is
often used in such a way as to express <snow is white>. But that is not what
people usually mean when they say that “snow is white” means <snow is
white>. (It would not help, anyway.) Another option is that they are right,
but only relative to certain contexts. Without diving into the deep waters
of dening “standard contexts”, it seems quite plausible to suppose that
in standard contexts “snow is white” means ‘snow is white’ (or expresses
<snow is white>). I think that this is what is meant when philosophers
write about “snow is white” having this and that meaning. The context
in which they make their statements also ensures that their words get in-
terpreted in a particular way. The observation is blatantly trivial but still
20 Save for contextual features necessary for word disambiguation.
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worth being mentioned here. One simply never makes context-free state-
ments. If I say that “snow is white” means ‘snow is white’ and if that state-
ment is part of a book entitled ‘Philosophical Semantics 101’ and if I do not
mention any particular contexts of utterance and if in the paragraphs pre-
ceding this statement nothing can be read o that would signal a certain
reading, then all this is the relevant context. This context determines, as it
de facto very often does, that my statement about the meaning of “snow
is white” is meant relative to standard contexts (in which case it would be
true in the actual world).
Imagine someone replies as follows. Agreed, “snow is white” means
‘snow is white’ in standard contexts. But this is not what I am pointing
at when I say—without saying anything else—that “snow is white” means
‘snow is white’. Rather, I indicate the conventional meaning that “snow is
white” has independently of conversational contexts. Standard contexts
leave the conventional meaning unaected, so to speak. This is why ut-
terances of “snow is white” in such contexts might mean ‘snow is white’.
In other contexts, it might mean something else: but only due to the fact
that its conventional meaning, irrespective of particular contexts, is ‘snow
is white’.
This is putting the cart before the horse. Conventions are regularities in
behavioural patterns. That a word has conventional meaning means that
people use it somewhat regularly, namely in accordance with some con-
vention they associate with it. The conventions for “snow”, for example,
require that it is used to refer to snow (or so I assume for the sake of argu-
ment). So the just-cited counterargument amounts to saying that because
“snow” has this conventional meaning, it can be used to refer to snow in
standard contexts, referring to something else otherwise. But note that in
order to say what is conventional about “snow”, you need to recur to stand-
ard contexts. If the context does not indicate anything dierent, “snow”
means ‘snow’. Or, in the jargon of my proposal: within all actual “snow”
instantiations, a subclass can be extracted the elements of which are more
or less homogeneous in that they are similar in one important respect.
Namely, they are all used in order to refer to snow. So, even if meaning
statements were interpreted as expressing something about the conven-
tional meaning of a given word (if such a thing exists), this is a statement
that is essentially based on the assumed circumstance that this word has
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specic meaning in specic contexts. In other words, both epistemolo-
gically and metaphysically, context-bound tokenings are primary relative
to the types they instantiate. Hence, a faithful description of supercially
‘context-free’ meaning statements like “‘snow is white’ means that snow
is white” would acknowledge that the relevant conversational contexts are
implicitly mentioned.
Ad (5): See 2.2.4. The basic idea here is that the desideratum of a com-
prehensive theory of meaning to being able to integrate multimodal com-
positionality is a more a less direct consequence of my assumption that
the basic unit in semantics is utterances. If full-blown utterance meaning
is at least partly determined in a non-trivial way by gestures, then one
ought to ensure that one’s theory is capable of accommodating this fact. I
emphasise “non-trivial”, because, as I have shown above, some gestures—
in particular pointing gestures—already have been taken into account by
philosophical theories. However, gestures have typically been integrated in
relatively trivial cases, e.g. with respect to reference-xing. Here, gestures
merely serve the purpose of, for example, increasing salience. The prob-
lem, though, is that a great deal of gestures are signicantly more complex
than basic pointing gestures. Therefore, a theory should be able to integ-
rate them as well, in order to then explain how gestures can serve as proper
‘constituents’, as it were, in the determination of utterance meaning.
A universal approach to communication, as I suggest it here, is particu-
larly well-equipped to meet this requirement. The most important reason
is that both constitutive basis of meaning (use) as well as meaning itself
(semantic description) are described schematically. That is, basically all
empirically adequate descriptions are ‘permissible’ in my view. With re-
spect to use, this is straightforward. The use of a gesture is just the way
a certain gesture type gets instantiated (relative to one’s classications of
gesture types). The semantic description is probably best given in terms
of dispositional analyses. Importantly, I propose no constraint whatsoever
on semantic descriptions—i.e. ways of stating meaning—other than their
empirical adequacy. All descriptions of the semantics of gestures that are
available on the market are essentially usage-based. So, although I am not
able to present a full-blown account of multimodality at this point, I think
that the available evidence in gesture research suggests that gestural se-
mantics should be described in usage-based vocabulary and be based, rst
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and foremost, on a theory of communication. In the following few para-
graphs, I shall justify the claim underlying my argument—namely that ut-
terances are the basic objects of study in semantics.
7.2.2 Basic Meaningful Entities
What are the basic meaningful units? In philosophy, the most widely dis-
cussed proposals are sentences and words.21 Words have the signicant
advantage that they t so well to compositionality arguments and system-
aticity/productivity. Sentences, on the other hand, are seldom considered
to be the basic semantic unit. The classical arguments in favour of words
are not convincing, because they do not make sense with respect to the
logic of language acquisition.
If language faculty is not (fully) innate, then the material language lear-
ners are confronted with must somehow determine their success in the
acquisition of language skills. This is true for all relevant aspects; it cer-
tainly holds for learning meaning. Children, for example, are confronted
with instantiations of sentences. They hardly ever learn the semantics of
words from hearing isolated words. Accordingly, children’s ability to learn
the meaning of individual words must derive from their ability to under-
stand (context-relativised) full sentences rst (Tomasello 2003a). A nice
side eect of theories which posit that sentences are the basic semantic
units is that this goes hand in hand with a plausible account of syntax ac-
quisition. The currently successful and inuential accounts of language
acquisition such as Tomasello’s do not make a fundamental distinction
between the acquisition of syntax and the acquisition of the lexicon. In
general, the distinction between semantic knowledge and syntactic know-
ledge is signicantly blurred in CxG, since both ‘kinds’ of information are
jointly represented by constructions (cf. subsection 2.2.1). The linguistic
reason for this is that in construction grammar all form–meaning pairings
21 In linguistics, another important unit in semantics is morphemes. In CxG, though, the
status of morphemes is controversial (Ziem & Lasch 2013, 12). From a philosophical
point of view, the relevant divide is between, if you like, ‘atomistic’ approaches (morph-
emes, words, etc.) and approaches that consider sentences as basic units. Philosophically
speaking, it is not particularly important whether one makes a fuss about the priority of
words, morphemes, suxes, syntactic structures, and the like.
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(constructions) belong to the so-called constructicon, which is an assembly
of constructions covering semantic, syntactic, pragmatic, and sometimes
discourse-functional information. In the same way that learning words
is basically learning to recognise patterns across multiple instantiations of
words, so learning syntax is basically also just an abstraction process. How-
ever, someone who thinks that words are basic—and hence must be learnt
individually—is forced to believe that syntax is also acquired piecemeal, not
by abstraction. There is no plausible acquisition theory for learning word
meaning individually.
Insofar as current acquisition theories suggest that sentences are ba-
sic, an accompanying philosophical theory of meaning should do likewise.
However, one needs to be more specic with the terminology here. Thus
far I have taken for granted, as is common practice in philosophy, that it
is self-evident how to individuate sentences. Outside of philosophy, the
status of sentences is less clear. It is actually quite hard to give a satisfying
denition of “sentence”. Sentences are certainly not merely what stands
between two full stops. Judging from the available evidence in linguistics,
the unit ‘sentence’ is not applicable to all areas of research anyway (e.g.
spoken-language research). More importantly, talk of sentences in acquis-
ition theories typically refers to utterances, i.e. sentence tokenings. When
children are confronted with sentences, they are of course confronted with
instances, not with types. So, from all this one may reasonably conclude
that the basic meaningful unit in a philosophical theory of meaning that
respects the empirical evidence should actually be utterances. Utterances
have all the advantages one would like them to have, in particular:
(i) Utterances are easily recognisable;22
22 Typically, people assume that especially sentence types (as opposed to utterances) are
easily identiable, i.e. by virtue of formal properties such as sequences of letters. How-
ever, one immediate problem here, which, e.g., Borg (2004b) acknowledges, is that word
disambiguation takes place on the basis of contextual information beyond the reach of
formal semantics (e.g. world knowledge). To solve this problem, Borg suggests that prag-
matic processes might play a role in disambiguation prior to semantic processing. In
contrast, recognising utterances including utterance meaning is pretty straightforward
from the outset: in describing utterances (and their meaning) one is allowed to use just
any contextual information that might be relevant.
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(ii) Utterances are real in that language learners actually experience them;23
(iii) Due to their context relativity, utterances have determinate mean-
ing;24
(iv) Utterances t nicely with an overall usage-based methodology.25
I do not assume that this cursory list is read as a concluding argument
‘against’ (word/sentence) types in semantic theories. However, I do think
that the evidence collected in this section—together with the considera-
tions in previous chapters—indicates that a token-based approach to se-
mantics has some signicant virtues, without neglecting the type-level
properties of expressions. For type properties can be explained in terms
of token properties.
23 Utterances are real in a sense in which sentences are not. Sentences understood as sen-
tence types are real in that their tokenings instantiate the relevant type. But the type
itself is just an abstraction. In this respect, language learners can’t be directly acquain-
ted with sentences themselves but only with their instances. This, however, eectively
amounts to saying that what people experience is utterances.
24 As I have shown in chapter 5, it makes sense to attribute meaning to all utterances and
to attribute primary meaning only to a subclass of these. In this view, word types and
sentence types derive their ‘primary meaning’ from regular expectations of language users
concerning usage. Accordingly, sentences in contexts can be viewed as the primary object
of study in semantics.
25 Cf. section 6.2. At any rate, this holds if the slogan ‘meaning is use’ is not taken at
face value but specied somewhat more precisely. One variant (i.e. Horwich’s) is to
cash out the motto in terms of use properties (acceptance properties). Use properties,
however, even if they concern types of meaning—as they must do—are nevertheless cru-
cially determined by the tokenings associated with a given word type. Therefore, a serious
usage-based theory of meaning should rather build its central thesis on the concept of
word/sentence tokens, rather than on their corresponding types.
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The aim of this chapter is to step back and take a look at the big picture
that emerged in the foregoing chapters. To this end, I take the main res-
ults of these chapters for granted. This chapter may be read as a brief
summary. Though I think it is slightly more accurate to conceive of it as
an outlook for potential future research, since, admittedly, the framework
that I present here is really a framework. There are a range of topics worth
to investigating in greater detail. Most importantly, the fundamental claim
that meaning is total use, i.e. the sum of all actual word type instantiations,
needs to be specied more precisely than I have been able to do here.
The chapter starts o with a short remark on what I think are the most
important ‘results’ established in the book (8.1). After this, I will be dis-
cussing the relevance of tokenings in usage-based approaches, arguing that
usage-based theories of meaning are forced to adopt a token-focused view
on language (8.2). In 8.3, then, I explicate my view on the relationship
between, on the one hand, semantic descriptions (i.e. usage-based analyses)
and, on the other, the constitutive basis of meaning (i.e. use).
8.1 The Big Picture
In this section, I briey call to mind the four most important results of the
book (from my perspective). Expect no arguments here. They all can be
found in the relevant chapters.
The constitutive basis of meaning is use. In philosophy of language as
well as in linguistics, semantic theories divide into two main strands. The
above chapters showed that usage-based theories of meaning are more
advantageous in a variety of respects, especially in comparison to truth-
conditional semantics and its relatives. One main reason is TCS’s ongoing
tendency to deal solely with declaratives. This problem turned out to be
especially pressing in regard to utterances that serve a specic conversa-
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tional function. Another reason was the following: in individuating word
types, truth-conditional semanticists feel free to recur to use; whereas in
specifying the semantics they take into account only referential and truth-
functional relations. I showed that such an ad hoc divide between the
epistemology of semantics and semantic metaphysics is unwarranted. A
third ‘philosophical’ reason against truth-conditional semantics is that a
thorough review of the relevant literature reveals that a crucial argument
against use theories is unsupported by the evidence; all serious usage-based
theories on the market are compatible with compositionality and acknow-
ledge its importance.
Use theories are empirically validated. To be sure, that continues to be
controversial. But many inuential developments in empirical disciplines
base their respective theories on usage-based considerations, among them
most notably Michael Tomasello’s work on common ground, joint atten-
tion, and language development;1 most varieties of construction grammar
(especially the ‘cognitive’ variants (cf. Ziem & Lasch 2013), i.e. Croft (2001),
Goldberg (1995), and Langacker (2008)); and some inuential linguistic sub-
disciplines concerned with perspectives (Evans 2012). It would be silly to
deny that other areas of empirical research work with dierent assump-
tions. But it seems relatively safe to say that (i) the mentioned areas gained
some weight in the last two decades, which gives ‘philosophical’ usage-
based theories some indirect support, and (ii) to the extent that empirical
researchers are justied in basing their theories on usage-based assump-
tions, it is the philosopher’s duty to provide them with an adequate basis.
No established usage-based theory works perfectly. This is a major premise
that I take to be justied by the above discussion. I have shown that Paul
Horwich’s theory is today the by far most plausible account of such a the-
ory of meaning. Therefore, if it turns out that this theory only insuciently
accounts for meaning (as I think is the case), this complaint applies a for-
tiori to other usage-based theories as well.2 I think it is fair to say that
1 Tomasello’s habit of starting six out of nine chapters of Constructing a Language with a
quote from the later Wittgenstein is quite telling in this regard.
2 Horwich gives the following overview of related theoretical frameworks:
What I shall be calling “the use theory of meaning” is intended to answer the
question: in virtue of which of its underlying properties does a word come
to possess the particular meaning it has? The theory I am going to articulate
294
8.1 The Big Picture
Horwich’s theory is considered ‘state of the art’ in today’s usage-based
philosophy of language. So the controversial aspect of my own framework
is not so much what I say about other theories, but my misgivings con-
cerning Horwich’s ideas. The major problems that I have discussed above
(in chapter 6) can only be summarised very briey here. Although strictly
departing from the truth-conditional mainstream (cf. also Horwich 2008b),
Horwich keeps focussing on declarative sentences. This leads him to pro-
pose acceptance properties as a general solution to the problem of how to
cash out use properties. Both the idea to spell out the general disposition to
apply ‘referential’ words (words like “dog”, “red”, etc.) in terms of accept-
ance and the accompanying idea to have a unied framework in which all
word types get the same kind of underlying property associated (i.e. ac-
ceptance) is brilliant. Yet, I think that the constraint on acceptance is only
due to the focus on declaratives—a factor that severely limits the theory’s
scope.
Compositionality is conceptually tightly linked with language use. This
counter-intuitive result is justied by combining several consequences es-
tablished in the prior chapters. Basically, it all boils down to the question:
what are the demarcation lines for semantics? In particular, the relevant
question is where to separate semantics from pragmatics, and where to sep-
arate semantics from issues of communication. In line with the principle of
the Primacy of the Phenomena (dened in 7.1.1), I propose acknowledging
the explanatory priority of communication over semantics. Simply put,
communication (not semantics) is a proper phenomenon, hence the ad-
equacy of linguistic theories in this area is determined by what is required
to explain communication (not semantics). This aects one’s understand-
ing of what constitutes an utterance. If non-verbal aspects can be poten-
tial constituents of utterance meaning, then these non-verbal aspects—e.g.
gestures—must be assigned appropriate meanings. These meanings, again,
must be formulated (or must in principle be re-formulatable) in a semantic
bears certain anities to ideas in the works of Wittgenstein [(2009)], Sellars
[(1954, 1963, 1969)], Field [(1977)], Harman [(1982, 1987)], Block [(1986)],
Peacocke [(1992)], Brandom [(1994)], Cozzo [(1994)], and other philosophers
whose views could reasonably be labelled use theories of meaning. (1998,
43)
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framework that would make them compatible with verbal constituents. In
general, multimodal compositionality seems to favour usage-based mean-
ing descriptions.
These intermediate results suggest that the relevant empirical disciplines
are particularly likely to combine with some variant or other of usage-
based semantics, i.e. they suggest that we need some use theory; but these
considerations do not unequivocally determine the exact structure of such
a theory. It is to this issue that I now turn. The answer depends crucially on
one’s conception of “meaning” itself. Or, in other words, being clear about
one’s favoured notion of “meaning” means committing oneself to a specic
theory. The following sections aim at bringing together some puzzle pieces
scattered over previous sections of the present book.
8.2 Use, Token, Constitution
Let me begin with the notion of ‘use’ employed in this book. A central
distinction in philosophy in general, and in philosophy of language in par-
ticular, concerns the type/token dierence. In slogan form, a use theory
says simply that meaning is use. Is use best spelled out in terms of word
types or in terms of tokens? I think the only reasonable answer here is:
tokens. When people claim that meaning is use (and the like), then they
surely mean actual use—in fact, this is the only viable option. But types are
abstract descriptions. They can’t be used. They can only be ‘used’ insofar
as a type can be instantiated. But instantiations of a word type are tokens,
again.
This is pretty much in line with what William Croft, one of the most
prominent defenders of Construction Grammar, says when, in describing
language change, he points out that
An utterance is a particular, actual occurrence of the product
of human behavior in communicative interaction (i.e. a string
of sounds), as it is pronounced, grammatically, structured, and
semantically and pragmatically interpreted in its context. [. . . ]
An utterance as dened here is a spatiotemporally bounded
individual. Thus, unlike sentences, only actually occurring
tokens count as utterances in our sense. It is critical to the the-
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ory of language change that utterances be actually occurring
language; recall that selection operates only over actual, not
possible, alternatives. Since an utterance is an actually exist-
ing entity, all levels of its structure are included, in particular
its specic pronounciation and meaning in context as intended
by the speaker and interpreted by the hearer [. . . ]. (2000, 26)
Theories of meaning that are bound to the usage-based tradition appar-
ently do not simply claim that meaning is use. But they do insist, in some
form or other, that the meaning of words is determined by the way they are
used. That is to say, meaning—from this point of view—is determined by
instantiations/tokens. What is called a word type is, analogously, determ-
ined by tokenings. For example, the alleged ‘fact’ that “bank” is separable
into two distinct word types (‘institution’ vs ‘riverbank’) is determined by
“bank” tokenings, and the distinction is justied by structural dissimilarit-
ies within the set of all formally individuated tokens. Hence, it is relatively
easy to see that usage-based theories of meaning are forced to accept the
view that what constitutes meaning is tokenings. The types that are instan-
tiated by these tokens are theoretical constructs to systematise linguistic
data. To be sure, which type a given token is a token of is an essential aspect
of linguistic theory. For example, an ironic interpretation of “cool” might
mean ‘warm’ or ‘boring’, depending on the type of “cool” instantiated. But
typing is an post hoc issue; it is determined by the available evidence (i.e.
mere tokenings), not the other way around.
Given that for these reasons usage-based theorists are committed to re-
lativise their theory to word tokens, some immediate problems arise. The
basic issue here concerns meaning holism. Meaning holism can take many
dierent forms (Horwich 1998, 59–65). It often arises in the context of
inferentialism à la Brandom (1994). Inferentialism, or conceptual role se-
mantics, is the idea that the meaning of a word is determined by the specic
contribution it makes toward the ‘commitments’ one enters into by using
that word in declarative sentences (see especially pp. 157–166 of Making it
Explicit). For instance, by saying “This object is a cat” I am committed to
also claiming that “This object is an animal”. This is due to the conceptual
role of “cat”. I do not intend to go too much into the details here. But let me
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stress one particular diculty that conceptual role semantics shares with
token-based use theories.
Conceptual roles are necessarily dened holistically: if the meaning of
a given word is dened in relation to the meaning of related words (cf.,
in particular, Brandom 1994, 180–198), then each (word) meaning changes
with every change of the conceptual roles of related terms. This problem is
particularly pressing if one takes into account the varying idiolects of indi-
vidual speakers, e.g. that every speaker is competent with respect to a dif-
ferent set of words. The ‘commitments’ associated with individual words
can be related either directly to idiolects, or to whole language communit-
ies. In both cases, holism is a problem for word semantics spelt out in terms
of conceptual roles. In the former case, meaning would be constituted by
idiolects. This would imply dierent word meanings for every dialect—a
result that is hard to swallow. In the latter case, meaning would be con-
stituted by the sum of idiolects of, for instance, all competent speakers of
English. Here, meaning would not vary in between two persons. But, still,
holism would turn out problematic here, since meaning would change con-
tinuously. That is because the individual idiolects that constitute meaning
on this view change continuously as well. Either way, the holism implied
by inferentialism is problematic.
A token-based use theory faces a very similar diculty. This time mean-
ing variance enters not due to holistic concerns (indeed, I think my ap-
proach is immune to holism issues in general), but rather due to its focus
on tokens. The immediate—in fact, obvious—response to the proposal that
the meaning of a given term is the sum of all its actual instantiations is the
following: this can’t be right, for this would imply that meaning changes
with every new utterance of a term. True. The ‘variance’ in meaning in
conceptual role semantics would look absolutely harmless in comparison.
But then, it would seem, we face a paradox here: by their very nature, use
theories must be token-based; but explaining meaning in terms of token-
ings implies wild meaning variance. The solution that I proposed in the
foregoing chapters avoids these problems, yet at the same time it is really
simple.
The paradox, I should emphasise, is a paradox indeed, i.e. it is no di-
lemma. In particular, it is absolutely implausible to assume that a possible
way out would be to go for one of the two ‘horns’. Firstly, it is not an op-
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tion to deny that use theories are forced to take tokens as the basis of their
explanation, i.e. as the eventual formulation of their slogan that meaning
is use. To see this, consider all actual theories on the market, in particular
Wittgensteinian, Horwichian, Brandomian, or Sellarsian approaches. They
all essentially recur to word type tokenings.
Here, then, is a way of thinking about implicitly normative
social practices [e.g. linguistic/discoursive practices]. Social
practices are games in which each participant exhibits various
deontic statuses—that is, commitments and entitlements—and
each practically signicant performance alters those statuses
in some way. The signicance of the performance is how it
alters the deontic statuses of the practitioners. (Brandom 1994,
166)
Let us now turn our attention to rule obeying behavior. We
have already noted that it involves a distinction between game
and metagame, the former, or “object game” being played ac-
cording to certain rules which themselves are positions in the
metagame. Furthermore, we have emphasized that in an object
game played as rule obeying behavior, not only do the moves
exemplify positions specied by the rules (for this is also true
of mere pattern governed behavior where even though a rule
exists the playing organism has not learned to play it) but also
the rules themselves are engaged in the genesis of the moves.
(Sellars 1954, 214, my emphasis)
Think of all the facts regarding a person’s linguistic behaviour—
the sum of everything he will say, and in what circumstances.
The thesis [of the use theory] is that this constellation of data
may be unied and explained in terms of a relatively small and
simple body of factors and principles including, for each word,
a basic use regularity. (Horwich 1998, 45)
Suppose that the tools A uses in building bear certain marks.
When A shows his assistant such a mark, the assistant brings the
tool that has that mark on it. In this, and in more or less similar
ways, a name signies a thing, and is given to a thing.—When
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philosophizing, it will often prove useful to say to ourselves:
naming something is rather like attaching a name tag to a
thing. (Wittgenstein 2009, 10e, my emphasis)
In linguistics, the related notion of ‘usage-based semantics’ does not
mean quite the same as ‘usage-based theories’ in philosophy. Still, there
are more similarities between the two research directions than dierences.
In linguistics, it is even clearer that “usage-based” always means ‘token-
based’, because what usage-based linguists do, at the end of the day, is
analysing corpora. Corpora analysis is a paradigm example of a token-
focussed approach to meaning. Thus, both in empirical and in theoretical
research, a closer look at existing, established theories is enough to show
that there is no way around tokenings when it comes to usage-based the-
ories of meaning.
The second horn of the pseudo-paradox is acknowledging that there is
huge, in fact continuous, variance in word meaning, but to claim that this
is in fact unproblematic. This would be blatantly absurd, for language is, in
the long run, relatively stable. At least, it is as stable as to be not aected
by single tokenings. It takes some time until meaning changes occur. So
even if—as seems plausible—meaning shifts are caused by tokenings, one
tokening surely does not suce. Hence, the overall stability of natural
language meaning suggests that single tokens leave meaning unaected.
Accepting that the paradox is a proper paradox indeed, one must recon-
cile the two aims. As I already said above, it all hinges on one’s denition of
“meaning”. As I see things, it is possible to work with a denition of “mean-
ing” that is broad enough as to cover all ‘usages’ of “meaning” in relevant
sub-disciplines. I have already argued for a liberal stance towards com-
peting conceptions of “meaning” in dierent semantic theories. It is time
now to rene the rather naïve notion introduced in section 2.1. Replacing
it with a more sophisticated version, I still want to stick to the basic idea
that it makes sense to have a unied denition that puts dierent theoretic
frameworks under one umbrella.
The solution I want to propose here is to distinguish between the con-
stitution basis for meaning and an appropriate description thereof. This
distinction is relatively widespread in the relevant literature. In contrast,
the way this divide helps to solve serious problems in linguistics is seldom
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discussed in detail. In line with the way “meaning” is commonly employed
in everyday life and in empirical research, it might turn out fruitful to as-
sociate semantic descriptions with meaning as such, or, simply put, with
meaning. I take it that this proposal is in fact quite ‘conservative’, since to
a large extent it is simply an elegant way of systematising what is common
practice anyway (inside and outside academia). As distinguishing between
‘constitution basis’ and ‘semantic description’ is motivated mainly by the
paradox presented above, I shall jump into the details by discussing both
aspects of that paradox in turn.
To begin with, the metaphysical claim underlying all varieties of so-
called use theories is—in slogan form—that meaning is use. The problem-
atic step for each theory is to cash out this slogan appropriately. I have
already shown that the most natural way would be to spell out ‘use’ in
terms of instantiations/tokenings of a given word type. However, this
strategy would immediately face two problems already discussed above.
Firstly, this strategy would lead to the epistemological problem that, in
such an account, meaning would turn out to be de facto unknowable (save
exceptions like word coining). Secondly, continuous meaning shifts would
occur with every new tokening. Furthermore, it seems really problematic
to equate meaning directly with the sum of all actual word type instanti-
ations.
The natural solution to this is to equate the sum of all actual past in-
stantiations of a given word type not with meaning but with the constitution
basis for the meaning of that word type, i.e. with that fact that constitutes
the meaning of the word in question. I concede that this really sounds coun-
terintuitive at rst, but this impression vanishes as soon as this account is
linked to an appropriate conception of meaning (itself). In this view, the
meaning of a word is identical with the most ecient, most general way of
summarising the use of a word type as exemplied by the sum of all actual
past instantiations. I shall now discuss, step-by-step, possible problems and
objections, some of which have already been mentioned above. My aim is
to show that, in conjunction, both theses overcome these objections very
elegantly.
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8.2.1 Meaning Shis
First of all, let me note that the threat of extreme meaning shifts—i.e. shifts
accompanying each tokening—are avoided in this account. Meanings are—
as I will put it in what follows—ecient descriptions of use. But in contrast
to the constitution basis of meaning, meaning is not aected by individual
tokenings (save for some minor exceptions). Assuming that we are deal-
ing with ‘established’, normal, words of English like “dog”, “red”, “snow”,
“hello”, “Aristotle”, and so forth, it seems extraordinarily unlikely that the
eciency of the currently best description of their respective uses could
possibly be aected by individual word type instantiations. For example,
assuming that “‘Aristotle’ is used to refer to Aristotle” is currently the most
ecient summary of competent English speakers’ use of “Aristotle”, the
appropriateness would remain the same if, for example, I now say this: I
quite like Aristotles. Crucially, “I quite like Aristotles” involves an “Ar-
istotle” token whose interpretation, taken individually, can’t be explained
solely by referring to the above description.3 But that does not matter for
the appropriateness of the description. The description that is singled out
as the meaning of a word is, in my account, dened in relation to the sum
of all instantiations. And relative to this, the summarising description “‘Ar-
istotle’ is used to refer to Aristotle” is still most ecient; and it would con-
tinue to be the most ecient variant unless a signicant number of people
would decide to use “Aristotle” for structurally dierent purposes than for
referring to Aristotle.
At the same time, the framework can account for meaning shifts quite
easily. Moreover, it answers the use theorists’ intuition that meaning shifts
are intimately bound to tokenings. The reason is simply that, since mean-
ing is constituted by all word type instantiations, a certain amount of token-
ings may alter the meaning of a given term. To be sure, the amount varies
according to a huge variety of factors. The two most important ones are
probably these: (i) how established is the word and (ii) how central is it
relative to our ‘web of beliefs’ (Quine 1951)? The latter is particularly im-
portant, as there are whole classes of words that are hardly ever aected by
3 Note that by “interpretation” I mean ‘semantic interpretation’, as the point is that mean-
ing shifts, caused by individual tokenings, might lead to a situation in which a ‘literal’
interpretation of “I quite like Aristotles” is indeed possible and plausible.
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meaning shifts: proper names, logical constants, connectors, indexicals, to
name but a few. Philosophically speaking, it is indeed quite uninteresting
to determine an actual threshold here. For the general, abstract threshold
for meaning change is simply: the amount of tokenings it takes to make a
dierent description of the overall use more ecient.
8.2.2 Appropriate Descriptions
My framework species that the meaning of a term is the description that
describes its use most eciently. It seems obvious that, if, for a given term,
there were contradictory descriptions, all of which purportedly summar-
ise its use, then it is simply an empirical question which description is most
ecient. Thus, my framework ensures that there is always an order forced
upon rivalling meaning statements. But this might lead to a further pos-
sible objection: “most ecient” suggests that there is no perfect description,
i.e. that all existing proposals that summarise the meaning of a given term
are always mere approximations. This collides with the deep conviction
of most philosophers (and laymen) that every word type can be associated
with only one specic meaning. Referential relations are a good example
here, as the reference relation allegedly can be specied almost schematic-
ally for many terms: names refer to their bearers; indexicals refer to what
is speciable via their corresponding Kaplanian characters; natural kind
terms, let’s suppose, refer to the set of things exemplifying a particular es-
sence (DNA, molecular constellation, etc.); predicates, in general, refer to
sets of objects (e.g. “green” refers to the set of green objects); and so forth.
But we also nd this intuition in ‘usage-based’ approaches to semantics; cf.,
for example, Horwich’s often-repeated example that one’s overall tendency
to apply the term “red” is governed by the basic acceptance property to ac-
cept “This is red” in the presence of red objects. In general, many scholars
tend to think that words have one specic meaning. In this view, individual
theories of meaning are just dierent characterisations of one and the same
thing.
Before I turn to the actual counterargument to this objection, let me
very briey point out that I think that at least the impression that ordinary
meaning statements are not merely approximations but deal with the al-
leged denite meaning of a given term is reasonable. This tendency stems, I
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think, from the range of examples that are typically chosen in philosophy.
Focussing on specic examples—commonly those with quite entrenched
meanings—fosters an understanding, according to which speaking of cor-
rect meaning statements in terms of most appropriate approximations looks
absurd. Therefore, my aim in the following few paragraphs is to show that
even statements concerning the most entrenched meanings are nothing
more than (probably quite accurate) approximations.
The main thesis defended in this chapter is that distinguishing between
the constitutive factors for meaning (i.e. use) and an appropriate descrip-
tion thereof (i.e. meaning) is the most plausible way to make sense of usage-
based approaches to semantics. Use, according to that account, is the to-
tality of actual past instantiations of a word type. With the exception of
recently coined terms, this conceptually implies that the constitutive basis
of word meaning is necessarily unknown to human beings. Accordingly,
it can be shown for in fact any word that its corresponding meaning state-
ments only approximates this constitutive basis. In light of this, it makes
sense to exemplify this by discussing a word with a very stable meaning.
Now to the counterargument against the assumptions that terms really
have one meaning, i.e. one ‘correct’ semantic description. The word “and”
will again serve as an example. “And” is a logical connective; simply by
belonging to that class, its semantics is more stable than words belonging
to other classes, which is why it is particularly appropriate for making the
point at hand. If we assume that the constitutive basis of meaning is use,
the main task of a semantic theory for “and” is to state, in the most general
and ecient terms, how “and” is used in the language community of Eng-
lish. The most general, but at the same time least ecient way, would be to
list all actual “and” tokenings. A list would be inecient in two respects:
rstly, a list would ignore the apparent fact that most “and” tokenings bear
striking similarities (i.e. continuing with the list would be pointless after a
certain time). Secondly, a list would therefore fail to generalise accordingly
(i.e. it would lack the powers to account for the role “and” plays in inferen-
tial reasoning).4 Presumably, a good candidate description would be along
the following lines: “and” is used in English in a way that corresponds to
4 Still, this list plays a relevant role in determining the ‘ideal disposition’; cf. below, section
8.3.
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the use of introduction and elimination rules for “and” in algebraic logic,
i.e. that people who have a tendency to accept, in Horwich’s terminology,
“p” and “q” would have an equal tendency to also accept “p and q”, and
vice versa. Due to its central role in inferential processes, this description
is probably indeed quite accurate. Still, it only approximately describes the
use of “and”, as there are tokenings that do not accord with this rule.5 But
if this already holds for logical connectives, i.e. for terms the meaning of
which can be relatively easy agreed upon, it holds a fortiori for other terms
as well.
This argument hints at something more fundamental. At several places
throughout the book, I have emphasised that phenomena gure promin-
ently in my account in the following sense. One needs to carefully distin-
guish between, on the one hand, the phenomena that give rise to the need
for specic theories (e.g. semantics), and, on the other hand, artefacts that
result from our theorising about these phenomena (e.g. compositionality).
Impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, there is striking disagree-
ment among professionals as to what meaning actually is. The range of
existing rival theories in this area speaks for itself.
Another quite illustrative example is this: one of the most uncontrover-
sially accepted examples of a semantic relation is reference. In particular,
reference relations are of central importance in formal approaches to se-
mantics (as in those theories, the meaning of singular terms gets equated
with their referents). Emma Borg’s ‘minimalism’, which is a variant of a
formal-semantic approach, delegates questions of reference to areas out-
side of semantics (Borg 2004b, ch. 3.3). For example, in regard to the actual
referent of an indexical expression, the semantics is conned to specifying
the relevant token-reexive rule that is capable of resolving reference re-
lation only in conjunction with further information (i.e. information from
outside a Fodorian semantics module). In her view, only the ‘condition-
alised’ rules associated with indexicals are genuinely semantic (i.e. only
those rules are meanings of indexical expressions), whereas the actual ref-
erents are determined by, and hence part of, pragmatics (i.e. the semantic
values of indexicals belong to pragmatics). This shows the enormous vari-
5 For example, people sometimes tend to read causal or temporal relations into “and” con-
junctions; cf. “John married Mary, and Mary got pregnant”.
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ety of views in semantics, as the view that the referent of a given term (its
semantic value) is an integral part of a semantic theory is probably the view
most philosophers of language would subscribe to or agree with. Thus,
giving the debate a fresh start by looking at the phenomena rst looks like
a strategy that could possibly provide a solution to a discussion that often
seems to continuously go around in circles. Often, the ‘data’ with respect to
particular example cases (e.g. which proposition is expressed by utterances
of the type “It is raining”) is, to a large extent, uncontroversial between the
involved parties, i.e. they agree, for example, on the range of plausible in-
terpretations. Therefore, there seems to be no fact of the matter that could
decide the discussion in favour of either side. I contend that focussing on
the phenomena rst might be a practicable solution.
Anticipating a response that is likely to be raised at this point, let me
stress that all instances of a given word enter into its constitution base,
i.e. not just those in which the term is applied ‘correctly’. First of all, the
distinction of correct vs incorrect applications is only fully comprehensible
in light of the fact—repeatedly emphasised in the previous chapters—that
language is a means to achieve extra-linguistic ends. It is not false per se to
apply, say, “dog” to things other than dogs. It is only false in the sense that,
given our current language, it is rational in most cases to apply “dog” only
to dogs, because that helps achieving one’s aims. In simple terms, the only
reason to apply “dog” to dogs (i.e. correctly) is because that is what people
usually do. Including correct and incorrect applications into every word’s
constitution base gives just the right results for their semantics, e.g. with
respect to meaning shifts.
8.2.3 Specifying Context, Tokening, and Meaning
Constitution
For the semantic framework I put forward in this book, the notion of con-
text is specically important. The underlying reason is that I propose to
think of usage-based theories of meaning rst and foremost in terms of
tokenings or instantiations of a given word type. Focussing on tokenings—
in particular, focussing on the sum of all actual tokenings—involves spe-
cifying how tokenings are ‘counted’, if you like. That is, I need to specify
(i) the way tokens are identied as instantiations of a particular word type
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and (ii) what details of the context are relevant for counting actual instan-
tiations.
In dierent theoretical frameworks, “context” might mean very dier-
ent things. A very common locution is that of a ‘context of utterance’,
where contexts are conceived simply as possible worlds that are specied
with respect to time, place, and speaker. That is, if you like, one end of
the continuum of possible variations of the meaning of “context”. Here,
contexts consist solely of three formally speciable variables. At the other
end, contexts may involve any number of additional features. For example,
contexts might involve whatever turns out to be relevant for determining
the communicated content of an utterance, as in relevance theory (Sperber
& Wilson 1986). The theoretically most important divide between dierent
conceptions of ‘context’ concerns the question whether a particular theory
allows contexts to include (ascriptions of) the intentions of speakers and
hearers (Borg 2004b).
When it comes to my own proposal and the ‘contextually relevant’ fea-
tures, it will help to consider the above-mentioned distinction of constitu-
tion base versus semantic description rst (cf. also next section). The con-
stitution base of the meaning of a term is ‘xed’, so to speak. It is simply
use. One can’t get it wrong, as it were. Contextual factors only come into
play when semantic descriptions are taken into account, i.e. descriptions
that try to approximately summarise this use. My hunch would be that
a particularly philosophical theory of meaning should describe contextual
relevance as schematically as possible. Simply put, the relevant features
are those circumstances of a conversational context that a competent lan-
guage user would recognise as being relevant for a given word to have a
particular meaning relative to the context in question. I go a bit more into
the details in the following section.
8.3 Constitution Base
Conceiving of meaning in terms of actual word type instantiations only
makes sense within the broader context of the specic theory that I propose
here. The distinction between constitution base and semantic description,
which I already mentioned briey in section 8.2, is crucial in this regard.
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It will be worth the eort to now look in more detail at which contextual
factors are relevant in ‘counting’ tokenings. More precisely, the relevant
question is: which factors of conversational contexts are relevant in de-
termining what a given word actually means?
Traditionally, there has been a well-established tendency in the philo-
sophy of language (of whatever variant) to think of context only in terms
of the just mentioned three formally speciable features: time, place, and
speaker. Although these three features are indeed particularly relevant in
semantics, their applicability is somewhat constrained, to say the least. Ap-
parently, the focus on time, place, and speaker is inspired by the idea that
one of the central aims of semantics is to account for reference xing. This
idea is so obviously taken for granted that it is hard to cite explicit evid-
ence in its favour. Anyway, this tendency, I take it, is the reason behind the
enormous popularity of indexicals in the semantics literature. The actual
referents of indexical expressions, however, seem to be particularly hard to
determine.6
The (values of the) variables of time, place, and speaker of a given utter-
ance seem to t the bill. It goes without saying that semantic knowledge
concerning token-reexive rules that are attached to indexicals help people
in determining referents in contexts. For example, people tend to think that
a tokening of “here” refers to the place of the utterance.7 From today’s per-
spective, the discussions from the early 1970s seem far too optimistic as
regards the convictions that (i) all referential ‘facts’ are clear as soon as
the reference of indexicals is resolved and that (ii) the referents of indexic-
als are determined by specifying the relevant input to their characters. Be
that as it may; since then the classical way to think of contexts has been in
terms of the three mentioned factors.
There are alternatives to this, one of which is to leave contexts unspe-
cied. Often, people talk as if the only features of the context that are
relevant for a particular task (e.g. reference xing) are those that are (de
facto) contextually relevant.
6 This, to be sure, is only true under the assumption that the actual referents of non-
indexical expressions such as “dog” are particularly easy to determine.
7 Ignoring the fact that this oversimplies things, since ‘place of the utterance’ is notori-
ously underdetermined.
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If I say that meaning is constituted by actual tokenings, I certainly want
to include ‘more context’ into my analysis than just time, place, and speaker.
Also, I want to be more precise than just saying that contexts include
everything that is relevant (which is tantamount to saying that context
is always relevant, except when it is not). However, the reason for going
beyond time, place, and speaker is not so much that these three key fea-
tures do not uniquely determine referents. This, by itself, is a problem, but
only insofar as (actual) reference is relevant to how a given term is used.
In fact, reference xing as such is absolutely unimportant from the current
perspective. I need to include more context, though, since more features
of the context are relevant for determining how a given word is used in a
specic context than time, place, and speaker.
The fundamental distinction with which I began was between constitu-
tion basis and semantic description. Of the latter, I said that it is neces-
sarily always only an approximation of an accurate description of use. If
I now try to account for the constitution basis, this, again, is also just a
description, albeit a dierent one. Figure 8.1 illustrates the relations that
hold between linguistic descriptions and the constitution bases that justify
certain descriptions. The idea here is that there are two things that can be
described accurately at a metalevel. Firstly, the relation between consti-
tution base and meaning: particular meanings (i.e. linguistic descriptions)
approximate the use associated with a given term. The use of a term, in
turn, constitutes its meaning, which is to say that it justies exactly the
most faithful (i.e. general and ecient) descriptions. Secondly, the kinds of
entities involved can also be described very precisely. Although it is con-
ceptually impossible to know the particular (complete) constitution basis
of a term like “table”, it is possible to describe precisely the general nature
of constitution bases, e.g. in terms of full sums of actual type instantiations.
In 8.1, what is below the dotted line represents actual practice in linguist-
ics. The individual semantic descriptions produced by linguistic theories
are always inaccurate to a certain extent. These descriptions—i.e. what is
commonly called ‘the’ meaning of a term—are mere approximations of uses
associated with particular terms. In this sense, it seems fair to say that
although specic semantic descriptions lack accuracy, the corresponding
metalevel description of the kinds of entities involved and how they relate
to each other might still be quite precise.
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META
description
base meaning
accurate
description
ACTUAL ‘inaccurate’
constitutes
approximates
Figure 8.1: Relations between constitution base and linguistic description
I think that whereas what I call ‘semantic descriptions’ are always inac-
curate to a certain extent, the philosophical account of the basis that consti-
tutes meaning can be formulated very precisely. To this end, I now turn to
some very general considerations. It is a recurring theme in (usage-based)
semantics that use plays a double role. Besides determining meaning, it
‘determines’, if you like, use itself. Clearly, how I actually use “apple”—and
thereby partly determine how “apple” is actually used (by my linguistic
society)—is inuenced by how “apple” is actually used (by my linguistic
society). The fact that, for example, “apple” means what it does (is used in
the way it is de facto used) is kind of a self-preserving mechanism. The de-
facto usage of a given term is a valid reason for everyone for aligning their
usage accordingly. This, to be sure, is nothing new. But it helps showing
what is relevant when it comes to tokenings and their respective contexts.
The following explanations will be hearer-centric as opposed to speaker-
centric. The fact that use determines use is rooted in the fact that hearers
make certain assumptions about what function a given term previously had
in specic situations.
Here, “Could you please pass the salt?” will again serve as an example.
People would usually assume that sentences of this type are typically used
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to express one’s wish to get the salt passed. Moreover, people would also
assume that “salt” is used to refer to salt. It seems reasonable to suppose
that our tendency to apply “salt” to salt is rooted in the successes that
people, who want to get the salt passed, have when they try to get the
salt passed by tokening “Could you please pass the salt?” These successes—
and similar successes in other contexts that involve “salt” tokenings—are
relevant reasons for people to assume that “salt” will be used in a specic
manner on future occasions (cf. also section 6.2.2). Analogously, observing
these successes will be reason for them to use “salt” in a way that accords
with just those factors, of which they think they have been relevant to the
successes. In other words, observing “salt” utterances plus their accompa-
nying situations helps in interpreting future “salt” utterances and in produ-
cing “salt” utterances that are likely to be interpreted accordingly (all else
equal). The likelihood depends on how well the hearer is able to determ-
ine which factors were ‘responsible’ for the relative success of a given word
type tokening to serve the communication intentions at hand. For example,
whether she knew in advance that the “Could you please pass the x?” con-
struction is typically used by people in need of x and that the speaker was,
in fact, in need of salt—if, at least, that was her assumption—then the be-
haviour (salt passing) relative to which the success of the utterance gets
evaluated will be traced back to a particular property of “salt”, namely its
‘ability’ to refer to salt. In other words, what people assume about the
meaning (use) of words directly hinges on what they expect with respect
to communication intentions (and their success or failure) in situations in
which these words are applied.
Note that the relevant communication intentions need not be as specic
as in the ‘salt’ example. For instance, the communication intention that
motivates the use of “please” is relatively unspecic. Yet, people are still
able to determine reliably how “please” is used in English. Note also that
the intentions I am talking about here need not be real at all (in the real-
ist’s sense). The only claim I want to make is that the uniformity in use
in natural language must stem from the intentions people ascribe to their
interlocutors combined with what they can infer about (alleged) commu-
nication successes. For “salt” to mean what it does, it is not necessary that
people have specic intentions; but what is required is that they think oth-
ers have those intentions (e.g. to get the salt passed) and that they can ob-
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serve that these (alleged) intentions get fullled (e.g. that salt gets passed).
So neither do I assume that intentions directly aect the meaning of words,
nor that intentions are real, besides the need to ascribe intentions in order
to make sense of the (non-)verbal behaviour of others.
I said earlier that one of the most promising ways to summarise use is
by way of dispositional analysis. With the explanations above in mind, it is
now possible to describe in more detail what I mean by ‘ideal dispositions’.
What I just said about communication intentions and successes can easily
be rephrased in terms of dispositions. For a particular hearer, the best dis-
positional description that summarises their specic usage of a given term
is just this: the disposition (to apply the term in question) that emerges
from that hearer’s prior experience with instantiations of that term and
corresponding assumptions about which communication functions have
been fullled by using it.
For every particular hearer and every particular situation in which a
word was tokenened and with which that hearer is familiar, the disposition
that is ‘derivable’ from this varies enormously. But that does not undermine
my claim that the general remarks about constitutive bases might be true
simpliciter. For the constitutive basis of the meaning of a given term is
independent of the contingent set of tokenings particular language users
are acquainted with. By the same token, the ‘correct’ dispositional analysis
is also independent of particular analyses that apply to particular language
users. For the ‘ideal disposition’ is xed (relative to a given constitutive
basis); namely it is just that disposition an otherwise competent hearer
would arrive at if he were familiar with all actual tokenings of a particular
word type.8 Accordingly, the ‘correct’ dispositional analysis is whichever
analysis approximates this ideal. For instance, the analysis that people who
understand “dog” have the overall tendency to apply that term to dogs and
dog-like appearances might turn out to be the best analysis, because it best
approximates the disposition that a speaker/hearer would have who knew
all instances of “dog”.
8 Note the proviso “otherwise competent” in this regard. The dispositions particular speak-
ers acquire not only depend on their respective evidence basis but also on their cognitive
resources. For instance, in order for ‘abstraction’ (Tomasello 2003a) to get o the ground,
one needs to be able to recognise what is similar between dierent communication scen-
arios. This might be easier or harder, depending on individual resources.
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The main idea defended in this book is that the rise of construction gram-
mar in linguistics indicates the coming decline of truth-conditional se-
mantics in philosophy. My main argument is that there is converging evid-
ence in areas of empirical research that suggests that semantics should
be pursued with a usage-based underpinning. CxG comprises research
areas as diverse as language acquisition, language evolution, semantics,
conversational analysis, pragmatics, psycholinguistics, articial language
learning, and more. In philosophy, though, CxG has thus far attracted not
much attention. This is remarkable insofar as the basic theoretical com-
mitments of CxG concern core areas of philosophical theorising. Most not-
ably, the increasing importance of constructionist approaches undermines
philosophical commonplaces such as the fact that there is a strict boundary
between semantics and pragmatics; that there is a strict boundary between
semantics and syntax; that there is a clear distinction between ‘literal’ and
‘non-literal’ meaning; and that the universal applicability of the composi-
tionality principle is relatively undisputed.
In this book, I have shown that these commonplaces are brought into
question by CxG. I showed that the plausibility of formal and truth-con-
ditional approaches to semantics is severely undermined. Furthermore, I
showed that there are currently no adequate usage-based approaches avail-
able that could serve a philosophically informed basis of CxG. Lastly, I
shaped the outline of such an alternative.
Crucially, the proposed outline is nothing more, really, than an outline.
Allow me to use the allotted space of this conclusion to highlight the as-
pects of the theory that I consider most relevant and that merit being laid
down in more detail than I have been able to do in this book. There are three
points that I would like to mention here, all of which are closely linked.
Phenomena-based philosophising: A recurring theme in this book is that
in many areas there does not seem to be a ‘fact of the matter’ that could
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decide certain debates in favour of either side. For instance, after decades
of research there is no consensus as to what are appropriate denitions
of “what is said”. People keep rehashing the same examples and thought
experiments again and again without any signicant progress. The most
important point in these debates seems to be that there is no datum that
could possibly convince the respective other side. Therefore, I suggest in
the text that a viable ‘way out’ would be to rst agree on what the relevant
phenomena are. Because it is the phenomena—nothing else—that give rise
to the need for theories in the rst place. If there were no relevant phenom-
ena, there would be no theories either. This is why the phenomena should
guide one’s search for adequate theories.
Metaphysical and ‘descriptive’ semantics: One of the major topics that
I discuss repeatedly is that the—certainly not new—distinction between
the reductive programme in semantics and adequate semantic analyses
gets neglected far too often. The metaphysical project in philosophical
semantics is to account for semantic properties in terms of ‘underlying’
non-semantic properties. In this sense, use can be identied with the con-
stitutive basis of meaning. The important point in this context is that pos-
sible counterarguments to such an identication, such as holism or rapid
meaning change, refer to semantic descriptions, not to their underlying
metaphysical basis. In this sense, I argue that although the metaphysical
basis of meaning develops, in fact, continuously, there need be no corres-
ponding shift in the relevant semantic description whatsoever. This is be-
cause the adequacy of semantic descriptions might be completely unaf-
fected even by rapid ‘changes’ in its metaphysical basis.
Token-focused approach: Taken together, these two methodological con-
siderations suggest that theories of meaning in philosophy should be con-
strued on the basis of tokens. With respect to the metaphysical programme,
usage-based theories are best conceived as dealing with instantiations of
word and sentence types. This is the most integral part of my proposal
and, likewise, the one that is denitely worth being pursued further. In
semantics, instantiations are relevant rst and foremost as instantiations
of particular types. In the main text, I indicate how this requirement might
be achieved. The basic idea is that ‘solutions’ to such puzzles must be de-
signed schematically. Given that what an expression means is determined
by how it is used—which is, in its entirety, unknown—philosophical theor-
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ies of meaning must focus on explaining the development of astonishingly
similar semantic knowledge in language users. Dispositional analyses are
probably most suitable for this task, as they do not require that subjects
with similar semantic knowledge acquire this knowledge on the basis of
the same piece of evidence.
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